🌐 국제기구 · "MET" · 총 73건
필터 보기현재 지수
50.0
0 = 부정 우세
50 = 중립
100 = 긍정 우세
최근 7일 기준 5,976건을 분석한 결과, 뉴스 심리지수는 50.0(균형)입니다. 긍정 0건(0.0%)·중립 5,976건(100.0%)·부정 0건(0.0%)이며, 중립 비중이 뚜렷하게 높습니다. 성향 지수는 종합 0.0(중도 균형)입니다.
As civic space shrinks across Africa, one film festival is betting that cinema can do what reports and protests sometimes cannot, hold power to account.
Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo Source: World Health Organization Bunia, République démocratique du Congo — Quatre infirmiers, qui étaient traités pour la maladie à virus Ebola causée par le virus Bundibugyo, ont été autorisés à quitter un hôpital de Bunia, capitale de la province de l’Ituri, après avoir guéri de la maladie. D’autres guérisons sont attendues, en particulier lorsque les personnes sont diagnostiquées précocement et peuvent accéder aux soins, ainsi qu’à mesure que la riposte à l’épidémie s’intensifie. Les agents de santé avaient auparavant pris en charge des patients atteints d’Ebola dans leur établissement au début du mois de mai. Au total, cinq personnes se sont désormais remises du virus. Un agent de laboratoire s’était également rétabli plus tôt, le 28 mai. « C’est une victoire qui mérite d’être célébrée. C’est un message fort montrant qu’il est possible de guérir d’Ebola lorsque l’on consulte tôt dans une structure de santé dédiée », a déclaré le Dr Dieudonné Mwamba Kazadi, Directeur général de l’Institut national de santé publique du pays. Pour contribuer à renforcer la prise en charge clinique, l’Organisation mondiale de la Santé (OMS) a remis aux autorités sanitaires un Centre de traitement Ebola réhabilité à Bunia. L’établissement dispose d’une capacité initiale de 24 lits, pouvant être portée à 60 lits. L’OMS met également en place une annexe à ce centre, avec jusqu’à 42 lits, qui devrait être opérationnelle dans les semaines à venir. Au 31 mai, 210 cas confirmés avaient été signalés dans le pays, dont 17 décès confirmés. Au total, 349 cas suspects sont en cours d’investigation. Seize agents de santé ont été signalés comme infectés par Ebola au cours de cette flambée. Le Directeur général de l’OMS, Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, lors d’une visite à Bunia le 30 mai, a souligné que, bien qu’il n’existe actuellement aucun vaccin ou traitement homologué contre le virus Bundibugyo, « il n’y a pas lieu de perdre espoir. La maladie à virus Ebola causée par le virus Bundibugyo peut être surmontée grâce à de bons soins médicaux, et certaines personnes ici en Ituri se sont déjà rétablies. Consulter tôt fait réellement la différence. » Plus tôt dans la semaine, des groupes consultatifs de l’OMS ont annoncé que plusieurs traitements et vaccins candidats sont suffisamment prometteurs pour justifier leur priorisation en vue d’une évaluation dans des essais cliniques. L’OMS travaille actuellement en étroite collaboration avec la République démocratique du Congo et l’Ouganda pour faciliter la mise en œuvre de l’évaluation de ces produits dans le cadre de la recherche. Depuis la déclaration de l’épidémie d’Ebola le 15 mai, la République démocratique du Congo, avec l’appui de l’OMS et de ses partenaires, a mis en œuvre des mesures essentielles de riposte, allant du dépistage en laboratoire, à la surveillance de la maladie, en passant par la prévention et le contrôle des infections, l’engagement communautaire et la mobilisation des ressources. L’OMS s’engage à veiller à ce que les autres services de santé essentiels ainsi que l’assistance humanitaire continuent d’être fournis aux populations de l’Ituri et au-delà, et à ce que les actions mises en œuvre dans le cadre de cette riposte bénéficient aux communautés bien après la fin de l’épidémie. Pour plus d'informations ou pour demander des interviews, veuillez contacter : Eugene Kabambi Communications Officer WHO DRC Tel : +243 81 715 1697 Office : +47 241 39 027 Email: kabambie@who.int Collins Boakye-Agyemang Communications and marketing officer Tel: + 242 06 520 65 65 (WhatsApp) Email: boakyeagyemangc@who.int
Country: Ghana Source: World Bank Washington, 28th May 2026 - The World Bank today approved $500 million in financing for the Ghana Market Access and Connectivity Project (GMACP), a major initiative to improve rural road connectivity, strengthen agricultural value chains, expand economic opportunities, and create short-term direct jobs for rural communities across Ghana. Poor road conditions and inadequate maintenance have long constrained rural livelihoods in Ghana — limiting market access, driving up transport costs, and contributing to significant post-harvest losses. The project directly addresses these challenges by rehabilitating and maintaining critical feeder roads in selected regions, improving all-season connectivity between rural production areas and urban markets, and enabling farmers to reach buyers more efficiently, transition into higher-value agricultural activities, and unlock local job and income opportunities along agricultural value chains. "This project will improve access to markets and opportunities for rural communities while strengthening Ghana's agricultural competitiveness and resilience," said Robert Taliercio, World Bank Division Director for Ghana, Liberia, and Sierra Leone*. “It will directly benefit more than 550,000 people — including approximately 350,000 farmers, 250,000 women, and 310,000 youth. It is also expected to generate some 25,000 short-term direct jobs through civil works and road maintenance activities.”* To be implemented over five years by the Ministry of Roads and Highways, the GMACP project will support the rehabilitation and maintenance of more than 1,000 kilometers of rural roads across four clusters spanning the Upper West, Northern, Savannah, Oti, Volta, Eastern, Ashanti, Bono, and Western regions. These areas are major producers of priority crops — including maize, rice, yam, and cassava — that are central to Ghana's food security but remain constrained by poor market connectivity. Improved all-season access aims to reduce transport costs, shorten travel times, increase supply reliability, and open larger markets to smallholder farmers, ultimately reducing post-harvest losses, strengthening agricultural value chains, and contributing to lower food prices and improved food security. The GMACP incorporates climate-resilient design to ensure roads and drainage systems can withstand climate risks over the long term. Sustainability is a central pillar of the project: it will operationalize the Road Maintenance Trust Fund (RMTF) and introduce Performance-Based Contracts for road maintenance, while providing technical assistance to strengthen institutional capacity and ensure that rehabilitated roads remain functional well beyond project completion. PRESS RELEASE NO: 2026/073/AFW Contacts In Accra: Kennedy Fosu, (233) 302-221 4142 kfosu@worldbank.org
Country: Sierra Leone Source: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies Please refer to the attached file. Description of the Event Date when the trigger was met 13-05-2026 What happened, where and when? On 13 May 2026, the National Public Health Agency (NPHA), in collaboration with the Ministry of Health (MoH), officially declared a measles outbreak in Sierra Leone following confirmation of sustained transmission across multiple districts. On the same day, 41 confirmed cases were reported across eight districts: Western Area Urban (Freetown), Western Area Rural, Port Loko, Bombali, Tonkolili, Bo, Kenema, and Kono. Between 14 and 19 May 2026, an additional 8 confirmed cases were identified, bringing the total to 49 confirmed cases. The outbreak is characterized by a laboratory positivity rate of 75 per cent, indicating active community transmission and likely underdetection of cases through routine surveillance systems. The spread across both urban and rural districts, including densely populated communities in Freetown, significantly increases the risk of rapid nationwide propagation. The outbreak is occurring within a context of persistent immunity gaps linked to suboptimal routine immunization coverage, particularly in underserved and hard-to-reach communities. Children under five years of age remain the most vulnerable due to low vaccination uptake, malnutrition, and limited access to healthcare services. High population mobility, overcrowded settlements, schools, and marketplaces continue to facilitate rapid transmission. Health systems in affected districts are under increasing pressure due to rising demands for surveillance, case investigation, laboratory testing, community engagement, and case management. Existing response efforts are further constrained by weak community-level surveillance, limited outreach capacity for rapid vaccination scale-up, inadequate risk communication coverage, and shortages of operational resources in high-risk districts. In response, the MoH and NPHA activated the Incident Command Centre (ICC) and initiated coordination with humanitarian and development partners to scale up containment measures, including reactive vaccination, surveillance strengthening, community engagement, and case management support. NPHA has specifically requested urgent partner support to reinforce outbreak response efforts, warning that the outbreak risks escalating further, particularly in densely populated districts, if immediate action is not taken. Despite ongoing response measures, transmission continues to expand, highlighting the urgent need for coordinated humanitarian support to contain the outbreak, strengthen vaccination uptake, and reduce preventable morbidity and mortality among vulnerable populations.
