ECNS (China News Service)
기타
기타
China successfully launches 11th group of Qianfan polar-orbit satellites
A Long March 6 modified carrier rocket lifts off from the Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center in north China's Shanxi Province, June 4, 2026.
"MODIFIED" · 총 17건
필터 보기현재 지수
50.3
0 = 부정 우세
50 = 중립
100 = 긍정 우세
최근 7일 기준 82,501건을 분석한 결과, 뉴스 심리지수는 50.3(균형)입니다. 긍정 4,266건(5.2%)·중립 76,137건(92.3%)·부정 2,098건(2.5%)이며, 중립 비중이 뚜렷하게 높습니다. 성향 지수는 종합 14.8(중도 균형)입니다.
A Long March 6 modified carrier rocket lifts off from the Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center in north China's Shanxi Province, June 4, 2026.
The Toronto Maple Leafs have made contact with the New York Rangers about acquiring center Vincent Trocheck, driven by Max Domi's injury and a lack of proven depth at center. Toronto carries roughly $22.2 million in projected cap space, making Trocheck's $5.625 million hit workable. However, Rangers GM Chris Drury is demanding a first-round pick, an NHL-ready player, and a top prospect. Trocheck's modified no-trade clause further complicates movement. The deal is possible but far from done.
The modified Ioniq 5 will be loaded with sensors to capture data for Uber's new AV Labs division.
“My name is Ozymandias, king of kings: Look on my works, ye mighty, and despair! Nothing beside remains. Round the decay Of that colossal wreck, boundless and bare The lone and level sands stretch far away.” — Percy Bysshe Shelley, Ozymandias “I am in blood, Stepped in so far that, should I wade no more, Returning were as tedious as go o’er.” — William Shakespeare, Macbeth PROLOGUE This is and isn’t about America’s illegal war against Iran. It is primarily about hiding an empire in plain sight and now watching it unravel in plain sight. The war against Iran becomes a consequential event in tandem with other structural weaknesses, a fillip of sorts. It reminds one of the Soviet war on Afghanistan. That war, in and of itself, did not bring down the Soviet Leviathan. The process inhered in the very make-up of the Soviet Union. The war just shoved it over the precipice. But let’s get on with our purpose here. In August 2022, then-US President Joe Biden signed the CHIPS and Science Act into law. A $280 billion legislative package, it sought to revitalise domestic semiconductor manufacturing. The act was a response to a startling vulnerability: the world’s most advanced chips, essential for everything from F-35 fighter jets to surgical equipment to artificial intelligence, are overwhelmingly manufactured by a single company, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), located on an island claimed as sovereign territory by America’s primary strategic rival, China. This dependence is not an accident of geography or a supply chain anomaly. The semiconductor industry wasn’t even hobbled by Covid 19. Despite its complex and far-flung operations, the industry works smoothly. The US dependence is the logical endpoint of a decades-long corporate strategy that maximised profit by outsourcing physical production while retaining only the high-value design and marketing ends of the value chain, the so-called “Smile Curve” strategy. The undoing of the United States in the Iran war may be far more significant than its defeats in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan. It may well mark a historic milestone in the fraying of the position of the US as a global hegemon. But the seeds of this erosion of American dominance, argues Ejaz Haider, were laid long before its misadventure in Iran… The Italian economist and sociologist Giovanni Arrighi, to whom I shall return, would have been amused to see the revered smile curve — taught at prestigious business schools and which encourages firms to outsource capital-intensive manufacturing to focus solely on high-margin research and development (R&D), branding and marketing — as a classic trap of late-stage capitalism. In fact, the CHIPS Act stands as a state-level admission that this strategy, so profitable for individual corporations like Apple and NVIDIA, to name just two, has become a major geopolitical vulnerability for the US. This is the central paradox of America’s declining empire. The very mechanisms that generated unprecedented wealth have systemically dismantled the material and industrial foundations upon which that wealth ultimately rests. The decline of the American empire is not a partisan talking point. The US is a behemoth. It won’t just collapse one day like the Berlin Wall. Nor is a snapshot view the way to go. It is an ongoing structural process and a number of scholars have used longitudinal designs to analyse the trend lines. I argue that it is a slow, systemic unravelling across interconnected domains. First, the financialisation of capital, theorised most rigorously by Arrighi. Capital shifts from productive investment to speculative finance, generating short-term profits at the cost of long-term industrial vitality. It hollows out domestic industrial and political power, a process identified by American sociologist and political scientist Ho-fung Hung, who argues that off-shoring of production destroys the industrial ecosystem, skilled labour base and, ultimately, the social cohesion required for great power competition. Second, the erosion of the alliance system. And no, it’s not just Trump. Three deeper currents are