Latent Agents: A Post-Training Procedure for Internalized Multi-Agent Debate
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IT/기술 · "DURE" · 총 9건
필터 보기현재 지수
50.3
0 = 부정 우세
50 = 중립
100 = 긍정 우세
최근 7일 기준 78,039건을 분석한 결과, 뉴스 심리지수는 50.2(균형)입니다. 긍정 4,019건(5.1%)·중립 72,062건(92.3%)·부정 1,958건(2.5%)이며, 중립 비중이 뚜렷하게 높습니다. 성향 지수는 종합 15.2(중도 균형)입니다.
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Ponte sobre o Rio Caeté na BR-364 é totalmente interditada após movimentação do solo A ponte sobre o Rio Caeté, na BR-364, que liga Sena Madureira ao Vale do Juruá, no interior do Acre será interditada nesta sexta-feira (5) pelo Departamento Nacional de Infraestrutura de Transportes (Dnit). Segundo o órgão, trata-se de uma medida preventiva após uma vistoria técnica identificar movimentação do solo margens do rio. (Confira a nota mais abaixo) Conforme o DNIT ao g1, não há previsão de liberação da ponte. Contudo, o tráfego não será interrompido e a passagem será feita através de uma ponte metálica, ao lado da estrutura principal, conhecida como pontilhão, que vai ser sinalizado para orientar motoristas sobre o novo acesso. 📲 Participe do canal do g1 AC no WhatsApp Esta travessia secundária foi instalada no ano passado, quando a ponte principal passou por interdições. A interdição ocorre no km 282,65 da rodovia. Segundo o DNIT, será instalado um pilar provisório estaiado na ponte principal para reforçar a sustentação da estrutura e garantir mais segurança. Dnit interdita totalmente a ponte sobre o Rio Caeté após identificar movimentação do solo em Sena Madureira Arquivo pessoal/ Departamento Nacional de Infraestrutura de Transportes LEIA TAMBÉM: Ponte sobre o Rio Caeté no interior do Acre é interditada e pontilhão é colocado em desvio Subida do Rio Caeté cobre ponte provisória e interdita trecho da BR-364 no interior do Acre Após balsa encalhar, ponte sobre o Rio Caeté é reaberta com controle de fluxo no interior do Acre Segundo o departamento, a previsão é de que os serviços de construção sejam concluídos até o final de 2026. Em novembro do ano passado, uma forte chuva provocou a elevação do nível do Rio Caeté e a ponte chegou a ser interditada. À época, a água cobriu as cabeceiras da ponte provisória e impossibilitaram a passagem de veículos. No episódio, para poder liberar a passagem, uma máquina foi deslocada ao local para remover tubos que estavam sobre a estrutura e permitir a operação do sistema de tráfego alternado. Já em janeiro do ano passado, a ponte também havia sido interditada por problemas estruturais. Nota do Dnit O Departamento Nacional de Infraestrutura de Transportes (DNIT) alerta para a interdição total da ponte sobre o Rio Caeté, no km 282,65 da BR-364/AC, em Sena Madureira, a partir desta sexta-feira (5). A interdição é uma medida preventiva, necessária para a continuidade das obras de reforço estrutural em andamento na travessia. As equipes da autarquia executam os serviços de implantação de um pilar provisório estaiado, solução destinada a reforçar a sustentação da estrutura e garantir mais segurança aos usuários da rodovia. Durante a execução das obras, a travessia do Rio Caeté será realizada por meio de uma ponte metálica instalada ao lado da estrutura de concreto. O trecho será devidamente sinalizado para orientar os usuários quanto ao novo acesso VÍDEOS: g1