Country: Lebanon Source: World Food Programme BEIRUT, Lebanon – The United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) is warning that nearly three months into the conflict, Lebanon faces a deepening humanitarian emergency with a critical combination of displacement and increased food insecurity. More than one million people remain displaced, while soaring prices, lost incomes and strained markets are pushing food further out of reach for vulnerable families. WFP has rapidly scaled up its response nationwide, but the situation remains highly fragile. Sustained humanitarian access, stable supply flows and predictable funding are critical to ensuring continued assistance for those most in need. Below are the latest updates on WFP operations and the food security situation in Lebanon: Since 2 March, WFP has reached a total of more than 700,000 conflict-affected people across Lebanon with emergency food and cash assistance. On average, WFP has supported close to 150,000 people per day since the escalation, providing hot meals, ready-to-eat rations, and food parcels to families sheltering in displacement sites. The ongoing conflict characterized by daily bombardments and displacement orders is challenging humanitarian access and resulting in continued displacement. These conditions are constraining the delivery of critical assistance, particularly in hard-to-reach areas. A total of 24 humanitarian convoys have been deployed to southern Lebanon, including border villages, Tyre and Hermel, to reach communities facing access constraints. More than 50 percent of the requested convoys have been delayed or cancelled due to movement and access risks. Current WFP assistance includes emergency cash support for close to half a million Lebanese through national systems, as well as cash support for more than 100,000 Syrian refugees. Since the onset of the emergency, WFP has distributed nearly five million hot meals, prioritizing newly displaced families arriving with limited belongings. WFP has supported more than 215,000 displaced people across over 500 shelters nationwide, alongside approximately 85,500 people in host communities and hard-to-reach areas. To help stabilize food availability, a shipment of 250 metric tons of wheat flour recently entered Lebanon through the corridor with Jordan, made possible through close coordination between Lebanese and Jordanian authorities. The shipment is supporting approximately 10,000 vulnerable households. The WFP-led Logistics Cluster has supported a total of 64 partners — including UNFPA, UNRWA, IOM, UNICEF, UNHCR, and international and national NGOs — of which 18 have utilized the logistics services to transport nearly 2,500 m³ of cargo. The latest food security analysis confirms a sharp deterioration nationwide, with 1.24 million people — nearly one in four — facing acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or worse) between April and August 2026. Displacement, rising food and fuel prices, market disruptions, and broader economic shocks are driving the crisis. While food remains available in many areas, it is becoming increasingly unaffordable. Since the start of the escalation, vegetable prices have risen by more than 20 percent, while bread prices have increased by around 15 percent. Market conditions vary significantly: in southern Lebanon and Nabatieh, more than 80 percent of markets are no longer functioning, while in Beirut and other areas markets remain operational but under growing strain. To sustain life-saving assistance and respond to rising needs, WFP requires USD 112 million between May and August 2026 (USD 44.1 million per month). Without adequate and predictable funding, WFP’s ability to maintain emergency food and cash assistance for vulnerable families across Lebanon will be at risk. Contact For more information please contact (email address: firstname.lastname@wfp.org): Rasha Abou Dargham, WFP/Lebanon, +961 76 866 779 Abeer Etefa, WFP/Cairo, Mob +20 106 66 34 352 Julian Miglierini, WFP/ Rome, Mob. +39 348 2316793 Rene McGuffin, WFP/ Washington Mob. +1 771 245 4268
Countries: Ukraine, Belarus, Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Türkiye Source: UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs Drone strike in Romania underscores growing risk of spillover of the war in Ukraine, Security Council hears Madam President, Excellencies, Only last week, the Secretary-General alerted this Council to the serious risk of further escalation of the war in Ukraine, including to the broader region. Last Friday, a dangerous incident crystallized our oft-stated warnings about potential spillover of the war. On the night of 28 to 29 May, an armed drone exploded on the top floor of a ten-story residential building in the eastern Romanian city of Galaţi, injuring two residents, a woman and a child. This was not the first reported breach of Romanian airspace by an armed drone since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. However, it was the first time such an incident resulted in casualties. The United Nations does not have any additional information on the strike in Galaţi. But Friday’s incident came on the heels of a worrying trend of drone incursions into the airspaces and territorial waters of countries bordering either Ukraine or the Russian Federation. Over the past 12 months, such incidents have been reported by the authorities in Moldova, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Finland, Poland, Kazakhstan, and Belarus, as well as in countries in the wider region - Bulgaria, Greece and Türkiye. Madam President, The United Nations strongly condemns all attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure. Such attacks, wherever they occur, violate international humanitarian law and must cease immediately. Civilians must be protected at all times. Madam President, The Galaţi incident comes amidst a sharp escalation of large-scale missile and drone attacks by the armed forces of the Russian Federation on Ukrainian towns and cities, resulting in ever worsening toll of civilian casualties and destruction of civilian infrastructure. There has also been a marked increase in Ukrainian attacks on military, energy and industrial infrastructure in the Russian Federation, which have reportedly resulted in a growing number of civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure. As the Secretary-General stressed last week, the dangerous trajectory of escalation and intensification that we are witnessing today, risks getting out of control. The current course must change. Madam President, The risk of miscalculation is particularly dangerous for the safety of nuclear facilities. Such risk has only increased in recent days. On 30 May, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was informed by the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant that a drone struck a turbine building at the site, reportedly causing a hole in its wall. This was the first such attack within the Plant’s perimeter since April 2024. Yesterday, the IAEA team at the site observed damage to the exterior of a turbine building, noting that it appeared consistent with the impact of a drone. We echo the deep concern expressed by the IAEA Director-General over this serious incident that endangered key nuclear safety principles. Attacks on nuclear sites are reckless and unacceptable. They must stop immediately to prevent any risk of a nuclear accident. Madam President, Amidst heightened tensions, it is incumbent on all concerned to act responsibly and to refrain from any action that could destabilize the situation further. As the Secretary-General emphasized last week, we urgently need immediate steps towards de-escalation, leading to a full and unconditional ceasefire. To that end, we urge dialogue and negotiations to resume at once. Diplomacy needs to be given a meaningful chance to create conditions for achieving peace in Ukraine. A peace that is just, lasting and comprehensive - in line with the Charter of the United Nations, international law, and relevant UN resolutions. A peace that contributes to a more stable regional and international environment. The United Nations will continue to fully support all meaningful efforts to that end. Thank you.
