ReliefWeb Updates
중도 성향
기타
Philippines: Mayon Volcano Summary of 24Hr Observation 2 June 2026 12:00 AM [EN/TL]
Country: Philippines Source: Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology Please refer to the attached Infographic.
🌐 국제기구 · "VAT" · 총 85건
필터 보기현재 지수
50.0
0 = 부정 우세
50 = 중립
100 = 긍정 우세
최근 7일 기준 5,639건을 분석한 결과, 뉴스 심리지수는 50.0(균형)입니다. 긍정 0건(0.0%)·중립 5,639건(100.0%)·부정 0건(0.0%)이며, 중립 비중이 뚜렷하게 높습니다. 성향 지수는 종합 0.0(중도 균형)입니다.
Country: Philippines Source: Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology Please refer to the attached Infographic.
Country: Sudan Sources: Emergency Telecommunications Cluster, World Food Programme Please refer to the attached file. The WFP-led Logistics and Telecommunications Cluster (LTC) was activated as the Emergency Telecommunications Cluster (ETC) on 25 May 2023 in response to the conflict crisis in Sudan. This Situation Report provides a monthly update on LTC telecoms activities. All references to the LTC in this report relate to the telecommunications area of the cluster. Summary Points • In May, LTC Telecoms sustained critical connectivity across seven hubs despite funding and access constraints, while expansion plans in Khartoum slowed due to renewed insecurity. UN agencies are preparing phased returns from Port Sudan to the capital. • LTC Telecoms is transitioning to an on-demand service model, managed by WFP, using cost-recovery and costsharing to sustain operations. Piloted in Al Gedaref, the model supports shared connectivity services and is expanding to more stable areas in eastern Sudan. • LTC Telecoms is finalizing a project to support community connectivity in Khartoum, in coordination with the Protection Working Group and partner Go Green, to strengthen digital services at community centres.
Country: Afghanistan Source: World Food Programme Please refer to the attached file. Highlights Exchange Rate and Trade Dynamics: During the fourth week of May, the Afghani exchange rate remained stable at AFN 63.8/USD, while remaining stronger than both last year and the three-year average, helping to moderate the impact of imported inflation on domestic markets. Market supply conditions remained generally stable, supported by ongoing domestic harvests and continued imports through regional trade corridors. However, transportation costs, regional trade uncertainties, and high import dependence continue to pose risks to market stability and contribute to localized price fluctuations. Food Items: Overall, national average food prices remained relatively stable during the fourth week of May, with moderate week-on-week declines across major food commodities. However, compared to last year, most key food commodities continue to remain above year-ago levels, particularly wheat grain (+14%), wheat flour (high-price +9%; low-price +12%), rice (high-quality +38%; low-quality +28%), cooking oil (+4%), sugar (+25%), and salt (+10%). Meanwhile, pulses (-12%) and bread (-4%), remain below their respective levels from the same period last year. The higher year-on-year prices reflect increases recorded between Oct-25 and Mar-26 following border closures with Pakistan and the rerouting of trade through Iran and Central Asia. Since then, improved trade flows and market availability have gradually contributed to declining price levels. Vegetables: Vegetable prices continued their seasonal decline, supported by increased domestic production and improved market availability. Tomato prices recorded a significant weekly decrease of 18.5%, while potato prices declined by 2.3%. In contrast, onion prices increased by 4.6%, partially reversing the declines observed in recent months and moving back toward more typical seasonal levels. Compared to last year, tomato prices remain 20% lower and onion prices 35% lower, while potato prices continue to remain substantially above last year’s level (+24%). Increased arrivals of seasonal produce from several provinces, continued to improve market availability and support downward price movements across major markets. Non-Food Items: Diesel prices increased slightly during the week (+1.3%) and remained 14% above last year's level. Fertilizer prices remained broadly stable, with DAP increasing by 0.8% and urea by 0.3% compared to the previous week. Compared to last year, fertilizer prices continue to remain elevated, particularly for urea (+45%) and DAP (+16%), maintaining pressure on agricultural production costs. Improved seed and animal feed prices remained largely unchanged during the week. Livestock and Labour Market: The price of a one-year-old female sheep increased by 6.0%, driven by stronger demand ahead of Eid-ul-Adha, when livestock purchases typically increase across the country. Meanwhile, labour market conditions remained weak during the week, with labour availability declining slightly to 1.9 days per week, compared to the previous week. Labour availability remains substantially below both last year (-20%) and the three-year average (-16%), reflecting continued constraints in employment opportunities and increased competition among casual labourers.
