"PROFITABLE" · 중립 · 총 38건
필터 보기현재 지수
50.3
0 = 부정 우세
50 = 중립
100 = 긍정 우세
최근 7일 기준 76,293건을 분석한 결과, 뉴스 심리지수는 50.2(균형)입니다. 긍정 3,927건(5.1%)·중립 70,451건(92.3%)·부정 1,915건(2.5%)이며, 중립 비중이 뚜렷하게 높습니다. 성향 지수는 종합 15.3(중도 균형)입니다.
Airlines are also expected to cut unprofitable routes to protect margins, while fares, which have surged since the start of the Iran war, are unlikely to fall soon, Walsh said.
Airlines are also expected to cut unprofitable routes to protect margins, while fares, which have surged since the start of the Iran war, are unlikely to fall soon, IATA Director General Willie Walsh said.
Delta's president, Peter Carter, told CNBC that the carrier wants to take United on over the Pacific.
Airlines are also expected to protect margins by cutting unprofitable routes, while fares, which have surged since the outbreak of the Iran war, are unlikely to come down soon, Walsh said.
“THOSE who gorge themselves on usury behave but as he might behave whom Satan has confounded with his touch; for they say, ‘Buying and selling is but a kind of usury’ — the while God has made buying and selling lawful and usury unlawful. … If, however, [the debtor] is in straitened circumstances, [grant him] a delay until a time of ease… .” — Surah Al-Baqarah, translation by Muhammad Asad. Islamic banking started in Pakistan in 1979 and by 1985, commercial banks had stopped using the word ‘interest’ and used ‘mark-up’ instead. But with time it was apparent this kind of ‘Islamic’ banking wasn’t really Islamic and was just a name change from ‘interest’ to ‘mark-up’. Pakistan’s modern Islamic banking began in 2002 when the first new fully Islamic bank started working. Since then Islamic banking has rapidly grown and now there are many Islamic banks. Islamic banks have turned out to be more profitable and there is considerable demand among Pakistanis to conduct their banking as prescribed by Islam. Islamic banks now have Sharia boards that rule whether any banking facility is Sharia-compatible and the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) also has a Sharia advisory committee. We have also progressed from merely banking and now the government issues sukuks (long-term bonds backed by assets), we have Islamic leasing, called Ijara, and Islamic insurance, called Takaful. We should examine how close to Quranic edicts is Islamic banking. Next year as we celebrate the silver jubilee of the Islamic banking industry, we should examine how close to Quranic edicts is Islamic banking and whether it has grown closer to Islamic ideals. A company can borrow from a secular commercial bank running finance for its working capital needs and long-term finance for its project financing needs. From the Islamic bank it will get Musharakah financing or Murabaha and Istisna financing. For an example of Istisna financing assume a company wants a loan for buying cotton. The bank will buy cotton for Rs10 million and sell it to the company for Rs11m with payment due in one year, or for Rs10.5m for payment due in six months. The bank doesn’t actually buy the cotton or sell it to the company. There is, however, paperwork to pretend this has taken place. The profit the bank makes depends entirely on the policy rate set by the SBP. When the policy rate is high, the bank’s profit is also equally high. In Musharakah financing, the profit an Islamic bank charges the company also depends on the SBP’s policy rate. Typically, if the interest rate charged by commercial banks is two per cent above the SBP’s policy rate, the profit rate required by Islamic banks is also the same. If during the tenor of the loan the policy rate is increased by the SBP, the profit rate is increased by Islamic banks by a similar amount. Just as commercial banks get their interest from the client whether the company is incurring a profit or a loss, Islamic banks also have no downside when a client loses money. Except for default or restructuring, no Islamic bank has ever made a loss because its borrower was losing money. This then seems distinct from trade-based, risk-assuming lending that Islam envisions. For instance, a priori people would think that under Islamic banking’s Istisna financing if a company borrows money for buying 1,000 bales of cotton, it should return the money for a 1,000 bales of cotton, no matter what the new price of cotton is. If the value of cotton has increased, the bank will make a profit and if it has decreased, it will lose. But it will not get a fixed