Countries: Afghanistan, Pakistan Source: UN Women Earthquake survivors in Afghanistan have been forced to flee again due to Pakistan-Afghanistan border conflict. It was during an air attack in eastern Afghanistan that 30-year-old Najeeba* felt her labour pains begin. Around her, families were already on the move, fleeing renewed hostilities along the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. But her baby wasn’t going to wait. Just six months earlier, the ground had shaken beneath her feet when a massive earthquake devastated the region. Now, it was the skies that she feared. “There was no safe place”, she recalled, as the conflict reached the camp where she had been living with other families displaced by the earthquake. “Aircraft were flying overhead, and my children were extremely frightened; whenever they heard the sound, they would cry and scream.” With her husband, she packed up their tent and few remaining belongings. Najeeba gave birth in a Red Crescent clinic, then climbed into a rented mini truck with her newborn daughter, six other children aged two to 11, and her husband, and escaped to a new camp in the Maza Dara Valley, in Nurgal district. What is happening on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and how does the conflict affect displaced women? More than 100,000 people have been displaced by the latest cross-border air strikes, shelling, drone attacks, and ground clashes in eastern Afghanistan, following the escalation of renewed hostilities along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Women and girls – who are already living under increasing restrictions on their freedoms and movement under the Taliban – and those struggling to survive the aftermath of last year’s earthquake in eastern Afghanistan have been hit hardest by the increased insecurity. An estimated 50,000 people in the affected areas are at increased risk of gender-based violence. And women have further reduced access to health and essential services. For pregnant women, the risks are even higher, as many face hunger and limited healthcare. Women displaced by border fighting in eastern Afghanistan face growing health risks; pregnant women struggle to access care For Najeeba and her family, the journey was expensive, forcing them to sell already scarce resources – precious blankets, flour, and cooking oil – just to pay for the trip to the new camp in the Maza Dara Valley. About 40 minutes away, along a steep dirt road in the mountains, another new mother reflected on the impact of the ongoing hostilities along the border. Seventeen-year-old Fahima* had given birth to her son just before the latest escalation began in late February. When the fighting started, her three other children, aged five and under, were terrified by the sound of aircraft and missiles. She and her husband – who had also been living in a camp with families displaced by the earthquake – decided to leave, selling flour and borrowing money to pay for transport. Less than a year ago, they were farmers, growing sorghum, wheat, and kidney beans to feed their family or sell for income. Now, forced to move for the second time in six months, they are running out of food. “Our land was destroyed [in the earthquake] and there is no work here”, Fahima said. “We give more food to our children and eat less ourselves.” More than two-thirds of women in ten impacted provinces have lost income, according to the Afghanistan Gender Coordination Group. Three-quarters report finding it harder to find food and more than four-in-ten report greater difficulty accessing healthcare. Women are also more likely to experience psychological distress. What is UN Women doing to support women and girls in eastern Afghanistan? With funding from the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, and through a local partner, UN Women has been supporting women-only safe spaces in camps for families displaced by the earthquake. Counsellors provide much-needed mental health support, while the spaces also offer a rare opportunity for women to connect with each other in privacy, despite the crowded camp conditions. Two of the four safe spaces have now been relocated due to the conflict. Each tent is run by a team of two, a manager and a counsellor, who provide support to women during the day, and cook and sleep in the same space at night. Many have toddlers with them, and return home to their older children, one day a week. Supporting Afghan women affected by trauma and displacement “We stay together and eat together – we are like a mother and daughter”, said Zaland,* 25, a counsellor who moved to a new location with her colleague after the hostilities escalated. Inside their newly re-erected safe space, bright balloons hang from the roof and multicoloured cardboard signs carry messages of mental health support along the walls. “Some of the women have suffered a great deal”, added Zaland. “Some have lost family members, some have lost their homes, some have lost livestock, and some have hungry children.” After counselling, she says, some women leave to collect wild plants to eat. Her colleague, Mastoora,* 36, explains the impact of their work. “The happiness I feel comes from knowing that, even if I cannot do much for a woman, I can at least say something that helps her”, she said. “When I go home, I explain [to my daughters] that I am working for women – they are happy when they see their mother going somewhere to serve other women.” For 17-year-old Fahima, the service helps her cope better, despite the daily struggle she faces to feed her four children. “When we come [for counselling], we feel relieved and our mood improves”, she says. “We would not come if they were male counsellors; the female counsellors are like our sisters, and we can speak openly with them.” Sustained humanitarian support is critical for women and girls in Afghanistan As families continue to endure double displacement following the 2025 earthquake, and now the on-going hostilities, women and girls are affected distinctly and immensely. Sustained support is essential to ensure that women’s civil society organizations can maintain vital women-only safe spaces and other community-based services, providing protection, mental health support, and dignity for those most at risk. * Names have been changed to protect identities.
Country: World Source: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies Please refer to the attached file. Message from the IFRC Secretary General Small and medium-sized disasters may not dominate global headlines, but for communities affected they are just as devastating. The IFRC’s Disaster Response Emergency Fund (IFRC-DREF) ensures that these crises are met with speed, dignity and locally-led action. Money is made available fast, without the need to wait for a specific appeal. The DREF 2026 Plan is firmly anchored in the IFRC’s Renewal. In the context of significant global funding constraints, humanitarians must be more focused, disciplined and accountable than ever. The IFRC-DREF is central to this shift - enabling early, flexible financing while reinforcing strong stewardship and clear evidence of results. It is also innovative both in the way it is financed (our world-first indemnity insurance policy was triggered for the first time in 2024) and in how its funds are allocated; funding anticipatory action, before hazards hit, is a growing priority. Our 2026–2030 DREF Ambition involves strengthening not only what we fund, but how we deliver. In 2026, we will continue to streamline processes, improve sequencing between DREF grants and Emergency Appeals and reinforce compliance and operational quality. This ensures that speed is matched by sound decision-making, transparency and impact. Localization remains at the heart of IFRC-DREF. By channeling resources directly to National Societies, we enable action that is timely, context-driven and sustainable. At a time when humanitarian needs are rising and financing is under pressure, this agile and principled mechanism is more essential than ever. The DREF 2026 Plan reflects our commitment to work smarter, better demonstrate impact and ensure that no community facing disaster is ignored. I urge you to read it. Jagan Chapagain Context and rationale for the 2026 plan What is the IFRC-DREF? The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies’ Disaster Response Emergency Fund (IFRC-DREF) is an efficient, fast, transparent, and localized way of getting funding directly to local humanitarian actors – both before and after a crisis. It enables National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies to respond rapidly to emergencies and act ahead of predictable hazards through two complementary pillars: • Response • Anticipatory Action The fund combines speed, flexibility, transparency and localization to support community-led humanitarian action. Context and rationale for the 2026 plan The IFRC’s Disaster Response Emergency Fund (IFRC-DREF) enters 2026 at a pivotal moment, marking the conclusion of its Strategic Ambition 2020–2025 and the release of the IFRC-DREF Strategic Ambition 2026–2030, with 2026 serving as the first year of its operationalization. This transition builds on a period of significant reform, as the revision of procedures introduced in 2025 strengthened accountability, clarified operational and financial rules, and reinforced minimum readiness requirements, including for anticipatory action, while safeguarding IFRC-DREF’s core strengths of speed, flexibility, and reliability. These developments take place within the broader context of the IFRC Renewal, which seeks to strengthen a collective approach by reinforcing localization, quality, accountability, and proximity to communities across the IFRC network (the IFRC secretariat and its 191 member National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies). At the same time, National Societies continue to operate in increasingly complex environments shaped by: · climate-related disasters, · epidemics, · displacement, · economic pressures, · and shrinking humanitarian funding. These realities reinforce the importance of a fast, agile and locally led humanitarian financing mechanism. Global operational realities In 2025, IFRC-DREF allocated CHF 77.4 million across 170 operations in 83 National Societies, supporting 14.5 million people affected by crises worldwide. While most allocations remained under the Response Pillar (CHF 64.9 million), anticipatory action reached a record CHF 12.7 million, representing 16% of total funding. This growth was supported by the approval of 11 new simplified EAPs and 21 new EAPs. Despite a decline from 2024, allocations in 2025 remained 75% higher than in 2021, while operations increased by 27% over the same period. At the same time, the number of countries supported remained relatively stable, reflecting growing concentration of IFRC-DREF usage in highly crisis-affected contexts. Anticipatory action expanded significantly faster than the overall fund between 2021 and 2025, increasing by approximately 150%. This trend is expected to continue in 2026 through simplified procedures and expanded early action mechanisms. Despite growing pressure on humanitarian financing systems, IFRC-DREF allocations in 2025 remained 75% higher than in 2021.
