🌐 국제기구 · "BIT" · 총 28건
필터 보기현재 지수
50.0
0 = 부정 우세
50 = 중립
100 = 긍정 우세
최근 7일 기준 5,975건을 분석한 결과, 뉴스 심리지수는 50.0(균형)입니다. 긍정 0건(0.0%)·중립 5,975건(100.0%)·부정 0건(0.0%)이며, 중립 비중이 뚜렷하게 높습니다. 성향 지수는 종합 0.0(중도 균형)입니다.
Galician literature not only narrates, but constructs identity. It is a form of belonging, projecting oneself and inhabiting the world.
Country: Haiti Source: REACH Initiative Please refer to the attached file. 2. Justification 2.1 Contexte et informations générales En 2026, la crise humanitaire en Haïti s’est encore aggravée, avec une intensification des besoins et une fragilisation accrue des services essentiels. Les violences armées, désormais étendues au-delà de la zone métropolitaine de Port-au-Prince vers les provinces, ont provoqué le déplacement forcé de près d’1,4 million de personnes, soit environ 12 % de la population haïtienne2. L’ouragan Melissa, survenu en octobre 2025, a accentué cette vulnérabilité en détruisant ou endommageant plus de 842 000 habitations et infrastructures vitales, perturbant durablement les moyens de subsistance3. Dans ce contexte, les Haïtiens demeurent exposés à une insécurité persistante, à des violences basées sur le genre d’une ampleur alarmante, et à des phénomènes climatiques extrêmes qui dépassent les capacités de réponse du pays. Les conséquences de cette insécurité généralisée se traduisent par une détérioration dramatique du système de santé. Depuis 2025, seuls 10 % des établissements disposant de capacités d’hospitalisation restent pleinement opérationnels et à Port-au-Prince, où vivent près de 3 millions de personnes, ce chiffre n’atteint que 11 %4. Les services obstétricaux et néonataux d’urgence sont notamment particulièrement affectés, tandis que la résurgence du choléra et la propagation de la dengue aggravent les risques sanitaires dans les zones dépourvues d’accès à l’eau potable et à l’assainissement. Parallèlement, plus de 225 000 Haïtiens5 ont été expulsés vers leur pays depuis le début de l’année, majoritairement en provenance de la République dominicaine, accentuant la pression sur des communautés déjà fragilisées. Sur le plan alimentaire, la situation atteint un seuil critique. Environ 5,83 millions de personnes vivent une insécurité alimentaire aiguë, dont 1,9 million en phase d’urgence (Phase 4 de l’IPC), plaçant Haïti parmi les crises de la faim les plus graves au monde6. Les hausses des prix du carburant ,29 % pour l’essence et 37 % pour le diesel, ont entraîné une augmentation des coûts de transport et de distribution, dépassant parfois 50 %, ce qui accentue la pression sur des prix alimentaires déjà élevés7. Malgré un léger ralentissement de l’inflation (22,1 % en février 2026), les ménages continuent de recourir à des stratégies d’adaptation érosives, tandis que la faiblesse de la production agricole et les contraintes d’accès aux intrants maintiennent le pays dans une insécurité alimentaire chronique.8 Ainsi, l’année 2026 s’inscrit dans une trajectoire de crise multidimensionnelle où se conjuguent violence armée, effondrement des services de base, déplacements massifs et vulnérabilités économiques. Les perspectives de stabilité demeurent fragiles, alors que les populations haïtiennes affrontent simultanément les menaces de la faim, de la maladie et de l’exclusion sociale, dans un contexte où les capacités nationales et internationales peinent à répondre à l’ampleur des besoins.
Country: Colombia Sources: El Equipo Humanitario País Colombia, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Please refer to the attached file. Mensajes Claves En 2025 el agravamiento de la situación humanitaria en el departamento del Valle del Cauca se evidenció por el aumento del número de personas desplazadas tanto en movimientos masivos como individuales. Así mismo, se identificó un crecimiento en el número de personas confinadas en varias zonas del departamento, en especial en Buenaventura, cuarto municipio a nivel nacional con mayor población víctima por confinamiento en el año (13.000 personas afectadas), y municipios del norte y sur del departamento. La afectación se concentró en comunidades étnicas tanto afrodescendientes como indígenas de manera desproporcionada. Sumado a ello, cinco territorios fueron impactados por la segunda temporada de lluvias, generando doble afectación en alrededor de 6.000 personas. 2025 fue un año crítico por el uso extendido de armas no convencionales, los ataques con explosivos en Cali y el uso de drones para el transporte de explosivos improvisados en zonas rurales de Jamundí y Buenaventura, agravó la percepción de inseguridad y dificultó el acceso humanitario de socios para la atención, por la suspensión de misiones humanitarias, limitando también el monitoreo de protección y las labores de desminado o verificación. El Valle del Cauca es el cuarto departamento del país con mayor concentración de población refugiada y migrante venezolana, con 201.550 habitantes. Las ciudades de Cali, Palmira, Yumbo y Jamundí concentran el 81% de esa población, aunque está presente en los 42 municipios del departamento, enfrentando riesgos de protección relacionados con la discriminación y estigmatización, denegación del acceso a recursos y oportunidades, trata de personas, empleo informal principalmente en relación con las limitaciones a la regularización del status, y el desconocimiento de los derechos.
Countries: Ecuador, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) Sources: Grupo de Trabajo sobre Personas Refugiadas y Migrantes, R4V Please refer to the attached file. 1. INTRODUCCIÓN Desde 2020, la Plataforma de Coordinación Interagencial para Refugiados y Migrantes de Venezuela (R4V) en Ecuador, conocida como el Grupo de Trabajo para Refugiados y Migrantes (GTRM), anualmente ha efectuado una Evaluación Conjunta de Necesidades (JNA, por sus siglas en inglés) dirigida a los hogares venezolanos con vocación de permanencia y tránsito. Este ejercicio tiene como objetivo identificar y analizar las principales necesidades de la población, sirviendo como base para orientar una respuesta humanitaria coordinada y basada en evidencia. Según el Plan de Respuesta para Refugiados y Migrantes (RMRP) 2025-2026, se estima que para diciembre de 2025 la población en tránsito en Ecuador ascenderá a 325.200 personas, de las cuales aproximadamente 299.300 requerirán asistencia humanitaria (Plataforma Regional de Coordinación Interagencial para Refugiados y Migrantes de Venezuela, 2024). Esta proyección reafirma la importancia de contar con información actualizada y específica sobre las condiciones de esta población en movimientos mixtos. En este contexto, entre abril y mayo de 2025, se llevó a cabo una nueva ronda del JNA centrada en la población migrante y refugiada en tránsito de distintas nacionalidades. Los resultados revelan patrones de movilidad heterogéneos y complejos, entre los cuales se destacan: •Los flujos mixtos registrados variaron desde desplazamientos circulares hasta rutas extensas hacia el sur del continente, siendo la más recurrente la que conecta Venezuela con Perú (20,9 %). •El 87 % de los grupos familiares enfrentan inseguridad alimentaria moderada o severa, reflejada en la baja diversidad dietética de niñas y niños entre 6 meses y menores a 5 años, quienes a su vez tienen una escasa atención nutricional. El 40% de este grupo no recibió una intervención en salud nutricional en los últimos 3 meses. •El 59% de los refugiados y migrantes reportan que solicitan dinero (limosna) y donaciones en la calle para acceder a alimentos. •La educación de niñas, niños y adolescentes presentó interrupciones críticas, el 51,7 % estuvo matriculado para el período escolar 2024–2025 y el 61,1 % no accedió a ningún tipo de asistencia educativa desde su salida del país de residencia previa. •El 95,7 % de las personas en tránsito se encontraba en situación migratoria irregular en Ecuador. Esta tendencia fue más común en las personas de nacionalidad venezolana (98,3%). •El 49,5% de los grupos familiares enfrentaron situaciones de riesgo durante el viaje. En el 35,5% de los casos, algún integrante fue víctima de vulneraciones de derechos en el ámbito laboral, y en el 5,5% alguno de sus miembros fue retenido contra su voluntad por una persona ajena a la autoridad.
