Forbes Business
중도 성향
기타
Occupational Wellness: Doing The Real Work
Occupational wellness is vital because work shapes us. It often defines our identity. The question we must ask is: Where is it leading us, and do we want to go there?
"OCCUPATIONAL" · 총 8건
필터 보기현재 지수
50.3
0 = 부정 우세
50 = 중립
100 = 긍정 우세
최근 7일 기준 83,846건을 분석한 결과, 뉴스 심리지수는 50.2(균형)입니다. 긍정 4,210건(5.0%)·중립 77,558건(92.5%)·부정 2,078건(2.5%)이며, 중립 비중이 뚜렷하게 높습니다. 성향 지수는 종합 14.7(중도 균형)입니다.
Occupational wellness is vital because work shapes us. It often defines our identity. The question we must ask is: Where is it leading us, and do we want to go there?
• Cites 2026 study that finds Karachi has highest urban-rural temperature difference • Says emergency response not enough, the city must reduce heat at its source • Links pollution, dense construction, traffic, and tree loss to growing health risks KARACHI: Highlighting the multiple environmental challenges Karachi faces, a senior community health sciences expert has called for urgent actions at both the government and individual levels to tackle the growing urban heat problem that’s silently damaging public health and productivity. Responding to Dawn’s queries about Karachi’s challenges on the eve of World Environment Day, Prof Zafar Fatmi, Head of Environmental Occupational Health and Climate Change at the Department of Community Health Sciences, Aga Khan University, said that the city’s urban heat effect appears to be becoming more intense. “This is not only because of global climate change, but also because of how the city is growing, how people move through it, how much pollution they breathe, and how little protection many people have while working and living outdoors,” shared Prof Fatmi, who has done several studies on subjects related to community health. He explained that more concrete, more roads, high-density construction, traffic congestion, loss of trees, and fewer open spaces are making the city absorb and retain more heat. Referring to studies conducted from Karachi, he said that they showed that urban heat island effects are present, with higher night-time land surface temperatures in urban areas, and recent work has identified heatwave vulnerability in the city’s dense urban zones. “A 2026 multi-city Pakistan study also found that Karachi has the highest urban-rural temperature difference among major cities studied, around 4.5°C, and linked vegetation loss with higher land surface temperature. “This means Karachi is not only experiencing hotter weather; it is also being built in a way that makes heat worse. In our own microscale urban heat work in Karachi [a 2024 study], we found that delivery riders and rickshaw drivers experienced temperatures much higher than the city’s recorded average,” he said. The study published two years ago showed that in summer, exposure was about 5.5°C higher under direct sun and 1.8°C higher even in shade compared with the city average. “This tells us something very important: the heat people face on the street is often different from the official temperature. The real exposure is what people feel at traffic signals, bus stops, roadside markets, construction sites, school routes, and while travelling for work.” Responding to a question about warning signs of growing intensity of urban heat, Prof Fatmi said that they are already visible; nights are not cooling adequately, outdoor workers feel exhausted earlier in the day and people complain of dehydration, headache, dizziness, poor sleep, fatigue, and fainting. “Those with heart disease, lung disease, hypertension, diabetes, kidney disease, and old age are at greater risk. Children, pregnant women, traffic police, vendors, construction workers, delivery riders, rickshaw drivers, and people living in poorly ventilated homes are particularly vulnerable.” Underscoring the need for urgent action, he said that when ordinary places such as bus stops, traffic signals, roadside shops, and school routes become heat-risk zones, it is a sign that urban heat is no longer an occasional discomfort; it is becoming a public-health exposure. The problem, he points out, becomes more serious when heat combines with air pollution. Karachi’s residents do not experience heat and pollution separately. “They breathe polluted air in hot, congested, dusty, and traffic-heavy conditions. Heat increases dehydration, breathing rate, and pressure on the heart, while air pollution affects the lungs, blood vessels, and cardiovascular system.” According to Prof Fatmi, research from hundreds of cities has shown that high temperatures can modify the health effects of air pollutants, including particulate matter, nitrogen dioxide, and ozone. “Other studies also suggest that combined exposure to heat and particulate pollution can increase mortality risk more than either exposure alone. For Karachi, this means air pollution control and heat planning should not be treated as separate