Country: Lebanon Source: International Organization for Migration Beirut, 22 de mayo de 2026 – Una alianza de organizaciones no gubernamentales humanitarias internacionales y locales en el Líbano ha lanzado una campaña mundial de recaudación de fondos para ayudar a las familias de todo el país a recuperarse de los impactos acumulados del conflicto, el desplazamiento y la crisis económica. La iniciativa se lleva a cabo bajo los auspicios del Ministerio de Asuntos Sociales del Líbano y cuenta con la facilitación de la Organización Internacional para las Migraciones (OIM). "La emergencia humanitaria del Líbano exige una respuesta rápida, coordinada y fundamentada en la dignidad", afirmó la Ministra Haneen Sayed. "El Ministerio de Asuntos Sociales ha liderado este esfuerzo, incluso a través de la Red de Seguridad con Capacidad de Respuesta ante Crisis, nuestro mecanismo nacional de asistencia de emergencia en efectivo, que ya ha llegado a más de 140.000 hogares de personas desplazadas. Sin embargo, la magnitud de las necesidades requiere una solidaridad más amplia." Su Excelencia añadió: "Esta alianza mundial reúne a las comunidades de la diáspora libanesa, a simpatizantes internacionales y a organizaciones de la sociedad civil en torno a una responsabilidad compartida: estar del lado de las familias afectadas por la guerra y el desplazamiento. Comprometidos con el Líbano es un complemento importante de los esfuerzos nacionales, que contribuye a movilizar apoyo allí donde más se necesita." El Líbano sigue enfrentando una crisis tras otra. Mientras el país lucha por recuperarse de una prolongada crisis económica y financiera, las recientes hostilidades han desestabilizado aún más los medios de vida, han desplazado a familias y han trastocado la vida cotidiana. Incluso en los hogares que permanecen en pie, las familias continúan enfrentando dificultades para satisfacer sus necesidades básicas, reconstruir sus ingresos y recuperar la estabilidad. "La asistencia en efectivo ofrece a las familias la flexibilidad de priorizar lo que más les importa. Ya sea alimentación, medicamentos, gastos de alojamiento o transporte, los hogares saben cuáles son sus mayores necesidades", señaló Mathieu Luciano, Jefe de Oficina de OIM Líbano. "Al proporcionar apoyo en efectivo, estamos reforzando la capacidad de decisión y ayudando a las familias a consolidar las bases necesarias para recuperar su estabilidad." La alianza humanitaria internacional incluye a Save the Children Líbano, World Vision en el Líbano, Care International en el Líbano, Himaya Daeem Aataa y el Consejo Danés para los Refugiados. Esta alianza garantiza que la asistencia humanitaria se canalice a través de los mecanismos de coordinación establecidos por las Naciones Unidas y de enfoques comunitarios. Los hogares apoyados a través de la alianza Arraigados por el Líbano son identificados mediante registros nacionales y evaluaciones de los socios, lo que permite que la asistencia focalizada llegue a quienes más la necesitan. Conozca más y apoye la campaña Comprometidos con el Líbano o realizando su donación en Comprometidos con el Líbano. Para más información, visite el Centro de Prensa de la OIM.
Country: Lebanon Source: International Organization for Migration Beyrouth, 22 mai 2026 – Une alliance d’organisations non gouvernementales humanitaires internationales et locales au Liban a lancé une campagne mondiale de collecte de fonds afin d’aider les familles du pays à se relever des impacts cumulés du conflit, du déplacement et de la crise économique. L’initiative est conduite sous les auspices du ministère libanais des Affaires sociales et facilitée par l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations (OIM). « L’urgence humanitaire au Liban appelle une réponse rapide, coordonnée et fondée sur la dignité », a déclaré la ministre Haneen Sayed. « Le ministère des Affaires sociales conduit cet effort, notamment à travers le filet de protection sociale adaptatif aux chocs, notre mécanisme national d’aide d’urgence en espèces, qui a déjà atteint plus de 140 000 ménages déplacés. Mais l’ampleur des besoins exige une solidarité plus large. » Son Excellence a ajouté : « Cette alliance mondiale rassemble les communautés de la diaspora libanaise, les soutiens internationaux et les organisations de la société civile autour d’une responsabilité partagée : se tenir aux côtés des familles touchées par la guerre et le déplacement. Engagés pour le Liban constitue un complément important aux efforts nationaux, en contribuant à mobiliser des ressources là où elles sont le plus nécessaires. » Le Liban continue de faire face à une succession de crises. Alors que le pays peine à se remettre d’une crise économique et financière prolongée, les hostilités récentes ont davantage fragilisé les moyens de subsistance, déplacé des familles et bouleversé la vie quotidienne. Même dans les foyers encore debout, de nombreux ménages peinent à couvrir leurs besoins essentiels, à reconstituer leurs revenus et à retrouver une certaine stabilité. « L’aide en espèces offre aux familles la souplesse nécessaire pour répondre à leurs priorités. Qu’il s’agisse de nourriture, de médicaments, de frais de logement ou de transport, les ménages savent mieux que quiconque où se situent leurs besoins les plus pressants », a déclaré Mathieu Luciano, chef de bureau de l’OIM au Liban. « En fournissant une aide en espèces, nous renforçons l’autonomie des familles et les aidons à consolider les bases nécessaires pour retrouver leur stabilité. » L’alliance humanitaire internationale comprend Save the Children Lebanon, World Vision in Lebanon, Care International in Lebanon, Himaya Daeem Aataa et le Conseil danois pour les réfugiés. Elle veille à ce que l’assistance soit acheminée par l’intermédiaire des mécanismes de coordination des Nations Unies établis et au moyen d’approches communautaires. Les ménages soutenus par l’alliance Engagés pour le Liban sont identifiés grâce aux registres nationaux et aux évaluations des partenaires, permettant ainsi à une assistance ciblée d’atteindre les personnes qui en ont le plus besoin. Pour en savoir plus et soutenir la campagne Engagés pour le Liban, faites un don sur la plateforme Rooted for Lebanon. Pour plus d'informations, veuillez consulter le Centre médias de l'OIM.
Countries: Iran (Islamic Republic of), Afghanistan Source: Norwegian Refugee Council Millions of Iranian civilians and Afghan refugees living in Iran have been severely affected by the conflict, which has forced millions to flee their homes across the country. Essential civilian infrastructure has been damaged, exacerbating deep humanitarian needs, warned Jan Egeland, Secretary General of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) during a visit to the country. “Families here in Iran, both vulnerable Iranians and Afghan refugees, are paying a terrible price for this war,” said Egeland. “Widespread US and Israeli airstrikes forced millions to leave their homes in search of safety. Children are traumatised and have had their education disrupted, whilst parents struggle to make ends meet due to inflation and rising prices. Everyone I have spoken to feels fearful that the war will again escalate.” Since the war began on the 28th of February, almost 3,500 people have been killed in the country, with more than 32,000 people injured nationwide. Across Iran, Israel, Lebanon, and the Gulf, thousands have been killed in airstrikes, with millions of lives shattered as a result of widespread attacks. The intense air campaign on Iran – in densely populated areas – triggered massive displacement, with millions fleeing Tehran to seek safety. People who temporarily relocated are now returning, but those whose homes and livelihoods were destroyed remain displaced. In total, almost 150,000 homes, shops, schools, and other civilian buildings have been damaged, and 17 million pupils remain unable to attend school in person. NRC calls upon all parties to commit to a permanent end of hostilities. A sustained ceasefire and lasting peace agreement would enable the civilian populations in all conflict affected countries to gradually resume their lives and facilitate safe humanitarian access for humanitarian relief and rehabilitation. “Civilian life in Iran has been turned upside down as a result of the war,” said Egeland. “NRC and our partners have been doing all we can to support Afghan refugees and displaced Iranians. But we only have a third of the funding we need to sustain our emergency relief efforts.” NRC has been working in Iran since 2012, providing support to hundreds of thousands across ten provinces, including cash assistance, education, and water and sanitation. “Without further funding, we will have to reduce our emergency relief efforts instead of scaling up for those in desperate need. We only have funding from Norway, Sweden, and