involved: the gradual unravelling of the post-WWII security architecture; the economic failure of neoliberalism; and the imperial outreach baked into the very idea of neoliberalism. Third, the lateral diffusion of technologies, now commodified and everywhere. They help innovative and determined weaker powers offset the asymmetric advantage of bigger powers: Ukraine versus Russia; Hamas/Hezbollah/Houthis versus the US-Zionist duo; and now Iran versus the US-Zionist duo. As I note later in this space, the war against Iran is a much bigger setback for the US than its wars in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq. Corollary: the post-WWII ‘Pax Americana’ is transitioning from a period of hegemonic stability, to use American historian Charles Kindleberger’s concept, into a protracted and likely irreversible, terminal crisis, to borrow Arrighi’s term. But let’s first begin with the peg: the war against Iran. THE PRESENT Since its inception, America has been at war: wars of choice, wars of conquest, wars for resources, wars to defend its hegemony, wars to spread “American values.” How or why does the Iran war stand out? Foremost, the conflict has confirmed the structural limits of US coercive diplomacy in a shifting multipolar world. It has exposed acute structural vulnerabilities in defence economics and inventory endurance, as well as a critical absence of pragmatic post-war planning and a misreading of societal resilience. The conflict has also underscored the changing nature of global alignments in a multipolar world. This comes with the collapse of coercive economic power. For four decades, the US has relied on sophisticated sanctions and lawfare to pressure Iran into subjugation. It has failed, showing the limits of sanctions, especially on fungible commodities. Even sanctions on non-fungible elements like technology can be circumvented. As in Iran’s case, the sanctioned state can develop indigenous expertise through varied strategies. There’s clear evidence that Tehran has developed complex and sophisticated non-dollar lifelines with China and Russia, rendering unilateral sanctions increasingly ineffective. It has used an array of strategies to blunt the effect: interchangeability (can’t sell to X; sell to Y); value retention (barter, use of cryptocurrencies); substitution and evasion (relying on third parties, covert ship-to-ship transfers, use of shell companies). Unlike the insurgencies in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, the US is not involved in ground combat in Iran (so far). It has relied on high-tech aerial and missile attacks through its formidable ISTAR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance) capabilities. Iran has not responded through elusive, hit-and-run ground attacks. It has countered US technology through technology in a non-contact war. But its employment of technology is grounded in asymmetric capabilities: a large arsenal of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and one-way attack drones. The cost-exchange ratio, by most accounts, is unfavourable for the US. For instance, the Iranian Shahed-136 one-way attack drone has an estimated unit cost of $20,000 (some estimates put it at around $10,000). It is a simple, slow-moving, and relatively easy to detect drone. But it is also cheap and plentiful. To intercept it with costly SM-2 or ESSM missiles creates a cost-exchange ratio of between 30 to one and 100 to one. It is also a shoot-and-scoot system. Iran can afford to lose hundreds of such drones and produce some 1,000 per month. The US cannot afford to fire thousands of interceptors at them. And those interceptors take three to four years to manufacture. It is a cost-asymmetric war. Similarly, the US has been pulling out assets from the Pacific to the Gulf. The USS Boxer amphibious group is an example. Diverting naval assets from the Pacific physically manifests deployment overstretch. As Robert Farley, visiting professor at US Army War College notes, resources needed to prevail in one theatre guarantee weakness in another. It’s the same with all force deployments and employments: “Every missile allocated to one target is unavailable for another.” The contrast with Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan is instructive. In those theatres, the US was defeated by determined insurgencies, even as it bombed and bombed. The adversaries were willing to absorb enormous casualties, drag it out and inflict mission fatigue on the US. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, broadly speaking, the US won the conventional war expeditiously but then got bogged down. In the Iran conflict, while Tehran has demonstrated the ability to absorb much pain, the US is not facing elusive insurgents but a state with a sophisticated missile programme, a sharp understanding of force employment, a network of allies across the region (Hezbollah in Lebanon, Ansar Allah in Yemen, and Hashd al-Shaabi in Iraq and Syria), and the ability to close the Strait of Hormuz, through which 20 percent of the world’s oil passes. Iran has also demonstrated adaptation under fire, used the operational strategy of dispersal and delegation, exercised deception, demonstrated growing targeting capabilities through ISR, rapid repair of underground sites after US-Zionist bombing and consistently shifted locations for counterattack operations. Can