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'Hail for Agate' initiative contributes to Nature research

Beyond budget arithmetic

EVERY June, Pakistan’s budget season follows a familiar pattern: business groups repeat their proposals for relief, the government defends its targets, and taxpayers prepare for additional burdens. Yet a more fundamental question is rarely asked — what is the budget ultimately meant to achieve, and does it reflect a clear long-term national purpose? In principle, the budget is the state’s main inst­r­u­­ment for promoting growth, improving public services, reducing poverty and raising living stan­dards. In Pakistan, however, it has increasingly come to resemble an accounting exercise: mobilise sufficient revenue to finance a growing state and meet fiscal benchmarks agreed with the IMF. The result is a lopsided process that remains focused on extracting more from those already within the tax net, while paying insufficient attention to the quality of public spending, the need to broaden the base, or the incentives required for investment, employment and productivity. The Tax Policy Office was expected to introduce a longer-term perspective to this debate, but that wider vision is still not evident. The burden continues to fall, predictably, on the formal economy. Corporations, salaried employees, entrepreneurs, exporters, documented businesses and investors remain the most visible and therefore the most easily taxed. What receives much less scrutiny is whether public spending is yielding meaningful improvements in citizens’ lives, particularly in a country where a large share of the population remains below the poverty line. Pakistan has absorbed much of the fiscal cost of devolution without fully realising its potential efficiency gains. This distortion has become more pronounced since the 18th Constitutional Amendment altered Pakistan’s fiscal structure. Health, education, labour welfare and other social services were devolved to the provinces, which now receive a substantial share of national revenues through the National Finance Commission Award. The logic was straightforward: provinces, being closer to citizens, would deliver services more effectively, while the federal government would gradually withdraw from devolved functions and reduce its own size and cost. That second part of the arrangement, however, remains largely unfulfilled. More than a decade later, successive governments have shown limited willingness to undertake the constitutional, adm­i­nistrative and institutional reforms required to ri­­g­­ht-size the federation. Pakistan has, therefore, ab­­sorbed much of the fiscal cost of devolution without fully realising its potential efficiency gains. The results are plain: weak learning, poor heal­t­hcare access, child malnutrition, low productivity, millions of children out of school, under-equ­ip­ped hospitals, inadequate skills training and persistently low female labour-force participation. Yet, even against this backdrop, the provinces are expected to post a combined budget surplus of roughly Rs1.6 trillion. This surplus forms part of the consolidated fiscal framework that enables Pakistan to meet primary surplus targets under the IMF programme. Fiscal discipline is necessary; Pakistan’s record on deficits and debt leaves little room for complacency. But every rupee retained as surplus is also a rupee not directed towards schools, hospitals, technical training and local services. The balance appears to have shifted too far towards meeting accounting targets and too little towards building human capital. The irony is that while existing taxpayers are repeatedly told there is little room for relief, substantial untapped capacity exists elsewhere. Agriculture contributes nearly a quarter of GDP but remains lightly taxed, while property taxation is among the weakest in the region. Large agricultural and urban wealth holdings generate limited recurring revenue because assessment remains weak, enforcement uneven and valuations often disconnected from market reality. Since provinces have constitutional authority over agricultural income and property taxes, meaningful reform in these areas could broaden the base, improve fairness and reduce the state’s dependence on taxing the same formal businesses and individuals year after year. It would also help strengthen the sense that the fiscal burden is being shared more equitably. The next budget should therefore reset fiscal priorities. Rather than treating compliant taxpayers as an inexhaustible source of revenue, policymakers should present a credible path towards relief for documented economic activity: lower excessive tax rates on salaried employees, entrepreneurs and businesses, phase out the Super Tax, remove distortionary levies, reduce cascading taxation and bring greater predictability to policy. Better incentives would support investment, exports, formalisation and job creation — the key objectives of fiscal policy. But relief must be matched by credible efforts to broaden the tax base, improve spending efficiency and mobilise provincial revenues from ag­­riculture and property. Fiscal sustainability cannot rest indefinitely on squeezing a shrinking pool of compliant taxpayers. Provinces, meanwhile, should be judged less by the size of their surpluses than by measurable gains in education, healthcare, skills, productivity and poverty reduction. Pakistan’s fiscal debate remains confined to the narrow question of how to raise more revenue. The more important issue is how public finances can create opportunity, improve living standards and support durable growth. A budget should be more than a balancing exercise between revenue and expenditure; it should also reflect a willingness to reform the structure of the state itself. Unless Pakistan completes the unfinished agenda of devolution, broadens the tax base and channels provincial resources towards human development, it may strive to meet fiscal targets without delivering the broader prosperity its citizens are entitled to expect. The writer is a former CEO of Unilever Pakistan and of the Pakistan Business Council Published in Dawn, June 5th, 2026

Environment deficit

WORLD Environment Day arrives as the planet edges deeper into climatic uncertainty. New global temperature records are being set with unsettling frequency, and the World Meteorological Organisation has warned that the years from 2026 to 2030 are likely to rank among the hottest ever observed. There is a strong possibility that another record-breaking year will emerge before the decade is out, while average global temperatures are expected to remain close to or above the 1.5°C threshold that governments once hoped would help avert the worst impacts of climate change. The warning may be global, but its implications are intensely local. In May, temperatures in parts of Sindh and Balochistan climbed towards 50°C, triggering heatwave alerts and heightening concerns about pressure on already strained power, water and health systems. At the same time, scientists continue to raise the alarm about the glaciers and snow reserves that feed the Indus basin. For a country whose agriculture, food security and energy production depend heavily on the Indus basin, changes in the region’s ice reserves carry consequences that extend far beyond the mountains. Pakistan knows all too well the consequences of environmental neglect. The catastrophic floods of 2022 inundated vast areas, displaced millions and inflicted losses running into billions of dollars. Yet, despite repeated reminders of the country’s vulnerability, environmental protection continues to occupy a peripheral place in policymaking. Climate adaptation efforts move slowly, urban expansion often proceeds with little regard for sustainability, forests remain under pressure and air pollution continues to burden public health. Shrinking green spaces leave cities increasingly exposed to extreme heat, while weak enforcement of environmental regulations allows ecological degradation to continue largely unchecked. Pakistan is right to remind the world that it contributes only a tiny fraction of global greenhouse gas emissions and deserves greater international support. But that argument carries weight only if it is matched by seriousness at home. Fragmented planning, weak implementation and chronic underinvestment have left the country less prepared than it should be. World Environment Day is often marked by pledges, ceremonies and symbolic gestures. This year, it should prompt something more. As the federal budget approaches, the government has an opportunity to demonstrate that climate resilience is finally being treated as a national priority. Adequate resources must be allocated for adaptation measures, disaster preparedness, water conservation, ecosystem restoration and more livable, heat-resilient cities. Just as importantly, climate considerations must be embedded across development planning rather than confined to a handful of environmental programmes. Pakistan has received ample warning of what lies ahead. The upcoming budget should show that the state understands the scale of the challenge and is prepared to invest accordingly. Published in Dawn, June 5th, 2026