the European Union, in spite of Iran being the world’s largest refugee-hosting country and the dramatic impact of the war on civilians,” said Egeland. “Without proper resources for this crisis response, the lives of both Iranian civilians and Afghan refugees will face severe consequences from this war, for years to come.” Most of the four million Afghan refugees have been living in the country for decades, in urban and semi-urban industrial areas where their employment opportunities have been curtailed by the war and the sanctions against the Iranian economy. “The people I’ve met here in Iran speak of terrible loss: homes, family members, life savings, but also of the traumatising impact the war has had on children. Now, economic pressures are robbing them of their hope for the future. It is vital that we support both the vulnerable Iranian and Afghan refugee population, to prevent a further deepening of this humanitarian crisis,” said Egeland. Notes to editors: Photos and B-roll from Iran can be downloaded for free use here Around 3.2 million people were temporarily displaced at the beginning of the war (UNHCR). The Iranian Ministry of Health report 3,375 civilian deaths and 32,314 injuries nationwide. (OCHA). Nearly 149,000 civilian units have reportedly damaged, directly affecting an estimated 400,000 people. (OCHA). 1,200 educational facilities reported as affected and 20 schools destroyed, as well as 240 health facilities reported damaged (OCHA). More than 17 million students remain unable to attend school in person. (OCHA) With over 4.4 million Afghans seeking safety and livelihoods in the country, Iran is currently hosting the world's largest refugee population (UNHCR). About 2.4 million Afghans reside in Tehran (according to the Province Governor). Tehran metropolitan area hosts a significant Afghan population due to its industrial zones, employment opportunities, and proximity to the capital. The response for Afghan refugees in Iran has been chronically underfunded with just 18 per cent funded in 2025 through the Regional Refugee Response Plan (OCHA). The more than four million Afghans are among the most affected by the consequences of the war. More than 35,000 have returned to Afghanistan since the start of the conflict, and more than one million remain at risk of deportation. (NRC) The humanitarian response is 47% funded -only 37.6 of the 80 million US dollars required have been raised (OCHA) On the evening of the 7th of April, a ceasefire agreement was announced, but airstrikes have continued. NRC has been working in Iran since 2012. In 2025, NRC provided assistance to nearly 115,000 Afghans and host community members across 10 provinces. NRC is aiming to target 50,000 Iranians and Afghans affected by this crisis across nine provinces, while prioritising cash assistance, education services, protection and legal assistance and integrated water and sanitation, and shelter support to ensure vulnerable communities can meet their urgent needs. For more information or to arrange an interview, please contact : NRC global media hotline: media@nrc.no, +47 905 62 329 More on #War and conflict
Country: Mali Source: Famine Early Warning System Network Please refer to the attached file. Messages clé Suite à l’escalade de l’insécurité après les attaques coordonnées de fin avril, l**’insécurité alimentaire devrait se détériorer de Crise (Phase 3 de l'IPC) à Urgence (Phase 4 de l'IPC) à Kidal à partir de juin,** avec une faible proportion de ménages pauvres et déplacés en Catastrophe (Phase 5 de l’IPC). Les flux commerciaux, notamment en provenance d’Algérie, ont été fortement réduit en raison de l’intensification des bombardements militaires, des persécutions des groupes armés, et de l’absence de convois escortés, entraînant un isolement accru de la région durant la période de soudure agropastorale. La forte baisse des approvisionnements et des pénuries observées sur certains marchés, combinées aux prix déjà élevés et à la baisse des revenus, réduisent considérablement l’accès des ménages aux aliments. Bien que les ménages pauvres de Kidal disposent encore d'actifs en mai, leur capacité d'adaptation devrait se dégrader considérablement à partir de juin. L'accès à l’assistance humanitaire demeure sévèrement restreint en raison des contraintes de mobilité. La forte baisse des flux commerciaux est susceptible d'entretenir la flambée des prix et les pénuries d'approvisionnement sur les marchés, tandis que les perturbations des mouvements de bétail compromettent une source essentielle d'alimentation et de revenus saisonniers. Un recours atypique à la décapitalisation du bétail et à la mendicité tentera d'atténuer des importants déficits de consommation alimentaire ; toutefois, la détérioration de l'insécurité alimentaire ne fera qu'exacerber la situation nutritionnelle dans cette région. Dans le contexte de détérioration sécuritaire et économique, des résultats d’Urgence (Phase 4 de l’IPC) persisteront à Ménaka jusqu’en septembre avec une augmentation du nombre de personne en Urgence (Phase 4 de l’IPC) à Catastrophe (Phase 5 de l’IPC) à cause des impacts significatifs de la recrudescence de l’insécurité sur la capacité des ménages à accéder aux aliments dans la région. Dans les zones d’insécurité de Gao, Mopti et Tombouctou, des résultats de Crise (Phase 3 de l'IPC) seront observés de mai à septembre liés à la baisse importante du pouvoir d’achat. Les zones du nord des régions de Ségou, Nara et de Nioro et les centres urbains devraient rester en Stress (Phase 2 de l’IPC) jusqu’en septembre 2026, avec une faible proportion des ménages déplacés et plus pauvres en Crise (Phase 3 de l’IPC), sous l’effet combiné de la baisse des revenus, des prix élevés, et d’une soudure précoce liée à l’épuisement des stocks. Les attaques coordonnées du Front de Libération de l’Azawad (FLA) et du Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) le 25 avril 2026 et la tentative de blocus de Bamako, annoncé le 28 avril, ont fortement perturbé les flux commerciaux et les activités économiques à l’échelle nationale. Les attaques visant les garnisons de Kidal, Gao, Mopti, Bamako, Kati, ainsi que la tentative de blocus sur Bamako, ont considérablement réduit les mouvements de marchandises et de personnes sur plusieurs axes routiers stratégiques. Les affrontements se sont poursuivis en mai, malgré l’intensification des offensives militaires et les escortes. Les menaces et attaques contre les véhicules en direction de Bamako réduisent les flux alimentaires depuis Sikasso et Ségou vers Kayes, Nioro et la capitale. Les approvisionnements restent inférieurs à la normale, maintenant des prix élevés et limitant la capacité des ménages pauvres à satisfaire leurs besoins alimentaires malgré les stocks disponibles. Les perturbations persistantes de l’approvisionnement en carburant en dehors de Bamako, entraînent des prix anormalement élevés du transport et des denrées alimentaires, exacerbant les difficultés d’accès alimentaire des ménages pauvres, en particulier dans les zones déjà affectées par l’insécurité. Début mai, les prix de l’essence sur le marché parallèle ont enregistré une hausse allant de 42 à plus de 60 pour cent par rapport aux deux dernières semaines dans plusieurs localités (Koro, Mopti, Bankass, Douentza, Ménaka). Les prix des céréales de base affichaient en fin avril une augmentation de 15, 19 et 42 pour cent respectivement à Ménaka, Gao et Kidal par rapport à la moyenne quinquennale ; parallèlement, la hausse de des prix des denrées de base variait de 25 à 71 pour cent d’avril à mai dans les régions de Mopti, Gao et Ménaka, selon OCHA. L’impact conjugué de l’insécurité, de la crise d’électricité, du carburant et de la flambée des prix des denrées dégrade fortement le pouvoir d’achat et l’accès aux aliments des ménages pauvres. La campagne agricole 2026/27 démarre dans un contexte de perspectives pluviométriques moins favorables et de contraintes persistantes d’insécurité et d’accès aux intrants agricoles. Alors que des cumuls de pluies moyens étaient initialement prévues, les dernières prévisions indiquent des conditions pluviométriques inferieures à la moyenne entre juin et août dans le sud. Ces perspectives défavorables dans les zones agricoles du sud s’ajoutent aux effets du conflit, et de l’accès réduit aux intrants, y compris les engrais, à cause des développements au Moyen Orient, qui devraient tous ramener la production de moyenne à inférieur à la moyenne dans le pays. Néanmoins, malgré les difficultés de la production agricole, les activités agricoles dans le sud en cours offrent des revenus et de nourriture qui atténueront les difficultés d’accès aux aliments des ménages pauvres. Dans le centre et le nord du pays, l’insécurité limite l’accès aux champs, réduit les superficies cultivables et restreint les opportunités de main d’œuvre agricole.