Een week geleden kon Paul Scheermeijer uit Zwolle nog inloggen en heeft hij zelfs nog crypto gekocht via cryptoplatform Knaken. Maar inloggen lukte vrijdag ineens niet meer. "Ik maakte me geen zorgen, want het gebeurt weleens dat je na een update problemen hebt met inloggen." Maar na het weekend zag hij deze mededeling van het bedrijf: Knaken is nu helemaal niet meer bereikbaar. Daardoor kunnen klanten dus niet bij hun crypto. "Het geld dat ik heb geïnvesteerd, noem ik speelgeld. Als ik het kwijt ben dan is dat niet de grootste ramp", zegt Scheermeijer. Maar geld verliezen is wel altijd zuur, geeft hij toe. Hoeveel mensen zijn getroffen en hoeveel geld er in totaal is geïnvesteerd, is nog niet duidelijk. Nieuwe wetgeving Dat Knaken nu uit de lucht is, heeft te maken met nieuwe Europese cryptoregelgeving. Zo is een vergunning van toezichthouder Autoriteit Financiële Markten (AFM) noodzakelijk. De AFM kan vanwege vertrouwelijkheid niets kwijt over de de situatie van Knaken. In het verleden was een registratie bij De Nederlandsche Bank voldoende. Knaken, dat in 2017 is opgericht, had de registratie bij De Nederlandsche Bank in 2021 afgerond. Maar met de invoering van de nieuwe regels is die registratie sinds eind juni vorig jaar niet meer geldig. Er moest een nieuwe vergunning komen, maar dat is dus niet gelukt. 'Regeldruk is fors' "Dat Knaken nu in deze situatie is beland verbaast me niks", zegt Patrick van der Meijde, een van de oprichters van Bitkassa. Sinds 2014 verwerkt dat bedrijf transacties met bitcoins. Ook deed het bedrijf aan in- en verkoop van bitcoin aan consumenten, "onze meest lucratieve dienst", maar daar kwam in 2020 een einde aan. "Toen kwam er nieuwe wetgeving, nog onder toezicht van DNB, en die was al aardig streng", zegt Van der Meijde. Volgens hem is de drempel voor het behalen van een vergunning als kleine speler heel hoog. Zo moet er volgens de wetgeving een zogenoemde compliance officer worden aangesteld. Die moet controleren of de organisatie zich houdt aan de wetten en regels. "Voor kleine spelers, zoals Knaken, is dat zwaar om te doorlopen", zegt Van der Meijde. Daar sluit Michiel Stokman, medeoprichter van financiële technologiestartup Bots Capital, zich bij aan. "Die regeldruk is fors. Kleine bedrijven kunnen het kostentechnisch niet opbrengen." Bots Capital zat zelf ook in het proces voor het aanvragen van een vergunning voor de crypto-activiteiten, maar heeft besloten om die procedure stop te zetten. Vanaf 1 januari stopt het bedrijf met crypto-activiteiten. Vorig jaar werd al besloten om het af te bouwen. "Uiteindelijk vonden we dat crypto te veel een gokspelletje bleef en te weinig een belegging werd", zegt Stokman. Financieel kwetsbaar Knaken was ook sponsor van Feyenoord, maar die samenwerking is vorig jaar stopgezet. In de laatste jaarrekening van 2024 meldt het cryptobedrijf dat het "in financieel opzicht kwetsbaar is". Met een omzet van bijna 765.000 euro was de nettowinst van 28.712 euro minuscuul. Een lage nettowinst kan een aanwijzing zijn dat een bedrijf zich in een moeilijke situatie bevindt en mogelijk niet in staat is tot nieuwe investeringen. Hoe het nu verder afloopt is afwachten. Via de website laat het bedrijf weten aan klanten dat er nog wordt onderzocht hoe alles wordt afgehandeld. Nieuwe berichtgeving volgt half juni via de site.
The 60-year-old woman was admitted to the hospital with complaints of severe breathlessness and excessive sweating, with her oxygen saturation level dropping to a critical 60%
L’affaire du Breathitt County avait été choisie pour servir de référence aux procédures similaires intentées par 1200 autres collectivités locales chargées d’administrer les écoles publiques américaines.
Since human interaction with computers and all manner of other devices is a frontier-free concept, there’s no way to ever credibly decree “dominance.”
