Nikkei Asia
중도 성향
기타
"TAILORED" · 총 27건
필터 보기현재 지수
50.3
0 = 부정 우세
50 = 중립
100 = 긍정 우세
최근 7일 기준 81,436건을 분석한 결과, 뉴스 심리지수는 50.2(균형)입니다. 긍정 3,988건(4.9%)·중립 75,523건(92.7%)·부정 1,925건(2.4%)이며, 중립 비중이 뚜렷하게 높습니다. 성향 지수는 종합 14.7(중도 균형)입니다.
Chinese electric motorcycle maker Yadea has entered Kenya after selling over 48,000 units in Ethiopia, unveiling a new electric bike tailored for the boda boda.
Through tailored incentives for high-loyalty demographics, Dish doubles down on its ethos of "TV built for the heartland."
Some have rolled out merchandise tailored to the 2026 World Cup, which is set to kick off on June 11.
New Delhi: Beverages major PepsiCo on Tuesday announced the launch of its premium energy drinks brand 'Adrenaline Rush' in the Indian market, strengthening its presence in the category, which has seen strong growth in recent years.Pepsico, a leading player in the energy drinks with its brand Sting, now enters the mass-premium segment with 'Adrenaline Rush', creating a portfolio that spans from Rs 20 to Rs 60 price points. Adrenaline Rush is priced at Rs 60, while Sting costs Rs 20."With two variants under Sting and two variants under its premium offering, PepsiCo is broadening consumer choice while addressing a wider range of taste preferences and consumption occasions," the company said in a statement.With its two brands -- Sting and Adrenaline Rush -- PepsiCo's energy drinks portfolio will cater to a broad spectrum of consumers, seeking value propositions to those looking for a more premium, performance-led experience.Also Read: PepsiCo new packaging to carry 'No Artificial Flavours or Colours' labelCommenting on the development, PepsiCo India and South Asia, Vice President and General Manager -- Beverages, Nitin Bhandari said, "The energy drinks category in India continues to see strong growth, and we believe there is significant headroom for further expansion as consumers increasingly seek products that cater to different occasions, functional needs and aspirations."With Adrenaline Rush, PepsiCo is strengthening its energy drinks portfolio with a globally aspirational brand tailored for Gen-Z consumers, offering two differentiated variants -- Passion Rush and Classic Rush -- in a sleek premium can format to cater to the evolving preferences of today's youth.For Adrenaline Rush, PepsiCo has launched a high-energy campaign film centred on the proposition "A-Rush, A-Game On," adopting a digital-first and culture-forward approach.Also Read: PepsiCo to invest Rs 5,700 crore in India by 2030This is aimed at resonating with Gen-Z consumers through creator-led storytelling, internet culture, and social media conversations.As per a Mordor Intelligence report, the India energy drinks market size is valued at USD 0.82 billion in 2026 and is growing at a CAGR of roughly 2-6 per cent, helped by factors such as rising disposable incomes, rapid urbanisation, and an increasing need for quick-energy solutions among young working professionals.
Local self-government institutions have been strictly instructed to formulate and execute scientifically planned projects tailored to counter potential disaster scenarios
Countries: Honduras, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Haiti, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) Source: UN High Commissioner for Refugees Please refer to the attached file. Operational Context & Analysis Honduras faces a multifaceted crisis stemming from a context of fragile law and order, pervasive organized crime, gang violence, widespread poverty and inequality, and high vulnerability to the impacts of extreme climate events. With one of the world’s highest murder rates1, violence in Honduras is generalized, chronic, structural, and indiscriminate, making it a primary driver of displacement. Access to protection and assistance remains a significant challenge, particularly for those facing heightened risks due to their vulnerability. Certain groups are disproportionately affected, including children, women, indigenous people, people of diverse sexual orientation, political activists, schoolteachers, transportation workers, and human rights and environmental defenders. These populations often require urgent and tailored protection responses and alternatives to address their specific needs effectively. More than 247,000 people have been internally displaced in Honduras, with many more at risk of displacement. Internal displacement in the country stems from generalized violence and rights violations, including (i) social and territorial control by gangs, drug trafficking or organized crime groups, (ii) extortion, (iii) forced recruitment, use and association, particularly targeting youth; (iv) dispossession and destruction of housing, land, and property; (v) gender-based violence; and (vi) political violence. These multifaceted challenges faced by the Honduran population are starkly reflected in the significant number of Hondurans seeking asylum. During 2024, 27,888 Honduran nationals sought asylum in México, ranking as the first nationality of asylum requests to this country3 and in 2025 remain in the top five nationalities4. These figures underscore the life-threatening situations that force people to flee Honduras. Additionally, in 2024, 44,394 Hondurans were returned to their country of origin, and from January to December 2025, this figure reached 41,110 people, 7% of whom were identified as having protection needs in Honduras and 14% who had requested protection outside their country. Since 2022, Honduras has also been a transit country for an unprecedented number of refugees and migrants. However, the dynamics changed significantly in 2025. Unlike the unprecedented south to north flows observed in 2023 and 2024, 2025 saw a notable reduction of 89% in entries. According to the Honduran National Migration Institute (INM), between January and December 2025, 39,384 people entered the country irregularly, south to north route6. Meanwhile, according to UNHCR and partners, it is estimated that over 32,200 refugees and migrants have travelled from north to south.
