"ACCESSORIES" · 총 22건
필터 보기현재 지수
50.3
0 = 부정 우세
50 = 중립
100 = 긍정 우세
최근 7일 기준 86,260건을 분석한 결과, 뉴스 심리지수는 50.2(균형)입니다. 긍정 4,345건(5.0%)·중립 79,787건(92.5%)·부정 2,128건(2.5%)이며, 중립 비중이 뚜렷하게 높습니다. 성향 지수는 종합 14.7(중도 균형)입니다.
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Why Bangladesh must pivot to renewable energy now khairul.jahin@… Tue, 05/26/2026 - 08:30 Image Why Bangladesh must pivot to renewable energy now There are moments in a nation’s history when a crisis does more than create hardship. It reveals the weakness of an old system and opens the door to a better one. Bangladesh is now standing at such a moment. The country is facing an energy crisis that no longer centres on power cuts. It is affecting factories, farms, schools, offices, exports, foreign currency reserves, and the daily life of ordinary people. What we are seeing today is not just a temporary shortage of gas or fuel. It is a signal that our energy system has become too dependent on imported fossil fuels. More than 60 percent of Bangladesh’s energy demand is met through imports. LNG, coal, oil, and other fossil fuels have kept the country running for years, but this dependence has become risky and expensive. Global fuel markets are unstable because of geopolitical tension, supply chain disruption, and price volatility. For a country like Bangladesh, this creates double pressure: fuel supply becomes uncertain while fuel costs keep rising. The government is now spending more than BDT 200 crore per day in energy subsidies. Annual energy import expenditure remains around USD 12 billion, putting serious pressure on foreign currency reserves. Nearly 70 percent of Bangladesh’s LNG imports come from Qatar. If supply is disrupted, Bangladesh can quickly face a severe shortage. In the power sector, daily gas demand exceeds 2,500 mmcfd, but supply sometimes falls to 850–900 mmcfd. This can create a power generation shortfall of 1,500–1,800 MW. Overall, the daily gas shortage exceeds 1,100 mmcfd, and peak-time electricity shortages may reach nearly 2,000 MW. Bangladesh also has a weak Strategic Petroleum Reserve. The current reserve capacity is sufficient for only about 35–40 days, well below that of countries such as China and Japan. This makes the national energy system even more vulnerable. Visual: Teeni and Tuni The impact is already visible. In the readymade garments sector, gas shortages and load shedding are reducing productivity by 25–30 percent in many cases. This threatens export earnings, foreign currency reserves, and economic stability. The crisis has also reached ordinary households. Although Bangladesh declared 100 percent electrification in 2022, many rural areas still experience 10 to 20 hours of load shedding every day during summer. This affects education, small businesses, agriculture, and people’s dignity. We have also seen long lines at fuel stations, schools moving online, and offices shortening working hours because of fuel shortages. These are not isolated events. They show how deeply energy insecurity can disturb national life. Over the last 15 years, electricity tariffs in Bangladesh have been increased on many occasions, including more than 10 rounds of increases at both bulk and retail levels. This path is not sustainable. Fossil-fuel-based electricity depends on imported fuel, global prices, the availability of the dollar, subsidies, and repeated tariff adjustments. Solar power offers a different path. With a one-time investment, solar can provide stable energy for 15–20 years. Once installed, its fuel cost is almost zero. The economic comparison is clear. A 1 MW HFO-based power plant produces electricity per year at a cost of nearly BDT 190 crore, with much of the cost paid in foreign currency. In contrast, a 5 MW solar project requires a one-time investment of around BDT 25 crore, after which fuel costs are practically zero. Each 1 MW of solar power can save around USD 325,000 per year in foreign currency. Read more Bangladesh’s looming energy crisis and the choices ahead This is why renewable energy should not be discussed solely in technical terms like decarbonisation, emissions, and sustainability. For Bangladesh, renewable energy means jobs, fuel independence, savings in foreign currency, industrial competitiveness, agricultural protection, and economic strength. Policymakers and stakeholders can lead this transformation, inspiring confidence in a sustainable future. Despite Bangladesh’s potential, renewable energy contributes less than 5 percent to power generation, far below the global 30 percent target by 2030. Clear, measurable goals and timelines are essential for effective policy planning and investment decisions. Renewable energy equipment imports face around 50–60 percent in duties and taxes, hindering local manufacturing growth. Policy reforms that reduce import duties and support local industry can accelerate renewable deployment and reduce dependency on imports. For Bangladesh, renewable energy means jobs, fuel independence, savings in foreign currency, industrial competitiveness, agricultural protection, and economic strength. Policymakers and stakeholders can lead this transformation, inspiring confidence in a sustainable future. Import duty is usually imposed to protect the local industry. But where local production is not yet significant, a high duty only increases project costs, reduces investment returns, and slows renewable energy expansion. Policy reforms can unlock this potential, making stakeholders feel their efforts directly contribute to progress. India, Pakistan, Vietnam, and China have expanded solar and wind power by offering low or zero import duties, tax exemptions, and low-interest financing. Many countries have also reduced duties on lithium-ion batteries and energy storage systems. Bangladesh should learn from these examples. The barriers are clear: high duties and VAT, high financing costs of 10–12 percent or more, limited access to easy loans, slow