issues.” Replying to a question whether there is a link between rising temperature, urban heat and infections, he explained that higher temperatures can create conditions in which some pathogens, mosquitoes, and contamination risks grow more easily, especially where water, sanitation, waste, and drainage systems are weak. “Food spoils faster. Stored water becomes unsafe more easily. Stagnant water can support mosquito breeding. Climate research shows that warming temperatures and changing rainfall patterns are affecting vector-borne diseases, while water-borne and food-borne infections can also increase where heat is combined with poor sanitation and unsafe water.” In Karachi, therefore, he says, the risk is not heat alone; it is heat plus poor drainage, unsafe water storage, waste accumulation, crowding, and weak municipal services. On the actions required at both individual and state levels, he said that people should avoid unnecessary outdoor exposure during peak heat, drink safe water frequently, use shade, cover the head, avoid heavy exertion during the hottest hours, and check on children, elderly people, pregnant women, and people with chronic diseases. “People should recognise early danger signs such as dizziness, confusion, fainting, severe weakness, very hot skin, or inability to drink water. Outdoor workers need shaded rest areas, drinking water, and adjusted work hours. These should be treated as basic occupational protections, not as charity.” At the government level, he says, Karachi needs a serious heat-health action plan. “This should include simple public alerts in Urdu and local languages, shaded bus stops, public drinking-water points, cooling spaces, school guidance during heatwaves, emergency preparedness in hospitals, and legal protection for outdoor workers during extreme heat.” However, he emphasises that emergency response alone is not enough and that the city must also reduce heat at its source; protecting mature trees, expanding green and blue spaces, reducing unnecessary concrete, improving public transport, controlling dust and vehicle emissions, stopping waste burning, using cooler building and road materials, and making heat assessment mandatory for major roads, buildings, and infrastructure projects. “A climate-resilient Karachi will require health, planning, transport, environment, labour, and municipal authorities to work together. Otherwise, heat will continue to quietly damage health, productivity, and dignity, especially among the poor and those who work outdoors.” Published in Dawn, June 5th, 2026
The building at the center of the deadly explosion at Hanwha Aerospace's Daejeon facility handled large volumes of volatile solvents and materials for rocket propellants, according to safety reports Thursday. Reports submitted by the Korea Occupational Safety and Health Agency to Rep. Cho Ji-yeon of the People Power Party show that Building No. 56 — the site of Monday's blast — used roughly 8.2 metric tons of cleaning solvents and 36 metric tons of propellants each month during the second half o
Police launched a joint inspection Tuesday of a Hanwha Aerospace factory as part of a probe into a deadly explosion at the facility the previous day. The blast at the defense company's facility in Daejeon, some 140 kilometers south of Seoul, killed five people and injured two others. The joint inspection involved officials from the Daejeon Metropolitan Police Agency, the fire service, the National Forensic Service, the labor ministry and the Korea Occupational Safety and Health Agency. The polic
BUKIT MERTAJAM, May 31 — The Penang Department of Occupational Safety and Health (DOSH) has ordered all work activ...
A psychologist wades into controversial territory in this counterintuitive study of nature, nurture and gender According to the evolutionary psychologist Steve Stewart-Williams, almost everyone gets sex wrong. Traditionalists tend to exaggerate the natural differences between men and women. Progressives tend to minimise them, and to assume that nurture and socialisation play a decisive role. He wants to promote a more nuanced, scientifically rigorous public conversation about why and how men and women differ to guide better policymaking. Some sex differences are relatively pronounced, he claims, such as whether you’re primarily attracted to men or women, upper body strength, height, the likelihood you’ll murder someone and occupational interests. Many, such as ability in maths, or conscientiousness, are much more modest. Such differences are best visualised as two overlapping bell curves. To illustrate this, consider height: the shortest humans are almost all women, the tallest are men, the average man is taller than the average woman, but there is considerable common ground. Knowing that someone is 5ft 8in won’t enable you to guess with any confidence whether they are a man or a woman, for instance. Continue reading...
