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Stray dogs without owners must be held for at least five days, while dogs with potential owners can be held up to 60 days before euthanasia is allowed.
Over 1,000 cases were filed in 10 days as Bangladesh launches an AI-powered traffic enforcement system for the first time, while the fate of unregistered battery-powered rickshaws stays unclear.
Countries: World, American Samoa, Cook Islands, Fiji, French Polynesia (France), Guam, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Nauru, New Caledonia (France), New Zealand, Niue (New Zealand), Northern Mariana Islands (The United States of America), Palau, Papua New Guinea, Pitcairn Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Wallis and Futuna (France) Source: World Health Organization Please refer to the attached file.
Countries: Lebanon, Syrian Arab Republic Source: Famine Early Warning System Network Please refer to the attached file. Key Messages Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected across South and El-Nabatieh governorates through September 2026, driven by sustained insecurity, collapsed market functionality, and severely constrained humanitarian access. From June through September, a deterioration from Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!) to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) is likely in Akkar, Baalbek-El Hermel, Beirut, and parts of Mount Lebanon, Bekaa, and North, reflecting mounting displacement pressures and declining income-earning opportunities alongside a reduction in humanitarian food assistance after May. Hostilities between Israeli forces and Hezbollah persist in May, with continued airstrikes and ground operations driving large-scale displacement, reducing market access, disrupting agricultural production, and constraining humanitarian operations. Despite a 45-day ceasefire extension announced on May 15, fighting intensified in mid- to late May, with attacks remaining concentrated in southern Lebanon, particularly in Tyre, Nabatieh, Bint Jbeil, and Marjayyoun districts. Israeli air and drone strikes are also increasing in frequency in the Bekaa Valley. Attacks targeting critical infrastructure — including health facilities, water systems, and transportation routes — continue to disrupt supply chains and constrain service delivery, while humanitarian access remains constrained across insecurity-affected areas, further isolating southern populations. Displacements continue to increase, placing additional strain on collective shelters and intensifying social tensions in host communities. Returns to southern Lebanon remain limited due to persisting insecurity, widespread infrastructure destruction, restricted access, and disruptions to markets and essential services. Expanded evacuation orders beyond southern Lebanon are constraining movement and access to assistance across southern Lebanon, the Bekaa Valley, and Beirut’s southern suburbs, with 90 percent of forced displacement orders concentrated in South, triggering further population movements. As of May 21, nearly 130,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) are residing in 635 collective shelters, while the majority of the estimated 1.3 million IDPs remain outside formal sites in Beirut, Mount Lebanon, and North. Within these governorates, large influxes are exacerbating overcrowding, straining local resources, and heightening tensions between displaced populations and host communities. Food and fuel prices remain key constraints on household food access amid Lebanon’s heavy reliance on imports and ongoing insecurity-related disruptions. Below-average 2025 wheat production, intermittent trade disruptions, and localized access constraints, particularly in the south and the Bekaa-Baalbek-Hermel corridor, are placing upward pressure on prices, with bread prices rising 12 percent from mid-February to mid-April and remaining elevated despite national wheat availability that is supported by sustained imports, especially in areas affected by insecurity and transport disruptions. Sharp increases in fuel prices — rising by approximately 84 percent between mid-February and mid-May — due to domestic price adjustments and regional fuel market pressures following the escalation are raising transportation and production costs. These price increases are further eroding household purchasing power, particularly for poor and displaced households. Market functionality and income-earning opportunities remain uneven across Lebanon, reflecting a geographic divide between insecurity-affected areas and areas not directly impacted by hostilities. In South and El-Nabatieh, market functionality remains severely degraded, with limited trader activity, supply chain breakdowns, and restricted physical access constraining food availability. In contrast, markets continue to operate in most displacement-affected areas, though growing strain on local markets — driven by the IDP influx, price inflation, depleting stocks, and overwhelming trader capacity — and declining purchasing power are increasingly constraining food access. Income-earning opportunities remain well below average countrywide, with the collapse of the tourism industry — an 80 percent drop compared to the same period in 2025 — and below-average activity in construction, services, and transport limiting urban labor demand. The increased labor supply from displaced populations is increasing competition and placing downward pressure on wages. In South, El-Nabatieh, and Baalbek-Hermel, agricultural labor opportunities, associated with the start of the typical wheat and barley harvest, are below average and compounded by displacement, land access constraints, and infrastructure damage, which are reducing a key source of seasonal income. Humanitarian food assistance remains ongoing but insufficient to meet rapidly rising needs. A revised extension of the Lebanon Flash Appeal through August — expected to launch in early June — will continue to target up to 1 million people, contingent on the availability of funding, including poor Lebanese, displaced Syrians, and Palestinian refugees. However, implementation remains highly dependent on securing additional funding, with substantial funding gaps limiting partners’ ability to sustain assistance delivery at scale. Since the start of the escalation, partners have delivered more than 10.3 million hot and cold meals, 129,852 ready-to-eat rations, and 37,256 bread bundles across Lebanon, and have supported 618,000 insecurity-affected people with cash assistance as of May 21. Operational effectiveness also continues to vary by area. In insecurity-affected areas, particularly South and El-Nabatieh, ongoing hostilities, movement restrictions, infrastructure damage, and localized market disruptions limit households’ ability to fully utilize cash assistance, while access constraints and convoy limitations continue to restrict the timely delivery of in-kind assistance to the most affected and isolated populations.
Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo Source: Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development On 15 May 2026, the Ministry of Public Health in the Democratic Republic of the Congo issued a warning about an Ebola virus disease outbreak in Ituri Province, in the east of the country. According to the World Health Organisation, within the space of a week, the number of suspected cases in Ituri province rose from 513 to 883. By 25 May, there had been 220 deaths. These figures could see a gradual increase in the coming days. The outbreak now spans more than three provinces and, due to fears of further spread, the borders around the area are gradually closing, making supplies increasingly difficult to obtain. This effectively traps humanitarian workers and increases the risk of supply shortages, both for local markets and for medical equipment. This health crisis is exacerbated by a fragile humanitarian context, large-scale population displacement, the fragility of health infrastructure, a lack of community information, as well as challenges related to patient care and the management of bodies. The eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo is also already marked by a volatile security and humanitarian situation linked to clashes between the M23 armed group and Congolese government forces. The Democratic Republic of the Congo is facing a catastrophic convergence of the Ebola outbreak and the armed conflict in the east of the country. WHO Present in the DRC since 2003, Acted has real field expertise and has been operating in 10 provinces of the country, including North Kivu and South Kivu, for over 20 years. Funded by the CDCS, the Humanitarian Fund and ECHO, Acted implements numerous emergency projects to improve access to water, hygiene and sanitation, combat food insecurity and provide decent housing for the most vulnerable. From the very first days following the crisis, Acted staff were mobilised to provide a rapid emergency response to communities affected by this outbreak. In coordination with local authorities, Acted aims to combat the spread of the epidemic by carrying out the following activities: Installing handwashing stations in public places Rehabilitating latrines and ensuring the chlorination of water points Distribute hygiene kits containing, in particular, chlorine and aquatabs Identify, revitalise and train community representatives who will be responsible for raising awareness of good hygiene practices and protective measures These areas of intervention are essential and can save lives. Every contribution is invaluable.