Country: World Source: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies Please refer to the attached file. Message from the IFRC Secretary General Small and medium-sized disasters may not dominate global headlines, but for communities affected they are just as devastating. The IFRC’s Disaster Response Emergency Fund (IFRC-DREF) ensures that these crises are met with speed, dignity and locally-led action. Money is made available fast, without the need to wait for a specific appeal. The DREF 2026 Plan is firmly anchored in the IFRC’s Renewal. In the context of significant global funding constraints, humanitarians must be more focused, disciplined and accountable than ever. The IFRC-DREF is central to this shift - enabling early, flexible financing while reinforcing strong stewardship and clear evidence of results. It is also innovative both in the way it is financed (our world-first indemnity insurance policy was triggered for the first time in 2024) and in how its funds are allocated; funding anticipatory action, before hazards hit, is a growing priority. Our 2026–2030 DREF Ambition involves strengthening not only what we fund, but how we deliver. In 2026, we will continue to streamline processes, improve sequencing between DREF grants and Emergency Appeals and reinforce compliance and operational quality. This ensures that speed is matched by sound decision-making, transparency and impact. Localization remains at the heart of IFRC-DREF. By channeling resources directly to National Societies, we enable action that is timely, context-driven and sustainable. At a time when humanitarian needs are rising and financing is under pressure, this agile and principled mechanism is more essential than ever. The DREF 2026 Plan reflects our commitment to work smarter, better demonstrate impact and ensure that no community facing disaster is ignored. I urge you to read it. Jagan Chapagain Context and rationale for the 2026 plan What is the IFRC-DREF? The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies’ Disaster Response Emergency Fund (IFRC-DREF) is an efficient, fast, transparent, and localized way of getting funding directly to local humanitarian actors – both before and after a crisis. It enables National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies to respond rapidly to emergencies and act ahead of predictable hazards through two complementary pillars: • Response • Anticipatory Action The fund combines speed, flexibility, transparency and localization to support community-led humanitarian action. Context and rationale for the 2026 plan The IFRC’s Disaster Response Emergency Fund (IFRC-DREF) enters 2026 at a pivotal moment, marking the conclusion of its Strategic Ambition 2020–2025 and the release of the IFRC-DREF Strategic Ambition 2026–2030, with 2026 serving as the first year of its operationalization. This transition builds on a period of significant reform, as the revision of procedures introduced in 2025 strengthened accountability, clarified operational and financial rules, and reinforced minimum readiness requirements, including for anticipatory action, while safeguarding IFRC-DREF’s core strengths of speed, flexibility, and reliability. These developments take place within the broader context of the IFRC Renewal, which seeks to strengthen a collective approach by reinforcing localization, quality, accountability, and proximity to communities across the IFRC network (the IFRC secretariat and its 191 member National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies). At the same time, National Societies continue to operate in increasingly complex environments shaped by: · climate-related disasters, · epidemics, · displacement, · economic pressures, · and shrinking humanitarian funding. These realities reinforce the importance of a fast, agile and locally led humanitarian financing mechanism. Global operational realities In 2025, IFRC-DREF allocated CHF 77.4 million across 170 operations in 83 National Societies, supporting 14.5 million people affected by crises worldwide. While most allocations remained under the Response Pillar (CHF 64.9 million), anticipatory action reached a record CHF 12.7 million, representing 16% of total funding. This growth was supported by the approval of 11 new simplified EAPs and 21 new EAPs. Despite a decline from 2024, allocations in 2025 remained 75% higher than in 2021, while operations increased by 27% over the same period. At the same time, the number of countries supported remained relatively stable, reflecting growing concentration of IFRC-DREF usage in highly crisis-affected contexts. Anticipatory action expanded significantly faster than the overall fund between 2021 and 2025, increasing by approximately 150%. This trend is expected to continue in 2026 through simplified procedures and expanded early action mechanisms. Despite growing pressure on humanitarian financing systems, IFRC-DREF allocations in 2025 remained 75% higher than in 2021.
Countries: Kenya, Ethiopia Source: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies Please refer to the attached file. Description of the Event Date of event 15-11-2025 What happened, where and when? On 15 November 2025, the Ethiopia Public Health Institute (EPHI) confirmed an outbreak of Marburg virus disease (MVD) following laboratory testing of samples collected from a cluster of suspected viral hemorrhagic fever cases in Jinka Town, located in the southwestern part of Ethiopia. This marked the first recorded occurrence of MVD in the country. Genetic analysis conducted by EPHI indicated that the virus strain was consistent with those reported in recent outbreaks in other countries within the East African region. A total of nine cases had been reported at the time. Jinka Town was located approximately 170 km and 203 km from the Kenya–Ethiopia border points of Kibish and Todonyang, respectively (both in Turkana County), and approximately 230 km from Ileret and 465 km from Moyale Town (both in Marsabit County). Turkana and Marsabit counties were identified as being at high risk due to their shared border with Ethiopia. These areas, along with surrounding regions, have numerous informal and non-designated border crossing points that were not monitored by security or health officials. The geographical proximity of these entry points underscored the heightened risk of cross-border transmission driven by frequent social and economic interactions. In addition, frequent travel between Addis Ababa Bole International Airport and Jomo Kenyatta International Airport increased the vulnerability of Nairobi, the capital city. This situation necessitated the implementation of immediate preparedness and readiness measures to mitigate the risk of importation and potential spread of Marburg virus disease in Kenya.
Country: occupied Palestinian territory Source: UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Please refer to the attached files. UN Human Rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OHCHR OPT) condemns the increase in Israeli attacks in Gaza since the eve of Eid Al Adha on Tuesday, 26 May. At least 26 Palestinians were killed since Tuesday including six women and seven children as Palestinian families prepared to observe Eid amid displacement, deprivation, and insecurity. Three airstrikes on 26 May killed 12 Palestinians. In the early morning hours, one more 14-year-old girl died of injuries sustained in an Israeli airstrike the day before that also killed a 30-year-old woman and a five-year-old girl according to initial information. Since the announcement of a ceasefire, at least 32 children and eight women have been killed in Israeli attacks in which fatalities were exclusively women and children. One of the airstrikes on 26 May killed four men in eastern Al Maghazi camp, Middle Gaza, reportedly after they resisted attempts to search their homes by armed gangs allegedly supported by the Israeli military. Another airstrike hit a car in Al Mawasi, Khan Younis, killing two men. The third airstrike struck an apartment in Al Rimal, Gaza City, and killed a newly appointed commander of Hamas’s Al Qassam Brigades together with his wife, his two sons, aged 15 and 22, his daughter, aged 9, and a woman passerby. On the first day of Eid Al Adha, 27 May, an Israeli airstrike in central Gaza City reportedly killed at least ten: four girls, one boy, three women, and two men allegedly affiliated with Al Qassam Brigades. Since the announcement of a ceasefire, Israeli forces have killed 922 Palestinians in attacks across Gaza, bringing the total death toll since 7 October 2023 to nearly 73,000. OHCHR OPT has consistently warned that Israel’s attacks in Gaza violate international humanitarian law’s principles of distinction, proportionality, and precaution in attacks. A recent OHCHR OPT report also concluded that the totality of Israeli conduct in Gaza raises serious concerns about Israel’s compliance with its obligations to prevent acts prohibited under the Genocide Convention. The Israeli blockade on Gaza is also still depriving Palestinians of necessities, including adequate shelter, essential medicines, and food items. Almost everyone is displaced and concentrated into less than half the land area of Gaza— hemmed in by Israeli ground forces that continue to move west, displacing families and pushing them into a progressively narrower strip of land. In recent days, multiple displacement orders were issued, forcing people out of their shelters. The Israeli Prime Minister announced yesterday that he had directed Israeli forces to expand their deployment to cover 70 per cent of Gaza. The continued contraction of areas available to civilians raises grave concerns about access to humanitarian assistance, and the ability of displaced families to find any meaningful safety. “Our concerns about the commission of war crimes in Gaza have not stopped,” said Ajith Sunghay, Head of UN Human Rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. “It is difficult enough to navigate life in chronic displacement in the ruins of Gaza, under blockade, and after Israeli attacks virtually destroyed every essential system: healthcare, education, food production, law enforcement and civil order. Continuing military attacks on a population living under these conditions is unthinkable.” ENDS For more information and media requests, please contact: Mayy El Sheikh – mayy.elsheikh@un.org Tag and share Twitter @OHCHR_Palestine Facebook UN Human Rights Palestine
Country: occupied Palestinian territory Source: UN Children's Fund This is a summary of what was said by UNICEF Communication Specialist Salim Oweis - to whom quoted text may be attributed - at today’s press briefing at the Palais de Nations in Geneva GAZA/GENEVA, 29 May 2026 – “Failure to meet children’s basic needs in Gaza is trapping them in an endless cycle of suffering. “The experiences of the desperate parents I met this past week can illustrate this better than I could: “Hind hasn’t slept since her four-year-old daughter, Masa, was bitten by a rat during the night. “Like many families, they sheltered wherever they could – in their case, the second floor of a building block where sewage water leaks through the ceilings, and rodents crawl through the cracks in the building and climb the exposed pipes. “Amani’s daughter, Lemar, she’s 7, has developed deep lesions and sores on her head, back and legs due to a bacterial infection. Amani tries to clean her wounds each day with the little, hard-to-get, clean water she has, as her daughter screams in agony. “Abdallah’s mother told me that he has developed a skin infection as they live in a tent next to sand contaminated with faeces. His mother has spoken to doctors and desperately needs the medication and enough clean water and hygiene products to help him heal and protect him from exposure to more infections. “Abdel Aleem said that his 8 months old son, Ahmad, and his pregnant sister-in-law were both bitten a couple of weeks ago. They have layered sandbags around the outside of the tent to try to protect themselves, but the rats simply chew through it – stopping them is futile. “The common thread running through every one of these conversations is the sheer heartbreak of parents who no longer feel able to do the thing most innate to them – protect their children’s health and safety. “One look at the conditions that people are being forced to live in is enough to understand why. “We know that Gaza was already one of the most densely populated places in the world. Now, people have been crammed into around 40 per cent of the space left to them – sheltering among broken buildings, rubble and mounting solid waste. “Families across Gaza do not have enough clean water, they are forced to choose between drinking, washing and cooking with what little they have. “UNICEF is trying to reach as many people as possible with clean water– up to one and a half million people a month – but there are significant obstacles: “Firstly – deadly attacks on water operations, including recently at Al Mansoura filling point, where two UNICEF-contracted truck drivers were killed whilst trying to collect water. Now, this main water filling station – which more than a quarter of a million people rely on – is inaccessible. “Secondly, items needed to sustain water systems and repair damaged water infrastructure – including: lubricant oil, water treatment chemicals and spare parts – are not being allowed in at the scale needed, meaning we cannot repair systems as quickly as needed to reach more children with clean water, and existing systems risk failure due to lack of maintenance and overuse. If we cannot repair systems, then we have to rely solely on water trucking which is much more expensive and doesn’t reach populations as effectively. “Thirdly, solid waste is piling up by the day. This, alongside rubble, needs clearing at a scale that is currently impossible because there is no accessible space left to clear it to. “The effects of this are now widely apparent: children with respiratory infections, acute watery diarrhea, and more than half of all households reporting skin diseases. Fleas, lice, and scabies are commonplace. Increasing numbers of children are requiring hospitalization. All without a single fully functioning hospital across Gaza. “The picture is similarly stark when it comes to children’s nutrition. While we have managed to reverse the famine, the number of malnourished and vulnerable children remain extremely serious. More than two years of food insecurity, poor housing, limited water, terrible sanitary conditions and regular disease outbreaks has left the population extremely vulnerable. Without enough clean water and fuel to cook proper meals, even children who recover with treatment will quickly fall back in a cycle of malnutrition – the effects of which can last a lifetime. “No parent should be in a position where they cannot provide their child with the basic needs to keep them healthy. No parent should have to watch as their child writhes in pain from lesions or buckle from weakness because of entirely preventable diarrhoea. That this is happening should be – to everyone – entirely unconscionable. “Access to water, adequate nutritious food, and health care should not be conditional for any child, anywhere. “UNICEF is calling for safe unfettered access to deliver humanitarian operations, the lifting of restrictions on items needed to quickly repair and sustain water and sanitation systems, and for international humanitarian law to be upheld. “Only then will children in Gaza start to break free from the cycle of suffering they are trapped in.”