approval processes, net metering delays, high LC margin, weak Merchant Power Policy, lack of clear policies for rooftop solar, utility-scale solar, floating solar, agrivoltaics, solar irrigation, and hybrid solar-storage, weak local manufacturing, and insufficient grid digitalisation. Addressing these collectively can accelerate Bangladesh's renewable journey, uniting stakeholders in a common goal. One urgent reform is customs assessment. The current weight-based assessment system does not reflect the actual value of solar equipment. It can create artificial overvaluation and raise duties by three to four times. Bangladesh should shift to transaction-value-based assessment using pro forma or commercial invoice values, in line with international practice and WTO customs valuation principles. The second urgent reform is the elimination of customs duty on renewable energy equipment. This should apply to Solar PV Module, Photovoltaic Cell, Solar Inverter, DC Cable, Data Logger, Aluminium Mounting Structure, Battery Pack, Battery Cell, BMS Circuit Board, PV DG Controller, Hybrid Controller, Solar Plant Safety Aluminium Walkway Mesh, Safety Accessories, and related components. Current TTI rates are high. Solar PV Module carries 26.90 percent, Photovoltaic Cell 25.75 percent, Solar Inverter 28.73 percent, DC Cable 58.40 percent, Data Logger 37.25 percent, Aluminium Mounting Structure 58.40 percent, Battery Pack and Battery Cell 58.40 percent, BMS Circuit Board 31.50 percent, pack materials 37.25 percent, PV DG Controller or Hybrid Controller 89.08 percent, and Solar Plant Safety Aluminum Walkway Mesh 37.25 percent. These should be reduced to zero percent for renewable energy expansion. The third reform is a tax holiday. Rooftop solar power producers and project companies should receive benefits comparable to those of utility-scale renewable energy producers. A practical structure could be a 100 percent tax holiday for the first 10 years, 50 percent for the next 3 years, and 25 percent for the next 2 years. This should apply to CAPEX, OPEX, IPP, and MPP models. A broader 10–20 year tax holiday for renewable energy projects should also be considered. Read more How can Bangladesh rapidly expand solar capacity? Bangladesh has a remarkable solar opportunity already waiting on its rooftops. About 7 percent of the country’s land is covered with concrete or other built structures. This means more than 10,000 square kilometres, or about 10 billion square meters of built surface. If only 30 percent is usable, that would give around 3 billion square meters. At 10 square meters per kW, this can create nearly 300 GW of solar potential. Bangladesh’s peak demand is only around 16–18 GW. The opportunity already exists on rooftops, factories, warehouses, schools, hospitals, government buildings, and commercial establishments. Rooftop solar should therefore be relaunched nationwide with a clear business model. Utility-scale solar also needs support through unused khas land, transparent tendering, and grid readiness. Floating solar, river-based solar, agrivoltaics, solar irrigation, and hybrid solar-storage should receive separate policy attention. The suspended solar projects must also be revisited. A total of 31 solar power projects, with a combined capacity of more than 3,000 MW, were previously suspended or cancelled. Many were being developed by foreign investors, with more than USD 200 million reportedly already invested. If implemented, these projects could save around BDT 10,800 crore annually in energy import costs. They should be reassessed and revived quickly. Energy storage is another missing pillar. Solar and wind need storage support to become more reliable. Duties on lithium-ion batteries, BESS, and other storage systems should be reduced to zero. This will help stabilise renewable power and support future grid flexibility. Electric vehicles can also become part of the solution. In China, Japan, and the United States, EVs are increasingly seen as mobile energy storage systems. A typical EV battery has a capacity of 40–70 kWh, enough to power an average household for 1–2 days. If Bangladesh had 1 million EVs, the country would have 40–70 GWh of distributed storage. This is several times higher than the daily peak demand gap. Solar-powered EV charging, vehicle-to-home, and vehicle-to-grid systems should be included in future energy planning. If Bangladesh had 30–40 percent of the grid powered by solar, along with solar-powered EVs, the country would be far less exposed to global fuel market shocks. Long fuel lines, online schooling, shorter office hours, and industrial disruption could be reduced. Solar, storage, and EVs should now be planned together. Finance will decide how fast this transition happens. Renewable energy projects cannot grow at interest rates below 10–12 percent. Long-term financing should be available at an interest rate of 3.5–4.5 percent. A 10–15-year financing facility at a maximum interest rate of 5 percent should be introduced. Bangladesh Bank’s green refinancing fund should be expanded. Rooftop and residential solar customers should be eligible for collateral-free loans. The LC margin for renewable equipment should be limited to 5%.