the US still bomb Iran? Of course. Will that be painful? Yes. Will Iran respond? Hell, yes. Would that raise the overall cost? You can bet your dime on it. It will be proof, yet again, that it is a slow grind and the US cannot achieve its objectives at a sustainable cost. Yet, it is stuck, because to walk away means it loses credibility. Trump needs a win; Iran is not prepared to give him that. The war has changed the ground realities. There is no status quo ante. The objectives remain strategically incompatible — ie we might get a pause, even a long one, but the essential causes remain unaddressed. Spoiler alert: Zionist entity. US President Donald Trump attending the return of the bodies of the first six American soldiers killed during the war with Iran on March 7, 2026: the lateral diffusion of technologies help innovative and determined weaker powers, such as Iran, offset the asymmetric advantage of bigger powers, such as the US | AFP THE POINTILLIST EMPIRE: HOW IT BEGAN American imperialism did not begin with grand pronouncements like the Monroe Doctrine or the Big Stick diplomacy of Theodore Roosevelt, though they give us a potent sense of a rising, expansionist power. It literally began with bird poop, which sounds about right if one were to understand imperialism as a crap enterprise. The Guano Islands Act of 1856 allowed US citizens to claim uninhabited, guano-rich islands. The act set a precedent for later overseas acquisitions. Historian Daniel Immerwahr calls this a “pointillist” empire. This practical, resource-driven, and often hidden expansion set a pattern that would define America’s power and military bases for the next century. The Mexican-American War (1846-1848) established the continental empire, seizing vast territories from Mexico. This wasn’t a war of liberation but a war of conquest, not manifest destiny but a fig leaf to cover the musty crotch of violent expansion, economic greed and racial supremacy. The 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo formalised the seizure of over half of Mexico’s territory. The Spanish-American War of 1898 definitively projected American power overseas. Theodore Roosevelt’s Secretary of State John Hay, in a personal letter to Roosevelt, called it a “splendid little war.” By its end, the US had seized Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam and the Philippines. But the “splendid” label concealed a brutal reality, just like the payload of Trump’s “gorgeous B-2 bombers.” The subsequent Philippine-American War (1899-1902) resulted in Filipino genocide. That savagery has been systematically erased from American popular memory, even as Mark Twain was scathing in his condemnation and also did a fantastic job of calling out Rudyard Kipling for The White Man’s Burden. But this wasn’t all. Immerwahr documents that American forces employed waterboarding (yes, much before the darned ‘War on Terror’), concentration camps (“black sites”), and scorched-earth tactics that would be recognisable to any student of colonial atrocities. After World War I, US President Woodrow Wilson attempted a new form of imperialism: liberal internationalism, rather than direct territorial control. Much has been written about the “Wilsonian moment.” British historian and diplomat E. H. Carr called it a utopian project, divorced from the reality of power politics. In fact, it wasn’t. The project was essentially colonial and Wilson’s liberal internationalism fit it perfectly. The mandates were thriving. The US Senate’s refusal to join the League of Nations left a vacuum that no amount of idealistic pronouncements could fill. War did come. Carr gives us insights into why it became inevitable. The US emerged from the war as the leading power. The post-WWII order was a direct lesson learned from the intervening two decades. No more “isolationism”. The US must play the role of the hegemonic stabiliser. The core argument was simple and powerful: a stable world economy requires a single power to act as lender of last resort, maintain an open market for distressed goods, and coordinate macroeconomic policies. The US did that via the Bretton Woods system, the Marshall Plan and a vast security architecture that spanned the globe. The quid for the quo? American dominance. The US was now fully involved. It bore the cost but the return on investment was handsome. It kept the US in the lead, even during the bipolarity of the Cold War and beyond. With the Berlin wall crumbling, American political scientist Francis Fukuyama became the mascot for neoliberalism. History had ended; all the wagon trains were destined for one town. Some might arrive late, but arrive they would. Europe was pacified and rebuilt. Japan was demilitarised and transformed into a manufacturing powerhouse. The dollar became the world’s reserve currency, giving the US what French President Valery Giscard d’Estaing called “exorbitant privilege.” For three decades, from 1945 to the early 1970s, this system appeared to confirm the virtues of hegemonic stability. Real GDP growth in Western Europe averaged nearly five percent annually, and the US share of world manufacturing output remained above 40 percent. But beneath the surface, the seeds of decline were already being sown. ARRIGHIAN COUNTER World-systems theorists like Immanuel Wallerstein and Giovanni Arrighi were not focused on immediate “imperial