Countries: Lithuania, Ukraine Sources: International Organization for Migration, UN High Commissioner for Refugees Please refer to the attached file. Background Between 24 February 2022 and October 2025, over 5.7 million individuals are estimated to have fled Ukraine due to the ongoing war.¹ Of these, more than 101,000 have entered the Republic of Lithuania (hereafter referred to as Lithuania). At the time of writing of this report, more than 51,000 individuals held valid temporary residence permits pursuant to the temporary protection mechanism.² This remains the largest arrival of refugees recorded in Lithuania's history. The population that has settled in the country primarily consists of women (47%) and children (31%), along with elderly individuals (13%) and persons with disabilities (6%)—groups that often face heightened risks and require targeted support and services.³ Given the continued instability in Ukraine, it is anticipated that displacement will continue in 2026, with new arrivals seeking refuge in Lithuania and joining those already residing in the country. Lithuania has demonstrated a strong and sustained commitment to welcoming and assisting refugees fleeing Ukraine since 2022. The Ministry of Social Security and Labour leads the national coordination of the refugee response, while municipalities and civil society organizations play active roles in providing direct support and services. This collective effort— driven by government institutions, civil society, and local communities—reflects a comprehensive whole- of-society strategy aimed at ensuring protection and inclusion. Despite these coordinated efforts and the availability of tailored support for individuals with specific needs, many refugees continue to face barriers that limit their ability to fully sustain themselves and support their families. The 2025-2026 Regional Refugee Response Plan (RRP) builds on previous iterations by providing targeted, practical support to host countries. It further aims to ensure groups such as older people, children, people with disabilities and survivors of gender-based violence are receiving specialized assistance to address their needs, and that they are not left behind as the response shifts towards sustainability. To support a coordinated and effective response, access to comprehensive data is crucial for the design, delivery, and assessment of assistance programmes. In this regard, UNHCR Lithuania, working in collaboration with IOM and Lithuanian Red Cross, as well as other key actors engaged in the refugee response within Lithuania, carried out the 2025 Lithuania Socio-Economic Insights Survey (SEIS). The SEIS is a collaborative, inter-agency initiative designed to identify the most urgent needs of refugees coming from Ukraine across key sectors, including protection, health, education, accommodation, and livelihoods. It aligns with the objectives of the Regional Refugee Response Plan (RRP) for the Ukrainian refugee situation5 and specifically supports Lithuania's inter-agency RRP, led by UNHCR. SEIS serves as a source of important and comprehensive data for service providers. The 2025 SEIS in Lithuania was coordinated by UNHCR and developed through a collaborative effort, including with focal points from government, humanitarian actors and civil society, to ensure the survey maintained a multi-sectoral and inter-agency approach. Drawing on their specific expertise, each actor contributed to the design phase of the 2025 SEIS. The process included consultations at a round table event bringing together the key stakeholders involved in the refugee response. This final report serves as a strategic tool to guide humanitarian interventions in Lithuania throughout 2026 and beyond, informing the work of partners and stakeholders. It supports a more targeted and prioritized response and reflects the Grand Bargain commitments6 to improved harmonization and coordination of assessment efforts.
Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo Source: Médecins Sans Frontières Statement Of Dr Alan Gonzalez, Deputy Director Of Operations For Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) on the occasion of The High-Level Visit To Bunia, Ituri Province, Democratic Republic Of Congo, of the Director-General Of The World Health Organization Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus “Two weeks after the declaration of the Ebola disease outbreak in Ituri Province, the situation is deeply alarming and a legitimate source of anxiety for communities and frontline health workers alike. Never before has an Ebola outbreak recorded so many cases so soon after its declaration. Like everyone in the affected areas, Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders / MSF) teams are witnessing a response that has not yet caught up to the rapid spread of the epidemic. Unlike most previous Ebola disease outbreaks, this one involves the Bundibugyo virus, for which there are no approved vaccines or specific treatments, and which is particularly difficult to diagnose due to limited testing capacity. The reality today is that nobody knows the true scale and severity of this outbreak. New suspected cases are being reported daily, yet hundreds of samples remain untested. At the same time, major constraints, including border and airport closures, continue to delay the arrival of critical medical supplies, humanitarian aid, and specialized personnel. We know from experience that these measures severely hinder outbreak response, and isolate countries that urgently need international support. This outbreak is making those consequences painfully clear. The number of expert medical organizations responding on the ground is still far too limited, and the level of support being provided - including our own - falls far short of what is needed. People urgently need a response that matches the scale of the crisis they are facing. To bring the situation under even partial control, there must be an immediate expansion of testing capacity. This must be accompanied by a rapid, coordinated and tailored scale-up of the overall response, supported by experienced medical and humanitarian organizations, alongside guaranteed and sustained access for the swift entry of medical supplies and humanitarian staff into affected areas. This outbreak is unfolding in a context where medical needs are already acute, and we are now at real risk of a silent escalation of other critical health problems people face every day. So many health facilities are overwhelmed, and access to regular, non-Ebola care is affected while many people remain at home, too afraid to seek care. The response cannot succeed if it is imposed on communities rather than built with them. Every aspect of the response must be rooted in continuous engagement with communities — listening to concerns, addressing fear and misinformation, and building trust so that people feel safe seeking care. Trust and active community participation are essential to controlling the spread of the disease and saving lives. And the effectiveness of the response will ultimately depend on whether people believe in it.”