Country: Lebanon Source: World Food Programme BEIRUT, Lebanon – The United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) is warning that nearly three months into the conflict, Lebanon faces a deepening humanitarian emergency with a critical combination of displacement and increased food insecurity. More than one million people remain displaced, while soaring prices, lost incomes and strained markets are pushing food further out of reach for vulnerable families. WFP has rapidly scaled up its response nationwide, but the situation remains highly fragile. Sustained humanitarian access, stable supply flows and predictable funding are critical to ensuring continued assistance for those most in need. Below are the latest updates on WFP operations and the food security situation in Lebanon: Since 2 March, WFP has reached a total of more than 700,000 conflict-affected people across Lebanon with emergency food and cash assistance. On average, WFP has supported close to 150,000 people per day since the escalation, providing hot meals, ready-to-eat rations, and food parcels to families sheltering in displacement sites. The ongoing conflict characterized by daily bombardments and displacement orders is challenging humanitarian access and resulting in continued displacement. These conditions are constraining the delivery of critical assistance, particularly in hard-to-reach areas. A total of 24 humanitarian convoys have been deployed to southern Lebanon, including border villages, Tyre and Hermel, to reach communities facing access constraints. More than 50 percent of the requested convoys have been delayed or cancelled due to movement and access risks. Current WFP assistance includes emergency cash support for close to half a million Lebanese through national systems, as well as cash support for more than 100,000 Syrian refugees. Since the onset of the emergency, WFP has distributed nearly five million hot meals, prioritizing newly displaced families arriving with limited belongings. WFP has supported more than 215,000 displaced people across over 500 shelters nationwide, alongside approximately 85,500 people in host communities and hard-to-reach areas. To help stabilize food availability, a shipment of 250 metric tons of wheat flour recently entered Lebanon through the corridor with Jordan, made possible through close coordination between Lebanese and Jordanian authorities. The shipment is supporting approximately 10,000 vulnerable households. The WFP-led Logistics Cluster has supported a total of 64 partners — including UNFPA, UNRWA, IOM, UNICEF, UNHCR, and international and national NGOs — of which 18 have utilized the logistics services to transport nearly 2,500 m³ of cargo. The latest food security analysis confirms a sharp deterioration nationwide, with 1.24 million people — nearly one in four — facing acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or worse) between April and August 2026. Displacement, rising food and fuel prices, market disruptions, and broader economic shocks are driving the crisis. While food remains available in many areas, it is becoming increasingly unaffordable. Since the start of the escalation, vegetable prices have risen by more than 20 percent, while bread prices have increased by around 15 percent. Market conditions vary significantly: in southern Lebanon and Nabatieh, more than 80 percent of markets are no longer functioning, while in Beirut and other areas markets remain operational but under growing strain. To sustain life-saving assistance and respond to rising needs, WFP requires USD 112 million between May and August 2026 (USD 44.1 million per month). Without adequate and predictable funding, WFP’s ability to maintain emergency food and cash assistance for vulnerable families across Lebanon will be at risk. Contact For more information please contact (email address: firstname.lastname@wfp.org): Rasha Abou Dargham, WFP/Lebanon, +961 76 866 779 Abeer Etefa, WFP/Cairo, Mob +20 106 66 34 352 Julian Miglierini, WFP/ Rome, Mob. +39 348 2316793 Rene McGuffin, WFP/ Washington Mob. +1 771 245 4268
Countries: Iran (Islamic Republic of), Afghanistan Source: Norwegian Refugee Council Millions of Iranian civilians and Afghan refugees living in Iran have been severely affected by the conflict, which has forced millions to flee their homes across the country. Essential civilian infrastructure has been damaged, exacerbating deep humanitarian needs, warned Jan Egeland, Secretary General of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) during a visit to the country. “Families here in Iran, both vulnerable Iranians and Afghan refugees, are paying a terrible price for this war,” said Egeland. “Widespread US and Israeli airstrikes forced millions to leave their homes in search of safety. Children are traumatised and have had their education disrupted, whilst parents struggle to make ends meet due to inflation and rising prices. Everyone I have spoken to feels fearful that the war will again escalate.” Since the war began on the 28th of February, almost 3,500 people have been killed in the country, with more than 32,000 people injured nationwide. Across Iran, Israel, Lebanon, and the Gulf, thousands have been killed in airstrikes, with millions of lives shattered as a result of widespread attacks. The intense air campaign on Iran – in densely populated areas – triggered massive displacement, with millions fleeing Tehran to seek safety. People who temporarily relocated are now returning, but those whose homes and livelihoods were destroyed remain displaced. In total, almost 150,000 homes, shops, schools, and other civilian buildings have been damaged, and 17 million pupils remain unable to attend school in person. NRC calls upon all parties to commit to a permanent end of hostilities. A sustained ceasefire and lasting peace agreement would enable the civilian populations in all conflict affected countries to gradually resume their lives and facilitate safe humanitarian access for humanitarian relief and rehabilitation. “Civilian life in Iran has been turned upside down as a result of the war,” said Egeland. “NRC and our partners have been doing all we can to support Afghan refugees and displaced Iranians. But we only have a third of the funding we need to sustain our emergency relief efforts.” NRC has been working in Iran since 2012, providing support to hundreds of thousands across ten provinces, including cash assistance, education, and water and sanitation. “Without further funding, we will have to reduce our emergency relief efforts instead of scaling up for those in desperate need. We only have funding from Norway, Sweden, and the European Union, in spite of Iran being the world’s largest refugee-hosting country and the dramatic impact of the war on civilians,” said Egeland. “Without proper resources for this crisis response, the lives of both Iranian civilians and Afghan refugees will face severe consequences from this war, for years to come.” Most of the four million Afghan refugees have been living in the country for decades, in urban and semi-urban industrial areas where their employment opportunities have been curtailed by the war and the sanctions against the Iranian economy. “The people I’ve met here in Iran speak of terrible loss: homes, family members, life savings, but also of the traumatising impact the war has had on children. Now, economic pressures are robbing them of their hope for the future. It is vital that we support both the vulnerable Iranian and Afghan refugee population, to prevent a further deepening of this humanitarian crisis,” said Egeland. Notes to editors: Photos and B-roll from Iran can be downloaded for free use here Around 3.2 million people were temporarily displaced at the beginning of the war (UNHCR). The Iranian Ministry of Health report 3,375 civilian deaths and 32,314 injuries nationwide. (OCHA). Nearly 149,000 civilian units have reportedly damaged, directly affecting an estimated 400,000 people. (OCHA). 