\ Read more Rooppur begins, but is Bangladesh Prepared? Net metering must be simplified. Approval should be completed within 15–30 days through a one-stop service. Approval, interconnection, inspection, billing adjustment, and utility coordination should all be simple and time-bound. Wheeling charges for renewable energy should also be kept reasonable and low. The Merchant Power Policy should be clear, simple, and investment-friendly so that industries and commercial consumers can directly procure renewable electricity. Agriculture should also be included in the solar transition. Bangladesh can set a target to convert 1.5 million diesel irrigation pumps into solar pumps. This will reduce diesel imports, lower farmers’ production costs, and protect the environment. The program should include duty-free facilities, low-cost loans, investment support, and local service networks. Waste-to-energy should also receive policy support. City corporations need clear rules, easy financing, and private-sector participation to enable urban waste management and distributed power generation to work together. Bangladesh now needs a phased national roadmap for renewable energy. In the short term, within 0–6 months, customs duty, VAT, and taxes on renewable energy equipment should be reduced to zero. Duties on lithium-ion batteries, BESS, and energy storage should be withdrawn. Approval for net metering should be obtained within 15–30 days. Industrial and commercial solar installations should be eligible for special incentives. The 31 suspended solar projects should be reassessed. Wheeling charges should be rationalised. Solar, storage, and EV charging should receive urgent policy support. Collateral-free lines of credit should be introduced for rooftop solar. NBR should quickly implement assessment reform and a 0 percent duty. Read more All hopes will lose steam without a sustainable energy plan In the medium term, within 1–3 years, renewable energy financing should be available at a maximum interest rate of 5 percent for 10–15 years. The LC margin should be limited to 5 percent. Land banks and grid infrastructure should be developed for utility-scale solar. Merchant Power Policy and MPPA should be simplified. Rooftop solar, utility-scale solar, and hybrid solar-storage projects should receive a 10–15-year tax holiday. A national program should convert 1.5 million diesel pumps into solar pumps. Rooftop solar should be made mandatory or incentive-based for government buildings, industrial zones, EPZs, economic zones, and large commercial buildings. EV solar charging and distributed storage policies should be developed. Renewable energy skill development and employment programs should also be launched. In the long term, within 3–10 years, Bangladesh should aim to reach more than 10,000 MW of solar power by 2030. Offshore and onshore wind should be developed. Floating solar, river-based solar, and agrivoltaics should be implemented. A National Energy Storage Strategy should be prepared. Smart grid and power sector digitalisation should be accelerated. Local assembly and manufacturing of solar panels, inverters, mounting structures, battery packs, BMS, and EV charging equipment should be encouraged. Regional power trade should be expanded. The Renewable Purchase Obligation should be introduced. Fossil fuel subsidies should be gradually redirected to a renewable energy transition fund. Image Visual: Anwar Sohel The benefits can be large. Energy import costs will fall. Pressure on foreign currency reserves will decline. Industrial production costs will reduce. Export competitiveness will improve. The subsidy burden will decrease. New investment will grow. Renewable energy can create 20–25 jobs per MW through rooftop solar, utility-scale solar, solar pumps, EV charging, battery storage, smart grids, manufacturing, installation, operation, and maintenance. The government may worry about revenue loss from tax and duty exemptions. But this should be seen as an investment. In the short term, there may be a limited impact on revenue. In the long term, Bangladesh can save far more by reducing fuel imports, lowering subsidies, saving foreign currency, strengthening industries, and attracting new investment. Bangladesh’s energy crisis is a major challenge but also a historic opportunity. The crisis is not only a supply problem. It is a policy framework problem. Renewable energy, especially solar power, storage, and EV integration, can be among the most practical solutions for the country. The question is no longer whether Bangladesh should adopt renewable energy. The real question is how quickly, how systematically, and how boldly the country can complete this transition. Mohammad Ataur Rahman Sarker is a renewable energy entrepreneur and the secretary of the Bangladesh Sustainable and Renewable Energy Association. Md. Tanvir Siraj is a renewable energy researcher. Send your articles for Slow Reads to slowreads@thedailystar.net. Check out our submission guidelines for details. Read More
Country: occupied Palestinian territory Source: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Please refer to the attached file. Highlights In just one week, more than 50 attacks by settlers across the West Bank resulted in casualties or property damage, including arson attacks that damaged a mosque, homes, farmland and vehicles. OCHA has documented an average of six such attacks per day in 2026. Concerns over the risk of forced displacement of hundreds of Palestinians in eastern Jerusalem governorate intensified after the Israeli Finance Minister called for the rapid implementation of long-standing demolition orders against Khan al Ahmar. In Gaza, humanitarian partners have launched a pest-control campaign in over 1,700 locations, while warning that their efforts are limited by shortages and restrictions. Only half of all aid trucks from Egypt could offload at the Israeli-controlled Kerem Shalom Crossing in the first 18 days of May, based on data tracked by the Logistics Cluster. Overview The Occupied Palestinian Territory remains heavily fragmented; with people not allowed to move between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and movement within each of those areas further restricted by military divisions, physical barriers, and closed zones. Combined with ongoing violence, which keeps claiming civilian lives, these conditions are further deepening people’s humanitarian needs while making it both difficult and unsafe for them to access support. This past week saw new waves of displacement before previous ones had even ended, as attacks and threats once again forced people from their homes or shelters. For humanitarian partners, getting