Hong Kong authorities have slashed the time needed to send emergency mobile alerts to residents from an hour to 15 minutes under a HK$150 million (US$19 million) system, while messages can now be tailored to specific districts, the security chief has revealed. A hearing session into the deadly Wang Fuk Court fire in April had exposed the lengthy time needed to trigger the alert. But security chief Chris Tang Ping-keung on Saturday stopped short of specifying the types of incidents, such as major...
Countries: Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Somalia Source: ELRHA In the first blog introducing this series, Adrienne Testa, from the UK Humanitarian Innovation Hub and Elrha discussed how fundamental it is to measure excess mortality if response actors want to understand the severity of a humanitarian crisis and guide aid prioritisation. In our second blog we focus on the work of a consortium led by IMPACT Initiatives. This consortium is drawing attention to the roles that national and local actors play in mortality data collection and use by decision-makers and what is needed to design more localised mortality estimation systems in humanitarian contexts. The structural barriers we need to talk about Many of the challenges for local and national actors to collect mortality data and inform responses are well known, but poorly documented. They have fewer opportunities for technical training; face inequitable access to financial resources for activities; and structural barriers limit their representation in coordination forums where decision-making occurs about whether mortality data should be collected, who collects it, and what findings can mean. Meanwhile, international actors frequently have a seat at the table, and therefore control the narrative, deciding what data matters and how it will shape response priorities. Yet, local and national actors – including non-governmental organisations (NGOs), universities, and public health institutes – are often ideally placed to collect mortality estimates and inform response decisions. They have established connections and access to affected communities and contextual understanding of how to appropriately and effectively operate. They understand political sensitivities and how to navigate these so that mortality estimation findings will carry legitimacy with key stakeholders and decision-makers. Crucially, locally-led mortality estimation initiatives challenge long-standing power imbalances associated with colonial, top-down approaches to humanitarian assistance. Recognising this, three partners in our consortium, Evidence for Change, London School of Tropical Hygiene and Tropical Medicine and SIMAD University, were funded by the Humanitarian Innovation Hub in 2024-25 to imagine what an ideal mechanism might look like to systematically trigger mortality data collection for accountable decision-making in crises. Consultation with global humanitarian stakeholders confirmed: If we want better mortality data, we must widen the pool of people able to generate it. This starts with investing in and strengthening the capacities of local actors. Funding local actors’ priorities and strengthening capacities With follow-on funding from UKHIH-Elrha in 2025-26, our consortium expanded. We teamed up with IMPACT Initiatives along with their partners at Addis Ababa and Mekelle Universities in Ethiopia and World Needs and Help, an NGO in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Together, we’re working to better understand real-world opportunities and obstacles faced by national actors when implementing mortality estimation activities. Our goal is to use this evidence to strengthen advocacy for approaches that support and prioritise local actors in this vital work. Rather than imposing a predefined research plan, each national partner has selected, tailored and implemented a mortality estimation activity to their context. Our consortium operates a ‘help desk’ to foster peer-learning and strengthen capacities across contexts. Activities include: Somalia: New approaches in a fragmented landscape Our previous work in Somalia demonstrated the effectiveness of well-designed data collection exercises to influence humanitarian decision-making - when findings were communicated - in a timely fashion and to the right people. However, we also saw how fragmented the current data landscape is, with mortality data not always collaboratively shared between institutions, and major gaps in mortality data coverage, particularly in areas outside government control. SIMAD University is therefore running a qualitative study with community burial attendants in hard-to-reach areas of Somalia, exploring what would be needed for this to become a feasible and acceptable mechanism of mortality reporting to bridge data gaps. Drawing on a nutrition and mortality surveillance system originally developed in the NGO sector, Evidence for Change is training female health workers to collect mortality data within a large-scale community-based government programme. Ethiopia: Regional partnerships for regional aid prioritisation Previously, universities across Ethiopia ran demographic surveillance sites in their local areas, with mortality and other data flowing to government authorities. Conflict dismantled many of these surveillance programmes. Addis Ababa and Mekelle Universities, which previously ran surveillance sites, are now partnering with regional health authorities in drought-affected Somali region and conflict-hit Tigray to conduct mortality surveys to help guide regional aid prioritisation. Mekelle University is also including a verbal autopsy component to describe the causes of death, something regional authorities found particularly valuable about the pre-war surveillance system because it helped them monitor the health of populations. Democratic Republic of Congo: Navigating insecurity and mistrust Engagements with both formal and informal authorities in eastern Congo can create tension or mistrust, complicating operational permissions and community access. Nevertheless, World Needs and Help is initiating a mortality survey in a conflict‑affected North Kivu region, to document the human toll of ongoing violence and displacement. While the organisation has no prior experience in mortality estimation, our consortium helped them expand their technical skillset. Their experience supporting needs assessments among various partners across the east means they are well positioned to navigate the complex challenges to ensure mortality estimation is possible. Alongside these activities, we are documenting how teams have approached the process, keeping a close eye on context. We are building on social science methodological approaches we developed in phase 1 to help us understand how politics, institutional identities and other evolving challenges shape the ways mortality actors work. Equitable and sustainable systems change None of these challenges have quick fixes. Building an equitable and sustainable approach to mortality estimation will require the concerted efforts of many stakeholders, working together to drive change. Our own consortium is part of that broader momentum. By documenting barriers and testing solutions today, our hope is to inform the strategy that will address these challenges tomorrow, supporting UKHIH’s drive for true systems innovation in humanitarian action.