1,200 educational facilities reported as affected and 20 schools destroyed, as well as 240 health facilities reported damaged (OCHA). More than 17 million students remain unable to attend school in person. (OCHA) With over 4.4 million Afghans seeking safety and livelihoods in the country, Iran is currently hosting the world's largest refugee population (UNHCR). About 2.4 million Afghans reside in Tehran (according to the Province Governor). Tehran metropolitan area hosts a significant Afghan population due to its industrial zones, employment opportunities, and proximity to the capital. The response for Afghan refugees in Iran has been chronically underfunded with just 18 per cent funded in 2025 through the Regional Refugee Response Plan (OCHA). The more than four million Afghans are among the most affected by the consequences of the war. More than 35,000 have returned to Afghanistan since the start of the conflict, and more than one million remain at risk of deportation. (NRC) The humanitarian response is 47% funded -only 37.6 of the 80 million US dollars required have been raised (OCHA) On the evening of the 7th of April, a ceasefire agreement was announced, but airstrikes have continued. NRC has been working in Iran since 2012. In 2025, NRC provided assistance to nearly 115,000 Afghans and host community members across 10 provinces. NRC is aiming to target 50,000 Iranians and Afghans affected by this crisis across nine provinces, while prioritising cash assistance, education services, protection and legal assistance and integrated water and sanitation, and shelter support to ensure vulnerable communities can meet their urgent needs. For more information or to arrange an interview, please contact : NRC global media hotline: media@nrc.no, +47 905 62 329 More on #War and conflict
Country: Mali Source: Famine Early Warning System Network Please refer to the attached file. Messages clé Suite à l’escalade de l’insécurité après les attaques coordonnées de fin avril, l**’insécurité alimentaire devrait se détériorer de Crise (Phase 3 de l'IPC) à Urgence (Phase 4 de l'IPC) à Kidal à partir de juin,** avec une faible proportion de ménages pauvres et déplacés en Catastrophe (Phase 5 de l’IPC). Les flux commerciaux, notamment en provenance d’Algérie, ont été fortement réduit en raison de l’intensification des bombardements militaires, des persécutions des groupes armés, et de l’absence de convois escortés, entraînant un isolement accru de la région durant la période de soudure agropastorale. La forte baisse des approvisionnements et des pénuries observées sur certains marchés, combinées aux prix déjà élevés et à la baisse des revenus, réduisent considérablement l’accès des ménages aux aliments. Bien que les ménages pauvres de Kidal disposent encore d'actifs en mai, leur capacité d'adaptation devrait se dégrader considérablement à partir de juin. L'accès à l’assistance humanitaire demeure sévèrement restreint en raison des contraintes de mobilité. La forte baisse des flux commerciaux est susceptible d'entretenir la flambée des prix et les pénuries d'approvisionnement sur les marchés, tandis que les perturbations des mouvements de bétail compromettent une source essentielle d'alimentation et de revenus saisonniers. Un recours atypique à la décapitalisation du bétail et à la mendicité tentera d'atténuer des importants déficits de consommation alimentaire ; toutefois, la détérioration de l'insécurité alimentaire ne fera qu'exacerber la situation nutritionnelle dans cette région. Dans le contexte de détérioration sécuritaire et économique, des résultats d’Urgence (Phase 4 de l’IPC) persisteront à Ménaka jusqu’en septembre avec une augmentation du nombre de personne en Urgence (Phase 4 de l’IPC) à Catastrophe (Phase 5 de l’IPC) à cause des impacts significatifs de la recrudescence de l’insécurité sur la capacité des ménages à accéder aux aliments dans la région. Dans les zones d’insécurité de Gao, Mopti et Tombouctou, des résultats de Crise (Phase 3 de l'IPC) seront observés de mai à septembre liés à la baisse importante du pouvoir d’achat. Les zones du nord des régions de Ségou, Nara et de Nioro et les centres urbains devraient rester en Stress (Phase 2 de l’IPC) jusqu’en septembre 2026, avec une faible proportion des ménages déplacés et plus pauvres en Crise (Phase 3 de l’IPC), sous l’effet combiné de la baisse des revenus, des prix élevés, et d’une soudure précoce liée à l’épuisement des stocks. Les attaques coordonnées du Front de Libération de l’Azawad (FLA) et du Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) le 25 avril 2026 et la tentative de blocus de Bamako, annoncé le 28 avril, ont fortement perturbé les flux commerciaux et les activités économiques à l’échelle nationale. Les attaques visant les garnisons de Kidal, Gao, Mopti, Bamako, Kati, ainsi que la tentative de blocus sur Bamako, ont considérablement réduit les mouvements de marchandises et de personnes sur plusieurs axes routiers stratégiques. Les affrontements se sont poursuivis en mai, malgré l’intensification des offensives militaires et les escortes. Les menaces et attaques contre les véhicules en direction de Bamako réduisent les flux alimentaires depuis Sikasso et Ségou vers Kayes, Nioro et la capitale. Les approvisionnements restent inférieurs à la normale, maintenant des prix élevés et limitant la capacité des ménages pauvres à satisfaire leurs besoins alimentaires malgré les stocks disponibles. Les perturbations persistantes de l’approvisionnement en carburant en dehors de Bamako, entraînent des prix anormalement élevés du transport et des denrées alimentaires, exacerbant les difficultés d’accès alimentaire des ménages pauvres, en particulier dans les zones déjà affectées par l’insécurité. Début mai, les prix de l’essence sur le marché parallèle ont enregistré une hausse allant de 42 à plus de 60 pour cent par rapport aux deux dernières semaines dans plusieurs localités (Koro, Mopti, Bankass, Douentza, Ménaka). Les prix des céréales de base affichaient en fin avril une augmentation de 15, 19 et 42 pour cent respectivement à Ménaka, Gao et Kidal par rapport à la moyenne quinquennale ; parallèlement, la hausse de des prix des denrées de base variait de 25 à 71 pour cent d’avril à mai dans les régions de Mopti, Gao et Ménaka, selon OCHA. L’impact conjugué de l’insécurité, de la crise d’électricité, du carburant et de la flambée des prix des denrées dégrade fortement le pouvoir d’achat et l’accès aux aliments des ménages pauvres. La campagne agricole 2026/27 démarre dans un contexte de perspectives pluviométriques moins favorables et de contraintes persistantes d’insécurité et d’accès aux intrants agricoles. Alors que des cumuls de pluies moyens étaient initialement prévues, les dernières prévisions indiquent des conditions pluviométriques inferieures à la moyenne entre juin et août dans le sud. Ces perspectives défavorables dans les zones agricoles du sud s’ajoutent aux effets du conflit, et de l’accès réduit aux intrants, y compris les engrais, à cause des développements au Moyen Orient, qui devraient tous ramener la production de moyenne à inférieur à la moyenne dans le pays. Néanmoins, malgré les difficultés de la production agricole, les activités agricoles dans le sud en cours offrent des revenus et de nourriture qui atténueront les difficultés d’accès aux aliments des ménages pauvres. Dans le centre et le nord du pays, l’insécurité limite l’accès aux champs, réduit les superficies cultivables et restreint les opportunités de main d’œuvre agricole.