staff and the whole range of critical supplies to where they are needed remains extremely difficult. West Bank Across the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, escalating settler violence, Israeli forces’ operations, demolitions, displacement, and movement restrictions are increasingly heightening protection risks and disrupting Palestinians’ access to essential services. Hundreds of Palestinians living in Area C of eastern Jerusalem governorate are at risk of forced displacement, with concerns intensifying after the Israeli Finance Minister instructed Israeli authorities to rapidly implement long-standing demolition orders against Khan al Ahmar. Bedouin community leaders reported high levels of fear and uncertainty among residents following the announcement. Khan al Ahmar is among 18 Bedouin and herding communities, comprising about 4,000 people, directly affected by the E1 settlement plan between East Jerusalem and Ma’ale Adumim settlement. Humanitarian partners have long warned that the E1 settlement plan would further fragment the West Bank, sever East Jerusalem from the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, heighten the risk of forced displacement of Bedouin communities, and have severe humanitarian consequences for Palestinians across the West Bank. Since 2009, OCHA has documented the demolition of about 550 structures in the 18 communities for lacking Israeli-issued building permits, which are difficult for Palestinians to obtain, including 175 donor-funded structures provided as humanitarian assistance. According to the Shelter Cluster, between 1 January and 30 April, partners reached over 9,300 households, comprising more than 40,300 people, across the West Bank with shelter assistance, targeting displaced families and others affected by conflict-related damage, escalating settler violence, the increasing risk of forcible displacement of entire communities, and deteriorating shelter conditions. Assistance included shelter repairs and rehabilitation; support to displaced families in meeting basic shelter needs; installation of protective measures such as fences, doors, and window mesh; cash assistance for rental support; and the provision of tents, plastic sheeting, bedding kits, kitchen sets, and clothing vouchers. To help Palestinian communities cope with displacement shocks and heightened insecurity, community-based psychosocial support remains the primary intervention modality, complemented by recreational and structured support activities as well as parenting sessions. On average every week, child protection partners provide mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS) to approximately 1,600 children, including about 80 children with disabilities, and more than 670 caregivers. Partners additionally reach a weekly average of about 380 children and 100 caregivers through awareness raising sessions, including explosive ordnance risk education. Over the past week, cash assistance as well as clothing and other in-kind assistance was provided to about 60 children and 12 caregivers to help address urgent needs and reduce exposure to negative coping mechanisms, while 35 children received case management support, including specialized referrals. Casualties and Escalating Settler Violence Between 12 and 18 May (the reporting period in this section), Israeli forces and settlers killed five Palestinians, including one child, while nearly 60 Palestinians, including six children, were injured across the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. More than half of the injuries occurred during settler attacks, while the remainder were mainly recorded in the context of Israeli forces’ search operations and other raids. During the same period, OCHA documented more than 50 Israeli settler attacks against Palestinians that resulted in casualties, property damage, or both, bringing the number of such attacks documented since the beginning of 2026 to over 870 across more than 220 communities – an average of six attacks per day. Israeli forces shot and killed two Palestinian men while they were reportedly attempting to cross the Barrier. On 12 May, Israeli forces opened fire toward two Palestinians attempting to scale the Barrier near Dahiyat al Bareed, in Jerusalem governorate, killing a Palestinian man from Deir Qaddis village (Ramallah governorate) and injuring another. On 17 May, Israeli forces shot a Palestinian man near the Barrier in Beit Ula village, in Hebron governorate, under similar circumstances. He succumbed to his wounds the following day. Since 7 October 2023, when Israeli authorities revoked or suspended most permits issued to Palestinians to access East Jerusalem and Israel for work and other purposes, and as of 11 May, OCHA has documented the killing of 19 Palestinians and the injury of over 290 others who were reportedly attempting to cross the Barrier. On 14 May, Israeli forces shot and killed a Palestinian child in Al Lubban ash Sharqiya village, in Nablus governorate and withheld his body. In a statement, the Israeli military said that soldiers had opened fire toward Palestinians near Road 60 after stones were thrown at Israeli vehicles traveling on the road. Elsewhere in the northern West Bank, on 16 May, Israeli forces shot and killed a Palestinian man at the entrance to Jenin Camp, which has remained a closed military zone since January 2025, reportedly while he was attempting to enter. In a large-scale attack across Sinjil, Jiljiliya and Abwein villages in Ramallah governorate on 13 May, Israeli forces and settlers shot and killed one Palestinian and injured 10 Palestinians. According to local sources and video footage, dozens of Israeli settlers raided the western area of Sinjil and nearby areas in Jiljiliya and Abwein villages, stealing Palestinian-owned livestock and other property. When residents attempted to retrieve stolen flocks, Israeli forces and settlers fired live ammunition, rubber bullets and