overstretch” in the manner of British historian Paul Kennedy. Kennedy argued that empires declined when their military commitments outpaced their economic base. The US, he warned, was suffering from imperial overreach. For Arrighi, the decline was gradual and subtle. He argued that capitalist hegemonies move through repeating “systemic cycles of accumulation.” A phase of material expansion where capital is invested in production, infrastructure and trade, inevitably gives way to a phase of financial expansion, where capital seeks profit through speculation, lending and financial engineering. The material foundation is hollowed out even as the financial superstructure appears to boom. This was the logic of capitalism. The “autumn” of each hegemon is marked by a dazzling financial belle époque that masks terminal decline. The smile curve strategy is the purest expression of this financialisation and Apple is a textbook case. It designs its products, develops its chips, creates the operating systems, controls the branding, marketing and the retail experience. But it manufactures almost nothing. The iPhones and MacBooks are assembled by Foxconn in Zhengzhou and by Pegatron in Shanghai. The advanced chips are fabricated by TSMC in Taiwan. The displays come from Samsung in South Korea and LG Display. Apple captures an estimated 80-90 percent of the profit from each device, while the suppliers who do the actual physical work fight over the remaining scraps. Business schools love this strategy because it maximises corporate profits and shareholder value. But as Hung argues in his work on global value chains and the Arrighian counter, what maximises corporate profits does not necessarily maximise national power. In fact, it may systematically undermine it. By outsourcing the middle of the smile curve, the US has drastically hollowed out its industrial ecosystem. Combine it with the faith in short, sharp wars of shock and awe through high-tech precision weapons and we get the full picture of what has happened in the war against Iran. This is very different from the WWII industrial base of America. This brings us to TSMC and the chokepoint crisis. It manufactures chips designed by other companies (Nvidia, AMD, Qualcomm) rather than designing and selling its own chips. Over three decades, TSMC has built an unassailable lead in advanced process nodes. By 2025, it was manufacturing 92 percent of the world’s most advanced chips. The entire global technology industry (including the US military and intelligence apparatus) became dependent on a single cluster of fabs (fabrication plants) in Hsinchu, Taichung and Tainan. China, which views Taiwan as a breakaway province to be reunited with the mainland by force if necessary, has the physical means to blockade or invade the island. Whether it would do so or should is a different debate. On ground, the People’s Liberation Army has been systematically building anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, to prevent US intervention in a Taiwan scenario. It’s a fairly absurd position from the US point of view! Its technological supremacy is guaranteed by a factory complex on an island which, in theory, its primary strategic rival could potentially seize or blockade. To circle back to the CHIPS Act, this is the background. TSMC is now building a fab complex in Arizona. Intel is expanding in Ohio and Arizona. Samsung is building in Texas. But, as a 2023 Marketplace report noted, replicating TSMC’s “deep, deep process knowledge” will take years. The fab in Arizona has already faced delays, cost overruns, and labour disputes. Taiwanese engineers are reluctant to relocate to the United States. The set goes to Arrighi. America’s weaponisation of the dollar has accelerated efforts by China, Russia and other BRICS members to create alternatives | Shutterstock THE DOLLAR DILEMMA The dollar’s role as the world’s primary reserve currency has been a central pillar of American power since the Bretton Woods agreement of 1944. This exorbitant privilege allows the US to borrow in its own currency, run persistent trade deficits without penalty and, crucially, impose unilateral financial sanctions on states, corporations, and individuals. This weaponisation of the dollar has accelerated efforts by China, Russia and other BRICS members to create alternatives. China has been aggressively promoting its own Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) as an alternative to Swift. The People’s Bank of China has signed bilateral currency swap agreements with dozens of countries, allowing trade to be settled in renminbi rather than dollars. Russia has demanded payment in rubles for its natural gas exports. India has established a rupee settlement mechanism for trade. Brazil and China have agreed to trade in their own currencies. The Central Bank of Brazil has announced that it is diversifying its reserves away from the dollar. And yet, the actual pace of de-dollarisation has been glacial. Several structural factors explain this “stickiness”, to use American political economist Benjamin Cohen’s term. First, there is network stickiness. The dollar’s dominance is not simply a matter of policy; it is an issue of deep, self-reinforcing infrastructure. Global supply chains, commodity exchanges, derivatives markets, and correspondent banking networks are all built around the dollar. Second, as