Countries: Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda Source: World Health Organization On 17 May 2026, pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 12 - Determination of a public health emergency of international concern, including a pandemic emergency of the International Health Regulations (2005) (IHR), the Director-General (DG) of the World Health Organization (WHO), after having consulted the States Parties where the event was known to be occurring, determined that the epidemic of Ebola disease caused by Bundibugyo virus in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda constitutes a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC), but did not meet the criteria of pandemic emergency, as defined in the IHR. The DG statement issued on 17 May 2026 also contained “WHO advice” to States Parties to respond to and prepare for the event. On 19 May 2026, the DG convened the first meeting of the IHR Emergency Committee regarding the epidemic of Ebola disease caused by Bundibugyo virus in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda (hereafter “Committee”). The Committee’s advice aligned with the determination by the DG that the event constitutes a PHEIC, but does not meet the criteria for pandemic emergency. The Committee acknowledged that the epidemic is occurring in one of the most challenging operational environments possible, therefore, any response must incorporate key contextual information to improve the chances of a successful response. The DG, considering the advice of the Committee, he is hereby issuing the following temporary recommendations to all States Parties to respond to and prepare to respond to the PHEIC. ==== Temporary recommendations These temporary recommendations are issued for subsets of States Parties according to the public health risk associated with the Bundibugyo virus disease epidemic they face. All current WHO interim technical guidance can be accessed on this page of the WHO website. WHO evidence-based guidance has been and will continue to be updated in line with the evolving situation, updated scientific evidence, and WHO risk assessment. The implementation of these temporary recommendations by States Parties shall be with full respect for the dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms of persons, in accordance with the principles set out in Article 3 of the IHR. For States Parties with documented detection of Bundibugyo virus (the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda) As of 22 May 2026, the WHO Secretariat assessed the risk for these States Parties as “Very high” for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and as “High” for Uganda. It is noted that the epidemiological situation in the two States Parties differs in terms of magnitude of the epidemic and contexts where response efforts are being implemented. Specifically, as of 22 May 2026, Uganda has reported two confirmed cases of Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD), both with epidemiological link traceable to areas in the Democratic Republic of the Congo with documented BVD transmission. In Uganda, as of the same date, no onwards transmission among contacts of the two confirmed BVD cases was documented. The epidemic is caused by Bundibugyo virus (BDBV), a virus belonging to the Orthoebolavirus genus. Unlike Ebola virus causing Ebola virus disease, there is no currently approved therapeutics or vaccines against Bundibugyo virus. While candidate therapeutics are considered for clinical trials and work in ongoing to fast-track candidate vaccines evaluation, the control of the epidemic relies on scaling-up public health interventions as outlined below. Coordination and high-level engagement Declare the Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) epidemic a health emergency, at national or sub-national level, in accordance with domestic laws, and as appropriate. Activate national disaster or health emergency management mechanisms and activate or establish an emergency operation centre, under the authority of the Head of State or relevant government authority, to coordinate response activities across Government sectors, administrative levels, and partners to ensure efficient and effective implementation and monitoring of comprehensive BVD control measures. These measures must include enhanced surveillance, including case identification; contact tracing; infection prevention and control (IPC), risk communication and community engagement; laboratory diagnostic testing, case management, and safe and dignified burials. Coordination and response mechanisms should be established at national level, as well as at subnational level in areas where BDBV has been detected and at-risk areas. Establish and maintain up to date a register of signals consistent with BVD (“alerts”), including status of their investigation. Establish and maintain up to date a line list of suspected cases – including identified through syndromic surveillance, probable cases, and confirmed BVD cases. Establish and maintain up to date the list of contacts of all confirmed and probable BVD cases, and monitor each contact for 21 days after the date