The embrace of Nessus

THEY all look the same and for good reason. Every budget over the past 10 years (and more) is pretty much the same with minor differences usually in the gimmickry being advanced in the name of a ‘revenue plan’. And it will be no different this time round when the budget for FY27 is announced. There is a simple reason for this. A little more than a decade and a half ago Pakistan finally abandoned its last attempt to try and get serious tax reform through. Since then, successive governments have been rolling out various gimmicks, from amnesty schemes to ‘point of sale machines’ to do something that cannot be done with gimmicks. They are trying to document the growing services sector of the economy with these gimmicks, which is like trying to measure the ocean with a teacup. Consider a little perspective first. Since the 1980s, the single fastest-growing sector of the economy has been services. It was slightly less than half of Pakistan’s GDP back in those days. Today, it is touching 60 per cent while the shares of industry and agriculture have shrunk. But today, services contributes less than 40pc of total revenues while the share of manufacturing can be as high as 55pc. This is an important crux of the problem. The fastest-growing sector in Pakistan’s economy has made a diminutive contribution to its revenue effort. And there are a number of reasons why. First, successive governments have failed to undertake the kind of tax reforms necessary to keep abreast of the changes sweeping the economy where the services sector is a motor force for growth. For now, the bulk of the revenues contributed by this sector comes from banking and telecom — the low-hanging fruit. Quite possibly, this is the one budget of the past decade or more which will be defined almost entirely by its revenue effort. Documenting the transactions taking place in this sector is the first step to reaching them. And for decades there was one big idea on how to do that. It was called ‘value-added tax’, or VAT, and countries around the world implemented it with varying measures of success to help document their economies during periods of change, and help distribute the burden of the tax effort more widely. In some shape or form, the VAT was always on the agenda as a crucial structural reform measure of every IMF programme that Pakistan signed between 1988 and 2008, and there were many. The tax itself was passed into law in 1992, updated in 1996, but never really applied in value-added mode across the board. In 2008, it was supposed to be updated and modernised but the government of the time failed to ensure passage of the legislation so spectacularly that the IMF simply dropped it from all future reform agendas. Since then, it has been abandoned. In abandoning it, however, a new question arose. If you are not going to use the VAT to document your economy, how exactly are you going to do it? The question was an important one because Pakistan’s economy was growing in directions that its tax machinery struggled to capture. And successive governments gave their own answers to this question. This was the decade of gimmicks. We had amnesty schemes, proliferating withholding taxes, new taxes on banking transactions of non-filers, attempts to document the economy by triangulating multiple databases, reliance on data from point of sale machines and even one brief and doomed attempt to manually document the retail sector by serving tens of thousands of notices to them. Of course, all of these failed because, as already stated, they amounted to attempts to measure the amount of water in the ocean using a teacup. Pakistan’s tax-to-GDP ratio stagnated in the single digits and intensified political struggles around the shrinking resource envelope of the state. We saw more gimmicks on the revenue side, like deemed incomes. We saw a ‘hard state’ approach to withdraw all exemptions or rebates offered to schoolteachers and university professors. They leaned harder on fuel taxes than any government in any period in the past. And they printed more money than any other government in any comparable decade in the past. All to help make ends meet at the centre. Taken together, all these gimmicks made for an unseemly display of desperation. The growing resort to gimmickry was the state thrashing around within the shrinking confines of its resource envelope when it could not generate resources in quantities sufficient to keep pace with its expenditure growth. And they squeezed out a decade for themselves like this. This was the overriding context within which all budgets in these years were made. And now the context is wrapping itself around them like the cloak of Nessus that once worn began to tighten around the wearer until its grip became inescapable and fatal. This is what sets the stage for the forthcoming budget. Watch what rabbit they’ll pull out of their hat this time round to call a ‘revenue plan’ for the next fiscal year. They have to give relief to salaried people, and industry is near breaking point. They can’t lean more heavily on fuel or electricity taxes or deem more taxes into being out of foreign assets of the rich. Keep an eye on the revenue plan they announce as well as the target for incremental revenues they have to pursue. They are chasing incremental revenues of up to 0.6pc of GDP, half of which will come from the federal government through slashing exemptions and their FBR transformation plan, including production monitoring and audits. This was their Achilles heel this year. Now their constraints are tighter still for next year, and options even more limited. Quite possibly, this is the one budget of the past decade or more which will be defined almost entirely by its revenue effort. If there is no attempt to break out of the constraints, then we’ll know we are all headed for the embrace of Nessus. The writer is a business and economy journalist. khurram.husain@gmail.com X: @khurramhusain Published in Dawn, June 4th, 2026

BUDGET 2026-27: Analysis: Can remittance fairy-tale weather Mideast storm?