Countries: Lebanon, Syrian Arab Republic Source: Famine Early Warning System Network Please refer to the attached file. Key Messages Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected across South and El-Nabatieh governorates through September 2026, driven by sustained insecurity, collapsed market functionality, and severely constrained humanitarian access. From June through September, a deterioration from Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!) to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) is likely in Akkar, Baalbek-El Hermel, Beirut, and parts of Mount Lebanon, Bekaa, and North, reflecting mounting displacement pressures and declining income-earning opportunities alongside a reduction in humanitarian food assistance after May. Hostilities between Israeli forces and Hezbollah persist in May, with continued airstrikes and ground operations driving large-scale displacement, reducing market access, disrupting agricultural production, and constraining humanitarian operations. Despite a 45-day ceasefire extension announced on May 15, fighting intensified in mid- to late May, with attacks remaining concentrated in southern Lebanon, particularly in Tyre, Nabatieh, Bint Jbeil, and Marjayyoun districts. Israeli air and drone strikes are also increasing in frequency in the Bekaa Valley. Attacks targeting critical infrastructure — including health facilities, water systems, and transportation routes — continue to disrupt supply chains and constrain service delivery, while humanitarian access remains constrained across insecurity-affected areas, further isolating southern populations. Displacements continue to increase, placing additional strain on collective shelters and intensifying social tensions in host communities. Returns to southern Lebanon remain limited due to persisting insecurity, widespread infrastructure destruction, restricted access, and disruptions to markets and essential services. Expanded evacuation orders beyond southern Lebanon are constraining movement and access to assistance across southern Lebanon, the Bekaa Valley, and Beirut’s southern suburbs, with 90 percent of forced displacement orders concentrated in South, triggering further population movements. As of May 21, nearly 130,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) are residing in 635 collective shelters, while the majority of the estimated 1.3 million IDPs remain outside formal sites in Beirut, Mount Lebanon, and North. Within these governorates, large influxes are exacerbating overcrowding, straining local resources, and heightening tensions between displaced populations and host communities. Food and fuel prices remain key constraints on household food access amid Lebanon’s heavy reliance on imports and ongoing insecurity-related disruptions. Below-average 2025 wheat production, intermittent trade disruptions, and localized access constraints, particularly in the south and the Bekaa-Baalbek-Hermel corridor, are placing upward pressure on prices, with bread prices rising 12 percent from mid-February to mid-April and remaining elevated despite national wheat availability that is supported by sustained imports, especially in areas affected by insecurity and transport disruptions. Sharp increases in fuel prices — rising by approximately 84 percent between mid-February and mid-May — due to domestic price adjustments and regional fuel market pressures following the escalation are raising transportation and production costs. These price increases are further eroding household purchasing power, particularly for poor and displaced households. Market functionality and income-earning opportunities remain uneven across Lebanon, reflecting a geographic divide between insecurity-affected areas and areas not directly impacted by hostilities. In South and El-Nabatieh, market functionality remains severely degraded, with limited trader activity, supply chain breakdowns, and restricted physical access constraining food availability. In contrast, markets continue to operate in most displacement-affected areas, though growing strain on local markets — driven by the IDP influx, price inflation, depleting stocks, and overwhelming trader capacity — and declining purchasing power are increasingly constraining food access. Income-earning opportunities remain well below average countrywide, with the collapse of the tourism industry — an 80 percent drop compared to the same period in 2025 — and below-average activity in construction, services, and transport limiting urban labor demand. The increased labor supply from displaced populations is increasing competition and placing downward pressure on wages. In South, El-Nabatieh, and Baalbek-Hermel, agricultural labor opportunities, associated with the start of the typical wheat and barley harvest, are below average and compounded by displacement, land access constraints, and infrastructure damage, which are reducing a key source of seasonal income. Humanitarian food assistance remains ongoing but insufficient to meet rapidly rising needs. A revised extension of the Lebanon Flash Appeal through August — expected to launch in early June — will continue to target up to 1 million people, contingent on the availability of funding, including poor Lebanese, displaced Syrians, and Palestinian refugees. However, implementation remains highly dependent on securing additional funding, with substantial funding gaps limiting partners’ ability to sustain assistance delivery at scale. Since the start of the escalation, partners have delivered more than 10.3 million hot and cold meals, 129,852 ready-to-eat rations, and 37,256 bread bundles across Lebanon, and have supported 618,000 insecurity-affected people with cash assistance as of May 21. Operational effectiveness also continues to vary by area. In insecurity-affected areas, particularly South and El-Nabatieh, ongoing hostilities, movement restrictions, infrastructure damage, and localized market disruptions limit households’ ability to fully utilize cash assistance, while access constraints and convoy limitations continue to restrict the timely delivery of in-kind assistance to the most affected and isolated populations.
Country: Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) Source: Famine Early Warning System Network Please refer to the attached file. Key Messages Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are expected to persist countrywide through September, despite gradual macroeconomic improvements. Most poor households remain able to meet their minimum food needs, but face difficulties meeting their essential non-food needs due to extremely high food inflation in local currency and limited purchasing power. However, pockets of poor households – mainly in informal settlements around urban areas – with limited to no sources of income in USD and/or limited to no access to social safety net programs are likely to experience Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes. These households’ incomes in VED are insufficient to cover the rising cost of food, resulting in food consumption gaps or the use of negative coping strategies, without reaching the necessary threshold to change the area-level classification in any state. Macroeconomic conditions are stabilizing, but progress remains slow and incremental. Between March and April, the official exchange rate depreciated by 13.6 percent to 480.76 VED/USD while the parallel market exchange rate appreciated by 2 percent to 645.72 VED/USD. The gap between the official and parallel rates narrowed to 30 percent, declining 10 percentage points from March, supported by improved foreign currency availability throughout the Venezuelan economy. The monthly inflation rate slowed for the third consecutive month (to 10.6 percent), while the annual inflation rate was 611.9 percent (decreasing 37 percentage points from March). In April, the cost of the minimum survival ration (consisting of maize flour, rice, pasta, and oil) continued to increase in local currency at a pace similar to February and March, and increased by 11.5 percent in USD, reversing the downward trend reported last month. These increases reflect exchange rate pressures, high operational costs, increased consumer demand linked to increased social safety net benefits, speculation, and a perception of improving economic conditions, linked to stronger foreign currency inflows. Oil sector performance remained strong in April. Crude oil production exceeded 1 million barrels per day (bpd) in April, according to OPEC, marking the highest output since January 2019. Crude oil export volumes also remained above 1 million bpd, reaching levels not observed since 2018. International benchmark prices have continued to vary, but averaged 110 USD/barrel (Brent) and 104 USD/barrel (WTI) through May 18, supporting increased foreign currency inflows and government revenues, which continue to finance social safety net benefits. Increased foreign currency inflows are reducing the gap between the official and parallel market exchange rates as the Central Bank of Venezuela (BCV) interventions continue to add hard currency into circulation via sales to private banks. In April, weekly intervention amounts ranged between 180 and 450 million USD, sold at an exchange rate of 570.75 VED/USD. According to the BCV, total interventions in May are expected to reach 1.35 billion USD at an exchange rate of 611.00 VED/USD. For eligible households, recent increases in social safety net benefits are improving financial access to food. Although the minimum salary remains unchanged, the Ingreso Contra la Guerra Económica (ICGE) increased an additional 33.3 percent from 150 USD in April to 200 USD in May. Given the persistent gap between the official and parallel market exchange rates, the indexed value of 200 USD is equivalent to slightly less than 150 USD on the parallel market. This amount remains sufficient to cover the minimum survival ration estimated in April to cost 95.90 USD for a household of four and to also cover a portion of essential non-food expenditures. No Comités Locales de Abastecimiento y Producción (CLAP) in-kind food assistance distributions were reported in May.