Country: Niger Source: Famine Early Warning System Network Please refer to the attached file. Messages clé Des résultats de Crise (Phase 3 de l’IPC) persistent dans les régions de Tillabéry, Diffa et du nord-ouest de la région de Tahoua, de mai à septembre, où l’insécurité a entraîné une faible production agricole conduisant à un épuisement précoce des stocks alimentaires et une forte dépendance aux marchés, tant pour les déplacées que pour les ménages pauvres. Le pouvoir d’achat est insuffisant qui ne leur permettent pas d’accéder à des quantités adéquates de nourriture, face à des prix élevés (le mil se vend à 300 FCFA/kg au lieu du prix national de 230 FCFA/kg). La faible demande et l'augmentation de l'offre de main-d'œuvre locale disponible entraînent une baisse des revenus inférieure à la moyenne saisonnière, obligeant ces ménages à réduire le nombre de repas, générant ainsi des déficits alimentaires. Des groupes restreints connaissent une insécurité alimentaire aiguë d’Urgence (Phase 4 de l’IPC). Ce sont les ménages déplacés qui envoient leurs enfants mendier et les ménages résidents très pauvres qui sont obligés de consommer les stocks de semences conservés pour la prochaine campagne agricole. Une insécurité alimentaire aiguë de Stress (Phase 2 de l’IPC) est observée dans presque tout le pays et pourrait persister jusqu’en septembre 2026. Les zones concernées sont principalement les zones agricoles, agropastorales et pastorales qui ne sont pas affectées par les conflits et dont les marchés fonctionnent normalement, mais affichent des prix élevés. Les ménages pauvres, à faibles revenus et qui n’ont plus de stocks alimentaires, sont les plus affectés. Ils ont une consommation alimentaire adéquate, mais sont incapables de satisfaire les besoins essentiels non alimentaires sans recourir à des stratégies d’adaptation négatives. L’insécurité civile s'est considérablement accrue suite à une augmentation du nombre d’incidents sécuritaires et de déplacés dans les foyers de conflit. Selon ACLED, le nombre total d’incidents sécuritaires a augmenté de 33 pour cent entre janvier et avril 2026 par rapport à la même période en 2025, avec des augmentations de 53 pour cent, 19 pour cent et 12 pour cent enregistrées, respectivement dans les régions de Tillabéry, Dosso et Diffa. Ces attaques de groupes armés ont entraîné des déplacements continus de populations. La population en déplacement interne (PDI) est estimée à 548 000 personnes, soit 53 pour cent de la population totale en déplacement forcé de 1 042 859 personnes, selon l’UNHCR. Ces PDI sont concentrés à Tillabéry (45 pour cent), Diffa (32 pour cent) et Tahoua (12 pour cent), ce qui amplifie la pression sur les sources de revenus et de nourriture dans ces régions. Le fonctionnement des marchés est perturbé dans les zones de conflit, où les prix des denrées de base sont supérieurs de 30 pour cent à la moyenne nationale. L’offre est en baisse par rapport à l’année dernière et à la moyenne quinquennale, en raison des répercussions des conflits et du recul de la production agricole 2025/26 consécutif à l’arrêt précoce de la saison des pluies et à la baisse des superficies emblavées. Dans le reste du pays, l'offre moyenne sur les marchés reflète un fonctionnement normal, la demande toutefois inférieure à celle de l’année dernière, du fait de la disponibilité des stocks de report et du démarrage de la vente de céréales à prix modéré. Les prix des denrées alimentaires, inférieurs à ceux de l'année dernière, s'inscrivent dans la ligne de la baisse de 7,5 pour cent du taux global d'inflation en glissement annuel enregistrée en avril 2026 par rapport à 2025 (Institut national de la statistique). Les perturbations du commerce international provoquées par les conflits en cours au Moyen-Orient pourraient, à moyen terme, augmenter les prix des produits importés, notamment le riz importé, l’huile, le sucre, la farine de blé et les engrais. Cette augmentation des prix de ces produits constitue un facteur additionnel, réduisant davantage le pouvoir d’achat des ménages particulièrement pauvres et déplacés, ainsi que celui des ménages des centres urbains. Toutefois, les prochaines récoltes, ainsi que la stabilité des prix des hydrocarbures et des coûts de transport résultant d'une production domestique de carburant permettant de maîtriser l'inflation, atténueront les impacts sur l’accès aux produits alimentaires. Les précipitations pour la prochaine saison pluvieuse, de juin à septembre, sont estimées inférieures à la moyenne, contrairement aux prévisions antérieures qui prévoyaient des précipitations moyennes à supérieures à la moyenne dans la région du Sahel.Par ailleurs, des périodes de longue à moyenne durée, sans précipitations significatives au début de la saison, sont aussi attendues. Les effets combinés d’une pluviométrie déficitaire, d’une faible utilisation d’engrais par rapport à la normale, à la suite de la hausse de leur prix due au conflit au Moyen-Orient, et d’une baisse des superficies cultivées à cause des entraves à l’accès aux champs dues à l’insécurité civile vont entraîner une baisse de la production agricole globale pour la campagne 2026/2027. Les pics de baisse de la production céréalière seront enregistrés dans les zones affectées par les conflits.
Country: Haiti Source: Famine Early Warning System Network Please refer to the attached file. Messages clé Jusqu’en septembre 2026, les effets combinés de l’insécurité, des perturbations économiques et des difficultés d’accès aux moyens d’existence continueront d’alimenter une insécurité alimentaire aiguë élevée à travers le pays**. La plupart des départements resteront en Crise (phase 3 de l'IPC), mais une partie importante de la zone métropolitaine de Port-au-Prince restera en situation d'Urgence (phase 4 de l'IPC)**, en particulier les zones accueillant des ménages déplacés et les populations les plus exposées à la violence armée. La recrudescence des violences armées dans la zone métropolitaine de Port-au-Prince, l’Artibonite, et le Centre, ainsi que la hausse des enlèvements, continue de perturber les moyens d’existence, les flux commerciaux et l’accès aux revenus. Selon les Nations Unies, environ 30 000 personnes ont été déplacées durant la première moitié de mai 2026 au nord de Port-au-Prince, dont plus de 70 pour cent vers des sites de déplacés internes. Les contraintes sécuritaires réduisent l’accès aux terres agricoles, aux intrants, à la main-d’œuvre et aux marchés, particulièrement dans l’Ouest, l’Artibonite et le Centre. La répartition spatio-temporelle irrégulière des pluies depuis le début de la campagne de printemps perturbe les activités agricoles dans plusieurs zones, malgré des cumuls saisonniers et des conditions de végétation globalement favorables dans l’ensemble du pays. Les pauses pluviométriques alternant avec des épisodes de fortes pluies concentrées entravent le développement normal des cultures. Dans le Nord-ouest, des inondations et glissements de terrain ont particulièrement affectés les communes de Saint-Louis-du-Nord, Port-de-Paix et Anse-à-Foleur. Par conséquent, les pertes de récoltes potentielles pourraient maintenir les rendements printaniers en dessous de la moyenne, limitant les améliorations saisonnières de la disponibilité alimentaire et des revenus agricoles. Par ailleurs, le retour prévu de conditions El Niño à partir du second semestre 2026 pourrait entraîner des cumuls pluviométriques inférieurs à la moyenne et affecter négativement les rendements agricoles durant les saisons culturales d’automne et d’hiver, conformément aux conditions et aux effets historiques associées au phénomène El Niño. Les prix alimentaires demeurent élevés malgré le ralentissement de l’inflation annuelle, limitant l’amélioration du pouvoir d’achat des ménages pauvres. Selon l’IHSI, l’inflation annuelle a ralenti à 20,6 pour cent en mars 2026, contre 22,1 pour cent en février, mais l’inflation alimentaire demeure forte, actuellement à 22,9 pour cent. En avril, les denrées de base dépassaient encore leur moyenne quinquennale de 63 à 87 pour cent selon les produits, avec une hausse persistante du maïs local et du haricot noir. Ces prix élevés sont alimentés par les coûts de transport, les paiements imposés sur les axes routiers, les perturbations commerciales et la hausse du carburant. Malgré la revalorisation du salaire minimum du 6 mai, celle-ci ne compense pas l’érosion du pouvoir d’achat liée aux prix alimentaires et aux services essentiels. Les tensions au Moyen-Orient demeurent un risque inflationniste via leurs effets possibles sur le pétrole et les coûts de transport en Haïti.