THIS graph shows personal remittances as a percentage of Pakistan’s GDP since the late 1970s.—Source: World Bank, SBP data • Ex-finance minister Hafeez Pasha says foreign inflows could encourage disproportionate investment in real-estate • 1970s oil imbroglio marked the beginning of labour emigration to Gulf, while current crisis could spell its end • PIDE sees around a million workers’ livelihoods being affected if conflict prolongs ONLINE listings for properties in Punjab districts like Mandi Bahauddin and Gujrat yield images of Spanish-style villas, fully decked out with opulent fittings and European design flourishes. This stylised approach to construction is quite deliberate and reflects the social status that comes with having a ‘Kamanay Wala’ (earning member) abroad. In many families, at least one offspring is abroad, creating an alternative source of income that, in many cases, has reduced the incentive to further develop the district’s fertile agricultural land for those that still dwell there. Mandi Bahauddin particularly is one of many districts where household prosperity is closely tied to money sent from overseas. Saying that remittances are Pakistan’s lifeline is no exaggeration. Released in May, the State of Pakistan’s Economy Half-Year Report 2025-26 projects remittances at up to $42 billion this fiscal year, compared to exports of $30.5bn. At the macroeconomic level, remittances help keep the current account deficit in check. At the household level, they act as an essential safety net, providing direct cash support to families. However, cash in hand at the household level tends to drive spending rather than investment in productive activities. Pakistan’s reliance on remittances has laid the foundation for a form of ‘Dutch disease’, where the economy depends on inflows that fuel demand rather than production. The State Bank reports also note that remittances increase currency in circulation, as recipients convert inflows into physical cash for day-to-day expenditures. Data from the Household Integrated Economic Survey FY25 shows that remittances have risen from five per cent to 7.8pc as a source of household income. While this helps households smooth spending during periods of economic stress, it also increases their exposure to external shocks that can suddenly disrupt these inflows. Remittances and real estate Research by the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics indicates that a significant share of remittances is channelled into property and real estate. Anecdotally and empirically, this holds up; the dominant motive behind the decision to migrate is to improve the socio-economic status of the family, which investments in property demonstrate. Nor is Pakistan unique in this regard. India, the world’s largest recipient of remittances, received $136bn in FY25, more than three times Pakistan’s inflows. Non-resident Indians have also become increasingly active in the property market. According to the India Brand Equity Foundation, their share of real-estate investment has risen from 10-12pc in 2019 to a possible all-time high of 20pc in 2025. While property investments are a common feature of remittances, Pakistan faces another conundrum. Former finance minister Hafeez Pasha argues that Pakistan’s real-estate sector neither contributes adequately to tax revenues nor operates fully within the formal economy, yet continues to attract a disproportionate share of investment. “About a decade ago, investment in industry and manufacturing was two and a half times that of real estate. Today, you have the strange situation that real estate is over twice that of industry,” he says, though not solely because of remittances. There are six real estate and property-related taxes, he notes, yet total revenue collection amounts to only 0.2pc of GDP, despite a potential of around 0.8pc. Urban immovable property tax collection in Karachi, for example, generates roughly ten times less revenue than Mumbai in dollar terms because of severe under-taxation, he adds. Oil giveth, oil taketh One oil shock’s legacy, involving the US’s long-standing entanglement with oil markets and support for Israel, was the start of Pakistan’s emigration story. This was also the start of the country’s reliance on remittances. But another such oil shock, involving similar geopolitical players, may well mark the beginning of the end of the Pakistanis-in-Gulf fairy-tale. In 1973, Arab members of Opec imposed an oil embargo on the US in retaliation for its support for Israel. The resulting shock saw prices jump from around $3 to nearly $12 per barrel. The sudden influx of petrodollars supercharged growth across the Gulf, triggering massive infrastructure projects that required large volumes of blue-collar labour. In Pakistan, this coincided with a period of sweeping nationalisation under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, which pushed unemployment higher at a time when passage to Gulf countries was relatively easy to obtain. Hence, Pakistani labour moved in large numbers to the region, driving remittances to a peak as a percentage of GDP in 1983. The ratio fell steadily through the late 1980s and 1990s as oil prices fell, Gulf countries cut construction projects, and demand for Pakistani labour declined. Pakistan’s nuclear tests in 1998 led to sanctions. Pakistan froze foreign currency accounts, trapping diaspora savings deposited in Pakistani banks and eroding confidence in formal channels, leading to a boom in hawala/hundi. Then came 9/11, leading to a global crackdown on informal channels. Pakistan also became a front-line state in the ‘War on Terror’, leading to the lifting of sanctions. The drive by the authorities in recent years to regularise and incentivise remittances has led to flows back into formal channels. Returning labour External shocks — particularly movements in oil prices and developments in the Gulf — have historically shaped Pakistan’s remittance story. The Middle East accounts for roughly 55pc of Pakistan’s remittances and absorbs between 700,000 and 800,000 new Pakistani workers each year. The ongoing conflict involving Iran, the United States and Israel has damaged infrastructure, disrupted energy markets and introduced fresh uncertainty across the region, reducing demand for Pakistani labour. A recent policy viewpoint by the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics estimates that if the conflict is prolonged, around half a million Pakistani workers may be unable to secure overseas employment this year, while another half a million could be forced to return home. Such a reversal would have serious implications for Pakistan’s labour market, particularly in KP and Punjab, where overseas migration traditionally absorbs nearly one-third of new labour-force entrants. The flow of money that transformed villages, financed homes and underpinned aspirations for generations may no longer be as certain as it once seemed. Published in Dawn, June 4th, 2026

SPIEF 2026 Contributes to Global Economic Power Shift From West to East — Expert

The ample participation of countries in SPIEF reflects the level of trust in Russia, as well as shows faith in cooperation with new and trustworthy global powers, Lebanese international relations expert Jerar Dib tells Sputnik.

‘We love Wemby’: San Antonio embraces French star ahead of NBA Finals

Since Frenchman Victor “Wemby” Wembanyama came to San Antonio, locals say the Spurs have opened a new chapter and are confident the young basketballer will help the team secure a sixth title in the upcoming NBA final. "It's a great team. At the very top is Wemby; when he's on the court, everything just works better. Everyone contributes," one of his many local supporters said.

Halal sector contributes 27 pct to Indonesia's GDP: BPJPH

Indonesia's halal industry and supply-chain ecosystem contribute around Rp4,900 trillion (around US$274 billion), ...