tear gas canisters. In a statement, the Israeli military said forces had entered the area following reports that Palestinians had stolen sheep from a settlement outpost, and that troops responded with crowd-control measures and live fire after stones were thrown at them while exiting the village. Subsequently, on 16 May, 22 Palestinian Bedouin families, comprising 137 people including 81 children, in the area were forcibly displaced from the area following recurrent settler attacks and intimidation. The families had previously been displaced from three other communities in 2023 due to settler violence. The reporting period saw a concerning escalation in arson attacks targeting Palestinian property, especially in Ramallah and Hebron governorate, including incidents involving anti-Palestinian graffiti. In one incident, Israeli settlers set fire to a mosque in Jibiya village in Ramallah governorate. In Al Mughayyir and Burqa villages, also in Ramallah governorate, settlers set fire to agricultural land, burning olive trees and cultivated areas, with one fire spreading across about 10 dunums due to strong winds. In Wadi ar Rakhim community near Susiya, in southern Hebron governorate, Israeli settlers threw flammable materials toward a Palestinian home, setting fire to an external kitchen, damaging a parked vehicle, and causing damage to parts of the house. In addition to the arson attacks, Israeli settlers carried out multiple assaults on Palestinian homes and infrastructure across Ramallah, Nablus, Salfit and Hebron governorates. These included physical assaults against Palestinians, attacks on homes while families, including children, were inside, damage to water and electricity infrastructure, theft and vandalism of agricultural property, and the destruction of olive trees and fencing. In one incident in Hebron governorate on 17 May, a large group of settlers reportedly physically assaulted four Palestinians and damaged residential structures and personal property in Umm ad Daraj community near Sa’ir village. In Ramallah governorate, settlers from a recently established outpost near Ein ‘Arik village reportedly raided homes, physically assaulted four Palestinians, vandalized water tanks and construction materials, and seized electric cables. A Palestinian-owned car torched in Jibiya village, Ramallah governorate, where Israeli settlers also set fire to a mosque and spray-painted Hebrew graffiti on its walls during one of more than 50 settler attacks documented across the West Bank during the week of 12-18 May 2026. Photo by OCHA. On 14, 15 and 16 May, during the annual Israeli “Jerusalem Day” and accompanying “Flag March” events, Israeli settlers and other Israelis, including Israeli officials, marched through the Old City of Jerusalem and several Palestinian neighbourhoods in East Jerusalem under protection by Israeli forces. Israeli forces erected barriers, restricted Palestinian movement and access, including to Al Aqsa Mosque, and facilitated the marches throughout the Old City and surrounding areas. During the events, settlers assaulted Palestinians and damaged Palestinian-owned property, including shops and homes, while chanting anti-Arab and anti-Palestinian slogans. In Silwan neighbourhood, settlers physically assaulted and injured a 16-year-old Palestinian boy with a metal stick, causing facial fractures, while in the Old City two Palestinian shop owners were injured after settlers attacked their stores and sprayed them with pepper spray. According to local sources, Israeli forces also physically assaulted and arrested at least 20 Palestinians during the three-day events. Demolitions and Displacement During the reporting period, Israeli authorities demolished four homes and 20 agricultural and livelihood-related structures for lacking Israeli-issued building permits, which are nearly impossible for Palestinians to obtain. Overall, 19 structures were demolished in Area C and five in East Jerusalem, resulting in the displacement of five households comprising 26 people, including nine children, of whom 15 people were displaced in East Jerusalem and 11 in Area C. Eighteen of the 19 structures demolished in Area C were agricultural or livelihood-related structures, including 12 structures demolished in a single incident on 13 May in Area C of Al Marwaha area of Beit Hanina, on the Jerusalem side of the Barrier. During the incident, the Israeli Civil Administration, accompanied by Israeli forces, demolished animal shelters, caravans, and storage and sales facilities for construction materials, in addition to surrounding fences, affecting seven Palestinian households comprising 41 people, including 23 children. The demolition resulted in significant financial losses, as affected families were unable to remove most materials and equipment prior to the operation. Since the beginning of 2026, about 71 per cent of the approximately 400 structures demolished in Area C for lacking Israeli-issued building permits have been agricultural, livelihood-related, or water and sanitation structures. Humanitarian Impacts of Raids and Movement Restrictions During the reporting period, OCHA documented more than 40 raids and other operations by Israeli forces across the West Bank, involving house searches, mass detentions, temporary home evacuations, and movement restrictions, disrupting access to livelihoods, education and essential services and heightening fear and distress among affected communities. In multiple governorates, including Tubas, Salfit, Jenin and Nablus, Israeli forces carried out prolonged raids involving large-scale house searches, temporary takeover of Palestinian homes for military use, detentions, and reported physical assaults. In one raid on 17 May in Burin village, home to about 3,000 Palestinians southwest of Nablus city, Israeli forces closed all entrances to the village for nearly 19 hours, reportedly after alleging that stones had been thrown at Israeli vehicles. The