Country: Kenya Source: REACH Initiative Please refer to the attached file. 2. Rationale 2.1 Background The arid and semi-arid lands (ASAL) of northern Kenya, particularly the counties of Marsabit, Mandera, Wajir, Turkana, and Garissa, continue to experience multidimensional humanitarian needs driven by the intersection of climatic shocks, chronic vulnerability, and socio-economic marginalization. Over recent years, these counties have experienced climate variabilities that have severely disrupted livelihoods, reduced livestock productivity, damaged infrastructure, displaced households, and weakened already fragile coping capacities.1 While drought conditions have historically shaped humanitarian response planning in the ASAL regions, the increasing overlap between drought recovery periods and recurrent flooding events has created more multidimensional vulnerabilities affecting various populations. According to the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, food insecurity remains a defining feature of vulnerability across ASAL counties. As of 2025, approximately 3.3 million people in Kenya were classified in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis) or worse, with around 400,000 in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency).2 REACH Initiative revealed widespread needs across key sectors, including water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH), health, nutrition, shelter, and protection.3 In this context, the humanitarian situation in northern Kenya has become increasingly dynamic due to the overlapping impacts of drought and flooding. While early 2026 was characterized by worsening drought conditions across several ASAL counties, the onset of the March–May 2026 long rains led to flooding that reportedly affected tens of thousands of households, disrupting livelihoods, damaging infrastructure, contaminating water sources, and increasing displacement risks in multiple locations.4 However, rainfall distribution has remained uneven and erratic across the targeted counties. Mandera and Wajir counties continue to experience severe conditions and remain in the alarm phase, while Garissa, Marsabit, and Turkana are classified in the alert phase.5 This variability has created a complex humanitarian environment in which some communities are attempting to recover from prolonged drought while simultaneously facing emerging flood-related impacts. The refugee-hosting areas, such as Dadaab refugee camp in Garissa County, Kakuma refugee camp and Kalobeyei Integrated Settlement in Turkana County, where humanitarian conditions continue to evolve amid funding constraints and policy transitions. Recent reductions in humanitarian assistance, including food ration cuts and differentiated assistance approaches based on household vulnerability status, are likely to have significant implications for food consumption, indebtedness, coping strategies, social cohesion, and overall household well-being. In addition, accountability to affected populations (AAP) and equitable access to humanitarian assistance remain key operational concerns across the target counties.6 During the design phase, REACH consulted with a range of humanitarian and government stakeholders to contextualize the assessment and avoid duplicating existing data collection efforts. This involved discussions through the NGO Refugee Group (NRG), OCHA-led sector coordination meetings, engagements with sector focal points, the NDMA, and relevant county government counterparts. The input gathered through these consultations helped shape indicator selection, geographic prioritization, and alignment with ongoing humanitarian analysis and planning. Against this backdrop, the MSNA seeks to generate comprehensive household-level evidence on the severity, distribution, and drivers of humanitarian needs across food security, nutrition, health, WASH, livelihoods, shelter, education, and protection sectors in Mandera, Wajir, Marsabit, Turkana, and Garissa counties, including refugee camps and settlements. The assessment will support humanitarian actors, county governments, and development partners in identifying sectoral and geographic disparities, understanding differences between refugee and host community populations, and informing evidence-based targeting, resource allocation, and multisectoral response planning within Kenya’s evolving humanitarian landscape.
Country: Ecuador Source: Integrated Food Security Phase Classification Please refer to the attached file. ALREDEDOR DE 2,6 MILLONES DE PERSONAS PODRÍAN ESTAR EN CRISIS O EMERGENCIA DE INSEGURIDAD ALIMENTARIA AGUDA EN EL PERIODO DE ABRIL A JULIO DE 2026 Resumen El análisis de Inseguridad Alimentaria Aguda (IAA) en el Ecuador para el período 2025–2026, evidencia una crisis de carácter multidimensional. De una población nacional evaluada de 18,4 millones de habitantes (18,2 millones corresponden a población residente y 203 072 corresponden a población de movilidad humana con vocación de permanencia), distribuidos en 23 provincias, se estima que para la situación actual aproximadamente 2,5 millones de personas (14 %) se encontraron en Fase 3 o superior de la CIF IAA (Crisis o Emergencia), situación asociada principalmente a factores como la inflación, la economía de los hogares, variaciones climáticas y condiciones de inseguridad. A nivel territorial, las provincias de Esmeraldas y Pastaza se ubicaron en Fase 3 de la CIF IAA (Crisis), mientras que la mayoría de las provincias (20) se encuentran en Fase 2 (Acentuada) y solamente la Provincia de Pichincha en Fase 1 (Mínima). La magnitud de población afectada se concentra principalmente en provincias con alta densidad poblacional como Guayas, Manabí, Los Ríos y Pichincha, evidenciando presiones significativas principalmente en el acceso a alimentos. En este análisis, la provincia de Galápagos no fue incluida por no contar con la evidencia adecuada para su análisis. La situación de inseguridad alimentaria aguda está determinada por la interacción de factores económicos, climáticos y sociales. Entre los principales destacan la reducción del poder adquisitivo de los hogares debido al incremento sostenido de los precios de alimentos, la inestabilidad en los ingresos (especialmente en empleo informal y rural), y los efectos de eventos climáticos adversos sobre la producción agropecuaria. A esto se suman limitaciones en el acceso a servicios básicos, condiciones de inseguridad y dinámicas migratorias que afectan los medios de vida. [...]