Countries: Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda Source: United Nations Population Fund Please refer to the attached file. As of 26 May 2026, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) had reported 1,077 suspected cases of Ebola and 238 deaths, with transmission heavily concentrated in the Ituri, North Kivu, and South Kivu provinces. Uganda has reported five cases, including one death, all linked to imported cases from the DRC. The outbreak is complicated by acute insecurity, armed conflict, and massive internal displacement, which severely restricts response efforts. A critical concern is the absence of widely-licensed vaccines or specific therapeutics for this strain. Cross-border transmission risks are high, with 10 other African countries at elevated risk. UNFPA is participating in United Nations Country Team preparedness efforts across all 10 high-risk African countries and is working to ensure the continuity of critical sexual and reproductive health (SRH) services despite major supply chain challenges, including for personal protective equipment (PPE) specifically tailored for delivery procedures. Furthermore, UNFPA is addressing the threat to safe clinical pathways for the clinical management of rape and comprehensive gender-based violence (GBV) care; the risk of sexual transmission from survivors of rape necessitates the urgent integration of private, stigma-free counselling; contraceptive provision; and condom distribution. UNFPA advocated for the central integration of maternal health and GBV service continuity into the US $340 million Regional Response Plan. While international donors have pledged 70 per cent of the overarching regional fund, immediate operational funding gaps remain critical.
Country: Moldova Source: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies Please refer to the attached file. Description The late-May 2026 floods were one of Moldova’s sharpest localized hydrometeorological shocks in recent months, with Călărași and Ungheni identified by the government as the most affected districts after the torrential rains of 22 May. The damage profile was dominated by flooded households, damaged roads, pressure on dams and lakes, disrupted rail traffic, and agricultural losses. The human impact was serious but uneven: the confirmed district-level reporting shows at least one death in Călărași, multiple rescue operations, households inundated in both districts, and preventive evacuation planning for additional residents at risk. As of 28 May 2026, authorities were still assessing total monetary losses, so the available picture is operational and preliminary rather than final. The heavy precipitation led to rapid water level rises in rivers, streams, and artificial reservoirs, resulting in multiple cascading impacts: Dam and embankment failures, including a reported rupture of a local dam in Hîrjauca (Călărași district), which caused sudden downstream flooding. Overflow and flooding of lakes and ponds, raising concerns about inadequate maintenance and compliance with safety standards for water basins. Flash floods affecting rural settlements, with water entering households, agricultural land, and public infrastructure. Transport disruption, including blocked roads and temporarily halted rail traffic in affected zones. Power outages and preventive disconnections in several villages due to safety risks. Soil erosion, mudflows, and damage to agricultural assets, including greenhouses and crops. The combination of saturated soils and high runoff intensity significantly amplified the destructive capacity of the floods. The strongest cross-source figures available so far show that across the wider affected zone of Călărași, Strășeni, Ungheni, and Criuleni, the floods damaged or inundated 25 localities, affected 69 households, threatened around 400 households, flooded about 400 hectares of farmland, and damaged 55 km of roads. These are important numbers because they come from the crisis-management structure after the first response phase, so they likely reflect a more consolidated operational picture than the first-night reports. However, they are not yet final compensation figures. What happened The triggering event was the 22 May storm system, which brought torrential rain, strong winds, and major water accumulation. Moldova’s authorities shifted into crisis mode, with emergency teams, police, road services, rail services, and local authorities deployed to pump water, reinforce dikes, reopen transport links, and secure high-risk areas. The government explicitly said that Călărași and Ungheni were the hardest-hit districts. gov.md IGSU The disaster affected dozens of localities across at least two key districts, with secondary impacts reported in neighboring areas. Călărași: damage analysis Călărași appears to have suffered the most intense direct household and infrastructure shock. The immediate crisis was tied to dam failure/partial rupture, especially around Hîrjauca and Mîndra, where multiple reports say over 40 households were affected. Radio Moldova also reported that in Mîndra six households were completely destroyed, while many courtyards, wells, and agricultural plots were flooded. Local officials further said that in some mayoralties 70–80% of infrastructure was affected, with bridges and local transport links damaged. Radio Moldova Radio Moldova Human impact in Călărași was severe. The government confirmed the death of a 48-year-old man in Dereneu, linked to the flooding and heavy rains. Residents were trapped in houses and vehicles, and emergency services prepared for wider preventive evacuation around Bularda/Hîrbovăț if dikes failed. One operational report noted preparations for possible evacuation of over 20 households, while a TVR Moldova report said a field camp was readied for more than 200 people in case conditions worsened. Persons at the “Codru” sanatorium were also evacuated preventively. From an analytical perspective, Călărași’s vulnerability was not just rainfall intensity. It was the combination of intense runoff, small-basin/dam failure, and cascade effects from connected lakes and drainage channels. That made the district especially prone to sudden, high-energy flooding that damaged homes, roads, yards, wells, and local agricultural assets rather than only causing shallow standing water. Ungheni: damage analysis Ungheni’s impact pattern looks broader geographically but somewhat less concentrated in destroyed homes than Călărași, at least from the public reporting now available. The government said 11 localities in Ungheni district were affected. Emergency