interest-based ‘profit’ no matter what happens to cotton prices. Similarly, under Musharakah financing people would think that if the company is making profits, Islamic banks should also make a profit but not if it’s losing money. Otherwise, it is just like secular banks with Arabic names for loans. With the current practice of Pakistani Islamic banks, the benefits of having trade-based Islamic banking are lost and banks don’t have an incentive to seek and give loans to companies that have great ideas and products. If the profit is fixed at exactly the rate of interest, like it is in commercial banks, then we lose the barkat of Islamic banking. Up until last year, the SBP required banks to give a minimum interest to depositors. But Islamic banks objected that giving fixed profits to depositors would violate Islamic principles. However, the same Islamic banks are quite happy to charge their customers fixed profits based on the SBP’s policy rate. This dichotomy meant that customers of Islamic banks were getting less profits on their deposits than those given by commercial banks even as Islamic banks made more profits than others. Islamic banks were increasing people’s cost for being good Muslims. Even today, Islamic banks give lower profits to their depositors. This goes against the Islamic admonition of exploitation. When a borrower is late in paying loans or interest/ profit, both Islamic and commercial banks charge you penal interest (which is against the ayat I quoted above) but whereas commercial banks keep this profit, Islamic banks give up that profit as charity. One has to say that the difference between Islamic and commercial banks is more in nomenclature and less in substance. Bankers and economists know this but don’t say it in the hope that Islamic banks will eventually inch closer to true Islamic banking. However, it is unfortunate that even after decades this migration is non-existent. Perhaps it’s because ‘Islamic’ banks are more profitable and don’t want to exit a comfortable business model. Islamic bankers give the example of eating beef to justify Islamic banks. They say if you eat non-zabiha beef it is wrong but the same beef is halal if slaughtered properly. The example is powerful but not applicable as Islam has not prohibited eating beef, it has just prescribed a way of slaughtering cattle. The prohibition of interest is more like the prohibition of drinking wine. It doesn’t matter whether it is consumed out of a teacup or a wineglass; the prohibition stays. Similarly, while trade is allowed in Islam, interest is prohibited even if you give it Arabic names. We must endeavour to bring Islamic banking closer to the tenets of Islam — variable profits and risk sharing. The writer is a former finance minister. Published in Dawn, June 6th, 2026
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The issue of mental health in the music industry, and the roles labels, management and other companies can play in helping to keep artists healthy, has been a point of contention for many years. This guest post advocates strongly for a more involved and evolved role for the industry. Dr. Aprilia West PsyD, MT, PCC […]
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The PS5 era has been in some ways disappointing for Sony – on Tuesday, the company revealed a slate of games they hope will change that • Don’t get Pushing Buttons delivered to your inbox? Sign up here PlayStation’s future has looked a little uncertain these past few years. Although the PS5 has sold well and been very profitable, the brand is far from the runaway market leader it was in the PS2 days. Earlier this week, Game File dug into Sony’s most recent earnings reports to illustrate how PlayStation has been selling fewer and fewer of its own flagship games since a peak during the pandemic. About 54.1m copies of games either developed or published by Sony were sold in the 2018 financial year; in 2025, it sold 32.1m. Sony has put out some great homegrown games since the PS5 was released in 2020, from Astro Bot to Ghost of Yōtei, but it has also had some expensive and very public failures and cancellations; PlayStation boss Jim Ryan, who retired in 2024, placed big bets on live-service games and only a few panned out (hello, Helldivers). Sony also seems to have rolled back on releasing its single-player PS5 games on PC after a polite interval of time, suggesting it wants to preserve what advantage and exclusivity it has. Continue reading...