Ukraine: Director, Europe and Central Asia Division, Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations, Kayoko Gotoh’s remarks to the Security Council on Threats to International Peace and Security (New York, 1 June 2026)

Countries: Ukraine, Belarus, Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Türkiye Source: UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs Drone strike in Romania underscores growing risk of spillover of the war in Ukraine, Security Council hears Madam President, Excellencies, Only last week, the Secretary-General alerted this Council to the serious risk of further escalation of the war in Ukraine, including to the broader region. Last Friday, a dangerous incident crystallized our oft-stated warnings about potential spillover of the war. On the night of 28 to 29 May, an armed drone exploded on the top floor of a ten-story residential building in the eastern Romanian city of Galaţi, injuring two residents, a woman and a child. This was not the first reported breach of Romanian airspace by an armed drone since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. However, it was the first time such an incident resulted in casualties. The United Nations does not have any additional information on the strike in Galaţi. But Friday’s incident came on the heels of a worrying trend of drone incursions into the airspaces and territorial waters of countries bordering either Ukraine or the Russian Federation. Over the past 12 months, such incidents have been reported by the authorities in Moldova, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Finland, Poland, Kazakhstan, and Belarus, as well as in countries in the wider region - Bulgaria, Greece and Türkiye. Madam President, The United Nations strongly condemns all attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure. Such attacks, wherever they occur, violate international humanitarian law and must cease immediately. Civilians must be protected at all times. Madam President, The Galaţi incident comes amidst a sharp escalation of large-scale missile and drone attacks by the armed forces of the Russian Federation on Ukrainian towns and cities, resulting in ever worsening toll of civilian casualties and destruction of civilian infrastructure. There has also been a marked increase in Ukrainian attacks on military, energy and industrial infrastructure in the Russian Federation, which have reportedly resulted in a growing number of civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure. As the Secretary-General stressed last week, the dangerous trajectory of escalation and intensification that we are witnessing today, risks getting out of control. The current course must change. Madam President, The risk of miscalculation is particularly dangerous for the safety of nuclear facilities. Such risk has only increased in recent days. On 30 May, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was informed by the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant that a drone struck a turbine building at the site, reportedly causing a hole in its wall. This was the first such attack within the Plant’s perimeter since April 2024. Yesterday, the IAEA team at the site observed damage to the exterior of a turbine building, noting that it appeared consistent with the impact of a drone. We echo the deep concern expressed by the IAEA Director-General over this serious incident that endangered key nuclear safety principles. Attacks on nuclear sites are reckless and unacceptable. They must stop immediately to prevent any risk of a nuclear accident. Madam President, Amidst heightened tensions, it is incumbent on all concerned to act responsibly and to refrain from any action that could destabilize the situation further. As the Secretary-General emphasized last week, we urgently need immediate steps towards de-escalation, leading to a full and unconditional ceasefire. To that end, we urge dialogue and negotiations to resume at once. Diplomacy needs to be given a meaningful chance to create conditions for achieving peace in Ukraine. A peace that is just, lasting and comprehensive - in line with the Charter of the United Nations, international law, and relevant UN resolutions. A peace that contributes to a more stable regional and international environment. The United Nations will continue to fully support all meaningful efforts to that end. Thank you.

Global South does not perceive West as guarantor of security — Valdai report

External support rarely contributes to sustainable peace, while several Western military interventions "actually caused waves of instability in the regions of the global South"

Three Islamic republics

AFGHANISTAN, Iran and Pakistan are among the few states that formally identify themselves as Islamic republics or emirates. This article examines the extent to which they have adhered to the Islamic principles of efficiency, equity and social justice and how successfully they have promoted inclusive growth, human welfare and shared prosperity in keeping with Islam’s ethical foundations. Afghanistan: Afghanistan has undergone political transitions — from monarchy to communist rule, from the mujahideen to Taliban control, then to Western-backed governments, and finally back to the Taliban. Ironically, the regimes claiming to establish an Islamic emirate and enforce Islamic governance have inflicted greater damage on Afghanistan’s socioeconomic development than many previous governments. Large-scale migration of educated professionals, managers, academics and entrepreneurs has deprived Afghanistan of the human capital needed to run a modern economy. Equally harmful is the ban on girls’ education and restrictions on women’s labour participation, entrenching deep inequities and undermining long-term development prospects. Such policies project a distorted image of Islam to the world and reinforce Islamophobic narratives that contradict Islam’s stress on knowledge, justice and human dignity. Afghanistan’s per capita income is around $420, placing it among the world’s poorest countries. Poverty and food insecurity are widespread. Gains achieved between 2002 and 2021 in literacy, school enrolment and health indicators have stagnated or been reversed. The literacy rate is only 37 per cent — female literacy is around 27pc. Fertility remains high — nearly five children per woman. The economy depends heavily on imports financed through humanitarian aid and donor support. Although there’s better security, this hasn’t translated into sustained economic activity or investment. Pakistan was once Afghanistan’s principal trading partner for transit trade and bilateral commerce. However, tensions and border closures have disrupted trade and damaged livelihoods for thousands of Afghans in transport, retail and cross-border business. Safe havens allegedly provided to the TTP despite talks and mediation efforts have weakened Islamic solidarity and regional cooperation. Iran: The 1979 Revolution overthrew the monarchy and established a revolutionary Islamic state. The subsequent hostage crisis and US-Iran tensions led to extensive sanctions that have persisted for decades. Iran endured an eight-year war with Iraq and more recently military confrontations with both Israel and the US. Despite these pressures, it has shown remarkable resilience in economic and social development. Though all this has imposed hardship on its people, Iran has in­­vested heavily in human capital, scientific resea­rch and technological innovation. Adult literacy has risen to around 93pc; youth literacy is nearly universal. The gender gap in basic education has effectively disappeared. Women constitute nearly 60pc of university entrants and dominate enrolment in medical, health and STEM disciplines. Iran’s capabilities in nanotechnology, aerospace, biotechnology, AI and stem cell research are now globally recognised and Iran is among the leading developing states in scientific publications and research output. Sustained investment in research, development and higher education has led to the development of indigenous capabilities in reverse-engineering and manufacturing of advanced industrial and defence technologies. Iran produces far more scientists and PhDs per capita than Pakistan and has a diversified industrial base. The experiences of three Islamic republics — Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan — diverge sharply. Iran’s per capita income has risen from around $2,500 in 1980 to nearly $5,000. Poverty has dec­li­ned, while non-oil sectors account for almost 90pc of GDP. Industry contributes strongly to national income. Iran exports pharmaceuticals, steel, cem­ent and agricultural products. Social indicators have improved considerably. Fertility rates have fallen from over six children per woman in the 1980s to below replacement level, while life expectancy has increased from around 50 to nearly 78 years due to improved healthcare, electrification and access to potable water. Iran’s experience shows that a country can build indigenous technological capability and improve human development through sustained investment in education, science and industrialisation. But inflation, currency depreciation and political restrictions still generate public dissatisfaction and protests. Pakistan: Despite inheriting a weak economic base in 1947, Pakistan had emerged by 1990 as one of the more successful developing economies, achieving an average annual GDP growth of about 6pc for four decades, significantly outperforming India. Since the 1990s, however, the momentum has weakened; the growth rate has fallen to around 3-4pc, while India’s has accelerated to 6-7pc. Pakistan’s reversal is due to weak governance, policy inconsistency, institutional decay and an elitist growth model that benefits narrow segments of society. With an economy of some $400 billion and per capita income near $1,600, future prospects are uncertain unless reforms are undertaken to promote inclusion and broad-based opportunity. Structural challenges impede progress. Population growth remains high at about 2.5pc, fertility rates are still around 3.5 births per woman, and poverty has risen, affecting nearly 30pc of the people. Pakistan also ranks among countries most vulnerable to climate change, especially in water, food and energy security. Adult literacy is around 60pc; female literacy is slightly above 50pc. Graduate unemployment is high, reflecting the disconnect between education and labour market needs. Rural-urban, regional and gender disparities continue to widen. Pakistan’s HDI ranking has declined, and its position on the Global Gender Gap Index remains among the world’s lowest. Without adequate investment in research, higher education and scientific capability, it performs poorly on innovation and technological adoption. Divergent outcomes: The experiences of the three Islamic republics reveal striking contrasts. Iran, despite sanctions and international isolation, has invested heavily in human development, science and industrial capability, creating a foundation for self-reliance and technological advancement. Its successes in female education and scientific progress contradict the ideological assumptions underlying Taliban policies in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s earlier history shows that substantial progress is possible when governance and economic management are sound. Yet a persisting elitist growth structure has prevented it from realising its potential. Afghanistan, meanwhile, has moved into reverse gear. Excessive dependence on foreign aid, suppression of women’s education and employment, and economic isolation have undermined efficiency and social justice — the very principles Islam seeks to promote. Ultimately, an Islamic republic’s legitimacy do­­e­­s­­n’t rest merely on constitutional titles or religi­o­­us slogans. It must be judged by its ability to deli­ver justice, reduce poverty, expand opportunities and ensure dignity and inclusion for all citizens. The writer is a former governor of the State Bank of Pakistan. Published in Dawn, May 30th, 2026