reports and media coverage describe flooded households and basements, people stranded in vehicles or on rooftops, and drainage work in both rural settlements and the town. The key infrastructure signal in Ungheni was instability around water bodies and transport links. In Rădenii Vechi, landslides damaged two bridges in Novaia Nicolaevca. Authorities also reported an alarming situation at Lake Delia, which had accumulated water from failed upstream basins, while controlled water release operations took place near Mănoilești and Cornova to reduce pressure. Floodwater was also removed from multiple households, basements, and a kindergarten in Ungheni. Ungheni was also significant in the rescue and transport-disruption dimension. Multiple calls for help were recorded there, including incidents with people trapped in vehicles and on rooftops. Rail disruption near Pârlița temporarily stopped the Chișinău–Kyiv train with 142 passengers, illustrating that the flood impact extended beyond houses into inter-district mobility and economic connectivity. Key human impact indicators include: The public reporting allows a careful estimate of population impact, but not yet a precise district-by-district headcount. What is solid: - 69 households were actually affected across the four main districts. Moldpres - More than 400 households were considered at risk, but authorities say they were protected through dike reinforcement and drainage operations. Moldpres - In Călărași, over 40 households were flooded in Hîrjauca and Mîndra, and more than 20 households were under evacuation contingency in Bularda/Hîrbovăț. Radio Moldova Moldpres - In Ungheni, 11 localities were affected, with flooded households, a kindergarten, damaged bridges, and multiple rescue incidents. What remains uncertain: - There is no finalized official headcount of people directly affected in Călărași and Ungheni alone. - There is also no final published monetary damage estimate yet. - One media roundup referred to two deaths across Călărași and Ungheni, but the clearest official district-level confirmation currently available is one death in Dereneu, Călărași. Based on household estimates and rural population density, the directly affected population is estimated at several hundred people, while the indirectly affected population (service disruption, mobility constraints, power outages, and economic losses) likely extends to several thousand residents across the two districts. Casualties and Vulnerable Groups At least one fatality was reported in Călărași district (Dereneu village) as a result of flooding-related incidents. Preventive evacuations were conducted, including from areas near the Codru sanatorium, to avoid loss of life. Vulnerable groups include rural households, elderly populations in isolated villages, and communities located near water basins and low-lying river valleys. The main analytical conclusion is that Călărași suffered the more destructive household and infrastructure blow, while Ungheni experienced wider spatial disruption and acute water-management stress, especially around lakes, slopes, and transport corridors. This distinction matters for recovery planning: Călărași needs more household reconstruction and local infrastructure repair, while Ungheni may need stronger slope stability, drainage, and basin management measures. Why these floods were so damaging The event shows a classic compound local flood pattern: Short, intense rainfall Overflow and failure pressure on ponds/dikes Cascade effects between connected basins Localized flash flooding in villages Secondary impacts on roads, rail, wells, and farmland That combination explains why relatively small localities could suffer disproportionate destruction. In other words, this was not only a “rain event”; it was a water-retention and drainage system stress event. Authorities at national and local levels activated emergency mechanisms: Deployment of emergency response teams, firefighters, police, and road services. Continuous water pumping, reinforcement of embankments, and clearance of blocked infrastructure. High-level field visits by government officials, with ongoing coordination between ministries. Ongoing damage assessment processes, as many impacts remain under evaluation due to receding waters. The situation remains dynamic, with residual risks linked to: further rainfall forecasts, saturated ground conditions, structural vulnerabilities of water retention infrastructure. On 26 May 2026, the leadership of the Red Cross Society of Moldova (MRCS), together with regional directors from affected districts, conducted a field visit toCălărași district, one of the areas most severely impacted by recent flooding caused by heavy rainfall. The mission aimed to assess field conditions, identify urgent community needs, and determine appropriate humanitarian support. In Dereneu village, discussions with local authorities focused on flood impacts, damage to households, and coordination of emergency response efforts. The MRCS team also met with a bereaved family affected by the disaster to express institutional solidarity and assess immediate support needs. In the Bularda area, the delegation met with GIES (IGSU) emergency responders engaged in flood protection works, including embankment reinforcement using sandbags and the creation of diversion channels. The team also reviewed ongoing emergency infrastructure measures and identified operational needs for responders and affected communities. In Mândra village, field visits to affected households were carried out in coordination with social workers to assess urgent humanitarian needs, including material assistance and psychosocial support for vulnerable families. MRCS reaffirmed its continued presence in the affected areas and its commitment to provide humanitarian assistance, psychosocial support, and coordination with local authorities. The organization emphasized its role in strengthening local response capacity and community resilience in line with its humanitarian mandate. By 27–28 May, authorities indicated that the immediate flood danger had been reduced through dike strengthening, pumping, and controlled drainage, but the recovery phase was only beginning. The local emergency commissions were still inventorying losses, and support from local budgets plus central government top-ups was being considered. That means the current picture is best read as initial impact analysis, not a completed loss-and-needs assessment. Călărași and Ungheni were the epicenter of Moldova’s May 2026 flood emergency. Călărași suffered the heaviest direct destruction to homes and