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Researchers in Kazakhstan say Hong Kong's sound financial system, infrastructure and regulatory regime make it an ideal partner and fund-raising hub for green energy projects. Chief Executive John Lee will conclude his duty visit to Kazakhstan on Wednesday night, before continuing his Central Asian tour in Uzbekistan. The visit by the SAR delegation comes as Kazakhstan accelerates its decarbonisation drive, having committed to the Paris climate change treaty and a 2060 carbon neutrality target. "Our government is putting more effort on that. We have a lot of projects going on," said Nurxat Nuraje, head of the renewable energy lab at National Laboratory Astana. With petroleum reserves expected to be depleted within 50 years, he said the Kazakh government is "paying more attention to develop new technology like renewable energy technology". Nuraje, who attended the International Hydrogen Development Symposium in Wan Chai last month, believed there is plenty of room for cooperation. "We learned that Hong Kong has become a very important hub for the development of hydrogen and renewable energy," he said. "Hong Kong has a very good transportation system, also a capital investment system." Fellow researcher Yerbolat Magazov went further, suggesting Hong Kong look into developing a trading mechanism for green hydrogen. "The actual role of Hong Kong as a hub would be to make it not as an energy material, but as a valuable asset," he said. "Special frameworks, taxonomy, legislation — so hydrogen can be traded as a stock material." Their laboratory in the Kazakh capital has already demonstrated the potential of clean energy, after building a system last year that converts solar energy into hydrogen. Mainland company Zhejiang H2-Bank Technology was a key partner, supplying critical components such as electrolysers and hydrogen storage systems. But Magazov acknowledged they need to drive down costs before green hydrogen can really take off. It remains three to five times more expensive than "grey" hydrogen, which is derived from fossil fuels. "The biggest problem is bankability," he said. "Lots of people have lots of money, but they need to be sure that in the future, green hydrogen will be profitable. Right now, if you calculate, it's a non-profitable thing." This, according to Magazov, is where the Hong Kong brand comes into play. "If Hong Kong trusts this country, everyone can also trust. That allows future investors to put money and investments into this particular market," he said. With global energy markets remaining volatile, Magazov felt that Central Asia and China should forge closer ties. "It's better to make allies which are close to each other," he said. "China, Hong Kong, Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries should bring together. In the future, if something happens, we'll be independent of others." Edited by Raymond Yeung
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“My name is Ozymandias, king of kings: Look on my works, ye mighty, and despair! Nothing beside remains. Round the decay Of that colossal wreck, boundless and bare The lone and level sands stretch far away.” — Percy Bysshe Shelley, Ozymandias “I am in blood, Stepped in so far that, should I wade no more, Returning were as tedious as go o’er.” — William Shakespeare, Macbeth PROLOGUE This is and isn’t about America’s illegal war against Iran. It is primarily about hiding an empire in plain sight and now watching it unravel in plain sight. The war against Iran becomes a consequential event in tandem with other structural weaknesses, a fillip of sorts. It reminds one of the Soviet war on Afghanistan. That war, in and of itself, did not bring down the Soviet Leviathan. The process inhered in the very make-up of the Soviet Union. The war just shoved it over the precipice. But let’s get on with our purpose here. In August 2022, then-US President Joe Biden signed the CHIPS and Science Act into law. A $280 billion legislative package, it sought to revitalise domestic semiconductor manufacturing. The act was a response to a startling vulnerability: the world’s most advanced chips, essential for everything from F-35 fighter jets to surgical equipment to artificial intelligence, are overwhelmingly manufactured by a single company, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), located on an island claimed as sovereign territory by America’s primary strategic rival, China. This dependence is not an accident of geography or a supply chain anomaly. The semiconductor industry wasn’t even hobbled by Covid 19. Despite its complex and far-flung operations, the industry works smoothly. The US dependence is the logical endpoint of a decades-long corporate strategy that maximised profit by outsourcing physical production while retaining only the high-value design and marketing ends of the value chain, the so-called “Smile Curve” strategy. The undoing of the United States in the Iran war may be far more significant than its defeats in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan. It may well mark a historic milestone in the fraying of the position of the US as a global hegemon. But the seeds of this erosion of American dominance, argues Ejaz Haider, were laid long before its misadventure in