of last known exposure. Both the evolution of the epidemic and resources available may require risk-based prioritization of contacts requiring identification and monitoring. Negotiate, as applicable, and establish security corridors, including cross-border, to allow responders to safely reach affected communities, as well as to allow communities to seek appropriate health care. Notify WHO, through the relevant WHO IHR Contact Point in the WHO Regional Office, the detection of suspected, probable and confirmed BVD cases on a daily basis, as per WHO case definitions available here. Risk communication and community engagement Implement large-scale trust building and community engagement interventions – using all trusted available communication channels, and working closely with local religious and traditional leaders, and traditional healers – so that communities are fully aware of the risk and benefits of control measures, and pro-actively contribute and support the early detection and early isolation of cases; the identification and monitoring of contacts; and safe and dignified burial practices. Strengthen community awareness, engagement and participation, to establish and strengthen trust, including by identifying and addressing cultural norms and beliefs that may serve as barriers to their full participation in the response; and by integrating interventions and community feedback, within the wider response, to address the needs of the population, particularly in contexts of the protracted humanitarian crisis in the Eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Train community leaders on the rationale underpinning public health measures, including the isolation of cases, monitoring of contacts, and safe burials in a dignified, non-stigmatizing, and non-punitive manner. Activate local networks, including community health workers, Red Cross volunteers, and other trusted community actors to promote protective behaviours; facilitate early detection and referral of suspected BVD cases; support contact tracing activities; and collect and relay community feedback to enhance the acceptance of public health measures. Enable adherence to movement restrictions, associated with the application of control measures, by providing food, water, communication, financial and psychosocial support. Surveillance and laboratory Strengthen surveillance and laboratory capacity, decentralized across first sub-national administrative levels (e.g., provinces) with documented BDBV detection, as well as in their neighbouring first sub-national administrative levels, through: Dedicated surveillance and response teams within each health zone and in neighbouring health zones determined to be at high risk for the introduction of BVD; Active case finding and enhanced community surveillance for clusters of unexplained illness or deaths; The investigation of “alerts” within 24 hours from detection; The scale-up and strengthen RT-PCR laboratory capacities for timely testing for BDBV, including the establishment of protocols for safe sample collection, sample referral pathways, biosafety training for laboratory workers; The decentralization of the laboratory capacities should be considered to allow for quick turn-around time and support patient care, as well as any clinical trials that may take place. Field laboratories should be set up in accordance with biosecurity and biosafety standards. A near point of care assay might be considered provided that its performance is validated against current RT-PCR standards. NB: The GeneXpert platform cannot detect Bundibugyo virus (BDBV). Identify and monitor, for 21 days after the date of last known exposure, the health of contacts of suspected probable, and confirmed BVD cases. On a daily basis, the health status of contacts being monitored should be assessed and recorded. Any contact developing symptoms compatible with BVD should be assessed, isolated, tested and cared for. Establish a mechanism to monitor the evolution of indicators related to the performance of contact tracing activities. Infection prevention and control in health facilities and in the context of care Strengthen measures to prevent nosocomial infections, including systematic mapping of health facilities, the establishment and dissemination of protocols for triage, targeted IPC interventions and sustained monitoring and supervision. Provide continuous IPC training to health care workers, including the proper use of personal protective equipment (PPE). Provide health facilities with sufficient supplies of appropriate PPE equipment to ensure the safety and protection of their staff, resources for timely payment of their salaries and, as appropriate, hazard pay. Establish channels for health workers to report and be assessed following exposures, and have access to psychosocial support and, when possible post-exposure prophylaxis under compassionate use or clinical trial. All health worker occupational exposure must be investigated to allow for immediate corrective actions. Consider building community IPC capacity by training community leaders, and emphasizing that hand hygiene not only contributes to bring the BVD epidemic