World: Donor Greening Working Group Priority Actions

Country: World Sources: Logistics Cluster, World Food Programme Please refer to the attached file. The current global climate and environmental crisis contributes to an increase in humanitarian needs and affects how organisations respond to these. In addition to supporting communities to better adapt to the consequences of climate change and environmental degradation, humanitarian organisations have a critical role in mitigating their climate and environmental impact; this is central to the “Do No Harm” principle.

뷰스컴퍼니·고려대 김성철교수팀, 국제 SSCI 학술지에 두번째 공동논문 게재

크리에이터 기반 콘텐츠 IP 기업 뷰스컴퍼니(대표 박진호)와 고려대학교 미디어대학 김성철 교수 연구팀은 최근 국제 SSCI 학술지 ‘Journal of Theoretical and Applied Electronic Commerce Research (이하 JTAER)’에 두 번째 공동 논문을 게재했다고 29일 밝혔다. JTAER는 전자상거래(E-Commerce) 및 디지털 비즈니스 분야 국제 학술지로, 플랫폼 커머스·디지털 유통·전자상거래 구조 등을 다루는 SSCI 등재 저널이다. 이번 논문은 ‘상업성을 다시 묻다: 유튜브 뷰티 콘텐츠의 상업적 요소가 성과를 높이는 비결(Rethinking Commerciality: How Content Commerciality Contributes to YouTube Beauty Content Performance)’라는 제목으로, 유튜브 쇼핑(YouTube Shopping)과 같은 플랫폼 기반 커머스 기능이 숏폼 콘텐츠의 성과에 어떤 영향을

Zambia Special Report - May 28, 2026

Country: Zambia Source: Famine Early Warning System Network Please refer to the attached file. Executive Summary Zambia is located in southern Africa and is bordered by the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Tanzania, Malawi, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Namibia, and Angola (Figure 1), making it a key transit and trade hub in southern and central Africa. Zambia’s population is estimated to be between 21 and 22 million in 2025, with an annual growth rate of approximately 2.8 to 3.0 percent. The topography features high plateaus, major rivers, and escarpments with an elevation suitable for settlement, rainfed farming, and livestock. Zambia’s agro-ecological regions and zones vary according to rainfall patterns and soil quality, and each region has different agricultural production potential that shapes livelihood opportunities. Agriculture is the main source of livelihood and employment for about 55 percent of Zambia’s workforce, although it contributes a relatively smaller share to the GDP. Smallholder farmers rely on rainfed cropping and produce much of the domestic food supply. Large-scale commercial farming is concentrated in high-potential regions with production of cash crops for export and domestic industrial use. Maize is the dominant staple crop, and other significant food crops include cassava, sorghum, millet, and sugarcane. Major cash crops include cotton, tobacco, soybeans, and wheat. Mining is a central pillar of Zambia’s economy, contributing approximately 10-17 percent of the GDP. Copper and other mineral exports make up about 70 percent of total export earnings, making the sector the primary source of foreign exchange for the country. Rural households primarily rely on own production of crops and livestock for food, supplemented by market purchases, while urban households are mainly market dependent. The main income sources for rural households are crop sales, livestock and livestock-product sales, agricultural labor, fishing, forest product sales, self-employment, and petty trade. In urban areas, income is primarily derived from informal employment, trade, construction and mining services, transport, and retail trade. Food purchases constitute the largest share of household expenditures, particularly for poor households in both urban and rural areas, while better-off households use a smaller share. Household expenditures also include productive inputs, transport, education, and household assets. The main chronic and intermittent hazards affecting Zambia include drought, prolonged dry spells, localized flooding, crop pests, livestock diseases, wildlife damage in valley areas, and market shocks. The food security situation and prevalence of malnutrition are of low to moderate concern at the national level. However, there are notable regional variations, with the more concerning outcomes concentrated in the Western, Northwestern, and Southern provinces. Acute food insecurity is primarily driven by prolonged droughts, erratic rainfall, and high domestic food prices, which reduce households’ own production and drive increased need for market purchases amid constrained purchasing power.