Iran… The Italian economist and sociologist Giovanni Arrighi, to whom I shall return, would have been amused to see the revered smile curve — taught at prestigious business schools and which encourages firms to outsource capital-intensive manufacturing to focus solely on high-margin research and development (R&D), branding and marketing — as a classic trap of late-stage capitalism. In fact, the CHIPS Act stands as a state-level admission that this strategy, so profitable for individual corporations like Apple and NVIDIA, to name just two, has become a major geopolitical vulnerability for the US. This is the central paradox of America’s declining empire. The very mechanisms that generated unprecedented wealth have systemically dismantled the material and industrial foundations upon which that wealth ultimately rests. The decline of the American empire is not a partisan talking point. The US is a behemoth. It won’t just collapse one day like the Berlin Wall. Nor is a snapshot view the way to go. It is an ongoing structural process and a number of scholars have used longitudinal designs to analyse the trend lines. I argue that it is a slow, systemic unravelling across interconnected domains. First, the financialisation of capital, theorised most rigorously by Arrighi. Capital shifts from productive investment to speculative finance, generating short-term profits at the cost of long-term industrial vitality. It hollows out domestic industrial and political power, a process identified by American sociologist and political scientist Ho-fung Hung, who argues that off-shoring of production destroys the industrial ecosystem, skilled labour base and, ultimately, the social cohesion required for great power competition. Second, the erosion of the alliance system. And no, it’s not just Trump. Three deeper currents are involved: the gradual unravelling of the post-WWII security architecture; the economic failure of neoliberalism; and the imperial outreach baked into the very idea of neoliberalism. Third, the lateral diffusion of technologies, now commodified and everywhere. They help innovative and determined weaker powers offset the asymmetric advantage of bigger powers: Ukraine versus Russia; Hamas/Hezbollah/Houthis versus the US-Zionist duo; and now Iran versus the US-Zionist duo. As I note later in this space, the war against Iran is a much bigger setback for the US than its wars in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq. Corollary: the post-WWII ‘Pax Americana’ is transitioning from a period of hegemonic stability, to use American historian Charles Kindleberger’s concept, into a protracted and likely irreversible, terminal crisis, to borrow Arrighi’s term. But let’s first begin with the peg: the war against Iran. THE PRESENT Since its inception, America has been at war: wars of choice, wars of conquest, wars for resources, wars to defend its hegemony, wars to spread “American values.” How or why does the Iran war stand out? Foremost, the conflict has confirmed the structural limits of US coercive diplomacy in a shifting multipolar world. It has exposed acute structural vulnerabilities in defence economics and inventory endurance, as well as a critical absence of pragmatic post-war planning and a misreading of societal resilience. The conflict has also underscored the changing nature of global alignments in a multipolar world. This comes with the collapse of coercive economic power. For four decades, the US has relied on sophisticated sanctions and lawfare to pressure Iran into subjugation. It has failed, showing the limits of sanctions, especially on fungible commodities. Even sanctions on non-fungible elements like technology can be circumvented. As in Iran’s case, the sanctioned state can develop indigenous expertise through varied strategies. There’s clear evidence that Tehran has developed complex and sophisticated non-dollar lifelines with China and Russia, rendering unilateral sanctions increasingly ineffective. It has used an array of strategies to blunt the effect: interchangeability (can’t sell to X; sell to Y); value retention (barter, use of cryptocurrencies); substitution and evasion (relying on third parties, covert ship-to-ship transfers, use of shell companies). Unlike the insurgencies in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, the US is not involved in ground combat in Iran (so far). It has relied on high-tech aerial and missile attacks through its formidable ISTAR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance) capabilities. Iran has not responded through elusive, hit-and-run ground attacks. It has countered US technology through technology in a non-contact war. But its employment of technology is grounded in asymmetric capabilities: a large arsenal of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and one-way attack drones. The cost-exchange ratio, by most accounts, is unfavourable for the US. For instance, the Iranian Shahed-136 one-way attack drone has an estimated unit cost of $20,000 (some estimates put it at around $10,000). It is a simple, slow-moving, and relatively easy to detect drone. But it is also cheap and plentiful. To intercept it with costly SM-2 or ESSM missiles creates a cost-exchange ratio of between 30 to one and 100 to one. It is also a shoot-and-scoot