under control, but also reduces the risk of transmission of other communicable diseases present in the same areas. Hand hygiene shall be facilitated at critical spots, such as schools, churches, bars, markets, local gatherings sites, points of entry, etc. Patient referral pathway and access to safe and optimized intensive care Establish dedicated BVD isolation and treatment centers or units for suspected, probable, and confirmed cases, located within, or close to, areas with documented BDBV detection, with sufficient staff who are specifically trained and equipped to implement optimized intensive supportive care. Establish protocols for transferring suspected BVD patients safely to dedicated health care facilities for their isolation, assessment and treatment in a humane and patient-centred approach. This includes trained ambulance teams, mechanisms to notify the receiving health care facility, the application of appropriate IPC precautions during transfer, and decontamination protocols for vehicles and equipment. Establish protocols for the handling and disposal of medical waste, in accordance with biosafety principles. Establish survivor follow-up programmes, including clinical care, counselling, semen testing and sexual health advice and condoms where appropriate, along with psychosocial support and stigma-reduction programmes. Maintain the package of essential health services, including by providing IPC equipment for them to operate safely. This includes, at minimum, malaria diagnosis and treatment, and maternal and child health services. Safe and dignified burials Establish protocols ensuring funerals and burials are conducted by well-trained personnel, with provision made for the presence of the family and cultural practices, and in accordance with relevant national laws and regulations. Operations, supplies and logistics Establish logistics support to maintain a robust supply pipeline for PPE, diagnostics, therapeutics, and other medical commodities, IPC materials, including for safe burial. Border health, international travel and mass-gathering events Enhance, through arrangements between countries sharing borders, surveillance at ground crossings and border areas. Implement measures, in accordance with national laws and regulations, to prevent suspected, probable, and confirmed BVD cases, as well as their contacts from undertaking international travel, unless the travel is part of an appropriate medical evacuation. Prevent the cross-border movement of the human remains of deceased suspected, probable or confirmed BVD cases, unless authorized through bilateral arrangements. Implement exit screening at all points of entry – airports, ports and ground crossings – consisting of, at a minimum, a questionnaire encompassing history of potential exposure to BVD, a temperature measurement and, in case of fever, an in-depth assessment of the risk of BVD, by personnel trained and equipped with PPE. Any traveller determined to present with an illness consistent with BVD should not be allowed to travel unless the travel is part of an appropriate medical evacuation. Report to WHO, through the relevant WHO IHR Contact Point in the WHO Regional Office, the implementation of any international traffic related measure adopted. Consider postponing mass gatherings until BVD transmission is interrupted. Research and development of medical countermeasures Engage, when feasible, with research partners and international institutions to: Define a robust laboratory strategy, urgently implement head-to-head comparison studies of PCR diagnostics to validate or invalidate the PCR platform (Radione ®) currently used in the field. Implement ethically approved, scientifically robust clinical trials to advance the development and use of candidate therapeutics for treatment and post-exposure prophylaxis and for vaccines. Establish, with a view to support research, expedited and efficient national regulatory and ethics reviews, community engagement, pharmacovigilance (where applicable), data sharing and equitable access arrangements. For States Parties with land borders adjoining States Parties with documented BDBV detection As of 22 May 2026, the WHO Secretariat assessed the regional risk “High”. Establish a national coordination mechanism articulated with subnational levels. Enhance rapidly the status of readiness to respond to BVD cases, including establishing active surveillance across health facilities, with zero reporting; enhancing community-based surveillance for clusters of unexplained deaths; establishing access to laboratories qualified to test for BVD; raising the awareness of health workers regarding BVD; training health workers on IPC precautions; establishing rapid response teams for the investigation and management of BVD patients and their contacts; establishing a mechanism for the identification and monitoring of contacts. Establish the capacity at national reference laboratory(ies) to timely and safely perform testing for BDBV along with relevant differential testing. Considerations may be given to shipment to an international reference laboratory for inter-laboratory comparison as part of external