Country: Sierra Leone Source: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies Please refer to the attached file. Description of the Event Date when the trigger was met 13-05-2026 What happened, where and when? On 13 May 2026, the National Public Health Agency (NPHA), in collaboration with the Ministry of Health (MoH), officially declared a measles outbreak in Sierra Leone following confirmation of sustained transmission across multiple districts. On the same day, 41 confirmed cases were reported across eight districts: Western Area Urban (Freetown), Western Area Rural, Port Loko, Bombali, Tonkolili, Bo, Kenema, and Kono. Between 14 and 19 May 2026, an additional 8 confirmed cases were identified, bringing the total to 49 confirmed cases. The outbreak is characterized by a laboratory positivity rate of 75 per cent, indicating active community transmission and likely underdetection of cases through routine surveillance systems. The spread across both urban and rural districts, including densely populated communities in Freetown, significantly increases the risk of rapid nationwide propagation. The outbreak is occurring within a context of persistent immunity gaps linked to suboptimal routine immunization coverage, particularly in underserved and hard-to-reach communities. Children under five years of age remain the most vulnerable due to low vaccination uptake, malnutrition, and limited access to healthcare services. High population mobility, overcrowded settlements, schools, and marketplaces continue to facilitate rapid transmission. Health systems in affected districts are under increasing pressure due to rising demands for surveillance, case investigation, laboratory testing, community engagement, and case management. Existing response efforts are further constrained by weak community-level surveillance, limited outreach capacity for rapid vaccination scale-up, inadequate risk communication coverage, and shortages of operational resources in high-risk districts. In response, the MoH and NPHA activated the Incident Command Centre (ICC) and initiated coordination with humanitarian and development partners to scale up containment measures, including reactive vaccination, surveillance strengthening, community engagement, and case management support. NPHA has specifically requested urgent partner support to reinforce outbreak response efforts, warning that the outbreak risks escalating further, particularly in densely populated districts, if immediate action is not taken. Despite ongoing response measures, transmission continues to expand, highlighting the urgent need for coordinated humanitarian support to contain the outbreak, strengthen vaccination uptake, and reduce preventable morbidity and mortality among vulnerable populations.
Country: Chad Source: International Organization for Migration Please refer to the attached Infographic. The International Organization for Migration’s Emergency Tracking Tool aims to collect information on sudden and significant population movements, mainly triggered by security and climate-related emergencies. This information is collected through key informant interviews and direct observations. This dashboard provides an overview of confirmed movements in the Lac Province between 2 and 13 March 2026. In March 2026, the Lake Province experienced security incidents, leading to population movements. Three confirmed displacement alerts identified a total of 3,920 internally displaced persons across 867 households.
Countries: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Belgium, Egypt, France, Germany, Italy, Morocco, Netherlands, Sudan Source: International Organization for Migration Please refer to the attached file. Ovaj izvještaj pruža uvid u profile, iskustva, potrebe, rute kretanja i namjere migranata koji se kreću kroz Bosnu i Hercegovinu (BiH). Podaci su prikupljani od 1. do 30 aprila. 2026. godine. IOM je proveo vježbu posmatranja ruta u Republici Srpskoj, Kantonu Sarajevo, Posavskom kantonu, Tuzlanskom kantonu, Bosansko-podrinjskom kantonu i Unsko-sanskom kantonu kako bi pratio trendove ulazaka i izlazaka, kao i modalitete tranzita unutar BiH. Također, IOM je anketirao 108 migranata na lokacijama aktivnog tranzita, poput autobusnih stanica ili na ključnim ulaznim i izlaznim tačkama širom zemlje, te 333 migranata u dva tranzitna prihvatna centra (PPC) u BiH (Lipa, i Blažuj).
Countries: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Belgium, Egypt, France, Germany, Italy, Morocco, Netherlands, Sudan Source: International Organization for Migration Please refer to the attached file. This report provides insights into the profiles, experiences, needs, routes travelled and intentions of migrants transiting through Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). Data were collected from 1 to 30 April 2026. IOM carried out a route observation exercise in the Republika Srpska, Sarajevo Canton, Posavina Canton, Tuzla Canton, Bosnian-Podrinje Canton and Una Sana Canton to monitor trends in entries and exits as well as transit modalities within BiH. IOM also surveyed 108 migrants in active transit locations such as bus stops or at key entry and exit locations throughout the country as well as 333 migrants in two transit reception centres (TRCs) in BiH (Ušivak, and Blažuj).