system. Iran can afford to lose hundreds of such drones and produce some 1,000 per month. The US cannot afford to fire thousands of interceptors at them. And those interceptors take three to four years to manufacture. It is a cost-asymmetric war. Similarly, the US has been pulling out assets from the Pacific to the Gulf. The USS Boxer amphibious group is an example. Diverting naval assets from the Pacific physically manifests deployment overstretch. As Robert Farley, visiting professor at US Army War College notes, resources needed to prevail in one theatre guarantee weakness in another. It’s the same with all force deployments and employments: “Every missile allocated to one target is unavailable for another.” The contrast with Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan is instructive. In those theatres, the US was defeated by determined insurgencies, even as it bombed and bombed. The adversaries were willing to absorb enormous casualties, drag it out and inflict mission fatigue on the US. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, broadly speaking, the US won the conventional war expeditiously but then got bogged down. In the Iran conflict, while Tehran has demonstrated the ability to absorb much pain, the US is not facing elusive insurgents but a state with a sophisticated missile programme, a sharp understanding of force employment, a network of allies across the region (Hezbollah in Lebanon, Ansar Allah in Yemen, and Hashd al-Shaabi in Iraq and Syria), and the ability to close the Strait of Hormuz, through which 20 percent of the world’s oil passes. Iran has also demonstrated adaptation under fire, used the operational strategy of dispersal and delegation, exercised deception, demonstrated growing targeting capabilities through ISR, rapid repair of underground sites after US-Zionist bombing and consistently shifted locations for counterattack operations. Can the US still bomb Iran? Of course. Will that be painful? Yes. Will Iran respond? Hell, yes. Would that raise the overall cost? You can bet your dime on it. It will be proof, yet again, that it is a slow grind and the US cannot achieve its objectives at a sustainable cost. Yet, it is stuck, because to walk away means it loses credibility. Trump needs a win; Iran is not prepared to give him that. The war has changed the ground realities. There is no status quo ante. The objectives remain strategically incompatible — ie we might get a pause, even a long one, but the essential causes remain unaddressed. Spoiler alert: Zionist entity. US President Donald Trump attending the return of the bodies of the first six American soldiers killed during the war with Iran on March 7, 2026: the lateral diffusion of technologies help innovative and determined weaker powers, such as Iran, offset the asymmetric advantage of bigger powers, such as the US | AFP THE POINTILLIST EMPIRE: HOW IT BEGAN American imperialism did not begin with grand pronouncements like the Monroe Doctrine or the Big Stick diplomacy of Theodore Roosevelt, though they give us a potent sense of a rising, expansionist power. It literally began with bird poop, which sounds about right if one were to understand imperialism as a crap enterprise. The Guano Islands Act of 1856 allowed US citizens to claim uninhabited, guano-rich islands. The act set a precedent for later overseas acquisitions. Historian Daniel Immerwahr calls this a “pointillist” empire. This practical, resource-driven, and often hidden expansion set a pattern that would define America’s power and military bases for the next century. The Mexican-American War (1846-1848) established the continental empire, seizing vast territories from Mexico. This wasn’t a war of liberation but a war of conquest, not manifest destiny but a fig leaf to cover the musty crotch of violent expansion, economic greed and racial supremacy. The 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo formalised the seizure of over half of Mexico’s territory. The Spanish-American War of 1898 definitively projected American power overseas. Theodore Roosevelt’s Secretary of State John Hay, in a personal letter to Roosevelt, called it a “splendid little war.” By its end, the US had seized Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam and the Philippines. But the “splendid” label concealed a brutal reality, just like the payload of Trump’s “gorgeous B-2 bombers.” The subsequent Philippine-American War (1899-1902) resulted in Filipino genocide. That savagery has been systematically erased from American popular memory, even as Mark Twain was scathing in his condemnation and also did a fantastic job of calling out Rudyard Kipling for The White Man’s Burden. But this wasn’t all. Immerwahr documents that American forces employed waterboarding (yes, much before the darned ‘War on Terror’), concentration camps (“black sites”), and scorched-earth tactics that would be recognisable to any student of colonial atrocities. After World War I, US President Woodrow Wilson attempted a new form of imperialism: liberal internationalism, rather than direct territorial control. Much has been written about the “Wilsonian moment.” British historian and diplomat E. H. Carr called it a utopian project, divorced from the reality of power politics. In fact, it wasn’t. The project was