Norway and the EU to help Ukraine through the winter

Countries: Ukraine, Norway Source: Government of Norway Norway is entering into a new agreement with the EU to strengthen Ukraine’s energysecurity. Norway will provide NOK 425 million to help Ukraine rebuild a more resilientenergy system. After more than four years of full-scale war, Russian attacks have placed large parts of Ukraine’s energy system under severe pressure. Ukraine urgently needs support for repairs, spare parts 4and fuel. At the same time, it needs to reduce the vulnerability of its energy supply over time through more local and renewable energy production. Norway is now providing NOK 425 million (approximately EUR 40 million) for decentralised energy production, renewable energy, battery storage and flexible local energy systems. This funding will strengthen the resilience of Ukraine’s energy supply, help speed up recovery and keep critical services running. ‘Ukraine must get through the coming winter while building an energy system that is less vulnerable to attack. In cooperation with the EU, Norway is providing NOK 425 million to strengthen Ukraine’s energy security. This funding will help Ukraine meet urgent needs while also contributing to its recovery, modernisation and path towards EU membership. Winter may seem far away, but preparations must be made now,’ said Minister of Foreign Affairs Espen Barth Eide. ‘Norway’s contribution represents promises in action. It will help Ukraine to prepare for the next winter and to come closer to the EU’s energy system, towards its place in the EU. Focusing on renewables and decentralised energy generation contributes to Ukraine’s energy security. It also brings Ukraine further in line with the current priorities of the EU through the green transition,’ said European Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos The support will be channelled through the EU’s Ukraine Investment Framework. This arrangement is designed to mobilise additional financing from banks and other financial institutions. If the projects develop as expected, parts of the funding may eventually be reused for new energy projects in Ukraine.

Ukraine expects NATO summit to discuss funding despite trouble securing backing

Ukrainian Ambassador to Turkey Nariman Dzhelialov suggests each NATO member contributes a small proportion of its budget.