Country: World Source: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies Please refer to the attached file. Message from the IFRC Secretary General Small and medium-sized disasters may not dominate global headlines, but for communities affected they are just as devastating. The IFRC’s Disaster Response Emergency Fund (IFRC-DREF) ensures that these crises are met with speed, dignity and locally-led action. Money is made available fast, without the need to wait for a specific appeal. The DREF 2026 Plan is firmly anchored in the IFRC’s Renewal. In the context of significant global funding constraints, humanitarians must be more focused, disciplined and accountable than ever. The IFRC-DREF is central to this shift - enabling early, flexible financing while reinforcing strong stewardship and clear evidence of results. It is also innovative both in the way it is financed (our world-first indemnity insurance policy was triggered for the first time in 2024) and in how its funds are allocated; funding anticipatory action, before hazards hit, is a growing priority. Our 2026–2030 DREF Ambition involves strengthening not only what we fund, but how we deliver. In 2026, we will continue to streamline processes, improve sequencing between DREF grants and Emergency Appeals and reinforce compliance and operational quality. This ensures that speed is matched by sound decision-making, transparency and impact. Localization remains at the heart of IFRC-DREF. By channeling resources directly to National Societies, we enable action that is timely, context-driven and sustainable. At a time when humanitarian needs are rising and financing is under pressure, this agile and principled mechanism is more essential than ever. The DREF 2026 Plan reflects our commitment to work smarter, better demonstrate impact and ensure that no community facing disaster is ignored. I urge you to read it. Jagan Chapagain Context and rationale for the 2026 plan What is the IFRC-DREF? The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies’ Disaster Response Emergency Fund (IFRC-DREF) is an efficient, fast, transparent, and localized way of getting funding directly to local humanitarian actors – both before and after a crisis. It enables National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies to respond rapidly to emergencies and act ahead of predictable hazards through two complementary pillars: • Response • Anticipatory Action The fund combines speed, flexibility, transparency and localization to support community-led humanitarian action. Context and rationale for the 2026 plan The IFRC’s Disaster Response Emergency Fund (IFRC-DREF) enters 2026 at a pivotal moment, marking the conclusion of its Strategic Ambition 2020–2025 and the release of the IFRC-DREF Strategic Ambition 2026–2030, with 2026 serving as the first year of its operationalization. This transition builds on a period of significant reform, as the revision of procedures introduced in 2025 strengthened accountability, clarified operational and financial rules, and reinforced minimum readiness requirements, including for anticipatory action, while safeguarding IFRC-DREF’s core strengths of speed, flexibility, and reliability. These developments take place within the broader context of the IFRC Renewal, which seeks to strengthen a collective approach by reinforcing localization, quality, accountability, and proximity to communities across the IFRC network (the IFRC secretariat and its 191 member National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies). At the same time, National Societies continue to operate in increasingly complex environments shaped by: · climate-related disasters, · epidemics, · displacement, · economic pressures, · and shrinking humanitarian funding. These realities reinforce the importance of a fast, agile and locally led humanitarian financing mechanism. Global operational realities In 2025, IFRC-DREF allocated CHF 77.4 million across 170 operations in 83 National Societies, supporting 14.5 million people affected by crises worldwide. While most allocations remained under the Response Pillar (CHF 64.9 million), anticipatory action reached a record CHF 12.7 million, representing 16% of total funding. This growth was supported by the approval of 11 new simplified EAPs and 21 new EAPs. Despite a decline from 2024, allocations in 2025 remained 75% higher than in 2021, while operations increased by 27% over the same period. At the same time, the number of countries supported remained relatively stable, reflecting growing concentration of IFRC-DREF usage in highly crisis-affected contexts. Anticipatory action expanded significantly faster than the overall fund between 2021 and 2025, increasing by approximately 150%. This trend is expected to continue in 2026 through simplified procedures and expanded early action mechanisms. Despite growing pressure on humanitarian financing systems, IFRC-DREF allocations in 2025 remained 75% higher than in 2021.
Country: World Source: Regional Technical Group on Anticipatory Action in Latin America and the Caribbean Please refer to the attached file. The Technical Working Group on Anticipatory Action for Latin America and the Caribbean (GTAA LAC) publishes this briefing note in light of the forecast of an El Niño episode for the second half of 2026, with increasing probabilities of reaching strong to very strong intensity towards the end of the year. The document analyses current ENSO conditions, the differentiated impacts projected by subregion, and the compound effect of the fertilizer crisis stemming from the conflict in the Strait of Hormuz on regional agrifood systems. As of March 2026, the region has active or developing anticipatory action frameworks in 22 countries, with pre-arranged financing of USD 37.8 million. The note documents the ongoing inter-agency activations in the Central American Dry Corridor, funded by CERF with USD 10.5 million to protect up to 145,000 people in Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador, as well as complementary WFP activations in Nicaragua and Belize, IFRC Early Action Protocols, and ongoing actions in South America. The document presents the activation time windows by subregion and includes recommendations for governments, humanitarian actors and donors aimed at scaling up anticipatory action before the impacts of El Niño materialize on the most vulnerable populations in the region.
Country: Philippines Source: Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology Please refer to the attached Infographic.
Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo Sources: Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, World Health Organization The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the World Health Organization (WHO) reaffirm their strong partnership and shared commitment to protect the health and well-being of the people of Ituri Province and the nation at large, following the joint mission to Bunia led by Dr Samuel Roger Kamba, Minister of Health, Mr. Patrick Muyaya Katembwe, Minister of Communication and Medias, and the visit of WHO Director-General Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus. This high-level visit comes at a challenging time, as the country responds to an outbreak of Ebola disease caused by the Bundibugyo virus. The Ministry of Health reports a rapidly evolving situation, with cases and deaths notified in several health zones of Ituri, North Kivu and South Kivu. The Government, with support from WHO and partners, is intensifying surveillance, laboratory testing and patient care to interrupt transmission as quickly as possible The Government of the DRC is firmly leading a comprehensive national response, working closely with provincial authorities in Ituri and neighbouring provinces. WHO, alongside the broader United Nations system and health and humanitarian partners, is fully committed to supporting these efforts. Together, DRC authorities, WHO and partners are working to strengthen coordination, mobilize additional resources, and ensure that life-saving interventions reach affected communities quickly and equitably Central to this response is the recognition that communities are at the heart of the solution. Success will depend on the trust, engagement and leadership of local communities. National and provincial authorities, with support from WHO and partners, are intensifying dialogue with community leaders, women's groups, youth representatives, religious leaders and the private sector to better understand local concerns and co-develop solutions that are culturally appropriate and effective. While the Bundibugyo strain presents additional challenges, including the absence of a licensed vaccine or specific treatment, proven public health measures remain effective in slowing transmission and potential full recovery. The Ministry of Health, WHO and partners are working to rapidly undertake randomized control trials on candidate vaccines and treatments. Persistent challenges include early detection and isolation of cases, contact tracing, safe and dignified burials, robust infection prevention and control in health facilities, and strong community awareness. The Government and WHO call on all communities to continue adopting protective behaviours, including regular hand hygiene, early care seeking in health facilities, and sharing accurate information. The DRC brings unparalleled experience to this response, having successfully contained multiple previous Ebola outbreaks. This experience, combined with strong political leadership at the highest level of the State and renewed international solidarity, provides a firm foundation for bringing the current outbreak under control. Both parties emphasize that outbreak response must maintain primary health care and essential services and strengthen long-term health system resilience. Investments made today in laboratories, health workers, surveillance systems and essential services will leave a legacy for the people of Ituri and the DRC as a whole. We sincerely thank our international partners for the support already provided to response operations, and we encourage sustained solidarity to bring this outbreak under control. Cooperation between countries must also ensure that borders remain open, and that entry controls do not obstruct the flow of desperately needed medical supplies and personnel. Together, DRC authorities, WHO, Africa CDC and partners are working to strengthen coordination, mobilize additional resources, and ensure that life-saving interventions reach affected communities quickly and equitably. Media Contacts WHO Media Team World Health Organization Email: mediainquiries@who.int
Country: Honduras Source: Famine Early Warning System Network Please refer to the attached file. Key Messages Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes remain widespread across Honduras, with Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes emerging in the Dry Corridor between June and September as above-average prices, below-average labor demand, and previous harvest losses exacerbate seasonal trends. While many households continue to meet minimum food needs through market purchases, they are struggling to cover essential non-food expenditures amid below-average seasonal agricultural labor opportunities and are increasingly relying on coping strategies such as selling small livestock and borrowing. In the Dry Corridor, households negatively impacted by multiple poor agricultural seasons are likely to resort to more severe coping strategies at the height of the lean season. The rest of the country will experience Stressed (IPC Phase 2), while urban centers including Tegucigalpa (Francisco Morazán), La Esperanza (Intibucá), and the Bay Islands remain in Minimal (IPC Phase 1) due to more stable formal and informal income sources. Above-average fuel and fertilizer prices continue to drive high production and transportation costs for a second consecutive month. In April,diesel prices remained nearly 34 percent higher than March, 64 percent higher than last year, and 49 percent higher than the five-year average. Fertilizer prices have also remained elevated, with DAP (18-46-0) and urea rising to 7.2 and 50 percent higher than March, respectively, and 21.2 and 45.1 percent above the five-year average, respectively. These rising input costs contributed to inflation surpassing the 5 percent threshold in April. Staple food costs persist above last year and the five-year average despite relatively stable month-on-month prices, driven by weak domestic production. In April, wholesale white maize prices were 49.2 and 39.8 percent higher than last year and the five-year average, respectively, reflecting increased demand and lingering effects of below-average import volumes in 2025. Wholesale red bean prices are 10 percent above the five-year average but remained stable month-on-month and year-on-year, partly supported by increased bean availability due to crop substitution of maize for beans during primera 2025and improved import volumes. While increased remittance inflows in early 2026 are helping receiving households partially offset higher food costs, most poor households do not receive remittances and remain vulnerable to price increases. Recent rainfall estimates through mid-May indicate widespread below-average precipitation across Honduras, negatively impacting primera land preparation and planting in localized areas. While some localized rainfall has met thresholds for planting requirements, much of this precipitation has been concentrated within short periods (2-3 days), limiting soil moisture adequacy and leading many farmers to postpone planting until more consistent rainfall is established. As a result, smallholders are not expected to initiate primera planting until mid-May. At the same time, elevated input costs are constraining fertilizer use by smallholder farmers, likely contributing to expected below-average primera crop yields by August. The Secretariat of Agriculture and Livestock (SAG), in coordination with agroclimatology boards and with support from the Centro de Estudios Atmosféricos, Oceanográficos y Sísmicos (CENAOS)/Comisión Permanente de Contingencias (COPECO), is monitoring and guiding planting decisions across the country. The forecast transition to El Niño is expected to result in rainfall deficits and above-average temperatures through September, particularly in the Dry Corridor, reducing vegetation health and soil moisture and disrupting crop development throughout the primera season. While the magnitude of the El Niño event remains uncertain, CENAOS has issued region-specific guidance for farmers, recommending early planting (before May 10) in the Dry Corridor areas bordering El Salvador, and slightly later planting (after May 15) in central and eastern departments. Drought-prone areas, including southern Francisco Morazán, El Paraíso, Valle, Choluteca, and southern Comayagua, are likely to experience larger rainfall deficits. SAG is advising some farmers to prioritize planting red beans instead of white maize due to its short production cycle and lower water requirements, improving crop resilience under uncertain rainfall conditions.