quality assurance implementation. Conduct international contact tracing operations as necessary, including obtaining information from airlines and other conveyances operations; identifying contacts associated with conveyances on an international voyage, and communicate with States Parties known as final destination of those contacts. Intensify risk communication and community engagement activities, in communities residing in border areas and at points of entry, including airports and ports with direct connection with States Parties with documented BDBV detection, and provide the general public with accurate and up to date information regarding the BVD epidemic and measures to reduce the risk of exposure. Exercise arrangements in place to respond to BVD through simulation exercises relating to management of BVD ” alerts”, including cross-border; sample referral; activation of rapid response teams and mechanisms. Establish, with a view to support research, expedited and efficient national regulatory and ethics reviews, community engagement, pharmacovigilance (where applicable), data sharing and equitable access arrangements. Border health and international travel Provide travelers with accurate and up to date information regarding the BVD epidemic and measures to reduce the risk of exposure, including discouraging travel to areas with documented BDBV detection. Enhance, through arrangements between countries sharing borders, surveillance at ground crossings. This includes establishing coordination mechanisms for the detection and assessment of travelers with unexplained febrile illness; and the timely sharing of information regarding contacts who have, or may have, crossed the border, thus enabling continuity of follow-up. Pre-position PPE, other IPC materials, sample collection kits, case investigation forms, and safe burial supplies in border areas adjacent to those with documented BDBV detection. Activate health contingency plans at airport and ports, involving conveyance operators, to detect, assess, and manage travellers from States Parties with documented BDBV detection, presenting with symptoms compatible with BVD, and the identification of their contacts, according to established protocols. This entails the availability of trained personnel, referral mechanisms, application of IPC measures. Coordinate with conveyance operators to facilitate timely communication, prior to arrival and to relevant authorities, of any suspected BVD cases on board conveyances, and to identify contacts associated with conveyances on an international voyage. The identification of such contacts entails, where applicable, the communication of personal details to the States Parties known as final destination of those contacts. At the time these temporary recommendations are issued, neither the suspension of flights or waterways routes with States Parties with documented BDBV detection, nor denial of entry to travellers and conveyances arriving from those States Parties, are recommended. Report to WHO, through the relevant WHO IHR Contact Point, the implementation of any international traffic related measure adopted. Treat as a health emergency, including through a formal declaration according to domestic laws, the detection of a suspected or confirmed BVD case, of a contact thereof, or of a cluster of unexplained deaths. This include investigating any of those events within 24 hours and, by instituting case isolation and management; establishing a definitive diagnosis; and undertaking the identification and monitoring of contacts. Notify to WHO immediately, through the relevant WHO IHR Contact Point in the WHO Regional Offices, any suspected, probable or confirmed BVD case, as per WHO case definitions available here. In the presence of a BVD case, temporary recommendations for State Parties States Parties with documented BDBV detection apply. For all other States Parties As of 22 May 2026, the WHO Secretariat assessed the risk for these States Parties as “Low”. Make arrangements to detect, assess, report and manage travelers with unexplained febrile illness arriving from areas with documented BDBV tdetection. These include, but are not limited to, disseminating the definition of BVD cases to public and private health care facilities, including travel clinics, and general practitioners; identifying laboratories to conduct testing for BDBV; identifying isolation facilities allowing for safe assessment and clinical care. Provide no-governemntal organizations and other entities deploying personnel internationally to respond to the BVD epidemic with information on risk, measures to minimize the risk of exposure, and advice for managing a potential exposure. Prepare to facilitate the evacuation and repatriation of nationals (e.g., health workers) who have been exposed to BVD cases. Provide the general public with accurate and up to date information regarding the BVD epidemic and measures to reduce the risk of exposure, including discouraging travel to areas with documented BDBV detection. Border health and international travel Provide accurate and up to date information regarding the BVD epidemic to travel clinics, other health