various experts have argued, there is a lack of viable alternatives. The Chinese renminbi, despite China’s enormous economic weight, is not a free-floating, fully convertible currency. China maintains capital controls, a heavily regulated financial system, and a non-independent central bank. No foreign investor can be certain that their renminbi holdings would not be frozen or devalued by arbitrary state action. The euro, the second-largest reserve currency, is hobbled by the Eurozone’s fragmented fiscal system and the lingering scars of the 2011 debt crisis. Gold is impractical for everyday transactions. And cryptocurrencies are far too volatile and illiquid to serve as a reserve asset. Third is the absence of a deep, liquid and open bond market. A reserve currency requires a “safe asset” in which foreign central banks can park their surplus reserves. The US Treasury market, with $25 trillion in outstanding debt and extraordinary liquidity, is the only game in town. Result: while China and Russia publicly call for de-dollarisation, their central banks have themselves continued to accumulate US Treasury securities, because there is nowhere else to go. Corollary: the near-term prognosis for de-dollarisation is not collapse but slow erosion. IMF data shows the dollar’s share of global reserves has declined from over 70 percent in 2000 to approximately 58 percent in 2025. This is not a precipitous decline, but it is a steady one. The debate is not if the dollar will lose its dominance but when. I have no expertise in this area and I have relied on studying existing expertise. Most analyses measure the timeframe in decades, not years. From that, my understanding is that increasing uncertainty, further weaponisation of the dollar, continuing application of sanctions and asset freezes will (a) erode the confidence that underpins the entire system and (b) force experts (and governments) to find alternatives. EPILOGUE: TERMINAL CRISIS Two other issues are important but I am only flagging them here for paucity of space: the implosion of neoliberalism and its internal effects and the fraying of the transatlantic alliance. Both are exacerbated by Trump but neither is a direct result of his election. Both are extremely consequential. The United States has not collapsed; not yet. Nor can it be defeated from outside. But it can crumble from within. The future is not about a return to US hegemony, certainly not in a unipolar sense. The industrial base may be gone but it can be rebuilt, albeit not overnight. Alliances are frayed; trust cannot be easily restored. The fiscal position is precarious, with a $35 trillion US national debt. Internal politics is deeply polarised, with a significant portion of the American electorate believing that the system is rigged against them. A lot of these factors, singly and in combination with other factors, are self-reinforcing. The future also lies in terra incognita, a contested transition to a multipolar world, whose contours remain unknown. A recent book by German political analyst Marc Saxer, Geopolitical Conflict in the Wolf World, is a sobering structural assessment of where the world and the US are headed. “Homo homini lupus est” (Man is a wolf to man) is how Saxer begins. With that statement, we are back to Plautus and Hobbes. This is not mere rhetorical flourish. Saxer’s wolf world is an analytic category, a systemic condition characterised by the absence of a hegemon capable of enforcing rules, the demise of neoliberalism, the collapse of shared legal-normative frameworks, the return of great-power competition, the rise of Middle Powers, many with regional hegemonic aspirations, and the normalisation of coercion as a primary instrument of statecraft. As I said to Saxer during the launch of his book in Lahore, for the Global South, it has always been a wolf world. Pax Americana did not keep the peace for the periphery. It financed selective peace on credit. The bill has now come due. The writer is a journalist interested in security and foreign policies. X: @ejazhaider Published in Dawn, EOS, May 31st, 2026
Direct-to-cell technology uses LEO satellites as spaceborne cell towers. It delivers LTE services to existing smartphones without hardware changes, bridging global coverage gaps. What Attendees will Learn How DTC works as a spaceborne cell tower — LEO satellites carry LTE eNodeB payloads in regenerative mode. How they serve unmodified phones using quasi-earth-fixed multi-beam antennas. How the satellite compensates for Doppler shift and time delay on thenetwork side. Why Doppler shift and round-trip time are critical challenges — A LEO satellite’s high velocity causes carrier frequency offsets in OFDMA systems. Pre-compensation at a reference point helps, but cell-edge users still face residual Doppler. How spectrum sharing and regulation shape DTC deployment — DTC has no dedicated spectrum allocation. It relies on spectrum sharing between terrestrial and satellite operators or re-farmed MSS bands. How national regulations like the FCC SCS framework govern access. Where DTC fits in the evolution toward 5G NTN and 6G — DTC is an interim technology offering fast time-to-market satellite services. It bridges the gap until 3GPP NR-NTN matures. How NR-NTN will bring purpose-built NTN features and international spectrum frameworks. Download this free whitepaper now!