Countries: Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, Uganda Source: World Bank How is the World Bank Group responding to the Ebola Outbreak The World Bank Group is responding swiftly to the Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Uganda. We are drawing on our investments in health preparedness — and the financing tools built specifically for moments like this — to help countries contain the outbreak and protect vulnerable communities. Our focus is on the people most at risk: the communities facing the outbreak, the health workers responding to it, and the governments working to contain it. Mobilizing financing and technical support Our immediate priority is to help ensure that financing and technical support can be mobilized rapidly to support frontline response efforts, reinforce health systems, and strengthen surveillance and cross-border preparedness. Frontline response support - Getting resources to the people responding to the outbreak, including for health workers, surveillance systems, and community engagement teams doing the hard work of containment on the ground. Health system reinforcement - Strengthening the local and national health systems that communities depend on — including laboratory capacity, referral pathways, and supply chains. Surveillance and cross-border preparedness - Supporting fast case detection and public health interventions that are the foundation of containment, including reinforcing preparedness in neighboring countries at risk of spread. Private sector capacity The World Bank Group is following up with private sector clients to assess the impact of the outbreak on operations, including access to routine healthcare and products, as well as the private sector’s capacity to scale up production and delivery of high-demand products such as Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), diagnostics, and specific treatment options. Supporting Impacted Countries Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) The World Bank Group has been a long-term partner in building health emergency infrastructure in the country. A current project in DRC, the Health Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Resilience (HEPRR) Project, is financing the deployment of Ministry of Health specialists to the field, including epidemiologists, infection prevention and control experts, and risk communication teams. It is also supporting the deployment of diagnostic equipment and laboratory experts to expand testing capacity in Bunia. At the same time, a separate $555 million nutrition and health project is protecting the delivery of maternal, newborn and immunization services during the emergency across over 3,500 health facilities in the DRC. Through the Regional Disease Surveillance Systems Enhancement (REDISSE) project, we helped establish the largest biosafety-level laboratory in Eastern DRC—now the central testing hub in the heart of the outbreak zone. The lab is fully operational and actively testing for Ebola. We are currently financing critical laboratory equipment in DRC to keep the lab fully operational through an existing health investment in the country. DRC's national response is being coordinated from the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) in Kinshasa, which was rehabilitated four years ago with World Bank funding through REDISSE. A warehouse in the same building holds stockpiles of emergency supplies — pre-positioned for exactly this kind of crisis. Uganda The World Bank Group has supported Uganda through previous major outbreaks and is mobilizing funding to help contain this one. We are in close coordination with national authorities and partners to assess evolving needs on the ground and are discussing additional options to support the country’s response. Regional and cross-border preparedness Cross-border transmission is a serious concern given the movement of people, goods, and trade across this region. In South Sudan, the Ministry of Health has deployed surveillance teams to border areas and is working with WHO — contracted under an ongoing World Bank project — to strengthen preparedness and ramp up Ebola response activities. Other neighboring countries are also activating preparedness measures, and the WBG is supporting these efforts alongside governments and development partners. WBG Health Emergency Response Tools Crisis Response Toolkit and Crisis Response Window These mechanisms allow countries to reallocate and access emergency financing more quickly in times of crisis. This outbreak underscores the importance of having these options pre-positioned. The Crisis Response Toolkit includes the Rapid Response Option, which allows countries to repurpose existing portfolio funds without new approvals; pre-arranged contingent financing; and catastrophe insurance mechanisms that mobilize private capital. The Crisis Response Window provides additional concessional financing for countries responding to major emergencies. We are actively exploring options under both mechanisms to support a robust response. The Pandemic Fund The Pandemic Fund, hosted by the World Bank, is the first multilateral financing mechanism dedicated specifically to strengthening pandemic preparedness and response capacity in low- and middle-income countries. The Fund is coordinating closely with countries as well as regional and international partners to support the rapid scale-up of surveillance, diagnostics, risk communications and community engagement, and other emergency response measures in affected regions of the DRC and Uganda, as well as neighboring countries, including Burundi and South Sudan. The Pandemic Fund has active projects in all affected countries and stands ready to scale up efforts to contain the outbreak and strengthen core health systems. An extraordinary meeting of the Fund’s Governing Board will be held this week to determine concrete measures, including the reprogramming of available resources to meet urgent needs. Commitment to Resilient Health Systems This outbreak is also a reminder of why resilient health systems matter. The World Bank Group is committed to reaching 1.5 billion people with quality, affordable health services by 2030 by mobilizing public and private sectors together—strengthening health financing, expanding the health workforce, scaling primary care, and boosting local manufacturing of medicines and supplies. That ambition requires resilient health systems that are strong enough to prevent, detect, and respond to health emergencies. One key initiative supporting this goal is the Africa Initiative for Medical Access and Manufacturing (AIM2030), a partnership led by the World Bank Group, the African Union Commission, governments, and partners to expand access to essential medicines and health products while building sustainable regional manufacturing capacity across Africa. Partners We are coordinating closely with governments across the region and with partners, including WHO, the Africa Centres for Disease Control (Africa CDC), Gavi, CEPI, and other partners. The Africa CDC, supported in part by World Bank funding, has been central to strengthening African countries' capacity to detect and respond to outbreaks, including this one. Stay Updated The situation is actively evolving. We are monitoring it closely and will continue to update this page as our response develops.
Country: Bolivia (Plurinational State of) Sources: Cruz Roja Boliviana, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies Please refer to the attached file. Análisis de riesgos La ciudad de El Alto atraviesa una situación de emergencia debido a los bloqueos y protestas sociales registrados desde mayo de 2026, que han interrumpido la circulación de personas y mercancías. Estos disturbios han generado desabastecimiento de alimentos, combustible y medicamentos, además de la suspensión parcial de actividades educativas y económicas. La concentración de movilizaciones y enfrentamientos en zonas urbanas incrementa el riesgo para la población, afectando tanto la seguridad como las condiciones de vida de miles de habitantes. En los distritos 4, 8 y 11 de El Alto se han registrado hasta 28 dias de bloqueos. A la fecha se han registrado 4 muertos y 90 detenidos. Solicitar asistencia Gobierno requiere asistencia internacional: Sí SN requiere asistencia internacional: Sí Boletín informativo publicado Solicitado Acciones tomadas por Federación General Coordinación del Movimiento Resumen La IFRC han acompañado las acciones, han apoyado el monitoreo y han brindado lineas para la comunicación hacia la población y el gobierno, todo esto en cumplimiento del mandato humanitario y los principios humanitarios. Acciones tomadas por RCRC General Sensibilización y Conciencia Pública Resumen El ICRC, y diplomacia humanitaria han acompañado las acciones de comunicación hacia la poblacion y el gobierno Acciones tomadas por Sociedad nacional General Apoyo psicosocial Activación / Movilización de voluntarios Resumen La SN mediante las filiales de La Paz, Oruro y Potosí, han acompañado a las cisternas de oxigeno medicinal para asegurar la dotacion a los hospitales, las Filiales han brindado servicios de primeros auxilios y RCF Medidas tomadas por otros La respuesta a los bloqueos y disturbios en El Alto y La Paz (mayo de 2026) ha involucrado a múltiples actores: el Gobierno boliviano desplegó fuerzas de seguridad, realizó detenciones y adoptó medidas parciales de negociación para contener la crisis; las organizaciones sociales y sindicales lideraron protestas, bloqueos y presión política sostenida; la comunidad internacional emitió alertas de seguridad y expresó preocupaciones diplomáticas ante la escalada de violencia; mientras que organismos internacionales y actores humanitarios han mantenido monitoreo de la situación, especialmente por el impacto en el acceso a alimentos, servicios y seguridad de la población Respuesta internacional prevista DREF: Solicitado
Country: Central African Republic Source: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Please refer to the attached file. FAITS SAILLANTS Insécurité à Tissi-Fongoro : impact sur les populations et l’accès humanitaire Plusieurs déplacements préventifs à Irabanda Des rapatriés spontanés enregistrés à Bria dans des conditions difficiles Dépistage nutritionnel à grande échelle dans la Basse‑Kotto et Ouaka CONTEXTE GENERAL Préfecture de la Haute-Kotto – Centre Depuis le 19 mai, les habitants du village d’Irabanda, situé à 75 km de Bria, craignant pour leur sécurité, effectuent des mouvements pendulaires préventifs vers les champs environnants ainsi que vers la ville de Bria, à la suite l’incursion d’éléments armés dans le village, lesquels se seraient installés à proximité du centre de santé local, provoquant la fuite du personnel soignant. À ce jour, certains de ces éléments armés auraient été signalés le long de l’axe Irabanda–Ippy. Les localités d’Irabanda et d’Aigbando restent difficiles d’accès depuis plusieurs années en raison de la présence de groupes armés et de mauvais était de la route. Cette situation prolongée a considérablement accru la vulnérabilité des communautés. OCHA coordonne avec les autorités locales et les partenaires humanitaires afin d’évaluer les besoins et soutenir la réponse en faveur des communautés affectées Préfecture de la Vakaga – Nord-Est Les habitants de Tissi-Fongoro, un village situé dans la zone des trois frontières (triangulaire) entre la République centrafricaine (RCA), le Tchad (au nord) et le Soudan (à l’est), craignant pour leur sécurité, effectuent des mouvements pendulaires vers les champs environnants depuis le 11 mai, suite à l’arrivée d’un grand nombre d’éléments armés dans le village. Les activités humanitaires dans la zone risquent d’être perturbées. Depuis le déclenchement du conflit au Soudan en avril 2023, la RCA continue d’accueillir des réfugiés fuyant les violences, principalement via la frontière d’Am-Dafock dans la préfecture de Vakaga. Au 30 avril 2026, plus de 43 000 personnes avaient trouvé refuge en RCA, dont plus de 36 000 réfugiés soudanais et près de 7 000 rapatriés réfugiés. Les autorités centrafricaines ont maintenu une politique d’accueille, depuis août 2023 et ont accordé le statut de réfugié prima facies aux ressortissants soudanais. La majorité des réfugiés, principalement des femmes et des enfants, sont accueillis dans le quartier Korsi à Birao, tandis que d’autres vivent dans des zones difficiles d’accès où l’accès aux services de base reste limité en raison de l’insécurité, de contraintes logistiques et d’un financement insuffisant. À Birao, la population réfugiée est désormais estimée à près du double de la population locale. La situation continue d’exercer une pression supplémentaire sur la Vakaga, l’une des régions les plus vulnérables et les moins desservies du pays. BESOINS ET REPONSE HUMANITAIRE Multisectoriel Préfecture de la Haute-Kotto – Centre Depuis le 23 mai, 122 retournés spontanés en provenance du Soudan sont arrivés dans le village de Raba, situé à 4 km de Bria, après un trajet de 28 jours effectué dans des conditions difficiles. Un décès a été signalé au cours de ce déplacement parmi les personnes retournées. À leur arrivée, les ménages font face à d’importants besoins humanitaires, notamment en matière d’abris, d’assistance alimentaire, d’accès aux soins de santé et de protection. Sécurité alimentaire Préfecture de la Nana-Gribizi - Centre L’ONG Welthungerhilfe a apporté, du 18 au 22 mai, une assistance à 52 ménages retournés issus des anciens sites de personnes déplacées de Kaga-Bandoro, à travers la distribution à chaque ménage d’un couple d’ovins et de caprins. Parallèlement, 288 membres de groupements agro‑multiplicateurs de semences (GAMS), dont 110 femmes, ont bénéficié d’un renforcement des capacités. À Kaga‑Bandoro, cette approche intégrée, combinant appui agricole et soutien à l’élevage, vise à relancer les moyens de subsistance, renforcer l’autonomie économique des ménages vulnérables et améliorer leur sécurité alimentaire, dans un contexte encore marqué par des violences armées récentes.