local infrastructure, including dam-related flooding and at least one confirmed death. Ungheni experienced widespread multi-locality flooding, bridge damage, water-basin instability, and transport disruption. The total economic loss is still being assessed, but the event already shows a major combined impact on households, roads, farmland, and local resilience. Request For Assistance Government Requests International Assistance: Yes NS Requests International Assistance: No Information Bulletin Published No Actions taken by National Society General Damage/Needs assessment Relief/Supply distribution Psychosocial support services Summary Since the onset of the flooding emergency, the Red Cross Society of Moldova (MRCS) has been actively engaged in field presence, coordination, and rapid needs identification in the most affected districts, including Călărași and Ungheni. During the latest field engagement, MRCS leadership and regional teams conducted on-site visits to affected communities to assess humanitarian needs, strengthen coordination with local authorities and emergency services, and identify priority support areas. Special attention was given to severely affected households, vulnerable families, and cases requiring immediate assistance, including psychosocial support. Based on ongoing assessments, MRCS is preparing targeted assistance for approximately 200 affected households, including the provision of non-food items (NFIs), basic household support, and tailored assistance packages (PFA) where required for the most vulnerable cases. In parallel, the National Society has reinforced coordination with all relevant decision-making actors, including local public authorities, emergency response services, and social assistance structures, to ensure an integrated and timely response. MRCS remains actively present in the field and continues to adjust its response based on evolving needs, with a focus on humanitarian relief, psychosocial support, and strengthening local response capacities. Actions taken by others The Government of the Republic of Moldova is leading the emergency response through national and local authorities, with coordinated operational support on the ground. The General Inspectorate for Emergency Situations (IGSU) has been actively deployed, carrying out evacuations, water pumping, installation of sandbag barriers, and reinforcement of flood protection infrastructure in affected areas. The Ministry of Environment, the State Hydrometeorological Service, and the “Apele Moldovei” Administration have provided technical monitoring, hydrological updates, and support for water management interventions. Local authorities in Călărași and Ungheni are coordinating local response efforts, including damage reporting, community support, and identification of affected households. No large-scale UN emergency deployment has been reported at this stage, while coordination with humanitarian partners and local actors remains ongoing within existing national response mechanisms.
Country: Iran (Islamic Republic of) Source: World Health Organization Please refer to the attached file. This is the eighth global public WHO situation report on the conflict in the Middle East. It covers the health situation and WHO operational updates from affected countries, as well as WHO's global response activities and priorities. Despite the ongoing ceasefires, the situation is fragile, particularly in Lebanon. Acute health threats remain since the last reporting period. Persistent constraints in global fuel supply chains continue to challenge health services in many locations. Due to persistent global constraints in health commodity supply chains, WHO continues to leverage alternative modalities to ensure continued provision of essential health services. Risk communication and community engagement materials and preparedness guidance have been developed and disseminated to support communities and health responders during the current regional escalation. The resources include public communication and food safety materials for Eid al-Adha, alongside comprehensive guidance addressing risks related to disruptions in energy, food, water, and environmental services. Tailored information has been prepared for vulnerable populations, caregivers, and frontline workers, with specific content on trauma response and chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRN) preparedness.
A project designed to teach elderly residents how to protect themselves during extreme heat has improved their health and reduced medical emergencies, according to researchers. Results from the first two years of the three-year “Beat the Heat” project, released by the Chinese University of Hong Kong on Thursday, showed that tailored home interventions led to a 132 per cent increase in knowledge among older residents regarding heat-related health risks, alongside a 37 per cent reduction in...
THE IMF’s Executive Board has approved the third review of Pakistan’s 37-month Extended Fund Facility (EFF), adding 11 new conditions and raising total structural conditionality to 75. In addition, there are 30 standing commitments, bringing total compliance requirements to 105. These span fiscal, governance, monetary, foreign exchange, financial, energy, state-owned enterprises, trade, investment, deregulation, social protection, and anti-corruption measures — many extending well beyond the IMF’s core mandate and institutional competence. The sheer breadth of this conditionality now touches almost every sphere of economic activity and governance, steadily eroding Pakistan’s policy autonomy and economic sovereignty. Parliament is required to approve the FY27 budget in line with the IMF’s stringent and intrusive policy advice and targets, effectively reducing the legislature to a rubber stamp. Pakistan is to phase out fiscal incentives for Special Economic and Technology Zones, publish an action plan to mitigate corruption vulnerabilities in government departments, amend the NAB ordinance to enhance the appointment process for NAB chairman, publish asset declarations of civil servants, amend the Companies Act to improve corporate governance structures, adopt a national policy for sugar market liberalisation, and lift restrictions on commercial import of used cars. Equally worrisome is the IMF’s approach to energy taxation amid persistently high inflation. Governments facing high energy costs ordinarily reduce or suspend fuel taxes to shield citizens from cost-of-living pressures. In Pakistan, the opposite has occurred: petrol prices are now carrying roughly Rs145 per litre in taxes and levies — nearly