Why Bangladesh must pivot to renewable energy now

Why Bangladesh must pivot to renewable energy now khairul.jahin@… Tue, 05/26/2026 - 08:30 Image Why Bangladesh must pivot to renewable energy now There are moments in a nation’s history when a crisis does more than create hardship. It reveals the weakness of an old system and opens the door to a better one. Bangladesh is now standing at such a moment. The country is facing an energy crisis that no longer centres on power cuts. It is affecting factories, farms, schools, offices, exports, foreign currency reserves, and the daily life of ordinary people. What we are seeing today is not just a temporary shortage of gas or fuel. It is a signal that our energy system has become too dependent on imported fossil fuels. More than 60 percent of Bangladesh’s energy demand is met through imports. LNG, coal, oil, and other fossil fuels have kept the country running for years, but this dependence has become risky and expensive. Global fuel markets are unstable because of geopolitical tension, supply chain disruption, and price volatility. For a country like Bangladesh, this creates double pressure: fuel supply becomes uncertain while fuel costs keep rising. The government is now spending more than BDT 200 crore per day in energy subsidies. Annual energy import expenditure remains around USD 12 billion, putting serious pressure on foreign currency reserves. Nearly 70 percent of Bangladesh’s LNG imports come from Qatar. If supply is disrupted, Bangladesh can quickly face a severe shortage. In the power sector, daily gas demand exceeds 2,500 mmcfd, but supply sometimes falls to 850–900 mmcfd. This can create a power generation shortfall of 1,500–1,800 MW. Overall, the daily gas shortage exceeds 1,100 mmcfd, and peak-time electricity shortages may reach nearly 2,000 MW. Bangladesh also has a weak Strategic Petroleum Reserve. The current reserve capacity is sufficient for only about 35–40 days, well below that of countries such as China and Japan. This makes the national energy system even more vulnerable. Visual: Teeni and Tuni The impact is already visible. In the readymade garments sector, gas shortages and load shedding are reducing productivity by 25–30 percent in many cases. This threatens export earnings, foreign currency reserves, and economic stability. The crisis has also reached ordinary households. Although Bangladesh declared 100 percent electrification in 2022, many rural areas still experience 10 to 20 hours of load shedding every day during summer. This affects education, small businesses, agriculture, and people’s dignity. We have also seen long lines at fuel stations, schools moving online, and offices shortening working hours because of fuel shortages. These are not isolated events. They show how deeply energy insecurity can disturb national life. Over the last 15 years, electricity tariffs in Bangladesh have been increased on many occasions, including more than 10 rounds of increases at both bulk and retail levels. This path is not sustainable. Fossil-fuel-based electricity depends on imported fuel, global prices, the availability of the dollar, subsidies, and repeated tariff adjustments. Solar power offers a different path. With a one-time investment, solar can provide stable energy for 15–20 years. Once installed, its fuel cost is almost zero. The economic comparison is clear. A 1 MW HFO-based power plant produces electricity per year at a cost of nearly BDT 190 crore, with much of the cost paid in foreign currency. In contrast, a 5 MW solar project requires a one-time investment of around BDT 25 crore, after which fuel costs are practically zero. Each 1 MW of solar power can save around USD 325,000 per year in foreign currency. Read more Bangladesh’s looming energy crisis and the choices ahead This is why renewable energy should not be discussed solely in technical terms like decarbonisation, emissions, and sustainability. For Bangladesh, renewable energy means jobs, fuel independence, savings in foreign currency, industrial competitiveness, agricultural protection, and economic strength. Policymakers and stakeholders can lead this transformation, inspiring confidence in a sustainable future. Despite Bangladesh’s potential, renewable energy contributes less than 5 percent to power generation, far below the global 30 percent target by 2030. Clear, measurable goals and timelines are essential for effective policy planning and investment decisions. Renewable energy equipment imports face around 50–60 percent in duties and taxes, hindering local manufacturing growth. Policy reforms that reduce import duties and support local industry can accelerate renewable deployment and reduce dependency on imports. For Bangladesh, renewable energy means jobs, fuel independence, savings in foreign currency, industrial competitiveness, agricultural protection, and economic strength. Policymakers and stakeholders can lead this transformation, inspiring confidence in a sustainable future. Import duty is usually imposed to protect the local industry. But where local production is not yet significant, a high duty only increases project costs, reduces investment returns, and slows renewable energy expansion. Policy reforms can unlock this potential, making stakeholders feel their efforts directly contribute to progress. India, Pakistan, Vietnam, and China have expanded solar and wind power by offering low or zero import duties, tax exemptions, and low-interest financing. Many countries have also reduced duties on lithium-ion batteries and energy storage systems. Bangladesh should learn from these examples. The barriers are clear: high duties and VAT, high financing costs of 10–12 percent or more, limited access to easy loans, slow approval processes, net metering delays, high LC margin, weak Merchant Power Policy, lack of clear policies for rooftop solar, utility-scale solar, floating solar, agrivoltaics, solar irrigation, and hybrid solar-storage, weak local manufacturing, and insufficient grid digitalisation. Addressing these collectively can accelerate Bangladesh's renewable journey, uniting stakeholders in a common goal. One urgent reform is customs assessment. The current weight-based assessment system does not reflect the actual value of solar equipment. It can create artificial overvaluation and raise duties by three to four times. Bangladesh should shift to transaction-value-based assessment using pro forma or commercial invoice values, in line with international practice and WTO customs valuation principles. The second urgent reform is the elimination of customs duty on renewable energy equipment. This should apply to Solar PV Module, Photovoltaic Cell, Solar Inverter, DC Cable, Data Logger, Aluminium Mounting Structure, Battery Pack, Battery Cell, BMS Circuit Board, PV DG Controller, Hybrid Controller, Solar Plant Safety Aluminium Walkway Mesh, Safety Accessories, and related components. Current TTI rates are high. Solar PV Module carries 26.90 percent, Photovoltaic Cell 25.75 percent, Solar Inverter 28.73 percent, DC Cable 58.40 percent, Data Logger 37.25 percent, Aluminium Mounting Structure 58.40 percent, Battery Pack and Battery Cell 58.40 percent, BMS Circuit Board 31.50 percent, pack materials 37.25 percent, PV DG Controller or Hybrid Controller 89.08 percent, and Solar Plant Safety Aluminum Walkway Mesh 37.25 percent. These should be reduced to zero percent for renewable energy expansion. The third reform is a tax holiday. Rooftop solar power producers and project companies should receive benefits comparable to those of utility-scale renewable energy producers. A practical structure could be a 100 percent tax holiday for the first 10 years, 50 percent for the next 3 years, and 25 percent for the next 2 years. This should apply to CAPEX, OPEX, IPP, and MPP models. A broader 10–20 year tax holiday for renewable energy projects should also be considered. Read more How can Bangladesh rapidly expand solar capacity? Bangladesh has a remarkable solar opportunity already waiting on its rooftops. About 7 percent of the country’s land is covered with concrete or other built structures. This means more than 10,000 square kilometres, or about 10 billion square meters of built surface. If only 30 percent is usable, that would give around 3 billion square meters. At 10 square meters per kW, this can create nearly 300 GW of solar potential. Bangladesh’s peak demand is only around 16–18 GW. The opportunity already exists on rooftops, factories, warehouses, schools, hospitals, government buildings, and commercial establishments. Rooftop solar should therefore be relaunched nationwide with a clear business model. Utility-scale solar also needs support through unused khas land, transparent tendering, and grid readiness. Floating solar, river-based solar, agrivoltaics, solar irrigation, and hybrid solar-storage should receive separate policy attention. The suspended solar projects must also be revisited. A total of 31 solar power projects, with a combined capacity of more than 3,000 MW, were previously suspended or cancelled. Many were being developed by foreign investors, with more than USD 200 million reportedly already invested. If implemented, these projects could save around BDT 10,800 crore annually in energy import costs. They should be reassessed and revived quickly. Energy storage is another missing pillar. Solar and wind need storage support to become more reliable. Duties on lithium-ion batteries, BESS, and other storage systems should be reduced to zero. This will help stabilise renewable power and support future grid flexibility. Electric vehicles can also become part of the solution. In China, Japan, and the United States, EVs are increasingly seen as mobile energy storage systems. A typical EV battery has a capacity of 40–70 kWh, enough to power an average household for 1–2 days. If Bangladesh had 1 million EVs, the country would have 40–70 GWh of distributed storage. This is several times higher than the daily peak demand gap. Solar-powered EV charging, vehicle-to-home, and vehicle-to-grid systems should be included in future energy planning. If Bangladesh had 30–40 percent of the grid powered by solar, along with solar-powered EVs, the country would be far less exposed to global fuel market shocks. Long fuel lines, online schooling, shorter office hours, and industrial disruption could be reduced. Solar, storage, and EVs should now be planned together. Finance will decide how fast this transition happens. Renewable energy projects cannot grow at interest rates below 10–12 percent. Long-term financing should be available at an interest rate of 3.5–4.5 percent. A 10–15-year financing facility at a maximum interest rate of 5 percent should be introduced. Bangladesh Bank’s green refinancing fund should be expanded. Rooftop and residential solar customers should be eligible for collateral-free loans. The LC margin for renewable equipment should be limited to 5%.\ Read more Rooppur begins, but is Bangladesh Prepared? Net metering must be simplified. Approval should be completed within 15–30 days through a one-stop service. Approval, interconnection, inspection, billing adjustment, and utility coordination should all be simple and time-bound. Wheeling charges for renewable energy should also be kept reasonable and low. The Merchant Power Policy should be clear, simple, and investment-friendly so that industries and commercial consumers can directly procure renewable electricity. Agriculture should also be included in the solar transition. Bangladesh can set a target to convert 1.5 million diesel irrigation pumps into solar pumps. This will reduce diesel imports, lower farmers’ production costs, and protect the environment. The program should include duty-free facilities, low-cost loans, investment support, and local service networks. Waste-to-energy should also receive policy support. City corporations need clear rules, easy financing, and private-sector participation to enable urban waste management and distributed power generation to work together. Bangladesh now needs a phased national roadmap for renewable energy. In the short term, within 0–6 months, customs duty, VAT, and taxes on renewable energy equipment should be reduced to zero. Duties on lithium-ion batteries, BESS, and energy storage should be withdrawn. Approval for net metering should be obtained within 15–30 days. Industrial and commercial solar installations should be eligible for special incentives. The 31 suspended solar projects should be reassessed. Wheeling charges should be rationalised. Solar, storage, and EV charging should receive urgent policy support. Collateral-free lines of credit should be introduced for rooftop solar. NBR should quickly implement assessment reform and a 0 percent duty. Read more All hopes will lose steam without a sustainable energy plan In the medium term, within 1–3 years, renewable energy financing should be available at a maximum interest rate of 5 percent for 10–15 years. The LC margin should be limited to 5 percent. Land banks and grid infrastructure should be developed for utility-scale solar. Merchant Power Policy and MPPA should be simplified. Rooftop solar, utility-scale solar, and hybrid solar-storage projects should receive a 10–15-year tax holiday. A national program should convert 1.5 million diesel pumps into solar pumps. Rooftop solar should be made mandatory or incentive-based for government buildings, industrial zones, EPZs, economic zones, and large commercial buildings. EV solar charging and distributed storage policies should be developed. Renewable energy skill development and employment programs should also be launched. In the long term, within 3–10 years, Bangladesh should aim to reach more than 10,000 MW of solar power by 2030. Offshore and onshore wind should be developed. Floating solar, river-based solar, and agrivoltaics should be implemented. A National Energy Storage Strategy should be prepared. Smart grid and power sector digitalisation should be accelerated. Local assembly and manufacturing of solar panels, inverters, mounting structures, battery packs, BMS, and EV charging equipment should be encouraged. Regional power trade should be expanded. The Renewable Purchase Obligation should be introduced. Fossil fuel subsidies should be gradually redirected to a renewable energy transition fund. Image Visual: Anwar Sohel The benefits can be large. Energy import costs will fall. Pressure on foreign currency reserves will decline. Industrial production costs will reduce. Export competitiveness will improve. The subsidy burden will decrease. New investment will grow. Renewable energy can create 20–25 jobs per MW through rooftop solar, utility-scale solar, solar pumps, EV charging, battery storage, smart grids, manufacturing, installation, operation, and maintenance. The government may worry about revenue loss from tax and duty exemptions. But this should be seen as an investment. In the short term, there may be a limited impact on revenue. In the long term, Bangladesh can save far more by reducing fuel imports, lowering subsidies, saving foreign currency, strengthening industries, and attracting new investment. Bangladesh’s energy crisis is a major challenge but also a historic opportunity. The crisis is not only a supply problem. It is a policy framework problem. Renewable energy, especially solar power, storage, and EV integration, can be among the most practical solutions for the country. The question is no longer whether Bangladesh should adopt renewable energy. The real question is how quickly, how systematically, and how boldly the country can complete this transition. Mohammad Ataur Rahman Sarker is a renewable energy entrepreneur and the secretary of the Bangladesh Sustainable and Renewable Energy Association. Md. Tanvir Siraj is a renewable energy researcher. Send your articles for Slow Reads to slowreads@thedailystar.net. Check out our submission guidelines for details. Read More