Country: World Sources: Insecurity Insight, Safeguarding Health in Conflict Please refer to the attached file. A Decade After UNSCR 2286, the Promise to Protect Health Care in Conflict Remains Unfulfilled Care in the Crosshairs: Violence Against Health Care in Conflict in 2025, released today by the Safeguarding Health in Conflict Coalition (SHCC), documents 2,546 incidents of violence against or obstruction of health care across 33 countries in 2025, including 790 incidents where hospitals were damaged or destroyed and 455 health workers killed. International humanitarian law prohibits attacks on health care, a commitment all 15 UN Security Council members reaffirmed when they unanimously adopted Resolution 2286 ten years ago. Yet perpetrators are rarely held to account, even as some hospitals and health workers continue to be strategically targeted. "In 2025, reported violence on health care rose in 13 countries. Today, as we release our 2025 findings, at least 18 first responders have been killed in Lebanon in sequential strikes targeting rescue workers responding to an initial air strike, while health facilities treating Ebola patients in eastern Congo are being set on fire as conspiracy theories about the origin of the virus spread online," said Christina Wille, Executive Director of SHCC member Insecurity Insight, which oversaw data collection and analysis processes for the report. "When health workers are kidnapped, tortured, or killed, societies lose irreplaceable expertise not only for conflict injuries, but for the full range of health emergencies and basic needs that follow. War is already devastating to health, but attacking hospitals makes it doubly so: health needs surge while services are destroyed. Outbreaks spread, trauma rises, and preventative care is all but lost in these situations. This lasts for years, if not for decades," said Rohini Haar, Co-Chair of the SHCC and Adjunct Associate Professor at the University of California, Berkeley. Kidnappings, Arrests, and Funding Cuts In 2025, health workers faced escalating danger on multiple fronts: in addition to the 455 health workers killed, kidnappings rose 58 percent to at least 218 cases, with sharp increases in eastern DRC, Mali, Haiti, Pakistan, and Syria, as violence against health care attributed to non-state actors rose. More than 260 health workers were arrested or detained across 17 countries. At least seven died in custody in Ethiopia, Gaza, Sudan, and Syria. Since 2021, state actors have consistently been reported as being responsible for more violence against health care than non-state armed groups, and 64% of all violence against health care was attributed to states in 2025. Compounding the crisis, USAID funding cuts and a broader decline in official development assistance forced the immediate closures of health services across conflict-affected areas, reducing essential services by up to 70 percent, in some settings. The cuts have also compromised the evidentiary record: in some countries, apparent drops in reported incidents likely reflect collapsed reporting capacity driven by funding cuts as well as insecurity and communication disruptions, and not improved security on the ground. “Armed drones are not striking health facilities by accident.” Armed drone strikes against health care surged 43% in 2025, accounting for 34% of all explosive weapons incidents affecting health facilities, up from 16% in 2024. Ukraine and Sudan drove much of that increase. In Sudan, incidents rose dramatically, from three to 24. In at least one case, first responders treating the wounded were hit in a deliberate follow-up drone strike. The civilian impacts of these drone strikes are large, as one doctor described: "Some days I see 20 patients; other days, after a missile or a drone hits, 200." A Decade of Unfulfilled Commitments Care in the Crosshairs: Violence Against Health Care in Conflict in 2025 is released ten years after the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2286, which condemned attacks on medical facilities and personnel, demanded compliance with international humanitarian law, and called on member states to investigate violations, prosecute perpetrators, and reform military doctrine and training. "Ten years of Resolution 2286 have produced ten years of largely unfulfilled commitments. Laws meant to protect the wounded and the workers caring for them are being deliberately reinterpreted to give states greater impunity. The people paying the price are patients and the health workers trying to care for them. Protecting health care in conflict is not only a matter of international humanitarian law, but also key to a healthy society post-conflict,"said Joseph Amon, Co-Chair of the SHCC and Professor at the Johns Hopkins Center for Public Health and Human Rights. The SHCC calls on the UN Secretary-General and member states to finally honor the commitments made in Resolution 2286: reform military doctrine and training, incorporate robust protections into domestic law, conduct thorough investigations of violations, and bring perpetrators to justice.
Country: Lebanon Source: Human Rights Watch Please refer to the attached file. Accession Amid Conflict Strengthens Global Opposition to Antipersonnel Mines (Beirut, May 27, 2026) – Lebanon’s recent accession to the Mine Ban Treaty amid an ongoing armed conflict underscores the treaty’s vital importance for saving lives and rebuilding communities, Human Rights Watch said today. The government’s decision should motivate other countries, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa, to support the global norm against antipersonnel mines. “Lebanon’s adoption of the Mine Ban Treaty during unrelenting fighting and destruction at home and in the region is an important step toward safeguarding civilian lives, assisting mine victims, and restoring land to its communities,” said Verity Coyle, deputy crisis, conflict and arms director at Human Rights Watch. “States that haven’t signed on should urgently follow suit.” Antipersonnel mines kill and wound people indiscriminately. They are typically placed by hand but can also be scattered by aircraft, rockets, artillery, and drones or dispersed from specialized vehicles. Uncleared landmines remain a danger until located and destroyed. Mined land can drive displacement of civilians, hinder the delivery of humanitarian aid, and prevent agricultural activities. The Mine Ban Treaty, which entered into force in 1999, comprehensively prohibits the use of antipersonnel mines and requires countries to destroy their stockpiles, clear mined areas, and help victims. Lebanon is heavily contaminated with antipersonnel landmines. Despite ongoing clearance efforts that remove thousands of mines every year, by the end of 2024 at least 15.79 square kilometers of land remained contaminated with landmines and an additional 4.67 square kilometers were contaminated with cluster munitions, which effectively act as landmines. In 2023, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) estimated that this contamination affects at least 200,000 people in Lebanon. Between 2015 and 2024, mines or explosive remnants of war killed at least 167 people in Lebanon. The Lebanese government has shown interest in the Mine Ban Treaty since the early 2000s but pointed to the security situation in the country as an impediment. In December 2009, Lebanon confirmed that it “has never produced or exported antipersonnel mines.” In January 2026, Lebanon’s Council of Ministers issued a decree approving the country’s accession to the treaty. Lebanon deposited its instrument of accession to the treaty with the United Nations in New York City on May 1, becoming the 162nd country to join. The treaty will enter into force for Lebanon on November 1, 2026. Lebanon’s accession comes at a critical time for the treaty as five European states—Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Finland, and Poland—withdrew from the treaty in 2025, and Ukraine has attempted to suspend its obligations, all citing security concerns as the primary reason for their decision. Lebanon is now required to submit an initial transparency report to the UN and begin to implement the provisions of the Mine Ban Treaty in territory under its jurisdiction or control under all circumstances. Other states should follow Lebanon’s example and join the treaty immediately. Countries in the Middle East and North Africa region that remain outside the Mine Ban Treaty include Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates. “Lebanon’s joining the Mine Ban Treaty strengthens global opposition to these horrific weapons and should encourage other states to do so,” Coyle said. “The fact that Lebanon made this legal commitment in the midst of a crisis should remind other countries why international treaties protecting civilians are so critical.”