Malgré tous nos efforts de diplomatie parentale et à quelques jours de la finale de Ligue des champions, faire entrevoir au jeune fan du PSG que son héros est au cœur d’une procédure judiciaire est mission impossible.
Em entrevista exclusiva à Rede Amazônica, Lula falou de investimentos na BR-364 O presidente Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (PT) afirmou, em entrevista exclusiva à Rede Amazônica nesta quarta-feira (27), que o governo federal vai garantir recursos para a recuperação dos trechos mais degradados da BR-364 no Acre. Lula, que cumpre agenda no Amazonas, destacou a inclusão da recuperação da rodovia no Novo Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento (PAC). A BR-364 sofre com trechos degradados e com situação de emergência decretada. ✅ Participe do canal do g1 AC no WhatsApp “Quando nós chegamos em 2022, a 364 estava semidestruída. E nós fizemos alguns investimentos para recuperar, a malha dela está melhor do que estava um tempo atrás, mas falta muito para fazer. Só para você ter uma ideia, no trecho de Feijó nós vamos ter que refazer a estrada, para dar mobilidade”, declarou. Trecho da BR-364 em Cruzeiro do Sul sofreu erosão em dezembro do ano passado Carla Carvalho/Rede Amazônica Em março deste ano, o Departamento Nacional de Infraestrutura de Transportes (Dnit) publicou o resultado do pregão eletrônico que escolheu a empresa para fazer a manutenção em trechos da BR-364 no estado que somam 80,80 km. O Consórcio EMT-Colorado II, de Cruzeiro do Sul, formado pelas empresas EMT Construtora LTDA e Construtora Colorado LTDA, foi o vencedor do pregão. O valor homologado é de R$ 121,5 milhões. A manutenção será feita em trechos como na fronteira entre o Acre e o Peru, além de municípios do Vale do Juruá, como Marechal Thaumaturgo e Rodrigues Alves. LEIA MAIS Acre vai receber mais de R$ 6,3 milhões para manutenção de nove trechos de rodovias em 2026 Dnit declara emergência em trecho da BR-364 após erosão e afundamento de pista no Acre Do isolamento à integração: com mais de R$ 800 milhões do governo federal, AC vive expectativa de reconstrução histórica da BR-364 Lula elogia rivalidade entre Caprichoso e Garantido e diz que festival dá 'lição de civilidade' ao Brasil Segundo o representante do DNIT no Acre, Ricardo Araújo, a obra de reconstrução da rodovia, que começou no trecho do Aeroporto de Rio Branco, já avançou quatro quilômetros de macadame e na próxima semana deve passar para o outro lado da pista até o bairro Custódio Freire. No local, também deve ser feito trabalho de drenagem e construída uma rotatória próxima ao Ramal do Romão. Ricardo Araújo informou que esse trecho deve ser entregue até o início de agosto. Ainda segundo Lula, o governo mantém as tratativas para seguir com a recuperação da passagem. “Eu tive uma reunião com o ministro dos Transportes [George Santoro] e nós estamos todos envolvidos. Nós colocamos a 364 no PAC para que a gente não deixe faltar dinheiro, para a gente fazer as coisas que têm que ser feitas”, afirmou o presidente. Próximas ações Ainda de acordo com o DNIT, já está em andamento a licitação que compreende um trecho de aproximadamente 104 km, entre Sena Madureira até o Rio Macapá, localizado 20 quilômetros depois de Manoel Urbano. Já de Manoel Urbano a Feijó, considerado o ponto mais crítico da rodovia, já foram mobilizadas quatro frentes de trabalho e a meta é reconstruir do km 400 ao km 425, para deixá-lo em melhores condições também até agosto. “No trecho entre Feijó e Tarauacá, está sendo realizado um trabalho de tapa-buracos e obras em áreas de erosão, enquanto de Tarauacá a Cruzeiro do Sul, são três trechos críticos já com equipes atuando e a meta é chegar até a região do [Rio] Liberdade ainda em junho com a estrada recuperada. E do Liberdade até a entrada da cidade, deve ser recapeado todo o trecho da Variante”, informou Araújo. Reveja os telejornais do Acre
This article is adapted by the author with permission from Tech Policy Press. Read the original article. South Africa is not just another developing country struggling to govern artificial intelligence; it is the exception with leverage, and the window to act on it is closing. It holds approximately 88 percent of global platinum-group metal reserves, critical inputs to parts of the semiconductor and data-center supply chains that make AI infrastructure possible. It hosts the largest data-center market on the continent. Its existing hyperscaler relationships give it procurement leverage that most African states will never have. And a major geopolitical contest over AI infrastructure is being fought on its soil right now, between Chinese and American technology companies competing for control of the systems that will underpin an entire continent’s public sector. In physics, leverage requires three