closure disrupted movement and access to work and education, forcing shops to close and leading some schools to postpone exams and suspend classes. Separately, Israeli settlers, reportedly from nearby settlement outposts and often accompanied by Israeli forces, carried out repeated attacks against homes in Burin village during the reporting period. At least two attacks included attempted break-ins, damage to property, and physical assaults against residents. In one of these attacks on 13 May, a 13-year-old Palestinian girl was reportedly struck on the head with a stick by an Israeli settler while her family attempted to protect their livestock during an attack on their home. She was treated at the scene by Palestine Red Crescent Society paramedics. Moreover, about 100 students attempting to reach a Palestinian school in the H2 area of Hebron city through As Salaymeh (160) checkpoint were reportedly subjected to repeated delays and restrictive measures imposed by Israeli forces, including demands to present birth certificates and, in some cases, be accompanied by a parent. On 11 May, 103 students were unable to reach the school altogether. Similar restrictions and delays were again reported on 14 and 18 May, disrupting students’ access to education. For key figures and additional breakdowns of casualties, displacement and settler violence between January 2005 and March 2026, please refer to the OCHA West Bank March 2026 Snapshot. Gaza Strip The humanitarian situation in Gaza remains critical, with many displaced families continuing to shelter in overcrowded tents, schools, or damaged structures due to the lack of safe alternatives. Access to essential services also remains severely constrained, including limited availability of clean water and inadequate waste management systems that are unable to effectively address growing public health risks, including the spread of pests and rodents. Many residential areas across Gaza remain unsafe and exposed to recurrent strikes, shelling, and shooting incidents in or near populated areas. Ongoing insecurity and access constraints are disrupting some humanitarian and community‑based activities, while aid workers continue to report significant access impediments in areas where Israeli authorities require humanitarian teams to coordinate their movements with them. Between 16 and 17 May, humanitarian partners recorded the displacement of more than 150 families from eastern Khan Younis and eastern Gaza city. Affected families said they fled because of tank movements or bombing. Forty of the newly displaced families have been identified by partners as requiring emergency assistance as they fled with only what they could carry, and a response by multiple partners has been initialized. Simultaneously, Israeli strikes continued to be reported during the reporting period, affecting residential areas and makeshift shelters. In one incident on 18 May, an airstrike hit Jabalya Camp, reportedly damaging 35 families’ tents and tarpaulins and displacing dozens of them. Data by the Ministry of Health (MoH) in Gaza indicates that between 12 and 20 May, 24 Palestinians were killed, five bodies were retrieved, two died of wounds, and 159 people were injured. This brings the overall reported casualty toll since the announcement of a ceasefire agreement on 10 October 2025 to 881 fatalities and 2,621 injuries, according to MoH. Severe shortages of engine oil continue to disrupt critical water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) services across the Gaza Strip. The WASH Cluster estimates that approximately 7,000 litres are required every month and life‑saving activities are increasingly curtailed. Key infrastructure is already affected, as demonstrated by the shutdown of the Sheikh Radwan stormwater lagoon in Gaza city on 11 May to preserve generator lifespan after prolonged operation. Water and wastewater levels have since risen significantly, raising the risk of flooding in the coming weeks and posing serious public health threats, according to the WASH Cluster. At the same time, solid waste management continues to rely on temporary dump sites located near active displacement sites. Humanitarian partners report that displaced families are increasingly affected by skin infections and other illnesses, as rats and insects enter shelters and contaminate food. While efforts are ongoing to improve sanitation and pest control, more sustainable responses require restored access to Gaza’s sanitary landfills near the perimeter, where Israeli forces remain deployed, as well as the entry of debris removal machinery and other critical supplies such as trucks, compactors, loaders, containers or personal protective equipment. To address pest infestations, WASH Cluster partners and local organizations, in coordination with the United Nation’s Development Programme (UNDP), have launched a response plan targeting over 1,700 locations across the Gaza Strip on 17 May. It involves spraying, rodent control, and awareness raising activities. The supplies for the campaign – 3 tonnes of rodenticides and 3,000 litres of pesticides – were brought into Gaza last week by UNDP. Partners indicate that a full response to rodents and pests requires the Israeli authorities to facilitate access to Gaza’s landfills where waste can be safely disposed of and approve requests to bring into Gaza items necessary for the removal of debris and the clearance of explosive ordnance – as well as inputs necessary to keep that equipment running. According to the Site Management Cluster (SMC), some 1,600 displacement sites across Gaza are currently hosting about 1.7 million people, or 354,480 households. This is based on non-exhaustive data collected through in-person visits or – in some cases – phone interviews, between 3 February and 10 May. Nearly 88 per cent them reside in makeshift sites, while others are accommodated in collective centres or scattered locations. Population movements