Country: Pakistan Source: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies Please refer to the attached file. Description of the Event Date of event 16-08-2025 What happened, where and when? Heavy monsoon rains were triggered in June 2025 with severe flash flooding across Pakistan, initially affecting Gilgit Baltistan (GB), Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK), and parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). The situation escalated rapidly in August as intense cloudbursts, flash floods, riverine overflows, landslides, and Glacial Lake Outburst Floods (GLOFs) struck northern Pakistan.1 The most severe impacts were recorded on 14–15 August 2025, when extreme cloudbursts—reaching up to 150 mm per hour in Buner— caused catastrophic flooding and landslides. KP emerged as the epicenter, with districts such as Buner, Swat, Shangla, Mansehra, Swabi, Bajaur, and Battagram experiencing major loss of life and infrastructure collapse.2 Entire villages including Golkada (Swat), Shahi Dand and Kuz Palaw (Shangla), and areas in Bajaur, Swabi, and Mansehra reported destruction of homes, roads, bridges, water systems, and livelihoods. In response to the evolving humanitarian situation, an IFRC Disaster Response Emergency Fund (DREF) operation was approved on 23 August 2025 to support immediate emergency response and relief activities, with an operational timeframe until 28 February 2026. As the scale and severity of the floods expanded across multiple provinces, including Punjab where riverine flooding along the Sutlej, Ravi, and Chenab rivers caused widespread inundation of settlements and agricultural land, the response was further scaled up through an Emergency Appeal (EA) approved on 30 August 2025. The Emergency Appeal, which will conclude on 31 December 2026, encompasses the DREF operation and supports longer-term recovery and resilience interventions. As the monsoon system persisted into late August, impacts expanded into Punjab, where riverine flooding along the Sutlej, Ravi, and Chenab rivers caused widespread inundation of settlements and agricultural land.3 Floodwaters gradually receded by late 2025, however secondary impacts—including waterlogging, infrastructure damage, and disrupted essential services—continued to delay recovery in many areas.
Country: Honduras Source: Famine Early Warning System Network Please refer to the attached file. Key Messages Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes remain widespread across Honduras, with Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes emerging in the Dry Corridor between June and September as above-average prices, below-average labor demand, and previous harvest losses exacerbate seasonal trends. While many households continue to meet minimum food needs through market purchases, they are struggling to cover essential non-food expenditures amid below-average seasonal agricultural labor opportunities and are increasingly relying on coping strategies such as selling small livestock and borrowing. In the Dry Corridor, households negatively impacted by multiple poor agricultural seasons are likely to resort to more severe coping strategies at the height of the lean season. The rest of the country will experience Stressed (IPC Phase 2), while urban centers including Tegucigalpa (Francisco Morazán), La Esperanza (Intibucá), and the Bay Islands remain in Minimal (IPC Phase 1) due to more stable formal and informal income sources. Above-average fuel and fertilizer prices continue to drive high production and transportation costs for a second consecutive month. In April,diesel prices remained nearly 34 percent higher than March, 64 percent higher than last year, and 49 percent higher than the five-year average. Fertilizer prices have also remained elevated, with DAP (18-46-0) and urea rising to 7.2 and 50 percent higher than March, respectively, and 21.2 and 45.1 percent above the five-year average, respectively. These rising input costs contributed to inflation surpassing the 5 percent threshold in April. Staple food costs persist above last year and the five-year average despite relatively stable month-on-month prices, driven by weak domestic production. In April, wholesale white maize prices were 49.2 and 39.8 percent higher than last year and the five-year average, respectively, reflecting increased demand and lingering effects of below-average import volumes in 2025. Wholesale red bean prices are 10 percent above the five-year average but remained stable month-on-month and year-on-year, partly supported by increased bean availability due to crop substitution of maize for beans during primera 2025and improved import volumes. While increased remittance inflows in early 2026 are helping receiving households partially offset higher food costs, most poor households do not receive remittances and remain vulnerable to price increases. Recent rainfall estimates through mid-May indicate widespread below-average precipitation across Honduras, negatively impacting primera land preparation and planting in localized areas. While some localized rainfall has met thresholds for planting requirements, much of this precipitation has been concentrated within short periods (2-3 days), limiting soil moisture adequacy and leading many farmers to postpone planting until more consistent rainfall is established. As a result, smallholders are not expected to initiate primera planting until mid-May. At the same time, elevated input costs are constraining fertilizer use by smallholder farmers, likely contributing to expected below-average primera crop yields by August. The Secretariat of Agriculture and Livestock (SAG), in coordination with agroclimatology boards and with support from the Centro de Estudios Atmosféricos, Oceanográficos y Sísmicos (CENAOS)/Comisión Permanente de Contingencias (COPECO), is monitoring and guiding planting decisions across the country. The forecast transition to El Niño is expected to result in rainfall deficits and above-average temperatures through September, particularly in the Dry Corridor, reducing vegetation health and soil moisture and disrupting crop development throughout the primera season. While the magnitude of the El Niño event remains uncertain, CENAOS has issued region-specific guidance for farmers, recommending early planting (before May 10) in the Dry Corridor areas bordering El Salvador, and slightly later planting (after May 15) in central and eastern departments. Drought-prone areas, including southern Francisco Morazán, El Paraíso, Valle, Choluteca, and southern Comayagua, are likely to experience larger rainfall deficits. SAG is advising some farmers to prioritize planting red beans instead of white maize due to its short production cycle and lower water requirements, improving crop resilience under uncertain rainfall conditions.