Country: Niger Source: Famine Early Warning System Network Please refer to the attached file. Messages clé Des résultats de Crise (Phase 3 de l’IPC) persistent dans les régions de Tillabéry, Diffa et du nord-ouest de la région de Tahoua, de mai à septembre, où l’insécurité a entraîné une faible production agricole conduisant à un épuisement précoce des stocks alimentaires et une forte dépendance aux marchés, tant pour les déplacées que pour les ménages pauvres. Le pouvoir d’achat est insuffisant qui ne leur permettent pas d’accéder à des quantités adéquates de nourriture, face à des prix élevés (le mil se vend à 300 FCFA/kg au lieu du prix national de 230 FCFA/kg). La faible demande et l'augmentation de l'offre de main-d'œuvre locale disponible entraînent une baisse des revenus inférieure à la moyenne saisonnière, obligeant ces ménages à réduire le nombre de repas, générant ainsi des déficits alimentaires. Des groupes restreints connaissent une insécurité alimentaire aiguë d’Urgence (Phase 4 de l’IPC). Ce sont les ménages déplacés qui envoient leurs enfants mendier et les ménages résidents très pauvres qui sont obligés de consommer les stocks de semences conservés pour la prochaine campagne agricole. Une insécurité alimentaire aiguë de Stress (Phase 2 de l’IPC) est observée dans presque tout le pays et pourrait persister jusqu’en septembre 2026. Les zones concernées sont principalement les zones agricoles, agropastorales et pastorales qui ne sont pas affectées par les conflits et dont les marchés fonctionnent normalement, mais affichent des prix élevés. Les ménages pauvres, à faibles revenus et qui n’ont plus de stocks alimentaires, sont les plus affectés. Ils ont une consommation alimentaire adéquate, mais sont incapables de satisfaire les besoins essentiels non alimentaires sans recourir à des stratégies d’adaptation négatives. L’insécurité civile s'est considérablement accrue suite à une augmentation du nombre d’incidents sécuritaires et de déplacés dans les foyers de conflit. Selon ACLED, le nombre total d’incidents sécuritaires a augmenté de 33 pour cent entre janvier et avril 2026 par rapport à la même période en 2025, avec des augmentations de 53 pour cent, 19 pour cent et 12 pour cent enregistrées, respectivement dans les régions de Tillabéry, Dosso et Diffa. Ces attaques de groupes armés ont entraîné des déplacements continus de populations. La population en déplacement interne (PDI) est estimée à 548 000 personnes, soit 53 pour cent de la population totale en déplacement forcé de 1 042 859 personnes, selon l’UNHCR. Ces PDI sont concentrés à Tillabéry (45 pour cent), Diffa (32 pour cent) et Tahoua (12 pour cent), ce qui amplifie la pression sur les sources de revenus et de nourriture dans ces régions. Le fonctionnement des marchés est perturbé dans les zones de conflit, où les prix des denrées de base sont supérieurs de 30 pour cent à la moyenne nationale. L’offre est en baisse par rapport à l’année dernière et à la moyenne quinquennale, en raison des répercussions des conflits et du recul de la production agricole 2025/26 consécutif à l’arrêt précoce de la saison des pluies et à la baisse des superficies emblavées. Dans le reste du pays, l'offre moyenne sur les marchés reflète un fonctionnement normal, la demande toutefois inférieure à celle de l’année dernière, du fait de la disponibilité des stocks de report et du démarrage de la vente de céréales à prix modéré. Les prix des denrées alimentaires, inférieurs à ceux de l'année dernière, s'inscrivent dans la ligne de la baisse de 7,5 pour cent du taux global d'inflation en glissement annuel enregistrée en avril 2026 par rapport à 2025 (Institut national de la statistique). Les perturbations du commerce international provoquées par les conflits en cours au Moyen-Orient pourraient, à moyen terme, augmenter les prix des produits importés, notamment le riz importé, l’huile, le sucre, la farine de blé et les engrais. Cette augmentation des prix de ces produits constitue un facteur additionnel, réduisant davantage le pouvoir d’achat des ménages particulièrement pauvres et déplacés, ainsi que celui des ménages des centres urbains. Toutefois, les prochaines récoltes, ainsi que la stabilité des prix des hydrocarbures et des coûts de transport résultant d'une production domestique de carburant permettant de maîtriser l'inflation, atténueront les impacts sur l’accès aux produits alimentaires. Les précipitations pour la prochaine saison pluvieuse, de juin à septembre, sont estimées inférieures à la moyenne, contrairement aux prévisions antérieures qui prévoyaient des précipitations moyennes à supérieures à la moyenne dans la région du Sahel.Par ailleurs, des périodes de longue à moyenne durée, sans précipitations significatives au début de la saison, sont aussi attendues. Les effets combinés d’une pluviométrie déficitaire, d’une faible utilisation d’engrais par rapport à la normale, à la suite de la hausse de leur prix due au conflit au Moyen-Orient, et d’une baisse des superficies cultivées à cause des entraves à l’accès aux champs dues à l’insécurité civile vont entraîner une baisse de la production agricole globale pour la campagne 2026/2027. Les pics de baisse de la production céréalière seront enregistrés dans les zones affectées par les conflits.
Country: Haiti Source: Famine Early Warning System Network Please refer to the attached file. Messages clé Jusqu’en septembre 2026, les effets combinés de l’insécurité, des perturbations économiques et des difficultés d’accès aux moyens d’existence continueront d’alimenter une insécurité alimentaire aiguë élevée à travers le pays**. La plupart des départements resteront en Crise (phase 3 de l'IPC), mais une partie importante de la zone métropolitaine de Port-au-Prince restera en situation d'Urgence (phase 4 de l'IPC)**, en particulier les zones accueillant des ménages déplacés et les populations les plus exposées à la violence armée. La recrudescence des violences armées dans la zone métropolitaine de Port-au-Prince, l’Artibonite, et le Centre, ainsi que la hausse des enlèvements, continue de perturber les moyens d’existence, les flux commerciaux et l’accès aux revenus. Selon les Nations Unies, environ 30 000 personnes ont été déplacées durant la première moitié de mai 2026 au nord de Port-au-Prince, dont plus de 70 pour cent vers des sites de déplacés internes. Les contraintes sécuritaires réduisent l’accès aux terres agricoles, aux intrants, à la main-d’œuvre et aux marchés, particulièrement dans l’Ouest, l’Artibonite et le Centre. La répartition spatio-temporelle irrégulière des pluies depuis le début de la campagne de printemps perturbe les activités agricoles dans plusieurs zones, malgré des cumuls saisonniers et des conditions de végétation globalement favorables dans l’ensemble du pays. Les pauses pluviométriques alternant avec des épisodes de fortes pluies concentrées entravent le développement normal des cultures. Dans le Nord-ouest, des inondations et glissements de terrain ont particulièrement affectés les communes de Saint-Louis-du-Nord, Port-de-Paix et Anse-à-Foleur. Par conséquent, les pertes de récoltes potentielles pourraient maintenir les rendements printaniers en dessous de la moyenne, limitant les améliorations saisonnières de la disponibilité alimentaire et des revenus agricoles. Par ailleurs, le retour prévu de conditions El Niño à partir du second semestre 2026 pourrait entraîner des cumuls pluviométriques inférieurs à la moyenne et affecter négativement les rendements agricoles durant les saisons culturales d’automne et d’hiver, conformément aux conditions et aux effets historiques associées au phénomène El Niño. Les prix alimentaires demeurent élevés malgré le ralentissement de l’inflation annuelle, limitant l’amélioration du pouvoir d’achat des ménages pauvres. Selon l’IHSI, l’inflation annuelle a ralenti à 20,6 pour cent en mars 2026, contre 22,1 pour cent en février, mais l’inflation alimentaire demeure forte, actuellement à 22,9 pour cent. En avril, les denrées de base dépassaient encore leur moyenne quinquennale de 63 à 87 pour cent selon les produits, avec une hausse persistante du maïs local et du haricot noir. Ces prix élevés sont alimentés par les coûts de transport, les paiements imposés sur les axes routiers, les perturbations commerciales et la hausse du carburant. Malgré la revalorisation du salaire minimum du 6 mai, celle-ci ne compense pas l’érosion du pouvoir d’achat liée aux prix alimentaires et aux services essentiels. Les tensions au Moyen-Orient demeurent un risque inflationniste via leurs effets possibles sur le pétrole et les coûts de transport en Haïti.
Country: Philippines Source: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies Please refer to the attached file. Description of the Event Date of event 30-09-2025 What happened, where and when? On the 30 of September 2025, at precisely 9:59 PM, a strong 6.9-magnitude earthquake struck off the coast of Bogo City, marking it as the strongest recorded earthquake in Cebu province to date. The epicentre was located near Bogo City in northern Cebu, with an estimated shallow depth of about five kilometres, where intense ground shaking led to the collapse of buildings, destruction of roads, and power outages. Neighbouring municipalities, including Daanbantayan, Medellin, San Remigio, and even parts of Cebu City also felt the severe impact of the earthquake. The event’s aftermath affected two regions, Central Visayas (Region VII) and Eastern Visayas (Region VIII), with Northern Cebu in Region VII bearing the brunt of the impact and damages. According to the Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology (PHIVOLCS), the quake was tectonic and was caused by an offshore fault that had remained dormant for over 400 years, which has now been identified as the Bogo Bay Fault. PHIVOLCS issued a tsunami advisory for coastal communities exposed to the risks of abnormal sea level disturbances following the main shock, but this was later lifted after monitoring confirmed that no significant tsunami threat remained. Within the first 48 hours of the event, PHIVOLCS recorded over 7,000 aftershocks, and at the time of reporting, aftershocks continue to be recorded, with the strongest recent aftershock measuring 5.1-magnitude on 06 April 2026.