Country: Ukraine Source: World Food Programme Please refer to the attached file. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2025 was the deadliest for civilians since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began, particularly for people living at the frontlines. It marked a significant escalation in hostilities despite efforts to impose a ceasefire, with Ukraine recording the highest levels of deadly violence for every month compared to previous years. The escalation of the war continues to disrupt domestic production, trade routes, energy supply, and foreign investment, further restricting Ukraine’s economic outlook. Attacks on ports significantly reduced Ukraine’s agricultural export capacity, which translated into higher prices and inflation, directly increasing household vulnerability. The human impact of the war continues to deepen, particularly among households living closest to active hostilities, with those residing within 50 km of the frontline bearing the greatest burden. More than 90% of all conflict events recorded in 2025 occurred within this zone, and 67% of civilian casualties also occurred near the frontline. Approximately 2 million war-affected people in Ukraine are identified as high-priority cases for humanitarian food assistance. More than half of the high-priority cases, about 1.2 million people, live within 50km of the frontline. This number reflects a vulnerability-driven analysis centered on four key issue areas: vulnerable populations within 50km of the frontline, IDPs, evacuees, and people affected by strikes. However, a nationwide analysis show that the overall number of food insecure people in Ukraine continues to rise, with an additional 1.5 million people now requiring food assistance across the country, compared to 2024. Households living within 50 km of the frontline are older, poorer, more dependent, and more reliant on assistance than those living further away. The proportion of elderlyonly households rises to 36% in the 0–50 km zone, compared to 27% beyond 50 km, while older persons living alone are significantly more common close to the frontline. Displacement and return dynamics are more pronounced close to the frontline with up to 30% of surveyed household within 50km of the frontline displaced and 20% returnees. Household-level analysis shows that at least one in four households at the frontlines are food insecure. This is more prevalence in the 20km zone in eastern and southern region where more than 30% of the households are food insecure. Rural households tend to experience higher levels of food insecurity than urban households, although the magnitude of this gap varies by proximity to the frontline. Within the 0– 20 km zone, 27% of rural households are food insecure compared to 22% of urban households. In the 20–50 km zone, food insecurity levels are nearly identical between rural and urban households (both around 21%). The higher share of food insecurity within frontline areas particularly among rural residents reflects both the direct effects of conflict and the concentration of vulnerable populations in these locations. Large families, households with elderly members living alone, and households with a member with a disability show food insecurity levels well above the overall average. Many food-insecure households continue to adopt unhealthy coping strategies including spending their savings, and more than half lack the economic capacity to meet their basic need without humanitarian assistance. consuming less preferred food or spending their savings, and more than half lack the economic capacity to meet their basic need without humanitarian assistance. Frontline households face compounded vulnerabilities. Limited economic opportunities, reduced agriculture production, deterioration in security, shelter and health lead to multidimensional deprivation. In fact, about half of food insecure households within 20km of the frontline are also multidimensionally deprived. While market generally functions, households living closest to the frontline continue to experience significant disruption in market access. About 20% of households within 20km of the frontline report lacking uninterrupted access to markets, and around 13%, particularly those living within 10 km of the frontline, report having no market access at all. Food assistance, provided both as in‑kind and cash transfers, has been central to alleviating immediate food gaps for vulnerable households in the frontline. WFP assistance is targeted toward households with the lowest economic capacity, and analysis shows that it translates into a measurable and meaningful reduction in food insecurity, reducing the probability of low economic capacity among assisted households by close to 20 percentage points. But with humanitarian funding declining and needs continuing to rise, many vulnerable households may soon be unable to access the food assistance they depend on. Three actions are critical to prevent a reversal of hard-won progress: First, sustaining monthly food assistance for the 2 million priority cases is essential, alongside protecting the 0–20 km frontline zone from coverage reductions, where the near-total collapse of local markets means that any cut would have immediate and severe consequences for household food security. Due to market disruption, the 0-20km zone is particularly suited for in-kind food distribution. Second, cash transfer values should be regularly adjusted to reflect documented food inflation, as maintaining outdated transfer levels results in a silent erosion of impact and undermines the purchasing power donors intend their contributions to deliver. Finally, robust impact evidence provides strong proof of effectiveness and should be actively leveraged in dialogue to justify sustained investment in Ukraine, particularly in contexts where assistance has successfully reduced visible needs without eliminating underlying vulnerability.