Countries: Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda Source: International Peace Institute On May 15, 2026, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) confirmed its seventeenth recorded outbreak of Ebola, in Ituri province. Since then, the number of cases has risen to over 900 and the virus has crossed into Uganda and reached the provinces of North and South Kivu, now controlled by the Rwanda-backed M23. Initial reports suggesting that the outbreak may have been circulating for weeks and local health authorities were underprepared to swiftly mount a containment strategy. As Ebola Returns to Eastern DRC, International Responders Must Not Repeat the Mistakes of 2018 May 26, 2026by Dirk Druet Ebola task force of MONUSCO and UNICEF Focal point Felicien Malyra (with information pamphlet), inform prisoners at the jail “Kakwangura" in Butembo in North Kivu about how they may protect themselves against the Ebola Virus on August 9, 2019. UN Photo/Martine Perret. On May 15, 2026, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) confirmed its seventeenth recorded outbreak of Ebola, in Ituri province. Since then, the number of cases has risen to over 900 and the virus has crossed into Uganda and reached the provinces of North and South Kivu, now controlled by the Rwanda-backed M23. Initial reports suggesting that the outbreak may have been circulating for weeks and local health authorities were underprepared to swiftly mount a containment strategy. As international concern grows that the deadly virus might be out of control, the mounting public health response is facing an even more challenging environment than during the last major outbreak in 2018. No vaccine exists for this strain of the virus and Goma, the logistical hub of eastern DRC, is occupied by an armed group. The UN peacekeeping operation in the DRC (MONUSCO) has been drawing down its operations and is now confined to Ituri and North Kivu. On top of this, the global health architecture is under strain following the US withdrawal from the World Health Organization (WHO) earlier this year and a growing deficit in funding to address health emergencies. In this challenging and high-risk context, it is critical that the lessons of the last outbreak inform the management of this one. The temptation in a fast-moving outbreak is to treat the response as an urgent technical problem requiring an urgent technical solution: identify cases, trace contacts, isolate the infected, vaccinate where possible, and bury the deceased safely. But as many learned during the COVID-19 pandemic, emergency health responses in complex political situations are not neutral interventions in passive contexts; they are political acts. This is particularly true in conflict environments, where large-scale public health responses distribute resources at scale, legitimize or delegitimize particular actors, reshape local security arrangements, and engage with populations that read them through the lens of the conflict. When the Health Response Became Part of the Conflict in the DRC In eastern DRC, the 2018–2020 Ebola outbreak was described by WHO as a “perfect storm” in which a highly infectious disease was spreading in an area of active conflict. The Congolese public, particularly in the country’s east, widely viewed their government as predatory, and much of the affected population resided in crowded conditions with poor health infrastructure and was located near porous international borders. Given the seriousness of the risks to local and international public health, WHO and partners in the international community launched a massive health and humanitarian response. This operation was grounded in the principle of “no regrets,” which holds that it is better to overreact to a public health emergency and adjust later rather than act too late. This approach was broadly seen as empowering WHO to take direct action in the affected area with only limited consultation with other parts of the UN system. Many of the decisions made during this period had devastating side effects: they empowered officials and security forces notorious for reprisals against local communities and produced what became known as the “Ebola Business”—a war economy with actors invested in prolonging the crisis. This conflation of the Ebola response with the conflict led to community resistance and violence against health workers that inhibited containment and accelerated transmission. By the time the outbreak was declared over in 2020, more than 3,400 people had been infected, of which some 2,200 had died. Moreover, the conflict in eastern DRC had become even more entrenched, with the ADF armed group carrying out sustained atrocities in Beni territory in North Kivu. MONUSCO’s authority was openly contested by host populations, culminating in the torching of its office in Boikene, near the town of Beni, in 2019. The risks to Congolese lives and international public health posed by the latest outbreak merit a large, swift health and humanitarian response. Such a response is all the more urgent following recent cuts to international support to the Congolese national health system, particularly as a result of the dismantling of USAID, which have reduced the country’s epidemic preparedness and likely undermined its capacity for early detection. However, a response that is not grounded in an understanding of conflict dynamics is likely to hamper efforts to stem transmission. In a 2022 study for the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, I analyzed the national and international response to the 2018–2020 outbreak and proposed a variety of ways international responders could have done things differently. Three recommendations from that study remain relevant for the current outbreak: Treat conflict and political economy analysis as central to the design of the health response: In 2018, WHO did not request MONUSCO’s analysis of the security and political landscape into which it was deploying, and MONUSCO was not informed in advance of several key WHO decisions. These included WHO’s decision to engage personnel from the Agence Nationale de Renseignements, a state security service notorious in eastern DRC for human rights abuses, as “community liaisons” who in practice helped direct where the response deployed. That arrangement, documented by the Congo Research Group, created perverse incentives, securitized the response, and lowered public trust in the health response. Position peace and security actors at arm’s length from health activities: There is a critical distinction between using security actors to provide a generally permissive security environment for a health response and using them to provide direct, proximate security. Using uniformed personnel to escort vehicles, guard clinic perimeters, or cordon off health facilities changes the character of the intervention in the eyes of affected communities. The 2018–2020 experience in Beni and Butembo demonstrated how rapidly the proximity of security actors to the health response led that response to be associated with them, sparking hostility against it. While MONUSCO and national security services may have a role in promoting security during the health response, they should clearly distinguish themselves from humanitarian and health operations. Balance the urgency of epidemic response with community engagement and operational flexibility: The “no regrets” posture that prevailed in 2018 produced the conditions that ultimately undermined its effectiveness. Public health measures only function if affected populations trust them enough to participate; securitized responses that treat communities as obstacles rather than partners are counterproductive. In practice, this means accepting slower initial reach in exchange for community-acceptable delivery—local responders rather than teams parachuted in from Kinshasa, motorcycles rather than Land Cruisers, and burial practices negotiated with families rather than imposed on them. WHO’s Global Health and Peace Initiative, and Its Limits To its credit, WHO has not ignored the 2018–2020 experience. In the years following the outbreak, the organization developed the Global Health and Peace Initiative (GHPI), built around two pillars: (1) making health programming “conflict-sensitive” by extending the “do no harm” principle into operational practice and (2) where conditions allow, making it “peace-responsive” by designing health interventions to actively contribute to peace outcomes such as social cohesion, dialogue, and community resilience. The initiative is likely to influence WHO’s thinking as it rapidly designs and rolls out its response to the current crisis. In a 2023 paper for the International Peace Institute, I argued that while the GHPI’s conceptual direction is broadly correct, its operationalization in violent conflict settings carries risks that have not yet been adequately addressed. Two in particular could present challenges for the response in eastern DRC. First, it is unclear how WHO and its partners in the field, including organizations such as Médecins Sans Frontières, will reconcile the principles of conflict sensitivity and humanitarian impartiality when the two pull in opposing directions. For example, even if a conflict-sensitive analysis identifies that delivering a particular intervention will exacerbate conflict dynamics (e.g., if negotiating access through a non-state armed group will entrench that group’s position), that intervention may still be compelled to proceed under the principle of humanitarian impartiality. The GHPI offers no framework for managing that tradeoff. Second, the initiative holds that programming “must be led at national level—from national authorities down to the community level.” This instinct to promote national ownership was borne of the lessons of the 2014-2016 Ebola crisis in West Africa, where the UN was criticized for bypassing national institutions. However, this principle becomes highly problematic when the state is itself a party to the conflict. In eastern DRC, much of the population views Congolese state institutions with hostility born of long experience. Deferring to national ownership without qualification risks reproducing the legitimacy problem that fueled community resistance in 2018 and could empower the predatory actors the response should be insulated from. The outbreak in the DRC demands a more localized, nuanced process for deciding on the role of national actors, grounded in thorough conflict analysis. The Way Forward The international response in eastern DRC will succeed or fail—and it is critical that it succeed—on its ability to implement emergency public health measures within the region’s long-standing social, political, and security quagmire. This will require three deliberate moves from the outset: (1) joint conflict and political-economy analysis to shape deployment decisions rather than follow them; (2) a security posture of less proximate protection combined with negotiated community-level access; and (3) a response built on localized approaches to engaging existing community structures and calibrating the role of national actors. Many further challenges will emerge that will demand difficult choices—not least the reconciliation of the dilemmas innate to the GHPI—but the decisions international responders make in the next weeks could have profound implications for regional and international public health. Originally Published in the Global Observatory