Country: Honduras Source: Famine Early Warning System Network Please refer to the attached file. Key Messages Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes remain widespread across Honduras, with Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes emerging in the Dry Corridor between June and September as above-average prices, below-average labor demand, and previous harvest losses exacerbate seasonal trends. While many households continue to meet minimum food needs through market purchases, they are struggling to cover essential non-food expenditures amid below-average seasonal agricultural labor opportunities and are increasingly relying on coping strategies such as selling small livestock and borrowing. In the Dry Corridor, households negatively impacted by multiple poor agricultural seasons are likely to resort to more severe coping strategies at the height of the lean season. The rest of the country will experience Stressed (IPC Phase 2), while urban centers including Tegucigalpa (Francisco Morazán), La Esperanza (Intibucá), and the Bay Islands remain in Minimal (IPC Phase 1) due to more stable formal and informal income sources. Above-average fuel and fertilizer prices continue to drive high production and transportation costs for a second consecutive month. In April,diesel prices remained nearly 34 percent higher than March, 64 percent higher than last year, and 49 percent higher than the five-year average. Fertilizer prices have also remained elevated, with DAP (18-46-0) and urea rising to 7.2 and 50 percent higher than March, respectively, and 21.2 and 45.1 percent above the five-year average, respectively. These rising input costs contributed to inflation surpassing the 5 percent threshold in April. Staple food costs persist above last year and the five-year average despite relatively stable month-on-month prices, driven by weak domestic production. In April, wholesale white maize prices were 49.2 and 39.8 percent higher than last year and the five-year average, respectively, reflecting increased demand and lingering effects of below-average import volumes in 2025. Wholesale red bean prices are 10 percent above the five-year average but remained stable month-on-month and year-on-year, partly supported by increased bean availability due to crop substitution of maize for beans during primera 2025and improved import volumes. While increased remittance inflows in early 2026 are helping receiving households partially offset higher food costs, most poor households do not receive remittances and remain vulnerable to price increases. Recent rainfall estimates through mid-May indicate widespread below-average precipitation across Honduras, negatively impacting primera land preparation and planting in localized areas. While some localized rainfall has met thresholds for planting requirements, much of this precipitation has been concentrated within short periods (2-3 days), limiting soil moisture adequacy and leading many farmers to postpone planting until more consistent rainfall is established. As a result, smallholders are not expected to initiate primera planting until mid-May. At the same time, elevated input costs are constraining fertilizer use by smallholder farmers, likely contributing to expected below-average primera crop yields by August. The Secretariat of Agriculture and Livestock (SAG), in coordination with agroclimatology boards and with support from the Centro de Estudios Atmosféricos, Oceanográficos y Sísmicos (CENAOS)/Comisión Permanente de Contingencias (COPECO), is monitoring and guiding planting decisions across the country. The forecast transition to El Niño is expected to result in rainfall deficits and above-average temperatures through September, particularly in the Dry Corridor, reducing vegetation health and soil moisture and disrupting crop development throughout the primera season. While the magnitude of the El Niño event remains uncertain, CENAOS has issued region-specific guidance for farmers, recommending early planting (before May 10) in the Dry Corridor areas bordering El Salvador, and slightly later planting (after May 15) in central and eastern departments. Drought-prone areas, including southern Francisco Morazán, El Paraíso, Valle, Choluteca, and southern Comayagua, are likely to experience larger rainfall deficits. SAG is advising some farmers to prioritize planting red beans instead of white maize due to its short production cycle and lower water requirements, improving crop resilience under uncertain rainfall conditions.
Country: Burkina Faso Source: Famine Early Warning System Network Please refer to the attached file. Messages clé Des résultats de Crise ! (Phase 3 ! de l’IPC) persistent à Karo-Peli et de Stress ! (Phase 2 ! de l’IPC) à Djelgodji et Yagha en mai 2026. Malgré la disponibilité des céréales sur le marché, les revenus issus de la vente de l’eau, de l’orpaillage et des envois d’argent par les proches sont insuffisants pour effectuer des achats. Grâce à l’assistance alimentaire dans ces zones, les ménages pauvres de Djelgodji et de Yagha ont une consommation alimentaire adéquate ; toutefois, de graves déficits de consommation contraignent ceux de Karo-Peli à limiter les quantités et le nombre de repas quotidiens. Entre juin et septembre, les ménages pauvres à Karo-Peli seront exposés à l’Urgence (Phase 4 de l’IPC). Le recours accru aux produits sauvages, conjugué à un accès limité aux denrées de base, les contraindra à adopter des stratégies d’adaptation sévères, notamment à passer une journée entière sans repas. Les résultats de Crise (Phase 3 de l’IPC) sont attendus entre juin et septembre dans les provinces à fort défi sécuritaire au nord (Djelgodji, Loroum, Oudalan, Séno, Kossin, Sourou) et à l’est (Komandjori, de Yagha, du Gourma, de la Kompienga, du Dyamongou, du Gobnangou). Les ménages pauvres dans ces zones seront principalement dépendants du marché pour leur alimentation, avec toutefois des revenus faibles qui seront insuffisants pour couvrir leurs besoins de consommation. Le recours aux produits de cueillette ne sera pas suffisant pour éviter des écarts importants de consommation. Ils seront contraints de réduire à la fois les quantités et le nombre de repas par jour, ou de limiter la consommation des adultes au profit des enfants. L’offre céréalière s’est améliorée sur les marchés des zones à fort défi sécuritaire (régions du Liptako, Soum et de Tapoa) cette année par rapport aux trois dernières années, bien qu’en dessous de son niveau avant la crise. L’augmentation du nombre de convois de ravitaillement, les ventes subventionnées de céréales et l’existence de flux transfrontaliers entrants (cas des marchés de Gorom-Gorom, Markoye, Kantchari et Diapaga) permettent d’éviter les ruptures de vivres sur les marchés. Par ailleurs, la disponibilité de l’assistance alimentaire contribue à réduire la demande des ménages sur le marché. L’offre céréalière dans ces zones devrait rester supérieure à celle de 2025, au moins jusqu’aux nouvelles récoltes de septembre. En avril, les prix des céréales demeuraient 25 à 35 pour cent en dessous de leurs niveaux de 2025 et 18 à 30 pour cent inférieurs à la moyenne quinquennale dans l’ensemble du pays. Ces prix sont restés stables ou en légère baisse par rapport au mois précédent, ce qui est contraire aux hausses saisonnières typiquement observées. La baisse globale des prix s'explique par une offre supérieure à la demande, des restrictions à l’exportation, ainsi que par des ventes subventionnées ou des opérations de distribution alimentaire. Néanmoins, des hausses de 9 à 23 pour cent par rapport à la moyenne quinquennale persistent dans les zones à fort défi sécuritaire, en particulier sur les marchés d’Arbinda, de Sebba et de Diapaga. Bien que les incidents sécuritaires restent à des niveaux élevés, une baisse relative de 4 pour cent a été enregistrée dans l’ensemble du pays entre janvier et avril 2026. De même, le nombre de décès liés aux conflits a chuté de 45 pour cent pendant la même période par rapport à la moyenne des trois dernières années (ACLED). Les alertes — généralement d’origine sécuritaire et constituant un facteur des déplacements de populations — ont également diminué de 47 et 31 pour cent respectivement, par rapport à la même période en 2025 et 2024 (GCORR). Des déplacements de population ont néanmoins eu lieu durant cette période, mais les effectifs des populations nouvellement déplacées ont été moins élevés (44 577 personnes), ce qui représente une baisse de 77 et de 49 pour cent respectivement par rapport à 2025 et 2024. Ces améliorations favorisent les retours de populations dans leurs localités d’origine et pourraient également favoriser la pratique des activités agricoles pour cette saison qui commence. La mise à jour des prévisions saisonnières de mai prévoit plutôt des cumuls pluviométriques inférieurs à moyens pendant la période de saison pluvieuse de juin à septembre. Ce qui est contraire aux prévisions formulées les mois précédents, qui anticipaient des précipitations moyennes à supérieures à la moyenne dans la région du Sahel. En outre, des séquences de jours sans précipitations significatives, longues et à tendance moyenne, sont également attendues en début de saison. Cette situation pourrait entraîner des resemis plus importants et affecter négativement le calendrier ainsi que l’efficacité d’utilisation des engrais. En outre, les conséquences du conflit au Moyen-Orient sur les prix des engrais entraîneront une hausse des prix sur les marchés et une baisse de l’offre, réduisant ainsi l’accès des producteurs aux engrais. Ces différents facteurs pourraient impacter négativement les perspectives de récolte dans le pays pour la campagne agricole 2026/2027.