facilities and professionals, and discourage travel to areas with documented BDBV detection. Provide incoming travelers, at points of entry, with information about measures to take should they develop symptoms compatible with BVD within 21 days after arrival. Coordinate with the transport sector, including conveyance and points of entry operators, for the timely management of suspected BVD cases, including communication prior to arrival if the individual is on board; as well as for the identification of their contacts on board conveyance. The identification of such contacts entails, where applicable, the communication of personal details to the States Parties known as final destination of those contacts. At the time these temporary recommendations are issued, neither the suspension of flights from States Parties with documented BDBV detection, nor denial of entry to travellers and conveyances arriving from those States Parties, are recommended. Report to WHO, through the relevant WHO IHR Contact Point, the implementation of any international traffic related measure adopted. Notify to WHO immediately, through the relevant WHO IHR Contact Point in the WHO Regional Offices, any suspected, probable or confirmed BVD case, as per WHO case definitions available here. In the presence of a BVD case, temporary recommendations for States Parties with documented BDBV detection apply. All States Parties Reporting on the implementation of temporary recommendations Report quarterly to WHO on the status of, and challenges related to, the implementation of these temporary recommendations, using a standardized tool and channels that will be made available by WHO, also allowing for the monitoring of progress and the identification of gaps in the national response. Media Contacts WHO Media Team World Health Organization Email: mediainquiries@who.int
For years, the field of robotics has used the terms “dull, dirty, and dangerous” (DDD) to describe the types of tasks or jobs where robots might be useful—by doing work that’s undesirable for people. A classic example of a DDD job is one of “repetitive physical labor on a steaming hot factory floor involving heavy machinery that threatens life and limb.” But determining which human activities fit into these categories is not as straightforward as it seems. What exactly is a “dull” task, and who makes that assumption? Is “dirty” work just about needing to wash your hands afterwards, or is there also an aspect of social stigma? What data can we rely on to classify jobs as “dangerous?” Our recent work (which was not dull at all) tackles these questions and proposes a framework to help roboticists understand the job context for our technology. First, we did an empirical analysis of robotics publications between 1980 and 2024 that mention DDD and found that only 2.7 percent define DDD and only 8.7 percent provide examples of tasks or jobs. The definitions vary, and many of the examples aren’t particularly specific (for example, “industrial manufacturing,” “home care”). Next, we reviewed the social science literature in anthropology, economics, political science, psychology, and sociology to develop better definitions for “dull,” “dirty,” and “dangerous” work. Again, while it might seem intuitive which tasks to put into these buckets, it turns out that there are some underlying social, economic, and cultural factors that matter. Dangerous Work: Occupations or tasks that result in injury or risk of harm It’s possible to measure the danger of a task or job by using reported information. There are administrative records and surveys that provide numbers on occupational injury rates and hazardous risk factors. While that seems straightforward, it’s important to understand how this data was collected, reported, and verified. First, occupational injuries tend to be underreported, with some studies estimating up to 70 percent of cases missing in administrative databases. Second, injuries and risk factors are rarely disaggregated by characteristics like gender, migration status, formal/informal employment, and work activities. For example, because most personal protective equipment—such as masks, vests, and gloves—are sized for men, women in dangerous work environments face increased safety risks. These caveats are an opportunity for robotics to be helpful. If we went out and looked for it, we could probably find some less obviously dangerous work where robotics might be an important intervention, not to mention some groups that are disproportionately affected and would benefit from more workplace safety. Dirty Work: Occupations or tasks that are physically, socially, or morally tainted Colloquially, most people might think of dirty work as involving physical dirtiness, such as trash removal, cleaning, or dealing with hazardous substances. But social science literature makes clear that dirty work is also about stigma. Socially tainted jobs are often servile or involve interacting with stigmatized groups (for example, correctional officers), and morally tainted jobs include tasks that people commonly perceive as sinful, deceptive, or otherwise defying norms of civility (like a stripper or