Country: Chile Sources: Cruz Roja Chilena, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies Please refer to the attached file. Descripción Un sismo de mediana intensidad se percibió a las 17:53 horas de hoy lunes 25 de mayo, entre las regiones de Arica y Parinacota y Atacama, alcanzando una máxima intensidad percibida VI Mercalli en las localidades de Antofagasta, Tocopilla, Mejillones y Sierra Gorda de la Región de Antofagasta. Antecedentes técnicos: Reporte del Centro Sismológico Nacional (CSN) Magnitud 6.9 Mww. Epicentro: Latitud -22.38; Longitud -68.76 Profundidad 114 kilómetros. Referencia geográfica 20 kilómetros al Noreste de Calama, Región de Antofagasta. Reporte del Servicio Hidrográfico y Oceanográfico de la Armada (SHOA) SHOA indica que las características del sismo NO reúnen las condiciones necesarias para generar un tsunami en las costas de Chile. 2. RESUMEN DE LA SITUACIÓN: Daños registrados en la Región de Antofagasta Comuna de Calama: - Suspensión de atención en el COSAM (por daño estructural) SAMU (sin energía eléctrica) y en SAPU norponiente. - Daño menor en SAR Calama. - Daño menor en BRIANT de Calama. - Con daños en evaluación se encuentran la Escuela Valentín Letelier, la Escuela Básica Andrés Bello y el Colegio Ejército de Salvación, se realizarán las evaluaciones de daños durante la jornada de mañana. Comuna de Antofagasta: - Con daños en evaluación se encuentra el Colegio Padre Alberto Hurtado. Comuna de San Pedro de Atacama: - Se registra desprendimiento de una roca en el sector Río Grande. Comuna de Tocopilla: - Se informa de grietas en el complejo habitacional Alto Covadonga, desprendimiento de material en la Ruta 1. Comuna de María Elena: - Se registra daño menor en la Iglesia de Quillagua. Alteraciones de conectividad Al momento, no se reportan alteraciones de tránsito en las rutas principales. Alteraciones de servicios básicos Región de Antofagasta: 5.044 clientes sin suministro de electricidad. - Comuna de Calama: 4.506 clientes sin suministro de electricidad. - Comuna de Antofagasta: 366 clientes sin suministro de electricidad. - Comuna de Mejillones 172 clientes sin suministro de electricidad. Estado de redes Las operadoras se encuentran funcionando con normalidad, sólo se registran 7 sitios de la compañía WOM en la Región de Antofagasta fuera de servicio por descarga de batería. De acuerdo a la informacion proporcionada por el centro sismologico de la Universidad de Chile, se han registrado sobre 50 sismo menores en la zona norte posterior a este evento. Solicitar asistencia Gobierno requiere asistencia internacional: No SN requiere asistencia internacional: No Boletín informativo publicado No Acciones tomadas por Federación General Otros Resumen Monitoreo Acciones tomadas por Sociedad nacional General Otros Resumen Monitoreo y reporte Medidas tomadas por otros CURSOS DE ACCIÓN: Se realizaron 2 Comité de Gestión del Riesgo de Desastres (COGRID) Provinciales, para la provincia de Tocopilla y para la Provincia de El Loa en la Región de Antofagasta, a fin de establecer las coordinaciones y evaluación de daños y afectación. Se informa la suspensión de clases para mañana martes 26 de mayo en la comuna de Calama, para los establecimientos SLEP Licancabur, particulares subvencionados y privados. Los equipos de respuesta del Sistema de Prevención y Respuesta ante Desastres (SINAPRED) se encuentran desplegados en terreno y continúan evaluando las situaciones de emergencias derivadas de este evento.
Country: Chile Sources: Cruz Roja Chilena, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies Please refer to the attached file. Descripción De acuerdo con la información proporcionada por el Servicio Nacional de Geología y Minería (SERNAGEOMIN), mediante el análisis realizado por el Observatorio Volcanológico de los Andes del Sur (OVDAS) y producto de la producto de la actividad del volcán Nevado de Longaví, La Delegación Regional Presidencial Maule en conjunto con SENAPRED regional emitieron el 22 de mayo un informe fundado de perímetro de Seguridad para el Volcán Nevado de Longaví con antecedentes de informe técnico correspondiente a SERNAGEOMIN. Dicho informe indica que a contar del 20 de mayo se ha registrado un incremento en la actividad interna del volcán, destacando hasta el momento 4 eventos con magnitud superior a 3.0, considerados de moderada a alta energía. De este modo, el evento de mayor magnitud local (4,3 ML) se registró el 20 de mayo a las 00:49 horas, siendo el evento de mayor magnitud local registrado hasta la fecha en este sistema volcánico desde la implementación de la red instrumental de monitoreo. Por otra parte, este incremento de la sismicidad representa un cambio relevante en la actividad interna del volcán, caracterizado por la aparición de una nueva fuente sísmica localizada aproximadamente entre 4 y 5 km al suroeste del cráter, con profundidades cercanas a 3 km. Con base a estos antecedentes técnicos, que suponen un aumento del riesgo asociado a esta variable volcánica, en coordinación con la Delegación Presidencial Regional del Maule, la Dirección Regional del SENAPRED Declara Perímetro de Seguridad para la comuna de Longaví de acuerdo con Resolución Exenta N°234 del 25 de mayo de 2026, en torno a un radio de 3 km respecto a la cima del volcán. En función de este antecedente, se señala la restricción de acceso a la zona indicada, proceso que implica el despliegue de recursos y capacidades de los sistemas locales, lo que se reforzará por los sistemas regionales y nacionales, de forma escalonada y en cuanto sea requerido. Cabe mencionar que, se mantiene vigente la Alerta Temprana Preventiva para la comuna de Longaví por actividad del volcán Nevados de Longaví, la que se encuentra vigente desde el 22 de mayo de 2026 y hasta que las condiciones así lo ameriten. 2. ANTECEDENTES TÉCNICOS: El Servicio Nacional de Geología y Minería (SERNAGEOMIN), mediante el análisis realizado por el Observatorio Volcanológico de los Andes del Sur (OVDAS), se han emitido a la fecha 5 Reportes Especiales de Actividad Volcánica (REAV) relacionados a sismos de fracturamiento de rocas Volcano – Tectónicos (20 de mayo a las 01:15; 03:00 y 08:00 y 22 de mayo 08:50 y 18:00 horas). En relación con el último REAV emitido el 22 de mayo, el volcán continúa registrando sismicidad de tipo volcano-tectónica, aunque con una tasa de ocurrencia menor respecto de los días previos. Por otra parte, desde la cámara “Retama” no se observan cambios evidentes en la actividad superficial. En este escenario, y considerando los antecedentes previamente expuestos, la actividad registrada evidencia una desestabilización del nivel base del sistema volcánico. En particular, el carácter energético del episodio, su persistencia temporal, la ocurrencia de eventos VT con magnitudes superiores a ML 3,0 y la identificación de una nueva fuente sísmica permiten establecer que el sistema se encuentra en un nivel de actividad superior al observado habitualmente desde el inicio de su monitoreo instrumental. Por lo tanto, se determina el cambio nivel de alerta técnica volcánica a amarilla. Finalmente, aunque no existe registro de actividad eruptiva histórica en el volcán, dadas las señales de inestabilidad interna observadas durante los últimos días, no se descarta que explosiones de baja magnitud súbitas y sin precursores afecten la parte superior del edificio volcánico, en torno a un radio de 3 km respecto a la cima. Solicitar asistencia Gobierno requiere asistencia internacional: No SN requiere asistencia internacional: No Boletín informativo publicado No Acciones tomadas por Federación General Otros Resumen Monitoreo y Reporte de la Situación Acciones tomadas por Sociedad nacional General Otros Resumen Monitoreo y Reporte de la Situación Medidas tomadas por otros Se ha establecido una coordinación constante con SENAPRED y la Delegación Presidencial Regional de Maule, para la evaluación de los aspectos técnicos de la amenaza. Cabe señalar, que los organismos integrantes del SINAPRED deberán mantener y ejecutar las medidas sectoriales de prevención establecidas en COGRID Regional, estableciéndose un monitoreo permanente de los puntos críticos en el territorio y conectividad vial, detección de zonas de riesgo y vulnerabilidades asociadas, catastro de recursos actualizados y prohibición de todas las acciones de pastoreo y turismo al interior del perímetro de seguridad. Asimismo, se realiza la activación de los respectivos Comités de Gestión del Riesgo de Desastres y puesta a punto de enlaces de coordinación, comunicación y planificación de operaciones de emergencia. SENAPRED continuará evaluando la condición de riesgo del volcán Láscar, de acuerdo con los reportes entregados por OVDAS-SERNAGEOMIN y demás organismos del Sistema Nacional de Prevención y Respuesta ante Desastres, manteniendo oportunamente informada a la población a las Autoridades.