over the preceding month indicate largely localized displacement patterns, with most sites reporting no significant change, though some continue to experience inflows and outflows. Incoming Supplies Kerem Shalom and Zikim remain the only operational entry points for humanitarian and commercial goods into Gaza. Between 11 and 17 May, offloading rates were 81 per cent across all corridors, with every other truck from Egypt still unable to offload at the Israeli crossings along Gaza’s perimeter, based on data tracked by the Logistics Cluster; this does not include bilateral humanitarian donations or the private sector. On the commercial front, according to the Chamber of Commerce and other humanitarian partner market assessments, prices remained elevated but generally stable with fresh products continue to show the greatest volatility. The Cash Working Group (CWG) continues to advocate for an increased number of commercial trucks entering Gaza to support market recovery, a reduction in fees applied to essential commodities, and a more appropriate balance between essential and non‑essential items being imported to better meet priority needs and stabilize markets. Between 7 and 20 May, the United Nation Office for Project Services (UNOPS) took into Gaza more than 2.1 million litres of diesel petrol into Gaza and distributed just over 2 million litres of diesel (including from stocks brought in before that period) in support of humanitarian operations. The UN is only able to confirm the entry of supplies tracked by UN 2720. For breakdowns of those, see the online UN 2720 Mechanism Dashboard. For a detailed account of the latest humanitarian operations in Gaza, see Annex 1 below. Funding Annexes Annex 1: Humanitarian Operations in the Gaza Strip by Cluster Read more This section covers 11 to 17 May unless otherwise specified. Food Security As of 18 May, partners provided general food assistance to 122,000 households (440,000 people) as part of the May monthly distribution. Each family receiving two parcels, one 25-kilogram flour bag and 2.5 kilograms of high energy biscuits, covering 75 per cent of the minimum caloric needs – the same as in April. Additional caloric needs are still covered through other modalities. As of 13 May, partners continued preparing and serving about 1 million meals every day through 103 kitchens and to almost 1,800 different locations. While these efforts remain critical, partners have scaled down cooked meal production due to funding constraints and rising operational costs. As the same time, responders are seeking to diversify assistance modalities, to include more cash and livelihood support. Humanitarian partners continue to support bread production through subsidized bakeries, community ovens, and partners’ own baking facilities, producing at least 300 metric tons of bread daily – about 36 per cent of the Strip’s estimated bread needs. More than 35 commercial bakeries are involved in these efforts, alongside flour distributions by partners and bilateral government actors to help families bake bread at home. As of 17 May, 28 subsidized bakeries were producing approximately 130,000 two-kilogram bread bundles per day, with about 80 per cent sold at a subsidized price of 3 NIS (US$0.85) through 168 contracted retailers and the remaining 20 per cent distributed free of charge to over 300 shelters and community sites. Meanwhile, under the “diesel-only” model, five private bakeries supported with free fuel by humanitarian partners resumed operations late April and have gradually increased production, despite ongoing challenges related to high fuel, spare parts, and engine oil costs. A few examples of what is still needed: Scaling up home gardening requires strengthened technical support, including real-time advisory channels, the use of organic compost, seed-saving practices, and the provision of seedlings to improve germination rates. Proper site assessments are also essential to ensure feasibility, taking into account water and soil quality, available space, and safe access for households. At a broader level, restoring local food production depends on the timely and unrestricted entry of agricultural inputs through commercial and humanitarian channels, alongside enabling local importers to directly source and import the materials needed to restart and sustain production at scale. Water, Health and Sanitation (WASH) Fifty-four partners provide approximately 24,000 cubic metres of water per day to people in more than 2,000 locations, as 74 per cent or all households in Gaza rely on such deliveries. Between 4 and 17 May, UNICEF distributed 15,343 hygiene kits, 2,448 dignity kits, and 7,350 jerry cans benefitting almost 116,000 people. A few examples of what is still needed: Generator and vehicle spare parts and consumables – including engine oil, air filters, and tires – are urgently needed, alongside emergency repair kits for the Israeli Mekorot and UAE water pipelines as well as water pipes of various sizes. Additional priorities include reverse osmosis units, spare parts and accessories for existing systems, and solid waste compactors, as well as access to landfills near Gaza’s perimeter to ease pressure on temporary dump sites in southern Gaza. Health Between 11-17 May, partners supported the medical evacuation of 59 patients, including six children, to Egypt via Rafah Crossing, alongside 87 caregivers. Partners provided medical consultations, with reportable diseases accounting for 21.4 per cent of the consultations across 181 reporting sites. Increasing trends were observed in skin diseases, acute watery diarrhea, and bloody diarrhea, while acute respiratory infections declined, likely reflecting seasonal variation. Environmental surveillance results for March and April 2026 confirmed all samples negative for Poliovirus, marking 12 consecutive months without detection; in line with WHO guidance, the outbreak may be considered over pending Poliovirus