essentially colonial and Wilson’s liberal internationalism fit it perfectly. The mandates were thriving. The US Senate’s refusal to join the League of Nations left a vacuum that no amount of idealistic pronouncements could fill. War did come. Carr gives us insights into why it became inevitable. The US emerged from the war as the leading power. The post-WWII order was a direct lesson learned from the intervening two decades. No more “isolationism”. The US must play the role of the hegemonic stabiliser. The core argument was simple and powerful: a stable world economy requires a single power to act as lender of last resort, maintain an open market for distressed goods, and coordinate macroeconomic policies. The US did that via the Bretton Woods system, the Marshall Plan and a vast security architecture that spanned the globe. The quid for the quo? American dominance. The US was now fully involved. It bore the cost but the return on investment was handsome. It kept the US in the lead, even during the bipolarity of the Cold War and beyond. With the Berlin wall crumbling, American political scientist Francis Fukuyama became the mascot for neoliberalism. History had ended; all the wagon trains were destined for one town. Some might arrive late, but arrive they would. Europe was pacified and rebuilt. Japan was demilitarised and transformed into a manufacturing powerhouse. The dollar became the world’s reserve currency, giving the US what French President Valery Giscard d’Estaing called “exorbitant privilege.” For three decades, from 1945 to the early 1970s, this system appeared to confirm the virtues of hegemonic stability. Real GDP growth in Western Europe averaged nearly five percent annually, and the US share of world manufacturing output remained above 40 percent. But beneath the surface, the seeds of decline were already being sown. ARRIGHIAN COUNTER World-systems theorists like Immanuel Wallerstein and Giovanni Arrighi were not focused on immediate “imperial overstretch” in the manner of British historian Paul Kennedy. Kennedy argued that empires declined when their military commitments outpaced their economic base. The US, he warned, was suffering from imperial overreach. For Arrighi, the decline was gradual and subtle. He argued that capitalist hegemonies move through repeating “systemic cycles of accumulation.” A phase of material expansion where capital is invested in production, infrastructure and trade, inevitably gives way to a phase of financial expansion, where capital seeks profit through speculation, lending and financial engineering. The material foundation is hollowed out even as the financial superstructure appears to boom. This was the logic of capitalism. The “autumn” of each hegemon is marked by a dazzling financial belle époque that masks terminal decline. The smile curve strategy is the purest expression of this financialisation and Apple is a textbook case. It designs its products, develops its chips, creates the operating systems, controls the branding, marketing and the retail experience. But it manufactures almost nothing. The iPhones and MacBooks are assembled by Foxconn in Zhengzhou and by Pegatron in Shanghai. The advanced chips are fabricated by TSMC in Taiwan. The displays come from Samsung in South Korea and LG Display. Apple captures an estimated 80-90 percent of the profit from each device, while the suppliers who do the actual physical work fight over the remaining scraps. Business schools love this strategy because it maximises corporate profits and shareholder value. But as Hung argues in his work on global value chains and the Arrighian counter, what maximises corporate profits does not necessarily maximise national power. In fact, it may systematically undermine it. By outsourcing the middle of the smile curve, the US has drastically hollowed out its industrial ecosystem. Combine it with the faith in short, sharp wars of shock and awe through high-tech precision weapons and we get the full picture of what has happened in the war against Iran. This is very different from the WWII industrial base of America. This brings us to TSMC and the chokepoint crisis. It manufactures chips designed by other companies (Nvidia, AMD, Qualcomm) rather than designing and selling its own chips. Over three decades, TSMC has built an unassailable lead in advanced process nodes. By 2025, it was manufacturing 92 percent of the world’s most advanced chips. The entire global technology industry (including the US military and intelligence apparatus) became dependent on a single cluster of fabs (fabrication plants) in Hsinchu, Taichung and Tainan. China, which views Taiwan as a breakaway province to be reunited with the mainland by force if necessary, has the physical means to blockade or invade the island. Whether it would do so or should is a different debate. On ground, the People’s Liberation Army has been systematically building anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, to prevent US intervention in a Taiwan scenario. It’s a fairly absurd position from the US point of view! Its technological supremacy is guaranteed by a factory complex on an island which, in theory, its primary strategic rival could potentially seize or blockade. To circle back to the CHIPS Act, this is the background. TSMC is now