Country: Lebanon Source: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Please refer to the attached file. HIGHLIGHTS Hostilities continued despite the ceasefire extension announcement, with airstrikes and displacement orders affecting at least 61 additional localities in southern Lebanon. Displacement orders south of the Zahrani River triggered large-scale displacement and overwhelmed collective shelters, particularly in Saida and Tyre districts in South Governorate. A total of 33,731 families (127,714 people) remain displaced across 631 collective shelters; women and girls account for nearly 52 per cent of those sheltered. Since 2 March, the Ministry of Public Health has reported at least 3,324 deaths and 10,027 injuries linked to hostilities. A total of 684,120 conflict-affected people received at least one round of Emergency Multi-Purpose Cash Assistance. Between 25 and 29 May, three incidents affecting health care were reported, resulting in one death and three injuries among health workers. The 2026 Lebanon Flash Appeal, requiring US$308 million, is 60 per cent funded, with approximately US$186 million received. SITUATION OVERVIEW Airstrikes across Nabatiyeh and South Lebanon governorates continued, causing casualties and displacement. A new wave of displacement also emerged from Beirut's Southern Suburbs following new threats of escalation and the destruction of civilian infrastructure. According to the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH), 3,324 people have been killed, and 10,027 people have been injured since 2 March 2026. On 29 May, Imran Riza, the Humanitarian Coordinator for Lebanon issued a statementexpressing alarm at escalating hostilities and widespread displacement orders, which are driving panic and repeated displacement, particularly in southern Lebanon. He underscored numerous attacks on health workers, growing displacement, reiterated the need to protect civilians and called for de-escalation and a sustained halt to hostilities. On the same sate, UNESCOraised concern over damage to protected cultural sites, including Chama’ Citadel and areas near Beaufort Castle, as well as risks to the World Heritage Site of Tyre in South Governorate. It reiterated that sites under enhanced protection must not be targeted. Since the ceasefire announcement on 17 April, a total of 36 attacks were documented against health care professionals, causing 27 deaths and 80 injuries according to the WHO surveillance system for attacks on health care (SSA). This brings the total number of attacks on health care since 2 March to 182, resulting in 125 deaths and 311 injuries. On 28 May, a reported strike hit Choueifat city in Mount Lebanon governorate, south of Beirut, contributing to ongoing displacement driven by continued hostilities and repeated displacement orders. Between 26 and 29 May, 12 new displacement orders were issued for 61 localities. Most of displacement orders were issued for areal in Nabatiyeh and the South Governorate. On 27 May, renewed displacement orders were issued for all areas south of the Zahrani River, triggering mass displacement and overwhelming shelters, with those in Saida and Tyre in the South Governorate reaching their full capacity. Newly displaced people are increasingly being directed toward Beirut and northern areas. Women and girls are directly affected by this renewed displacement, facing heightened protection risks, increased care responsibilities, and greater challenges in accessing essential services. As of 28 May 2026, an estimated 127,714 people (33,731 families) were reported as displaced across 631 collective shelters nationwide, reflecting a clear and sustained upward trend in displacement figures. Beirut and Mount Lebanon governorates continue to host the largest number of displaced people, while pressure on shelters across other governorates is also increasing. Funding constraints remain a major challenge to sustaining life‑saving assistance. With days remaining under the allocated time frame, the 2026Lebanon Flash Appeal has received US$185.9 million, which represents just over 60 per cent of the US$308.3 million required.
Ecuador is debating how to regulate artificial intelligence:, institutional gaps, and tensions between innovation, surveillance, education, inclusion, and responsible public governance are at the center of the conversation.
Country: World Source: ELRHA What if the most powerful indicator in humanitarian response was also the most neglected? When crises unfold, we count displacement, malnutrition, and funding gaps. But months later, one question often remains unanswered - how many people died? That omission matters - because mortality data changes decisions. As the UK Humanitarian Innovation Hub (UKHIH) and Elrha close Phase 2 of our Mortality Estimation in Humanitarian Crises Systems Innovation Partnership, this blog marks the beginning of a series exploring why mortality estimation matters, and how grantees are innovating so the humanitarian system can do it better. Mortality: the metric that changes the conversation Credible and timely mortality figures change conversations and decisions. As Chris Porter from FCDO put it during a 2025 panel discussion: "We often debate malnutrition rates, but deaths stop people in their tracks." Mortality metrics capture crisis severity, scale, and urgency in a way few other indicators can. Mortality data used to be central to humanitarian assessments. Over time, however, it slipped to the margins - seen as too sensitive, too political, too technically complex, or too slow to be useful. The result is a paradox: the metric that best reflects human cost in crises is often missing from decision-making altogether. Why mortality evidence is so hard - and essential Estimating mortality in crises is undeniably challenging. Data is incomplete. Access is constrained. Methods vary. Numbers can be contested or suppressed, particularly in politically charged settings. Different approaches can produce vastly different estimates, eroding trust and confidence. But the cost of not measuring mortality is higher. Without credible mortality evidence the true scale of crises is underestimated; resources are allocated reactively rather than strategically; accountability weakens and advocacy relies on anecdote instead of evidence. Mortality estimation is not just a technical exercise. It is a moral and operational necessity. From reactive funding toward systems change UKHIH-Elrha’s current investments are built on a longer history of mortality-driven action. Funding followed mortality research in Somalia that helped trigger an unusual and early UN intervention in a subsequent developing famine in 2016. That response was not driven by malnutrition figures, but by mortality data. It was rare. And it worked. Recently completed research established that mortality in southern Chad was far higher than humanitarian actors had assumed, with large segments of the affected population missed entirely. This evidence forced uncomfortable reassessments, but also opened pathways to identify deaths that would otherwise have remained uncounted. Those efforts demonstrated what's possible when rigorous methods are applied under pressure. They informed response discussions, shaped advocacy, and challenged assumptions in decision-making. But they also highlight a deeper issue: Mortality estimation has been treated as an emergency add-on rather than a standing capability in crises contexts. UKHIH’s first investment in mortality estimation proved decisive in a politically charged context. Rigorous work helped establish the credibility of mortality estimates from Gaza when official figures were being publicly dismissed. This evidence made it far harder for governments and global institutions to ignore the scale of civilian death, cutting through political pressure and reaffirming the role of independent science. Building on this work, UKHIH launched the Systems Innovation Partnership in 2024 to move beyond isolated projects and towards a durable ecosystem for mortality estimation. One rooted in equitable partnerships, shared infrastructure, and long-term investment, particularly in low- and middle-income countries. What progress looks like in practice UKHIH-Elrha is currently the only dedicated funder focused specifically on mortality estimation in humanitarian crises. Across Phases 1 and 2, we've seen tangible signs of change: Stronger methods, including improved modelling approaches and shared tools and resources like the Somalia Mortality Estimation Data Observatory (S-MED) Deeper learning, through case studies examining how mortality evidence has influenced - or failed to influence - responses in crises More equitable leadership, with LMIC-based partners SIMAD Institute for Global Health (Somalia) and Evidence for Change (Kenya) playing central roles in phases 1 and 2, scaling up partnering in phase 2 with Addis Ababa University, Mekelle University (Ethiopia) and Rebuild Hope for Africa (DRC) among others. Broader dialogue, bringing together researchers, humanitarians, policymakers, and funders to tackle the "last mile" problem of uptake and use Co-funding, for longer-term, strategic investment that builds synergies and amplifies impact across the system with European Commission Humanitarian Aid (ECHO). What this blog series will cover This blog marks the start of a weekly series showcasing the Phase 2 consortia pushing this agenda forward. IMPACT Initiatives are exploring locally led mortality estimation in Somalia, Ethiopia, and the DRC, highlighting what it takes to shift ownership and trust. Johns Hopkins University is focusing on methodological innovation in DRC, alongside practical guidance for local decision-makers on when and how mortality estimates can be generated and used. Save the Children International is developing a governance mechanism among Strategic, Technical and National Stakeholders and building an online platform making guidance, tools, and technical support accessible and equitable across the sector. Together, these consortia address not just how to count deaths, but how to ensure mortality evidence shapes response. Counting deaths to save lives Mortality evidence can't be optional because uncounted deaths represent a failure of accountability, a gap in our understanding, and a missed opportunity to prevent more. When we don’t count deaths, we're not avoiding difficult conversations - we're having them anyway, just without evidence The UKHIH-Elrha partnerships show we can do better. What remains is a choice: to embed mortality estimation as a non-negotiable part of crisis response, or to continue operating in the dark about the very metric that matters most.