one-third of what consumers pay at the pump. These levies have intensified inflation, raised transport and production costs, and deepened the burden on already-stretched households. The consequent pressure on the State Bank to raise interest rates further suppresses economic activity while ignoring the structural roots of inflation. Meanwhile, the IMF’s insistence on full cost recovery through electricity and gas tariff adjustments has failed to resolve the circular debt problem — a crisis rooted in inefficiency, theft, transmission losses, and the ruinous terms of IPP contracts. The effectiveness and legitimacy of IMF conditionality therefore deserve careful scrutiny. The effectiveness and legitimacy of IMF conditionality deserve careful scrutiny. The Fund was not designed to micromanage economies. The IMF’s own doctrine of parsimony holds that conditions should be few, focused, and directly tied to a country’s balance-of-payments needs, strictly limited to what is necessary to restore macroeconomic stability. Its 2018 Review of Programme Design and Conditionality and the 2024 Operational Guidance Notecontinue to stress the need for focused, tailored and parsimonious conditionality. Following the 2008 global financial crisis, the IMF itself acknowledged the need for streamlined conditionality focused on its core areas of expertise. Its 2011 review revealed a marked reduction in structural conditionality across 45 post-crisis arrangements, which averaged around 10 conditions per programme per year between 2008 and 2010, compared to 17-19 during the 1995-2007 period. Pakistan’s current EFF, with 75 conditions in just 1.5 years represents a striking reversal of that parsimony principle. The IMF’s own Independent Evaluation Office (IEO), in its 2021 report, also found excessive structural conditionalities in Pakistan’s arrangements, citing the 2013-2016 EFF, which carried 82 conditions, and concluding that the large majority had low depth and weak growth orientation. The empirical record is damning. A 2022 study by Prof Firat Demir in the Journal of Comparative Economics analysing IMF conditionality across more than 130 countries from 1980 to 2014 found that IMF programmes have delivered disappointing growth and development outcomes, with little or no impact on export sophistication, economic complexity, or diversification. Pakistan’s own record confirms this. Pakistan has consistently underperformed its South Asian neighbours, and its successive programmes have excessively focused on front-loaded adjustment while neglecting the structural foundations of sustained growth: weak exports, inequitable taxation, lavish government expenditure, poor human capital, and failing public services. Meanwhile, balance-of-payments crises have remained a recurring feature in countries like Pakistan, Egypt, and Argentina, despite completion of repeated IMF programmes. Part of the problem lies within Pakistan itself. In theory, borrowing countries have the primary responsibility for designing their economic programmes, set out in a letter of intent and a memorandum of economic and financial policies. In practice, these are drafted by IMF staff and presented to country authorities for signature. The proliferation of low-quality, low-depth invasive conditions in the current EFF reflects not only the IMF’s lack of evenhandedness but also the weakness of Pakistan’s negotiating team in blindly accepting IMF advice, effectively outsourcing economic management to the IMF. The Fund has also drifted far beyond its original mandate as a lender of last resort. It has ventured deep into domestic governance, climate policy, private sector development, and digitisation, on the pretext of these being macro-critical, without the institutional expertise those areas require. Its substantial financial support to Ukraine is equally revealing: a $15.6 billion programme launched in 2023 was followed by a new $8.1bn EFF approved in February 2026, part of a broader $136.5bn international support package. Officially, these programmes target macro-financial stability, corruption, and structural reforms. In reality, IMF support has become a linchpin of Ukraine’s war financing, just as recent IMF lending to Egypt has been framed as stabilising a strategically vital economy in the wake of the Gaza conflict. These programmes illustrate how the Fund has become an instrument of geopolitical stabilisation. The IEO has flagged that such perceptions of unequal treatment are actively undermining the IMF’s credibility. The IMF’s policy advice must be more pragmatic and country-specific. Fewer, more selective conditions would foster genuine ownership among country authorities and make reforms successful. Programme design must also ensure fair burden-sharing and a systematic assessment of social and distributional consequences of adjustment. Pakistan, for its part, must end its dependency on borrowed money and external prescription. Other nations have achieved this through strong policy frameworks and sound fundamentals; there is no reason Pakistan cannot do the same. What is required above all is visionary, competent and sincere leadership in public institutions. Without it, Pakistan’s economic management will remain captive to the IMF and self-seeking donors who have consistently failed the nation for decades. The writer is a former senior adviser of the IMF. He is the author of The Shady Economics of International Aid. drsaeed1201@gmail.com Published in Dawn, May 27th, 2026
This tale of a horny bear on a quest of sexual exploration after his partner leaves him during hibernation is certainly shocking. But can it match the sweetness of its predecessor? In the first minute of Netflix’s animated comedy Mating Season, a bear wakes up, urinates uncontrollably across his cave, stumbles outside, sees two horny raccoons banging away, then spirals into a deep well of shame about it. At this stage, it is barely worth pointing out that Mating Season is the spiritual successor to the outrageous, witty comedy Big Mouth, so completely does it inhabit that show’s DNA. And at this point, you will already know if the show is for you or not. Because Big Mouth, as popular as it was, polarised audiences like little else. That show was about the horrors of puberty and sexual awakening, and it was tailored with absolute precision to its target audience of hormone-battered adolescent boys. You could argue that it did this a little too precisely, because its juvenilia was so relentlessly nuclear-powered that plenty of people found themselves turned off by all the sex and farts and swearing. Continue reading...