building a fab complex in Arizona. Intel is expanding in Ohio and Arizona. Samsung is building in Texas. But, as a 2023 Marketplace report noted, replicating TSMC’s “deep, deep process knowledge” will take years. The fab in Arizona has already faced delays, cost overruns, and labour disputes. Taiwanese engineers are reluctant to relocate to the United States. The set goes to Arrighi. America’s weaponisation of the dollar has accelerated efforts by China, Russia and other BRICS members to create alternatives | Shutterstock THE DOLLAR DILEMMA The dollar’s role as the world’s primary reserve currency has been a central pillar of American power since the Bretton Woods agreement of 1944. This exorbitant privilege allows the US to borrow in its own currency, run persistent trade deficits without penalty and, crucially, impose unilateral financial sanctions on states, corporations, and individuals. This weaponisation of the dollar has accelerated efforts by China, Russia and other BRICS members to create alternatives. China has been aggressively promoting its own Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) as an alternative to Swift. The People’s Bank of China has signed bilateral currency swap agreements with dozens of countries, allowing trade to be settled in renminbi rather than dollars. Russia has demanded payment in rubles for its natural gas exports. India has established a rupee settlement mechanism for trade. Brazil and China have agreed to trade in their own currencies. The Central Bank of Brazil has announced that it is diversifying its reserves away from the dollar. And yet, the actual pace of de-dollarisation has been glacial. Several structural factors explain this “stickiness”, to use American political economist Benjamin Cohen’s term. First, there is network stickiness. The dollar’s dominance is not simply a matter of policy; it is an issue of deep, self-reinforcing infrastructure. Global supply chains, commodity exchanges, derivatives markets, and correspondent banking networks are all built around the dollar. Second, as various experts have argued, there is a lack of viable alternatives. The Chinese renminbi, despite China’s enormous economic weight, is not a free-floating, fully convertible currency. China maintains capital controls, a heavily regulated financial system, and a non-independent central bank. No foreign investor can be certain that their renminbi holdings would not be frozen or devalued by arbitrary state action. The euro, the second-largest reserve currency, is hobbled by the Eurozone’s fragmented fiscal system and the lingering scars of the 2011 debt crisis. Gold is impractical for everyday transactions. And cryptocurrencies are far too volatile and illiquid to serve as a reserve asset. Third is the absence of a deep, liquid and open bond market. A reserve currency requires a “safe asset” in which foreign central banks can park their surplus reserves. The US Treasury market, with $25 trillion in outstanding debt and extraordinary liquidity, is the only game in town. Result: while China and Russia publicly call for de-dollarisation, their central banks have themselves continued to accumulate US Treasury securities, because there is nowhere else to go. Corollary: the near-term prognosis for de-dollarisation is not collapse but slow erosion. IMF data shows the dollar’s share of global reserves has declined from over 70 percent in 2000 to approximately 58 percent in 2025. This is not a precipitous decline, but it is a steady one. The debate is not if the dollar will lose its dominance but when. I have no expertise in this area and I have relied on studying existing expertise. Most analyses measure the timeframe in decades, not years. From that, my understanding is that increasing uncertainty, further weaponisation of the dollar, continuing application of sanctions and asset freezes will (a) erode the confidence that underpins the entire system and (b) force experts (and governments) to find alternatives. EPILOGUE: TERMINAL CRISIS Two other issues are important but I am only flagging them here for paucity of space: the implosion of neoliberalism and its internal effects and the fraying of the transatlantic alliance. Both are exacerbated by Trump but neither is a direct result of his election. Both are extremely consequential. The United States has not collapsed; not yet. Nor can it be defeated from outside. But it can crumble from within. The future is not about a return to US hegemony, certainly not in a unipolar sense. The industrial base may be gone but it can be rebuilt, albeit not overnight. Alliances are frayed; trust cannot be easily restored. The fiscal position is precarious, with a $35 trillion US national debt. Internal politics is deeply polarised, with a significant portion of the American electorate believing that the system is rigged against them. A lot of these factors, singly and in combination with other factors, are self-reinforcing. The future also lies in terra incognita, a contested transition to a multipolar world, whose contours remain unknown. A recent book by German political analyst Marc Saxer, Geopolitical Conflict in the Wolf World, is a sobering structural assessment of where the world and the US are headed. “Homo homini lupus est” (Man is a wolf to man) is how Saxer