Country: Lebanon Sources: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator in Lebanon Please refer to the attached files. Beirut, 29 May 2026 This Eid al-Adha, normally a time of reflection and family celebrations, civilians across Lebanon faced an appalling escalation of violence, displacement, and human loss. I am deeply alarmed by the intensification of hostilities and by the impact of displacement orders affecting communities across Lebanon, including in Tyre, Nabatieh, and other locations south of the Zahrani River. The vast scale and unclarity of displacement orders are creating disproportionate panic and distress, pushing countless families to make impossible choices in their search for safety. There have been shocking reports that airstrikes have harmed civilians as they attempted to leave areas under displacement orders. Ongoing hostilities have reportedly hindered efforts by first responders to assist the injured, including people trapped under rubble in the aftermath of Israeli airstrikes. The human costs are immense. According to the Ministry of Public Health, at least 31 people including women and children were killed and 40 injured in hostilities on 26 May alone. This includes 14 people who were reportedly killed in a single airstrike in Borj El Chmali near the city of Tyre. In the past week, 15 children have been killed and 62 injured. Health workers are facing death and injury on a horrific scale. Since 2 March, 182 attacks have resulted in 125 health care personnel killed and 311 injured, according to the WHO surveillance system for attacks on health care (SSA). International humanitarian law is clear. The protection of civilians, including health workers and first responders, must be ensured. The ceasefire announcement raised hopes for a return to normal life. However, instead of families going home, the displacement of civilians continues unabated. Men, women, and children continue to flee their homes for safety. Shelters are now overflowing. Schools continue to be displacement sites, robbing children from their right to education. It is distressing to see the unique historical heritage of Lebanon, including Tyre, a UNESCO World Heritage Site and a site inscribed under enhanced protection, being threatened by the hostilities. One week ago, I was in Tyre meeting with displaced people in a collective shelter. Some families told me they had been forced to move five times in the last two years. Their wishes were crystal clear: de-escalation, a true stop to hostilities, the possibility of rebuilding their lives, and hope for the futures of their children.
Country: Lebanon Sources: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator in Lebanon Please refer to the attached files. Beirut, 29 May 2026 This Eid al-Adha, normally a time of reflection and family celebrations, civilians across Lebanon faced an appalling escalation of violence, displacement, and human loss. I am deeply alarmed by the intensification of hostilities and by the impact of displacement orders affecting communities across Lebanon, including in Tyre, Nabatieh, and other locations south of the Zahrani River. The vast scale and unclarity of displacement orders are creating disproportionate panic and distress, pushing countless families to make impossible choices in their search for safety. There have been shocking reports that airstrikes have harmed civilians as they attempted to leave areas under displacement orders. Ongoing hostilities have reportedly hindered efforts by first responders to assist the injured, including people trapped under rubble in the aftermath of Israeli airstrikes. The human costs are immense. According to the Ministry of Public Health, at least 31 people including women and children were killed and 40 injured in hostilities on 26 May alone. This includes 14 people who were reportedly killed in a single airstrike in Borj El Chmali near the city of Tyre. In the past week, 15 children have been killed and 62 injured. Health workers are facing death and injury on a horrific scale. Since 2 March, 182 attacks have resulted in 125 health care personnel killed and 311 injured, according to the WHO surveillance system for attacks on health care (SSA). International humanitarian law is clear. The protection of civilians, including health workers and first responders, must be ensured. The ceasefire announcement raised hopes for a return to normal life. However, instead of families going home, the displacement of civilians continues unabated. Men, women, and children continue to flee their homes for safety. Shelters are now overflowing. Schools continue to be displacement sites, robbing children from their right to education. It is distressing to see the unique historical heritage of Lebanon, including Tyre, a UNESCO World Heritage Site and a site inscribed under enhanced protection, being threatened by the hostilities. One week ago, I was in Tyre meeting with displaced people in a collective shelter. Some families told me they had been forced to move five times in the last two years. Their wishes were crystal clear: de-escalation, a true stop to hostilities, the possibility of rebuilding their lives, and hope for the futures of their children.
Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo Source: Direct Relief A clinical pharmacist and Direct Relief’s regional director for Africa, Dr. Samuel talks about the current Ebola outbreak, how it's different than past events, and how it can be contained. By Talya Meyers When the first cases of Ebola virus were announced in the Democratic Republic of the Congo this month, Dr. Jeffrey Samuel, traveling in East Africa, read about it on the Direct Relief website. Dr. Samuel, a clinical pharmacist and Direct Relief’s regional director for Africa, was visiting hospital partners in Uganda at the time the country’s first cases were being identified and contained. “We were already engaging with and supporting partners in Uganda through routine medical shipments and other ongoing support,” he explained. “That work was not Ebola-specific, but it reflects the kind of sustained support health systems need before, during, and after an emergency.” Direct Relief also dispatched $2.5 million in emergency medical support to the DRC, the epicenter of the outbreak, to support Ebola containment and treatment. But Dr. Samuel stressed that routine support can’t be disentangled from emergency response. Both are vital to containing an Ebola outbreak or similar public health emergency, and to helping affected communities respond and recover. “Ebola response is about much more than Ebola alone,” he said. “Stronger health systems allow countries to continue delivering essential healthcare services even while responding to an emergency.” Direct Relief: So many people are unfamiliar with Ebola, and it’s frightening. Can you give us some background? How does Ebola spread, what are the symptoms, and how do people stay safe? Jeffrey Samuel: Yeah, absolutely. Ebola is a severe viral disease: It primarily spreads through direct contact with body fluids from someone who is either sick with the disease or has died from it. That includes blood, vomit, diarrhea, urine, saliva, sweat, and other types of bodily fluids like that. It can also spread through contaminated medical equipment, unsafe burial practices, or direct contact with the body of someone who has died from the disease. One important thing I always emphasize with Ebola is that it’s not airborne, like measles or Covid-19. You can’t get Ebola simply by walking past someone. That’s why healthcare workers, the families that take care of these patients, and the people involved in different burial practices are often at the highest risk. Ebola typically starts with non-specific symptoms: stuff like fever, fatigue, muscle aches, headaches, and weakness. It can look like malaria, typhoid and other infectious diseases common in the region, so it’s hard to distinguish at the outset. It’s not until the disease starts to progress that many patients start developing vomiting, diarrhea, and dehydration. Their organs start to fail, and in some cases, patients can experience hemorrhaging in the later stages of illness. The incubation period, which means the time between when a person is exposed to when the symptoms begin, is usually between 2 and 21 days. That’s a very large range, which does not help [with diagnosis and containment] either. Direct Relief: How dangerous is this outbreak? Jeffrey Samuel: Historically, Ebola has been extremely deadly. Fatality rates typically depend on the strain involved, how quickly the outbreak is detected, and the strength of the healthcare system responding to it. Most people are familiar with the Zaire virus, which caused the large Ebola outbreaks from 2014 to 2016 in West Africa. Those outbreaks often had fatality rates around 50 to 70 percent, which is extremely high. The Bundibugyo virus, which is the one that’s causing the current outbreak, has historically had somewhat lower fatality rates – generally around 25 to 50 percent. But that’s still a very serious and potentially fatal disease. Direct Relief: How is Ebola prevented and treated? Jeffrey Samuel: In terms of prevention, the most important measures are early identification of cases, isolation of those suspected cases, infection prevention and control – in other words, good hand hygiene and personal protective equipment – contact tracing of people those patients have been in contact with recently, and safe burial procedures. You need strong community engagement and trust. That’s a big [issue] specifically with this outbreak. There have been reports of Ebola treatment units being attacked and set on fire, which shows how difficult containment becomes when fear, grief, and mistrust are present. Right now, the treatment is supportive care. That includes IV fluids, electrolyte replacement, oxygen support, treatment of secondary infections, management of blood pressure, providing the right nutritional support, and very careful monitoring. These supportive care measures can really improve survival in a massive way. For us at Direct Relief, focusing on supporting these areas is top priority. Direct Relief: Can you talk about the difference between treating the Zaire and Bundibugyo strains? Jeffrey Samuel: Absolutely. The biggest practical difference is that this current outbreak is being caused by the Bundibugyo virus, while the 2014 to 2016 West Africa outbreak was caused by the Zaire Ebola virus. That distinction matters because all of the approved vaccines and monoclonal antibody treatments that were developed over the past decade were specifically designed for the Zaire Ebola virus. But it’s important to remember that during that outbreak, these tools were not widely available. In fact, that outbreak is what accelerated [Ebola] vaccine and therapeutic development globally. Researchers are now working on similar tools for the Bundibugyo virus as well. In the meantime, the public health response principles remain largely the same. It’s really surveillance, monitoring, contact tracing, infection prevention and control, supportive care, and community engagement. Direct Relief: Why did this outbreak take so long to surface? Jeffrey Samuel: One of the biggest challenges is that early symptoms of Ebola look very similar to many other diseases common in the region. A patient with fever, vomiting, fatigue, or diarrhea may initially be suspected of having malaria, cholera, typhoid, or another common illness. In many outbreaks, the alarm bells only begin once healthcare workers become infected, or if there’s a cluster of unexplained deaths that appear, or if the laboratory testing confirms something unusual. This outbreak is also occurring in an incredibly complex environment. The eastern DRC has faced years of conflict, displacement, insecurity, and strain on the healthcare system. Insecurity can delay surveillance teams from reaching the affected areas. It can limit testing capacity, disrupt transport, and make it harder to trace contacts effectively. There are also trust issues that can emerge during outbreaks. In some communities, people may fear isolation centers or avoid seeking care because they worry about stigma or separation from family members. And because the Bundibugyo virus is relatively uncommon compared to the Zaire Ebola virus, it may not have been the first thing clinicians initially suspected when they were seeing these cases. Direct Relief: Is this going to spread much further? What happens if it does? Jeffrey Samuel: Yes, there’s certainly a risk of further regional spread, which is why neighboring countries have implemented stricter border controls, enhanced surveillance, and other preparedness measures. Rwanda, for example, temporarily closed key border crossings with the DRC. And in the U.S., travelers who have recently visited the DRC, Uganda, or South Sudan are being routed through designated airports for enhanced public health screening. The biggest danger is that outbreaks can overwhelm fragile health systems and healthcare facilities. They can reduce routine care access. They can increase infections in healthcare workers, and interrupt normal services like maternal and child health or vaccination programs. Ebola really creates broader humanitarian impacts, and in settings already affected by conflict or displacement, the response becomes even more difficult. A lot of measures have been put in place to try to prevent it from spreading further regionally. But that doesn’t negate the impact that’s happening on the ground right now. Direct Relief: During the West Africa outbreak, Americans were diagnosed with Ebola – it’s happened during this event too – and they had much better survival rates than the West African people who got sick. Why is that? Jeffrey Samuel: It’s important to state clearly that the differences in outcomes were not biological. They were largely about access to care and the strength of the surrounding healthcare system. Patients treated in highly resourced settings like the U.S. often received earlier diagnosis, intensive monitoring around the clock, aggressive fluid and electrolyte replacement. That’s a real key. They also had access to oxygen support, advanced laboratory testing, PPE, and intensive care when needed. [Note: the federal administration has announced that Americans diagnosed with Ebola during this outbreak are being routed to Kenya, not the U.S., for treatment.] In many outbreak settings, especially in places affected by conflict or displacement, it can be much harder to provide that same level of care consistently because the infrastructure and resources are often much more limited. And that can have a real impact on patient outcomes. Honestly, this is one of the broader lessons Ebola keeps exposing globally: Outbreak preparedness and health system strengthening are deeply connected. Direct Relief: Direct Relief has shipped a significant range of medical support, including PPE, cardiovascular drugs, and IV fluids, to the DRC in response to this Ebola outbreak. How did the organization decide what to send, and what role will that support play? Jeffrey Samuel: All these items play a very practical and important role in the outbreak response. PPE helps protect healthcare workers and prevent transmission inside of healthcare facilities. During Ebola outbreaks, protecting healthcare workers is critical because health worker infections can quickly weaken the overall response capacity. IV fluids are absolutely key to supportive care. Ebola patients often experience severe vomiting, diarrhea, dehydration, and electrolyte loss. So a key part of treatment is being able to replace those fluids and electrolytes. Beyond Ebola-specific supplies, essential medicines like cardiovascular drugs, antibiotics, and other critical treatments help keep the broader health system functioning during an outbreak. Ebola response does not pause the rest of healthcare – patients still need care for chronic diseases, infections, pregnancy complications, and other urgent health needs. And our approach is very much partner-driven. We work directly with local partner organizations, hospitals, and in-country ministries of health to understand the actual operational and clinical needs on the ground. We also look at storage capacity, cold chain requirements, logistics, and feasibility for what we send. The strongest responses happen when that emergency support is layered onto resilient local systems. Emergency response plus long-term system strengthening go hand in hand. The goal is to support countries not only in responding to the current outbreak, but also to build stronger systems for whatever comes next.
Country: Syrian Arab Republic Source: United Nations Population Fund Please refer to the attached file. Since early 2026, Syria has been affected by compounding crises, including renewed hostilities in Aleppo and the north-east, severe flooding across five governorates, and the cross-border displacement of 308,441 people, including Lebanese refugees and Syrian returnees. This regional escalation has severely exacerbated sexual and reproductive health (SRH) and protection needs across all affected communities. UNFPA estimates that 1.2 million people require urgent assistance, including over 300,000 women of reproductive age. Access to public services, particularly SRH and gender-based violence (GBV) prevention and response, is severely restricted in several areas, leading to increased GBV risks for displaced families in overcrowded temporary sites with poor privacy and sanitation. In response to the escalating needs, UNFPA has scaled up life-saving SRH and GBV services through both static delivery points and integrated mobile teams. In April, these efforts reached over 33,000 people with SRH services and nearly 37,000 people with GBV services. To address the immediate crises, including the Aleppo and north-east escalation of hostilities and the influx from Lebanon, UNFPA’s six-month response requires US $7.5 million. As of the end of April 2026, 25 per cent of this funding requirement has been secured. However, a critical funding gap of $5.6 million remains, and additional support is urgently required to sustain and scale up the response.