things: a fulcrum, a lever arm, and the ability to apply force. The Bushveld Complex, the world’s largest platinum-group metal deposit, is the fulcrum: a mineral endowment that gives South Africa a position in the semiconductor supply chain that no other African state holds. The since-withdrawn draft policy is the lever arm. The unresolved “OPTION” provisions in the policy are where force would be applied. Without a policy that specifies what South Africa wants in return for market access, the lever arm sits unused, and the weight of two of the world’s largest technology ecosystems settles exactly where those ecosystems want it to settle. This makes South Africa a global test case. Not because its proposed means of governance is exemplary, but because it is the one developing country with enough structural leverage to negotiate genuinely different terms, and the one that is choosing, through inaction, not to. The recent announcement of a new panel to update the draft policy is an important opportunity. But the deeper failure is not that an AI policy contained bad references. It is that no verification process caught them before the document entered the public domain. That is a systems problem, not merely a political one. It points to a missing layer in how governments are adopting AI. The contest already underway Last year, Huawei pitched an emerging-product bundle to tech executives across the continent. Huawei was now bundling access to DeepSeek’s large language model with its own cloud and storage infrastructure. The price differential was stark—in some cases by more than 90 percent. At the same time, Microsoft announced plans to spend ZAR 5.4 billion ($300 million) by the end of 2027 on cloud and AI infrastructure in South Africa, building on a prior ZAR 20.4 billion investment. Google, Amazon Web Services, and Oracle already have cloud regions in the country. According to one analysis, the country’s data-center market was valued at US $2.16 billion in 2024, the largest in Africa. These are not commercially neutral investments. Huawei’s infrastructure reach has been explicitly linked to Chinese strategic objectives, including a documented track record of providing governments with surveillance infrastructure through its Safe Cities network. U.S. hyperscaler investment comes with its own dependency structure: closed models, pricing set unilaterally, and terms of access that no African government has meaningfully shaped. South Africa is being asked to choose between these dependency models without a policy that specifies what it wants in return. The leverage it has There is a particular irony in South Africa’s position. The country whose mines supply platinum-group metals essential to semiconductor manufacturing, and through them to AI compute, has drafted a policy that treats it as a consumer of AI systems rather than a stakeholder in their governance. South Africa digs up the minerals that make AI possible. It has no say over the AI built from them. The AI triad framework covers algorithms, compute, and data. South Africa has no frontier model development capacity. South Africa holds significant data assets in financial services, health care, and agriculture, with no clear framework for their sovereign management. South Africa possesses PGM (Platinum Group Metals) leverage of global significance on the compute axis, currently being transferred without meaningful condition. It also has exceptionally high solar irradiance and significant renewable-energy potential. A country that can offer both critical mineral inputs and the energy to power the infrastructure those minerals help build occupies a negotiating position of unusual strength. The Draft Policy proposes no minimum terms for hyperscaler investment, no data sovereignty requirements, no technology transfer conditions and no compute visibility mechanism. Multiple provisions are explicitly left unresolved, marked “OPTION,” including the most consequential choices about how governance will function. Infrastructure decisions made now determine what is renegotiable later, and the answer is: very little. Three futures, one default The three infrastructure futures on offer each create a structurally different form of dependency, and only one creates sovereign capability. The Huawei-hosted DeepSeek integration offers low cost and open-source weights, but with data stored on infrastructure potentially accessible under Chinese legal frameworks, creating surveillance dependency in a pattern already documented across Africa. The second is U.S. closed-model dependency: higher capability, more reliable data protection, but complete API dependency on developers abroad. The third is locally hosted open-weight infrastructure: models governed under South African data-sovereignty rules, on