The National Stock Exchange (NSE) has announced a significant change to trading hours in the equity derivatives segment with the introduction of the Closing Auction Session (CAS) framework.Starting August 3, 2026, the normal market closing time for equity derivatives will be extended by 10 minutes to 3:40 pm from the current 3:30 pm. While the extension is noteworthy, the bigger change lies in how closing prices for eligible securities will be determined.The move aims to ensure a smoother transition between the cash and derivatives markets at the end of the trading day while maintaining consistency in the pricing framework across segments.What is the closing auction session?The CAS is a structured trading window held at the end of the trading day. During this period, market participants place buy and sell orders to determine a single closing price for a security through an auction-based mechanism.Unlike the current system where prices evolve through normal trading until market close, the auction process discovers a fair closing price based on orders entered during the designated session.According to the exchange, CAS will initially apply only to securities in the cash segment that have derivative contracts available. The framework will roll out in phases, and any future expansion will be subject to SEBI guidance and separate operational instructions from the exchange.Why are derivatives trading hours being extended?Although CAS applies only to the equity segment, NSE decided to extend trading hours in the derivatives segment to ensure both markets remain aligned during the closing process.The exchange also clarified that the price bands and pre-trade risk control measures introduced as part of CAS in the cash market will be mirrored in the derivatives segment. This is intended to maintain consistency between the two segments during the closing phase of trading.How will the closing auction session work?The CAS will run for 20 minutes, from 3:15 pm to 3:35 pm. The process will begin with a transition phase between 3:15 pm and 3:20 pm, during which the reference price will be calculated using the volume-weighted average price (VWAP) of trades executed between 3:00 pm and 3:15 pm.Between 3:20 pm and 3:25 pm, participants will be able to enter both market and limit orders. From 3:25 pm to 3:30 pm, only limit orders will be permitted. During this period, market orders cannot be modified or cancelled.The order entry session will close randomly at any point between 3:28 pm and 3:30 pm, after which the auction process will determine the final closing price.How will closing prices be calculated?One key point highlighted by NSE is that there will be no change in the methodology used to calculate closing prices of derivative contracts. The volume-weighted average price (VWAP) used for derivatives closing price calculation will continue to be based on trades executed during the final 30 minutes of trading. However, because market hours are being extended, that 30-minute window will now shift to 3:10 pm-3:40 pm instead of the current 3:00 pm-3:30 pm.For securities eligible for CAS, the closing price in the cash segment will be determined through the auction process.Ashish Nanda, President and Digital Business Head at Kotak Securities summed up the shift by noting that the market is moving from a "continuous trading close" to an "auction discovered close".Under the current framework, closing prices are derived from the VWAP of trades executed between 3:00 pm and 3:30 pm. Under the new framework, closing prices for F&O-eligible stocks will effectively be linked to a 20-minute auction process running from 3:15 pm to 3:35 pm.What happens if a stock is removed from F&O?NSE clarified that eligibility for CAS is linked to the presence of derivatives on the stock. If a security is excluded from the equity derivatives segment on both exchanges, it will no longer be eligible for the CAS.In such cases, the closing price will revert to the existing methodology and be determined using the VWAP of trades executed during the last 30 minutes of trading. However, if the security continues to be part of the derivatives segment on at least one exchange, it will remain eligible for CAS.What happens to pending orders?The exchange outlined operational changes relating to order management. All unexecuted special orders, including stop-loss orders and disclosed quantity orders, will be cancelled. Pending orders that fall outside the revised price band will also be cancelled automatically, and members will receive appropriate cancellation notifications.Why does this matter for traders?For many market participants, the biggest implication is that the final closing price may no longer mirror the last traded price visible on trading screens at 3:30 pm.According to Ashish Nanda, this could require adjustments to trading strategies, particularly for option writers and arbitrageurs who rely heavily on closing prices for valuation, settlement and hedging decisions.While the derivatives market will remain open until 3:40 pm, the broader shift is not simply about extending trading by 10 minutes. It marks a change in how closing prices for eligible securities are discovered, with the exchange moving toward an auction-based mechanism designed to determine a single closing price at the end of the trading day.What happens to existing market timings?Apart from the revised closing time, most trading schedules remain unchanged. The pre-open session in the derivatives segment will continue to begin at 9:00 am and the normal trading session will continue to start at 9:15 am. Similarly, the trade modification window will remain unchanged and continue until 4:15 pm.(Disclaimer: Recommendations, suggestions, views and opinions given by the experts are their own. These do not represent the views of The Economic Times)