Country: Gambia Source: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies Please refer to the attached file. RISK ANALYSIS AND EARLY ACTION SELECTION Prioritized hazard and its historical impact. The Gambia, like many other Africa countries, is susceptible to and unable to cope with the adverse effects of climate change, including extreme weather events, rising temperatures, sea-level rise, and other environmental shifts. The terrain is predominantly flat, with a narrow coastal plain and a gently wave-like in the interior The climate of The Gambia is a tropical type with two seasons: 1. a short rainy season from June to October, and 2. a long dry season from November to May. Average annual rainfall varies between 700mm and 1,000 mm according to the Department of Water Resources (DWR). More than 80% of the annual rainfall is recorded between July and September. August is the wettest month with the number of rainy days estimated to be around 19 days. Average temperatures in The Gambia range from 18°C to 30°C during the dry season and 23°C to 33°C during the wet season. According to the National Hazard Profile of The Gambia, flash flooding is one of the highest priority natural hazards in The Gambia. In the Gambia Pluvial Floods (Surface water floods happen because of heavy and prolonged downpour occurs thus saturating and overwhelming lower grounds and drainage systems. The accumulation of rainwater in compounds, houses, streets, farmlands and low-lying areas with inappropriate waterways (blocked or encroached natural and artificial waterways) usually results in harsh devastation and destruction. These factors are aggravated by the rapid urbanization & the rapid growth of unregulated expansion of settlement patterns and systems in the country. These Pluvial floods ( surface water) are amplified by several factors, including: • Lack of drainage and waste management: Inadequate drainage systems and poor waste management exacerbate flash flooding problem by causing blockages of canals, culverts and other water ways and reducing the capacity of drainage infrastructurehttps://gambia.un.org/sites/default/files/2023-01/UNDAC-Gambia_Floods-RNAR-ENG-Web.pdf causing widespread contamination of water bodies, submerge homes, roads, and farmland. Pluvial floods (surface water) has had a major impact in The Gambia over the past years, affecting the country’s social, economic and environmental aspects: • Disruption of daily life: Every year, Pluvial floods (flash floods and surface water) affect thousands of people living in both urban and local communities, forcing them to flee their homes, lose property and find themselves in precarious living conditions. populations at risk, including those living in informal urban areas or near rivers, are particularly affected. • Public health: Stagnant water creates an environment conducive to the proliferation of water-related diseases such as cholera, malaria and diarrhea. Contamination of drinking water by wastewater and the accumulation of waste aggravate the health risks for the population. Economic losses: In general, flash flood impacts include, destruction of houses and infrastructures Roads, schools. Telecommunications, electricity supply, transportation infrastructure, markets, businesses pollution and displacement among others which negatively impact local economies. Agriculture, a key sector for The Gambia, is also heavily affected, as farmland are submerged, leading to crop loss and reduced food production. • Displacement of Families: Due to the scale of the floods, many people are forced to leave their homes and migrate to other areas, increasing the pressure on local resources and contributing to the rapid urbanization of some cities, further worsening living conditions and sanitation problems. • Environmental destruction: Flash Flooding washes away agricultural soil, destabilizing ecosystems, and contributing to biodiversity loss. Increased wastewater and the destruction of natural habitats are affecting animal and plant species. • Loss of lives and injuries During the past 2 rainy seasons Flash Flood has caused more than 10 deaths and has caused dozens injured. Most of these deaths and injuries were caused by collapsed buildings.
Country: World Source: UN Women Crises are not gender-neutral. Women and girls are disproportionately affected due to pre-existing gender inequalities and discriminatory social norms, which limit their access to humanitarian aid, services, resources, and decision-making power. It is not surprising that the 30-year review of progress on the landmark Beijing Declaration and Platform of Action found that progress for women and girls is slowest in conflict and crisis-affected countries. The review raised the alarm about how ongoing trends may further thwart progress. The data is stark: Women and girls in extremely fragile contexts are 7.7 times more likely to live in households below the poverty line of USD 2.15 per day than those in non-fragile contexts. Under a worst-case climate scenario, up to 158.3 million additional women and girls could be pushed into poverty by 2050 as a direct result of climate change, surpassing the number of men and boys by 16 million. The number of food-insecure women and girls could rise by as much as 236 million, compared with an additional 131 million men and boys. The average incidence of child marriage in conflict-affected countries is 14.4 percentage points higher than in non-conflict settings. More than a third of maternal deaths occurred in 48 fragile and conflict-affected countries. Sexual violence in conflict zones has risen sharply in recent years, while impunity for these violations has remained the norm. Girls’ educational attainment continues to lag in conflict-affected countries. Behind these numbers are women and girls who have lost their lives, had their safety and health shattered, their rights eroded, their dignity compromised, and their potential squandered. From Gaza and Sudan to Haiti, Lebanon, and elsewhere, the gendered impacts are both immediate and long term, affecting individuals and societies. They are also not contained within borders. For example, according to a UN Women gender alert on the military escalation in the Middle East, rising food and fuel prices and supply disruptions risk deepening food insecurity and livelihood erosion and increasing unpaid care burdens for women and girls across the Arab region, Asia-Pacific, Africa, and beyond. A humanitarian system under pressure The unfolding tragedy of escalating and protracted conflicts and crises and growing humanitarian needs is taking place against a backdrop of several important global trends. First, recent years have seen a rising backlash against gender equality taking place within the wider context of democratic erosion and shrinking civic space in various countries and regions. This is influencing government policies as well as mainstream opinions and attitudes – and threatening hard-won gains for women and girls. Second, the world is experiencing a severe contraction of international aid precisely when it is needed the most. Recent data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development shows that international aid fell in 2025 by 23.1 per cent in real terms compared with 2024, representing the largest annual drop in the history of official development assistance. This brings aid back to 2015 levels – the year the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development began. As the Global Humanitarian Overview 2025 lays bare, the massive cuts to aid have forced the humanitarian system to do the “cruel math of doing less with less” and “hyper-prioritize” assistance toward those assessed to be in the direst need. The Humanitarian Reset, launched through the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) in March 2025, aims to make the system faster, lighter, more accountable, and more impactful. Against this backdrop, the international community needs to take bold and urgent action based on ample evidence of what works and rooted in existing commitments to gender equality and women’s rights. Put gender equality at the center of the reset First, gender equality needs to be a cornerstone of the ongoing Humanitarian Reset and not seen as a peripheral issue. In the drive for efficiency, simplification, and focus on strictly defined and hyper-prioritized life-saving assistance, there is a risk that implementation of the IASC’s commitments to gender equality may fall short. As funding contracts and established universal norms are under attack, now is the time to double down and prioritize interventions led by women and in support of their lives, dignity, and rights. Under the reset, there is a commitment that the humanitarian system will “defend” norms and principles, including on gender equality. The reset’s outcomes will depend on how consistently and concretely this is done at different levels – globally and in countries. A critical pillar is to recognize women’s vital and rich contributions in crisis-affected settings and enable their full and equal participation and leadership in decision-making processes. Women and girls are not passive victims or mere recipients of aid – they are responders on the front lines and are shaping the outcomes of crises, as community leaders and organizers, primary caregivers, educators, economic contributors, and peacebuilders. There is plenty of evidence that their leadership is a precondition for effective humanitarian responses, as well as for addressing the root causes of conflicts and for building sustainable recovery and peace. And yet we are far from achieving longstanding commitments to women’s participation and leadership as per the Sustainable Development Goals and the Women, Peace and Security agenda. All too often, participation remains tokenistic and women may have seats but no real influence over decisions made. Whether in internationally led mediation processes, in country-level humanitarian teams and cluster coordination groups, in funding allocation advisory boards, or in other decision-making forums – women need to be equally present and heard, and their perspectives recognized and heeded. They need to be able to exercise this fundamental right safely and without negative repercussions. Fund women-led and women’s rights organizations Second, women-led and women’s rights organizations working in conflict and crisis-affected countries need urgent funding. They were already underfunded and overstretched prior to recent funding cuts. UN Women’s report, At a breaking point, warns that these cuts have placed enormous additional strain on their vital work and even their very existence. Both the quantity and the quality of funding matter. Funding needs to be flexible, multi-year, and reflective of the holistic and transformative nature of their work, which is not only life-saving and life-sustaining but also often encompasses longer-term development, peace, democracy building, human rights, and gender-equality objectives. Both funding and broader political support need to take into account the significant, often overlooked, risks faced in crisis settings by women, girls, gender-diverse leaders, and human rights defenders. Work across the humanitarian–development–peace nexus Finally, it is critical that humanitarian, development, and peace actors work more closely and effectively together to address the complex challenges of today’s protracted and multifaceted crises. Meeting immediate needs should go hand in hand with building community resilience to disasters, strengthening governance systems, and addressing the root causes of conflict. Gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls need to be embedded throughout this nexus and its various components – from defining collective gender outcomes, to conducting joint gender analysis and assessments, to harmonizing funding streams with gender markers and ambitious targets for funding projects and interventions that address women’s specific needs, advance gender equality, or empower women. The stakes could not be higher. As the international community navigates an era of shrinking resources, eroding norms, and multiplying crises, the choices made now will determine whether women and girls are left further behind or emerge as the architects of more just and resilient societies. Delivering on commitments to gender equality in crisis settings is not a matter of idealism – it is a prerequisite for effective, sustainable, and principled responses. The evidence is clear and the commitments exist. The world cannot afford the cost of inaction. This article is reprinted with permission from SDG Action. About the author Asya Varbanova has 20 years of experience advancing sustainable development and gender equality in complex political, post-conflict and crisis contexts, across Europe, Central and South Asia, and the Middle East. Currently serving as Head of Humanitarian Section/Deputy Chief. She has led Country Offices of UN Women in Turkiye, Moldova, Serbia and North Macedonia. She has managed development programmes and humanitarian responses in diverse settings, translating normative commitments on women’s rights and empowerment into operational results and spearheading multi-stakeholder partnerships across the UN, government institutions, civil society and private sector to advance impact at scale and institutional and systemic change.