Outbreak Response Assessment (OBRA) desk review. A risk assessment for rodent-associated diseases remains ongoing. Partners completed a training on infection prevention and control (IPC) and isolation protocols for over 400 clinical staff across five major hospitals, as well as more than 100 environmental cleaners and emergency medical services personnel. A few examples of what is still needed: Water testing equipment and liquid chlorine supplies are lacking in hospitals, primary health-care centres, and medical points because of administrative impediments from Israeli authorities. For more information, see the online Heath Cluster Dashboard. Shelter Between 11 and 17 May, partners provided 14,429 households with shelter and non-food assistance through in-kind and cash-based modalities. Assistance included 14,936 bedding items, 3,173 bedding kits, 2,922 tarpaulins, 1,114 sealing-off kits, and 839 clothing kits. The Rapid Joint Distribution Mechanism supported 55 households with emergency shelter and essential household items, including 10 packages of tents and non-food items and 45 sealing-off kits. Partners installed 115 emergency shelters in Gaza and Khan Younis using Shelter Cluster Emergency Shelter Kit designs and specifications. A few examples of what is still needed: More essential household items are needed, as available stocks are merely enough to support fewer than 3,400 additional households. Administrative impediments imposed by Israeli authorities should be lifted along with restrictions on shelter items. For more information, see the Shelter Cluster website. Protection Between 11 and 17 May, 11 protection partners delivered lifesaving and protection-related services to almost 11,000 people: Mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS), including psychological first aid and individual and group counselling, was provided to 8,259 people; Legal aid and legal awareness support was provided to 219 people; Referrals and case follow-up were provided to 232 people; Other support was provided to 341 persons with disabilities; Group psychosocial support sessions were provided to 350 people; Mine action and explosive ordnance risk education were provided to 168 people; Relief was distributed to 1,265 people; Staff-care activities were conducted for 25 responders. During the same period, partners offered services to 146 returnees from Egypt; since the reopening of the Rafah border and as of 14 May, 2,429 returnees have been assisted, including 885 currently receiving follow-up protection services. Protection monitoring activities continued through eight focus group discussions and 130 key informant interviews across 16 neighbourhoods, reaching 1,155 people. A few examples of what is still needed: It is critical to address the psychological distress affecting staff members, alongside persistent fuel shortages, rising transportation costs, cash flow constraints, and the limited availability of essential materials and spare parts. For more information, see the online Protection Cluster dashboard. Child Protection Between 11 and 17 May, partners: provided MHPSS services to over 4,000 children and approximately 1,500 caregivers. Services included structured psychosocial support sessions, recreational and resilience-building activities, art and drama interventions, individual counselling, Psychological First Aid, parenting support, and community-based psychosocial programmes. conducted child protection awareness and community-based protection activities for another 4,700 children and caregivers through awareness sessions, risk mitigation activities, positive parenting sessions, safety mapping exercises, and community outreach across shelters, camps, schools, and displacement sites; provided individual case management support to 56 newly identified high-risk children, while continuing follow-up for more than 3,000 active child protection cases involving children without parental care, highly distressed children, and children exposed to violence, neglect, exploitation, family separation, and unsafe living conditions. conducted 135 follow-up contacts for unaccompanied and separated children to assess wellbeing, care arrangements, and protection concerns; A few examples of what is still needed: Additional funding and operational support are needed to sustain high-risk child protection case management, MHPSS services, outreach activities, and child-friendly spaces, many of which face disruptions. Partners also require increased fuel, transportation, and operational supplies to maintain home visits, referrals, and follow-up activities, particularly in underserved and newly displaced areas. Additional trained case workers, MHPSS specialists, accessible safe spaces, and psychosocial materials are also needed to respond to growing protection concerns among children and adolescents across Gaza. Mine Action UNMAS conducted 36 explosive hazard assessments in support of debris removal and other partner activities, and three inter-agency missions. Partners conducted explosive ordnance risk education activities, reaching almost 3,480 people between 10 and 14 May. Since the October 2025 ceasefire announcement, 109 accidents have been recorded, leading to 265 Palestinians injured and 49 killed. Emergency Telecommunications Between 11 and 17 May, ETC continued close collaboration with UNDSS on the Communications Plan, providing final technical inputs with completion expected by 31 May. Coordination also continued with PRCS and ICRC to support technical recovery of the damaged VHF network in Gaza, building on earlier VHF coverage assessments conducted along the Gaza city–Zikim route. A few examples of what is still needed: Despite progress, connectivity in Gaza remains severely constrained, limiting humanitarian coordination. The VHF network remains only partially functional due to security constraints and limited technical capacity.
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