Country: Mali Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations Please refer to the attached file. Synopsis (short abstract) Cette publication de Données en situations d’urgence (DIEM), fondée sur la collecte DIEM-Suivi réalisée en octobre et novembre 2025 au Mali, présente une évaluation des moyens d’existence agricoles des personnes déplacées internes dans les régions de Mopti et de Ségou. Elle fournit aux acteurs humanitaires une analyse détaillée des besoins des ménages agricoles déplacés afin de mieux cibler les interventions visant à soutenir leurs moyens d’existence, renforcer leur résilience face aux chocs et préserver leur sécurité alimentaire.L'Organisation des Nations unies pour l'alimentation et l'agriculture a mis en place DIEM-Suivi en juin 2020. Les données sont collectées plusieurs fois par an, dans les pays en situation d'insécurité alimentaire, par les enquêteurs DIEM lors d'entretiens téléphoniques assistés par ordinateur et d'enquêtes en face à face. Ces données couvrent les chocs, les moyens d'existence agricoles, la sécurité alimentaire et les besoins des ménages. Elles sont régulièrement mises à jour et facilement accessibles sur la plateforme DIEM. Les produits DIEM comprennent des tableaux de bord, des cartes, des bulletins et des données agrégées, qui permettent aux partenaires et aux parties prenantes de mettre en œuvre des mesures d'atténuation et de cibler les ménages vulnérables.
Country: Ukraine Sources: Voluntas, World Food Programme Please refer to the attached file. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Background As Ukraine enters the fifth year of the full-scale invasion, the country remains heavily affected y ongoing hostilities. As of early 2025, 3.7 million people remain internally displaced, 6.9 million are refugees abroad, and over 40,838 civilian casualties have been recorded.1 The impact is most severe in frontline oblasts such as Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Luhansk, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Sumy, and Zaporizhzhia.2 Continued displacement has deepened poverty, strained social protection systems, and disrupted livelihoods; particularly in rural and conflict-affected areas, where unemployment remains high.3 Social transfers, including pensions and targeted assistance to displaced people, have played a crucial role in preventing further hardship, but coverage may not be reaching hard-to-reach groups such as people without documentation, and hidden groups like Roma communities, LGBTQIA+ individuals, and people living with HIV/AIDS, or men avoiding military conscription.4 The psychological toll of the prolonged conflict is also g owing, with 63 percent of households reporting mental health challenges related to ongoing uncertainty and displacement.5 According to Ukraine’s 2025 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan, 12.7 million people in Ukraine are in need of assistance. Among them, 45 percent are women, 30 percent are older people (60+ years old), 15 percent are children, and 14 percent have disabilities. Within this context, the humanitarian aid landscape is shifting due to funding constraints and a gradual transition from emergency relief to resilience-building efforts 7 Emergency assistance is increasingly concentrated in frontline and war-affected oblasts, while support in cent al and western Ukraine is being scaled back as international organizations shift their strategies away from short-term emergency aid toward resilience- and development-oriented programming in areas perceived as more stable.8 However, humanitarian actors have raised concerns that this shift may create gaps in assistance for vulnerable populations who continue to depend on support in these more stable areas where aid is being scaled back. As operations become more localized, humanitarian actors have also expressed concerns about the capacity of Ukraine’s social security system to take over responsibilities currently handled by international organizations . This is largely due to budget pressures, a shortage of qualified personnel, particularly in social services, and the destruction of essential facilities caused by missile strikes.9 Concerns have also been raised about the long-term sustainability of aid delivery, particularly as the war drags on and humanitarian needs continue to grow. Local organizations also worry that cross-cutting aspects of humanitarian work – such as gender equality, accountability to affected people, the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse, and disability inclusion – may be deprioritized amid international funding cuts, due to limited capacity and competing government priorities. As Ukraine navigates these ongoing challenges, a balanced approach between emergency response and long-term resilience-building is essential to ensure that basic needs are met, social tensions between recipients and non-recipients of aid are minimized, and economic recovery is supported.
Country: World Source: ELRHA What if the most powerful indicator in humanitarian response was also the most neglected? When crises unfold, we count displacement, malnutrition, and funding gaps. But months later, one question often remains unanswered - how many people died? That omission matters - because mortality data changes decisions. As the UK Humanitarian Innovation Hub (UKHIH) and Elrha close Phase 2 of our Mortality Estimation in Humanitarian Crises Systems Innovation Partnership, this blog marks the beginning of a series exploring why mortality estimation matters, and how grantees are innovating so the humanitarian system can do it better. Mortality: the metric that changes the conversation Credible and timely mortality figures change conversations and decisions. As Chris Porter from FCDO put it during a 2025 panel discussion: "We often debate malnutrition rates, but deaths stop people in their tracks." Mortality metrics capture crisis severity, scale, and urgency in a way few other indicators can. Mortality data used to be central to humanitarian assessments. Over time, however, it slipped to the margins - seen as too sensitive, too political, too technically complex, or too slow to be useful. The result is a paradox: the metric that best reflects human cost in crises is often missing from decision-making altogether. Why mortality evidence is so hard - and essential Estimating mortality in crises is undeniably challenging. Data is incomplete. Access is constrained. Methods vary. Numbers can be contested or suppressed, particularly in politically charged settings. Different approaches can produce vastly different estimates, eroding trust and confidence. But the cost of not measuring mortality is higher. Without credible mortality evidence the true scale of crises is underestimated; resources are allocated reactively rather than strategically; accountability weakens and advocacy relies on anecdote instead of evidence. Mortality estimation is not just a technical exercise. It is a moral and operational necessity. From reactive funding toward systems change UKHIH-Elrha’s current investments are built on a longer history of mortality-driven action. Funding followed mortality research in Somalia that helped trigger an unusual and early UN intervention in a subsequent developing famine in 2016. That response was not driven by malnutrition figures, but by mortality data. It was rare. And it worked. Recently completed research established that mortality in southern Chad was far higher than humanitarian actors had assumed, with large segments of the affected population missed entirely. This evidence forced uncomfortable reassessments, but also opened pathways to identify deaths that would otherwise have remained uncounted. Those efforts demonstrated what's possible when rigorous methods are applied under pressure. They informed response discussions, shaped advocacy, and challenged assumptions in decision-making. But they also highlight a deeper issue: Mortality estimation has been treated as an emergency add-on rather than a standing capability in crises contexts. UKHIH’s first investment in mortality estimation proved decisive in a politically charged context. Rigorous work helped establish the credibility of mortality estimates from Gaza when official figures were being publicly dismissed. This evidence made it far harder for governments and global institutions to ignore the scale of civilian death, cutting through political pressure and reaffirming the role of independent science. Building on this work, UKHIH launched the Systems Innovation Partnership in 2024 to move beyond isolated projects and towards a durable ecosystem for mortality estimation. One rooted in equitable partnerships, shared infrastructure, and long-term investment, particularly in low- and middle-income countries. What progress looks like in practice UKHIH-Elrha is currently the only dedicated funder focused specifically on mortality estimation in humanitarian crises. Across Phases 1 and 2, we've seen tangible signs of change: Stronger methods, including improved modelling approaches and shared tools and resources like the Somalia Mortality Estimation Data Observatory (S-MED) Deeper learning, through case studies examining how mortality evidence has influenced - or failed to influence - responses in crises More equitable leadership, with LMIC-based partners SIMAD Institute for Global Health (Somalia) and Evidence for Change (Kenya) playing central roles in phases 1 and 2, scaling up partnering in phase 2 with Addis Ababa University, Mekelle University (Ethiopia) and Rebuild Hope for Africa (DRC) among others. Broader dialogue, bringing together researchers, humanitarians, policymakers, and funders to tackle the "last mile" problem of uptake and use Co-funding, for longer-term, strategic investment that builds synergies and amplifies impact across the system with European Commission Humanitarian Aid (ECHO). What this blog series will cover This blog marks the start of a weekly series showcasing the Phase 2 consortia pushing this agenda forward. IMPACT Initiatives are exploring locally led mortality estimation in Somalia, Ethiopia, and the DRC, highlighting what it takes to shift ownership and trust. Johns Hopkins University is focusing on methodological innovation in DRC, alongside practical guidance for local decision-makers on when and how mortality estimates can be generated and used. Save the Children International is developing a governance mechanism among Strategic, Technical and National Stakeholders and building an online platform making guidance, tools, and technical support accessible and equitable across the sector. Together, these consortia address not just how to count deaths, but how to ensure mortality evidence shapes response. Counting deaths to save lives Mortality evidence can't be optional because uncounted deaths represent a failure of accountability, a gap in our understanding, and a missed opportunity to prevent more. When we don’t count deaths, we're not avoiding difficult conversations - we're having them anyway, just without evidence The UKHIH-Elrha partnerships show we can do better. What remains is a choice: to embed mortality estimation as a non-negotiable part of crisis response, or to continue operating in the dark about the very metric that matters most.