begins. With that statement, we are back to Plautus and Hobbes. This is not mere rhetorical flourish. Saxer’s wolf world is an analytic category, a systemic condition characterised by the absence of a hegemon capable of enforcing rules, the demise of neoliberalism, the collapse of shared legal-normative frameworks, the return of great-power competition, the rise of Middle Powers, many with regional hegemonic aspirations, and the normalisation of coercion as a primary instrument of statecraft. As I said to Saxer during the launch of his book in Lahore, for the Global South, it has always been a wolf world. Pax Americana did not keep the peace for the periphery. It financed selective peace on credit. The bill has now come due. The writer is a journalist interested in security and foreign policies. X: @ejazhaider Published in Dawn, EOS, May 31st, 2026
China is pitching itself as the global fulcrum for the next phase of artificial intelligence and a legion of robotics companies is lining up initial public offerings to test investor appetite.Unitree Robotics, one of the most recognizable names in the industry after its robots practicing martial arts made headlines, on Monday received approval for a listing in Shanghai. Its IPO will serve as an early test for what could be a broader wave of offerings. Hong Kong alone has at least 46 robotics-related companies in the pipeline, more than 10% of applicants, according to a report. Companies that have filed IPO applications include Leju Robotics and Deep Robotics. “Chinese humanoids are one step closer to IPOs, igniting market interest on humanoids in the second half of 2026,” Sheng Zhong, head of China industrials research at Morgan Stanley, wrote in a note. “Funds from most of the Chinese humanoids’ IPOs will go toward R&D, especially robot models.” The deep pipeline of robotics IPOs mirrors the fast rise of China’s AI ecosystem, where an array of listings whipped up an investor frenzy in the past six months. It also aligns with Beijing’s push to shift high-tech industries from innovation to large-scale deployment. China is rushing to set the pace of funding, industrialization and ultimately leadership in what Nvidia Corp. CEO Jensen Huang calls “physical AI.” Shares of OneRobotics (Shenzhen) Co. jumped as much as 18% in Hong Kong on Tuesday, while component maker Leader Harmonious Drive Systems Co. gained as much as 11% on the mainland. 131456136“This is the decade of the robot – and it belongs to China,” Barclays analysts, including Zornitsa Todorova, wrote in a note last month. “This leadership reflects a decade-long, state-guided push.”The firm says China’s robotics roll-out is already unmatched, accounting for 50% of global industrial robots and 85% of humanoids in 2025. Backed by coordinated industrial policy and tight supply-chain control, humanoids could reach about 3.8% of the nation’s labor capacity by 2035, it estimates. Unitree got a nice shoutout from Nvidia’s Huang on Monday, when he showcased his company’s endeavors in robotic AI. The two companies have partnered to build humanoid “reference” machines, featuring five-fingered hands and built-in chips to replace cumbersome “Frankenrobots” in research labs.Some investors remain more cautious, though, when looking at the companies’ fundamentals. Many robotics firms are expected to burn cash for years and concerns are mounting that valuations could run ahead of earnings.A gauge of humanoid robot stocks has fallen about 13% this year, after registering a 47% gain in 2025. ChinaAMC CSI Robot ETF, a major exchange-traded fund tracking robot-related stocks, has seen net fund outflows for most of this year. Valuations were also elevated, with the sector trading at about 40 times forward earnings, compared with about 14 times for the CSI 300 Index, according to Bloomberg-compiled data.“Investors trading at such elevated valuations are typically not driven by long-term fundamentals, but rather by the pursuit of short-term price gains,” said Shen Meng, a director at Beijing-based investment bank Chanson & Co. “It indicates that sentiment is driven more by market dynamics than by conviction or long-term vision.”The state-run China Securities Journal also struck a cautious tone in an editorial published Tuesday, warning that pre-IPO valuations may outpace fundamentals, with many firms still unprofitable, raising the risk of a sharp correction if growth or commercialization disappoints. Still, prospective issuers can look at the performance of China tech IPOs this year, with many listings thousands of times oversubscribed and producing big gains on their debuts. Two of those companies, AI model developers Knowledge Atlas Technology Joint Stock Co. and MiniMax Group Inc. last month gained inclusion in the Hang Seng Tech Index after massive rallies since their January listings. For investors, the robotics companies can also offer a way to benefit from the rapid expansion of a cutting edge industry, said Zhou Nan, founder and investment director of Shenzhen Long Hui Fund Management Co.“With continued advances in AI, the robotics sector is poised for substantial long-term growth,” Zhou said. “Robotics is expected to become a key driver of enterprise value, and progressively complement or replace human labor across a wide range of use cases.”