WASHINGTON: A provision tucked into the US House of Representatives’ version of the National Defence Authorisation Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 2027 could significantly deepen military cooperation between the United States and Israel, potentially creating Washington’s closest defence partnership with any foreign country. The NDAA is the annual legislation through which Congress authorises defence spending and sets policy priorities for the Pentagon. Before becoming law, the bill must be approved by both the House of Representatives and the Senate, and then signed by the president. At the centre of the current debate is Section 224, titled the “United States–Israel Defence Technology Cooperation Initiative,” which requires the US Secretary of Defence to “designate an executive agent responsible for synchronising cooperative efforts between the United States and Israel, including bilateral defence technology research, development, testing, evaluation, integration, and industrial cooperation.” It outlines expanded collaboration in areas such as artificial intelligence, cyber warfare, autonomous systems, quantum technologies, and advanced weapons development. The provision also refers to potential “network integration” and “data fusion,” raising concerns among some analysts about the extent of operational interoperability between the two countries’ defence establishments. Critics of closer cooperation argue that the proposed framework goes significantly further than existing arrangements — shifting cooperation from traditional aid mechanisms toward integrated research and co-production. They warn that the proposed changes in procurement structures could reduce public transparency and congressional oversight. Under the current aid model, military assistance is typically approved through visible annual budgetary processes, whereas industrial and procurement partnerships operate through more complex contracting channels within the defence establishment. These concerns come amid broader and evolving debates within US politics over the scale and nature of American support for Israel. While bipartisan backing for the US–Israel security relationship has historically been strong, recent years have seen more public questioning from lawmakers across the political spectrum regarding alignment between US foreign policy interests and Israeli military actions. For example, Senator Chris Van Hollen, a Maryland Democrat, has argued publicly that unconditional support for Israeli governments may conflict with broader US strategic and humanitarian interests. “The Democratic Party has provided reflexive and unconditional support to Israeli governments, even as their actions have increasingly undermined American interests and values,” he wrote in The New York Times on Tuesday. On the Republican side, Representative Thomas Massie and former Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene have both criticised the influence of pro-Israel lobbying groups — positions that some analysts and commentators suggest may have affected their standing within the party. “Why is America having to give Israel $3.8 billion?” Greene asked, noting: “We’re $37 trillion in debt; Israel is less than $400 billion in debt.” Whether Section 224 survives in its current form remains uncertain. Defence authorisation bills in Congress often undergo significant revision during negotiations between the House and Senate, and controversial or far-reaching provisions are frequently modified, narrowed, or removed before final passage. Published in Dawn, June 1st, 2026
Suzlon Energy plans to challenge a recent Sebi order that imposed penalties of nearly Rs 29 crore on the company and several former executives over alleged accounting and disclosure violations. In an exchange filing, Suzlon said it intends to file an appeal before the Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT) against the regulator's order dated May 29."The findings of Sebi in the said order are related to the financial statements of the company from FY14 to FY18. The company will be filing an appeal before the Securities Appellate Tribunal in respect of the Sebi order," the company said.The development comes a day after Sebi imposed penalties on Suzlon and a number of former senior executives following a long-running investigation into the company's historical financial reporting practices.The market regulator levied a penalty of Rs 15.95 crore on Suzlon, while former executive Vinod R Tanti was fined Rs 5.75 crore and Girish R. Tanti was penalised Rs 5.45 crore. Former group CFO Kirti J. Vagadia was fined Rs 1.5 crore, while former CFO Amit Agarwal was directed to pay Rs 30 lakh.Sebi action followed a forensic audit and investigation covering multiple financial years after the regulator received a complaint alleging irregularities in dealings involving subsidiaries and associate entities.The regulator concluded that certain transactions between Suzlon and its subsidiaries had the effect of overstating profits and strengthening the appearance of the company's financial position.Among the issues examined were transfers of businesses and investments among group entities, accounting treatment of contingent liabilities, impairment reversals and disclosures made in financial statements.According to Sebi, some transactions involving subsidiaries resulted in substantial accounting gains being recorded without reflecting the underlying economic reality of the arrangements. The regulator also questioned the treatment of certain liabilities and fund flows between group entities, concluding that the company's disclosures did not present a true and fair picture of its financial position during the period under review.Sebi said accurate financial statements are critical because investors rely on them while assessing the health and prospects of listed companies. The regulator held that the violations warranted monetary penalties under provisions relating to disclosure norms, listing regulations and fraudulent and unfair trade practices.Suzlon, however, has now moved to contest the findings before the appellate tribunal.The company has undergone a significant turnaround over the past few years after overcoming a prolonged debt crisis and has emerged as one of the biggest beneficiaries of India's renewable energy push. It recently reported strong operational performance and remains one of the country's largest wind energy equipment manufacturers.The appeal before the SAT will determine whether the regulator's findings and penalties are upheld, modified or set aside. Until then, the Sebi order remains in force.(Disclaimer: Recommendations, suggestions, views, and opinions given by experts are their own. These do not represent the views of the Economic Times.)
KUALA LUMPUR, May 29 — Light Rail Transit (LRT) stations along the Ampang/Sri Petaling Line continued to operate t...
The modified Shaheds comes as Ukrainian interceptor drones are logging a growing number of drone kills.