infrastructure subject to minimum terms, developed with South African data. As Nathan Lambert at Interconnects has observed, open-weight models are likely the only realistic way to get sovereign AI off the ground as a real effort, enabling local communities and economies to integrate meaningfully with the technology. But this requires procurement conditions, not goodwill. What binding governance looks like The GovAI “Governing Through the Cloud” framework identifies four roles compute providers should accept as conditions of operating at scale: securers (protecting model weights and training data), record keepers (maintaining infrastructure usage logs), verifiers (confirming customer compliance with safety standards) and enforcers (restricting access when violations occur). These are operational requirements, not theoretical categories—specific, enforceable, and well within the bargaining power of a market of South Africa’s size and mineral position. A detailed policy analysis submitted to the Department of Communications and Digital Technologies (DCDT) identifies the specific provisions the final policy must contain: mandatory minimum terms for foreign compute infrastructure investments above ZAR 500 million (~$30 million); a compute reporting threshold; a National AI Safety Institute mandate covering defensive monitoring of AI capability accumulation; and National AI Champion Sector designations to create data assets for domestic model development. Each provision converts a structural advantage into a governance instrument before that advantage is foreclosed by market reality. Just as modern software security increasingly depends on knowing what components are inside a system—model provider, training data, compute environment, evaluation methods, update cadence, human review points, and failure-reporting procedures—public-sector AI governance requires a clear account of the stack before deployment, not after a problem surfaces. A public institution that cannot verify the sources in its own AI policy is unlikely to be ready to verify the AI systems it procures, deploys, or regulates. Why this is the continental test case South Africa’s choices will establish a regional precedent for what is commercially negotiable in AI infrastructure. If South Africa negotiates data-sovereignty guarantees and technology-transfer conditions as requirements for hyperscaler investment, it creates a replicable model. If Microsoft’s $300 million investment and Huawei’s infrastructure expansion proceed on standard commercial terms, as they are currently, it normalizes extractive AI infrastructure across the continent. The lesson is not specific to Africa. Governments everywhere are producing AI strategies while lacking AI assurance infrastructure. South Africa is an early warning, not an isolated case. The public comment period closed when the policy was withdrawn. But a parallel process remains live: the National Treasury’s Draft General Public Procurement Regulations—the legal instrument that will govern every government AI contract—closes for comment on June 15. Those regulations contain no AI-specific provisions. South Africa has more AI leverage than any country on the continent. Some argue, with force, that governance requirements risk deterring the infrastructure investment South Africa urgently needs: compute capacity, reliable energy, venture capital, and talent retention. That concern deserves a direct answer. Minimum procurement terms, compute reporting thresholds, and technology transfer conditions are not barriers to investment. They are the conditions under which investment serves the host country rather than extracting from it. Infrastructure built without minimum terms produces dependency. Infrastructure built with them produces leverage. To serve the public interest, its AI policy must use it. When late last month News24 reported AI-hallucinated references in the draft AI policy, Minister of Communications and Digital Technologies Solly Malatsi withdrew the draft policy. That was a mistake that could cost South Africa and the rest of the continent the initiative on this urgent issue. His more recent constitution of an independent panel is a belated step in the right direction, if it can turn South Africa’s leverage into policy. The panel—chaired by Professor Benjamin Rosman of the Wits Machine Intelligence and Neural Discovery Institute, and including Professors Vukosi Marivate and Alison Gillwald of Research ICT Africa and Dr. Jabu Mtsweni of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research—has the technical and governance credibility to produce a stronger document. What it has not yet produced is a timeline. No revised draft has been scheduled. South Africa remains without a formal AI governance framework in the interim.