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Hana Financial Group said Wednesday it is launching a comprehensive support program aimed at helping people with disabilities build sustainable and independent lives. The number of people with disabities is growing in Korea, with the program centered on five areas: Rehabilitation, education, housing and welfare, employment and financial services. Hana Financial officially launched the initiative with a donation ceremony Tuesday at its headquarters in Myeong-dong, central Seoul. The group said th
“Social engineering” sounds like something out of a conspiracy thriller, charged with totalitarian control and fringe paranoia. More mundanely, it’s come to be associated with phishing and other scams, in which fraudsters manipulate people into disclosing personal information. Yet the concept is older and more benign: it is the deliberate shaping of human behavior, often at scale. It predates silicon—and became pervasive, and ungoverned, especially once its practitioners learned to hide it. Authoritarian regimes and more recently scammers and big companies have profited from it. To defend ourselves from bad actors, and to benefit from social engineering’s good side, we need to reclaim the name, and govern it prudently. The roots of engineering In 1894, Dutch entrepreneur Jacques van Marken urged companies to hire “social engineers” to manage human systems such as insurance, education, and profit sharing for workers as carefully as they did mechanical ones. Fifteen years later, reformer William H. Tolman published Social Engineering, describing how U.S. industrialists optimized workers’ conditions alongside manufacturing methods. If industrialists could shape steel and electricity on demand, why not society itself? By the 1920s, that confidence had spread. The architect Le Corbusier declared that dwellings were “machines for living in,” imagining cities as orderly lattices where people moved like parts on a conveyor belt. Civilization would run like a Swiss watch. The idea soon darkened. Authoritarian regimes pushed it to extremes, promising to fashion “the New Man.” In Nazi Germany, engineer Fritz Todt founded Organization Todt, a vast state engineering enterprise that emerged from the autobahn highway system and later operated concentration camps using slave labor. In the Soviet Union, leaders adopted U.S. scientific management techniques to plan factory-worker movements and classify populations through centralized records, feeding both rapid industrialization drives and the gulag system of forced labor. The same tools and managerial methods used to build highways and enact five-year plans worked for repression and mass control. By the 1950s, “social engineering” had become a contaminated phrase. The revelations of Nazi and Soviet abuses, along with Cold War critiques of grand social planning turned the term from a progressive slogan into a warning label. Banishing the words pushed the practice underground, making it harder to recognize when it resurfaced in new forms—such as organizational psychology and systems management that still relied on classification and behavioral influence techniques but under softer, less loaded labels. Social engineering’s more subtle spread In the postwar years, the new social-engineering lexicon included “human factors” and “urban planning,” all promising integration rather than command. As computing advanced, the language shifted again: “customer journey mapping” to track interactions, “user experience” to script them. Engineering, which began as a means of reshaping physical space, set its sights on shaping behavior. Digital design features embedded in our smartphones now target our attention and desire. Language helps conceal these modern forms of social engineering. “Data analytics” sounds neutral beside “surveillance.” “Personalization” flatters individuality while still sorting users into predictable categories. “Behavioral nudges” guide decisions without the sense of intrusion. We attach “social” as a favorable modifier to sciences, capital, and media, yet recoil when it meets “engineering.” That discomfort is a clue. Engineering implies control, and control prompts us to ask who directs whom, toward what ends, and with whose permission. Not all social engineering these days is hidden. Hackers don’t need to break a firewall if someone hands over their password. Romance scammers cultivate intimacy the way farmers cultivate crops. They succeed not through force but by exploiting trust. If even these obvious attacks work, the invisible kind, with roots in social engineering, are a shoo-in. Most of the social engineering we encounter is proprietary and beyond our control. Firms build recommendation algorithms tuned to boost engagement and profit with no hearings or right of appeal. Browser and cookie defaults decide what data we surrender. A single autoplay toggle can cost users hours and build unhealthy habits. These are acts of engineering as deliberate as laying a road or redrawing an electoral district. They create a kind of curated itch by which boredom never settles, and satisfaction never arrives. The results are predictable—users click on targeted ads, make purchases, form habits, and lock in opinions. Consent has transformed along with it. Once straightforward and revocable, it is now subtle and persistent, buried in defaults or opaque terms of service too quickly accepted. You remain free to opt out, much as you are free to refuse roads or electricity. Consent has become the preselected setting of modern life. When social engineering operated more in the open, citizens could contest it, at least in societies with responsive government. Today’s invisible version diffuses accountability so thoroughly that scrutiny becomes hard to direct. Despite recent congressional hearings on social media’s impact on youth mental health and juries agreeing that firms are knowingly designing algorithms that cause harm, pinpointing responsibility remains elusive. When the mechanism is buried inside a system used by billions, we cannot easily point to a single decision-maker or trace the precise moment of manipulation. Today’s social engineering is less overt and theatrical than its predecessors. Earlier versions arrived on public posters and loudspeakers for mass audiences. Today’s version is more intimate, delivered through personal devices and constant feeds tailored to the individual. The model succeeds because participation feels like freedom, not control. Not all social engineering is dystopian. Well-kept parks foster community, accessible buildings extend dignity, vaccines and seatbelts save lives. Even in the digital realm, positive examples exist: browser extensions that automatically block hidden trackers, search engines that refuse to build personalized surveillance profiles, and decentralized social platforms that give users greater control over their own data and feeds. The term “social engineering” still unsettles, though. But “asocial” engineering, which ignores human consequences entirely, is worse. Recognition of the human dimension to engineering is the beginning of repair. Only by seeing the machinery clearly and naming it honestly can we decide who engineers what and why. The machinery will not dismantle itself. Once named, it becomes subject to choice. That negotiation of purpose, power, and process are the defining political questions of any real democracy. We cannot ensure that social engineering serves and sustains society so long as we dodge the words.