Countries: Democratic Republic of the Congo, Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania Source: International Organization for Migration Please refer to the attached file. Situation overview The outbreak of Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Uganda was declared a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) by WHO on 17 May 2026 under the International Health Regulations (2005), following confirmed cross-border transmission. This marks the 17th Ebola outbreak in DRC. Latest epidemiological updates are available in WHO’s External Situation Report. WHO continues to advise general travel and trade restrictions. Border closures have been implemented at some border crossings between DRC and neighboring countries, while humanitarian, emergency, cargo and other authorized movements are approved to continue. Given the elevated regional risk, WHO has prioritized countries for readiness and response: DRC, Uganda, South Sudan, Burundi and Rwanda (Priority 1), and Angola, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Kenya, Republic of Congo, United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia (Priority 2). IOM’S PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE EFFORTS IOM’s response continues to focus on strengthening preparedness and response at borders and in areas of high population mobility, including health screening at priority points of entry, surveillance to monitor, detect and report new cases and risk communication and community engagement to help communities reduce risk and better protect themselves. Insecurity continued cross-border movement and strained conditions in displacement settings, particularly in eastern DRC, continue to increase the risk of regional spread and complicate surveillance and response. To reinforce surge capacity, during the reporting period, IOM deployed emergency health personnel and accelerated staffing, procurement, logistics and field coordination in high-risk locations. Regional displacement tracking matrix (DTM) and data teams continued to support mobility analysis, dashboards and weekly reporting to inform outbreak analysis and partner coordination. Population Mobility Monitoring IOM expanded population mobility mapping and analysis in affected and at-risk countries to support preparedness, surveillance, and cross-border response to BVD. Mobility and DTM data helped identify priority entry points, high-risk routes, and vulnerable locations, informing public health measures and operational planning across Uganda, DRC, and South Sudan. Point of Entry Response, Disease Surveillance and Infection Prevention and Control IOM supported preparedness and surveillance activities at points of entry across multiple countries, including screening, infrastructure strengthening, infection prevention and control, community-based surveillance, and cross-border coordination. Uganda: IOM carried out flow monitoring and screening support at several border and airport entry points, while strengthening community-based surveillance and reporting systems in four high-risk districts. South Sudan: IOM supported surveillance and IPC activities at five entry points, including assessments, screening, community-based surveillance, reporting, and donation of IPC supplies to Juba International Airport. Burundi: IOM conducted capacity assessments at border locations with DRC and planned training for frontline health personnel and community health workers. Rwanda: IOM upgraded PoE infrastructure and equipment, strengthened surveillance systems, and supported simulation exercises and IPC readiness activities with the Rwanda Biomedical Center. Resource Needs: Significant funding gaps are constraining the scale-up of operations. Priority needs include community-based surveillance, risk communication, mental health and psychosocial support, IPC and WASH, logistics, staffing, and mobility monitoring.
Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo Source: International Organization for Migration Please refer to the attached file. Situation overview The outbreak of Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Uganda was declared a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC) by WHO on 17 May 2026 under the International Health Regulations (2005), following confirmed cross-border transmission. This marks the 17th Ebola outbreak in DRC. Latest epidemiological updates are available in WHO’s External Situation Report. WHO continues to advise general travel and trade restrictions. Border closures have been implemented at some border crossings between DRC and neighboring countries, while humanitarian, emergency, cargo and other authorized movements are approved to continue. Given the elevated regional risk, WHO has prioritized countries for readiness and response: DRC, Uganda, South Sudan, Burundi and Rwanda (Priority 1), and Angola, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Kenya, Republic of Congo, United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia (Priority 2). IOM’S PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE EFFORTS IOM’s response continues to focus on strengthening preparedness and response at borders and in areas of high population mobility, including health screening at priority points of entry, surveillance to monitor, detect and report new cases and risk communication and community engagement to help communities reduce risk and better protect themselves. Insecurity continued cross-border movement and strained conditions in displacement settings, particularly in eastern DRC, continue to increase the risk of regional spread and complicate surveillance and response. To reinforce surge capacity, during the reporting period, IOM deployed emergency health personnel and accelerated staffing, procurement, logistics and field coordination in high-risk locations. Regional displacement tracking matrix (DTM) and data teams continued to support mobility analysis, dashboards and weekly reporting to inform outbreak analysis and partner coordination. Population Mobility Monitoring IOM expanded population mobility mapping and analysis in affected and at-risk countries to support preparedness, surveillance, and cross-border response to BVD. Mobility and DTM data helped identify priority entry points, high-risk routes, and vulnerable locations, informing public health measures and operational planning across Uganda, DRC, and South Sudan. Point of Entry Response, Disease Surveillance and Infection Prevention and Control IOM supported preparedness and surveillance activities at points of entry across multiple countries, including screening, infrastructure strengthening, infection prevention and control, community-based surveillance, and cross-border coordination. Uganda: IOM carried out flow monitoring and screening support at several border and airport entry points, while strengthening community-based surveillance and reporting systems in four high-risk districts. South Sudan: IOM supported surveillance and IPC activities at five entry points, including assessments, screening, community-based surveillance, reporting, and donation of IPC supplies to Juba International Airport. Burundi: IOM conducted capacity assessments at border locations with DRC and planned training for frontline health personnel and community health workers. Rwanda: IOM upgraded PoE infrastructure and equipment, strengthened surveillance systems, and supported simulation exercises and IPC readiness activities with the Rwanda Biomedical Center. Resource Needs: Significant funding gaps are constraining the scale-up of operations. Priority needs include community-based surveillance, risk communication, mental health and psychosocial support, IPC and WASH, logistics, staffing, and mobility monitoring.
Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo Sources: Health Cluster, World Health Organization Please refer to the attached file. En mai 2026, le Cluster Santé en République Démocratique du Congo a recensé 42 acteurs humanitaires actifs ayant renseigné le 3W. Parmi eux : 04 agences des Nations Unies, 17 ONG internationales, 19 ONG nationales et 02 observateurs. Une dynamique qui illustre l’engagement de certains acteurs dans le processus de collecte et de partage d’informations.
Ecuador is debating how to regulate artificial intelligence:, institutional gaps, and tensions between innovation, surveillance, education, inclusion, and responsible public governance are at the center of the conversation.
Country: World Source: ELRHA What if the most powerful indicator in humanitarian response was also the most neglected? When crises unfold, we count displacement, malnutrition, and funding gaps. But months later, one question often remains unanswered - how many people died? That omission matters - because mortality data changes decisions. As the UK Humanitarian Innovation Hub (UKHIH) and Elrha close Phase 2 of our Mortality Estimation in Humanitarian Crises Systems Innovation Partnership, this blog marks the beginning of a series exploring why mortality estimation matters, and how grantees are innovating so the humanitarian system can do it better. Mortality: the metric that changes the conversation Credible and timely mortality figures change conversations and decisions. As Chris Porter from FCDO put it during a 2025 panel discussion: "We often debate malnutrition rates, but deaths stop people in their tracks." Mortality metrics capture crisis severity, scale, and urgency in a way few other indicators can. Mortality data used to be central to humanitarian assessments. Over time, however, it slipped to the margins - seen as too sensitive, too political, too technically complex, or too slow to be useful. The result is a paradox: the metric that best reflects human cost in crises is often missing from decision-making altogether. Why mortality evidence is so hard - and essential Estimating mortality in crises is undeniably challenging. Data is incomplete. Access is constrained. Methods vary. Numbers can be contested or suppressed, particularly in politically charged settings. Different approaches can produce vastly different estimates, eroding trust and confidence. But the cost of not measuring mortality is higher. Without credible mortality evidence the true scale of crises is underestimated; resources are allocated reactively rather than strategically; accountability weakens and advocacy relies on anecdote instead of evidence. Mortality estimation is not just a technical exercise. It is a moral and operational necessity. From reactive funding toward systems change UKHIH-Elrha’s current investments are built on a longer history of mortality-driven action. Funding followed mortality research in Somalia that helped trigger an unusual and early UN intervention in a subsequent developing famine in 2016. That response was not driven by malnutrition figures, but by mortality data. It was rare. And it worked. Recently completed research established that mortality in southern Chad was far higher than humanitarian actors had assumed, with large segments of the affected population missed entirely. This evidence forced uncomfortable reassessments, but also opened pathways to identify deaths that would otherwise have remained uncounted. Those efforts demonstrated what's possible when rigorous methods are applied under pressure. They informed response discussions, shaped advocacy, and challenged assumptions in decision-making. But they also highlight a deeper issue: Mortality estimation has been treated as an emergency add-on rather than a standing capability in crises contexts. UKHIH’s first investment in mortality estimation proved decisive in a politically charged context. Rigorous work helped establish the credibility of mortality estimates from Gaza when official figures were being publicly dismissed. This evidence made it far harder for governments and global institutions to ignore the scale of civilian death, cutting through political pressure and reaffirming the role of independent science. Building on this work, UKHIH launched the Systems Innovation Partnership in 2024 to move beyond isolated projects and towards a durable ecosystem for mortality estimation. One rooted in equitable partnerships, shared infrastructure, and long-term investment, particularly in low- and middle-income countries. What progress looks like in practice UKHIH-Elrha is currently the only dedicated funder focused specifically on mortality estimation in humanitarian crises. Across Phases 1 and 2, we've seen tangible signs of change: Stronger methods, including improved modelling approaches and shared tools and resources like the Somalia Mortality Estimation Data Observatory (S-MED) Deeper learning, through case studies examining how mortality evidence has influenced - or failed to influence - responses in crises More equitable leadership, with LMIC-based partners SIMAD Institute for Global Health (Somalia) and Evidence for Change (Kenya) playing central roles in phases 1 and 2, scaling up partnering in phase 2 with Addis Ababa University, Mekelle University (Ethiopia) and Rebuild Hope for Africa (DRC) among others. Broader dialogue, bringing together researchers, humanitarians, policymakers, and funders to tackle the "last mile" problem of uptake and use Co-funding, for longer-term, strategic investment that builds synergies and amplifies impact across the system with European Commission Humanitarian Aid (ECHO). What this blog series will cover This blog marks the start of a weekly series showcasing the Phase 2 consortia pushing this agenda forward. IMPACT Initiatives are exploring locally led mortality estimation in Somalia, Ethiopia, and the DRC, highlighting what it takes to shift ownership and trust. Johns Hopkins University is focusing on methodological innovation in DRC, alongside practical guidance for local decision-makers on when and how mortality estimates can be generated and used. Save the Children International is developing a governance mechanism among Strategic, Technical and National Stakeholders and building an online platform making guidance, tools, and technical support accessible and equitable across the sector. Together, these consortia address not just how to count deaths, but how to ensure mortality evidence shapes response. Counting deaths to save lives Mortality evidence can't be optional because uncounted deaths represent a failure of accountability, a gap in our understanding, and a missed opportunity to prevent more. When we don’t count deaths, we're not avoiding difficult conversations - we're having them anyway, just without evidence The UKHIH-Elrha partnerships show we can do better. What remains is a choice: to embed mortality estimation as a non-negotiable part of crisis response, or to continue operating in the dark about the very metric that matters most.