The 28 lawmakers who currently support the bill argue that the constitution needs to be modified to protect Mexico's electoral processes from interference by and/or from foreign countries, including the United States. The post New Morena-backed bill seeks to nullify elections in cases of foreign interference appeared first on Mexico News Daily
Penises, vaginas and breasts abound in the Indian painter’s work. As the son of a Hindu priest, he says his orgasmic scenes give us a way to consider religion T Venkanna’s paintings land like a sucker-punch. At the centre of his first institutional solo show is an overbearing altarpiece, modified by two squat side panels to take the overall shape of a juvenile dick drawing. Perched at the bottom, on either side, are Adam and Eve. Their backs are turned as they look out on an orgasmic thicket of desire. A female figure is pleasured by another’s nose, someone copulates with the hindquarters of an animal and others fondle in a kaleidoscopic blur of colours and styles that make Hieronymus Bosch look restrained. But carnal enjoyment is merely the footnote. “It is a way to consider many things, including the myth of religions,” says Venkanna. Scattered within this longing landscape are stony figures redolent of India’s pantheon of gods and goddesses. Women worship a topiary lingam – the aniconic depiction of Shiva – and a man caresses a statuesque woman’s breast (while drinking from her vagina). Graphic? “That is what you see in ancient temples,” says Venkanna. “People touch the breasts of sculptures so that over time they become very smooth and shiny.” Continue reading...
Qantas' ambitious ultra-long-haul project will be postponed yet again because of delays with the specially modified Airbus A350-1000 aircraft.
SpaceX’s Starship spacecraft splashed down into the Indian Ocean on Friday after the company performed a mostly successful test flight of the latest version of its enormous rocket. The voyage was not without a few glitches, but SpaceX employees shown on a livestream roared in delight following the trial flight that comes as the firm owned by Elon Musk prepares a potentially record initial public offering. The mammoth rocket blasted off into space at just after 5:30pm local time (2230 GMT). The company did not intend to recover the booster or the upper stage, and the final splashdown was fiery but controlled, as planned. “Splashdown confirmed!” the company wrote on X. SpaceX primarily aimed to demonstrate its redesigns in flight. The third-generation Starship spacecraft carried out a maneuver that saw it flip upright and reignite its engines for control, despite one being out of commission. It also deployed its 22 mock satellites, including two that attempted to photograph the spacecraft’s heat shield for analysis. The vehicle had coasted through space but was not in exactly the correct orbit after one of its engines malfunctioned during an initial burn. “I wouldn’t call it nominal orbital insertion,” company spokesperson Dan Huot said, adding however, that it was “within bounds” of a previously analyzed trajectory. After the Super Heavy booster separated from the upper stage as expected, Huot said on the livestream that the booster failed to complete its so-called boost-back burn. The booster fell swiftly back to Earth, uncontrolled, into the Gulf of Mexico. SpaceX wasn’t planning to retrieve the booster anyway, but was still hoping for a precision return. Musk applauded his team on X, calling the flight “epic”. “You scored a goal for humanity,” he said. ‘Long way to go’ Friday’s flight followed an aborted trial one day prior. The countdown clock stopped and started until it was determined that the last-minute red flags could not be addressed in time. Musk quickly posted on X that “the hydraulic pin holding the tower arm in place did not retract”. SpaceX said that issue was corrected overnight. The company is facing extra scrutiny after SpaceX filed earlier this week with US financial regulators to go public, likely in June, in what is expected to become a record IPO. Friday marks Starship’s 12th flight overall, but the first in seven months. The latest design is bigger than its predecessor, standing at just over 407 feet (124 metres) when fully stacked. There’s a lot riding on SpaceX’s progress: the company is under contract with Nasa to produce a modified version of Starship to serve as a lunar landing system. The US space agency’s Artemis programme aims to return humans to the Moon, as China forges ahead with a rival effort that’s targeting 2030 for its first crewed mission. Clayton Swope, an aerospace expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, told AFP that “the upgraded version of Starship did most of what SpaceX hoped it would do during the launch”. But he noted that significant time had lapsed since the last test flight. Nasa is aiming in 2027 to test an in-orbit rendezvous between its spacecraft and at least one lunar lander, which both SpaceX and rival Blue Origin — the Jeff Bezos-owned firm — are racing to develop. That Artemis phase is meant as a step towards carrying out a crewed lunar landing before the end of 2028, and before the end of Donald Trump’s presidency. But for Swope, “there is a long way to go and many more test flights before Starship is ready for the next Artemis mission”. Ahead of Friday’s test, Nasa Administrator Jared Isaacman appeared during the pre-launch SpaceX programme and said: “We’re looking forward to seeing this fly, because hopefully at some point in the not-too-distant future we’re going to join up in Earth orbit.” Following the test, Isaacman posted praise on X, congratulating SpaceX on “a hell of a V3 Starship launch”. “One step closer to the Moon … one step closer to Mars,” the Nasa official said.
Born out of the American tech sector, Preventive and Origin Genomics aim to advance the modification of embryo genomes. This highly controversial and largely banned technique has raised fears of a resurgence of a form of eugenics.
According to Andrey Chukavin, as part of the rifle’s modernization, the gas system has been slightly modified to make disassembly more convenient, and the stock has been improved to eliminate any looseness
The widespread modification of electric bikes is turning public roads into racetracks for many young people in Vietnam.