a collection agent). “Dirty work” is a social construct that can vary across time (like tattoo industry stigma in the United States) and culture (such as nursing in the U.S. versus in Bangladesh). One way to measure whether work is “dirty” is by using the closely related concept of occupational prestige, captured through quantitative surveys where people rank jobs. Another way to measure it is through qualitative data, like ethnographies and interviews. Similar to “dangerous,” we see some hidden opportunities for robotics in “dirty” work. But one of our more interesting takeaways from the data is that a lower-ranked job can be something that the workers themselves enjoy or find immense pride and meaning in. If we care about what tasks are truly undesirable, understanding this worker perspective is important. Dull Work: Occupations or tasks that are repetitive and lacking in autonomy When it comes to defining dull work, what matters most is workers’ own experiences. Outsiders can make a lot of false assumptions about what tasks have value and meaning. Sometimes things that seem boring or routine create the right conditions for developing skills and competence, such as the concentration needed for woodworking, or for socializing and support, when tasks are done alongside others. Instead of assuming that repetitive work is negative, it’s important to examine qualitative data on how people experience the work and what purpose it serves for them. DDD: An actionable framework In our paper, we propose a framework to help the robotics community explore how automation impacts individual jobs. For each term—dull, dirty, and dangerous—the framework gathers key pieces of information to reflect on what physical or social aspects of the task are, in fact, DDD. Worker perspective is an important part of all three considerations. The framework also emphasizes awareness of context—meaning the physical and social environment of an occupation and industry that can influence the DDD nature of a task. Our corresponding worksheet suggests existing data sources to draw on and encourages us to seek out multiple perspectives and consider potential sources of bias in the information. What makes tasks dull, dirty, or dangerous depends on the perspective of the humans doing those tasks.RAI Let’s take, for example, the waste and recycling industry. The world generates over 2 billion tonnes of waste annually, and this figure is expected to rise to nearly 4 billion tonnes by 2050. Intuitively, trash collection seems like a job that hits all the Ds. Going through our worksheet, we confirm that globally, workers in this industry face significant health hazards (dangerous), and waste collection is ranked as a low-status job (dirty), although interestingly, many workers take pride in providing this essential service. The job is also repetitive, but there are aspects that make it not dull. Specifically, workers cite the day-to-day interaction with their coworkers (which includes extensive insider vocabulary, work hacks, and mutual aid groups) and task variety as two of the most enjoyable aspects of the job. Task variety includes inspecting their vehicle and equipment, driving their truck, coordinating with crew members, lifting bins and bags, detecting incorrect sorting of waste, and unloading at the end destination. This finding matters because some types of robotic solutions will eliminate the parts of the job that workers most appreciate. For instance, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) recommends the adoption of automated side loader trucks and collision avoidance systems. This innovation increases safety, which is great, but it also results in a sole worker operating a joystick in a cab, surrounded by sensor and camera surveillance. Instead, we should challenge ourselves to think of solutions that make jobs safer without making them terrible in a different way. To do this, we need to understand all aspects of what makes a job dull, dirty, or dangerous (or not). Our framework aims to facilitate this understanding. Finally, it’s important to note that DDD is only one of many possible approaches to classify what work might be better served by robots. There are lots of ways we could think about which types of tasks or jobs to automate (for example, economic impact or environmental sustainability). Given the popularity of DDD in robotics, we chose this common phrase as a starting point. We would love to see more work in this space, whether it’s data collection on DDD itself or the creation of other frameworks. At RAI, we believe that the fusion of robotics and social sciences opens a whole new world of information, perspectives, opportunities, and value. It fosters a culture of curiosity and mutual learning, and allows us to create actionable tools for anyone in robotics who cares about societal impact. Dull, Dirty, Dangerous: Understanding the Past, Present, and Future of a Key Motivation for Robotics, by Nozomi Nakajima, Pedro Reynolds-Cuéllar, Caitrin Lynch, and Kate Darling from the RAI Institute, was presented at the 21st ACM/IEEE International Conference on Human-Robot Interaction (HRI) in Edinburgh, Scotland.