World: High-level meeting reaffirms shared commitment to strengthen cross-border collaboration and accelerate elimination of malaria and neglected tropical diseases

Country: World Source: World Health Organization A high-level meeting convened on 20 May on the margins of the Seventy-ninth World Health Assembly brought together global and regional leaders, Member States, donors, partners and technical experts to accelerate progress towards the elimination of malaria and neglected tropical diseases (NTDs). The meeting underscored the importance of strong cross-border collaboration, exchange of best practices, and integrated multi-disease approaches to sustain gains, expand access to essential health services, and protect vulnerable populations across Africa and beyond. The event was convened by the African Union Commission and the World Health Organization/Global Onchocerciasis Network for Elimination, in collaboration with partners including the African Leaders Malaria Alliance (ALMA), Drugs for Neglected Diseases initiative (DNDi), The END Fund, the Task Force for Global Health/Health Campaign Effectiveness Coalition, and the RBM Partnership to End Malaria. A high burden of disease requiring immediate action Malaria and NTDs remain major global health challenges. Malaria alone affects an estimated 282 million people annually and causes approximately 610 000 deaths, with young children and pregnant women most at risk. NTDs impact nearly one billion people, with 1.4 billion requiring interventions each year. Global targets for 2030 include a 90% reduction in malaria cases and deaths and in the number of people requiring NTD interventions, the elimination of at least one NTD in 100 countries and malaria in at least 35 countries, and the prevention of disease resurgence. Despite significant progress over the past two decades – driven by expanded access to treatment, preventive campaigns, improved surveillance, and coordinated national efforts – new challenges threaten these gains. Weak health systems, insufficient financing, resistance to drugs and insecticides, climate change, and workforce shortages continue to hinder progress. Recent declines in global health funding have added urgency to the need for more efficient, sustainable approaches. Dr Daniel Ngamije Madandi, WHO Director of Malaria and Neglected Tropical Diseases, emphasized the progress achieved to date while warning that these gains remain fragile: “Today’s progress shows what is possible: the number of people requiring interventions against neglected tropical diseases has decreased from 2.2 billion in 2010 to 1.4 billion in 2024; today, 63 countries have eliminated at least one neglected tropical disease, bringing us closer to the global target of 100 countries by 2030. At the same time, since 2000, 2.3 billion malaria cases and 14 million deaths have been averted. Over the past 70 years, 47 countries and one territory have been certified malaria-free, and 37 countries reported fewer than 1000 malaria cases in 2024. These gains reflect strong national leadership and partnership, but they remain fragile as malaria and NTDs do not respect borders. For countries entering the final mile, success will depend on integrated health systems, stronger cross-border collaboration, and reaching the most vulnerable and mobile populations. WHO remains committed to supporting through technical guidance, surveillance, innovation, and coordination, while continuing to strengthen its own country-focused approach. If we act together with urgency and unity, a future free of malaria and neglected tropical diseases is within reach.” Moving towards integration and cross-border collaboration High-level panels held during the meeting included senior representatives and leadership from ten African countries, including the Ministers of Health of Liberia, Senegal and the United Republic of Tanzania. Participants emphasized that sustaining momentum will require strong political leadership, prioritization of elimination targets, and the integration of malaria and NTD services into national health systems. Moving beyond fragmented, disease-specific approaches toward more resilient, integrated health services is essential to maintaining high coverage and ensuring long-term impact. The meeting highlighted the critical importance of cross-border collaboration. As diseases and vectors move across borders due to human mobility and climate change, progress in one country can be undermined by high transmission in neighboring regions. Border areas – often characterized by limited access to health services and high population movement – require targeted interventions to ensure equitable access to prevention and care. Dr Ibrahima Sy, Minister of Health and Public Hygiene, Senegal, highlighted the importance of national ownership and regional coordination: “For countries such as Senegal, elimination efforts are based on equity and adaptability. The decline in external funding has been a strong signal urging us to accelerate our transition toward greater health sovereignty and to mobilize more domestic resources. We are committed to strengthening regional coordination, improving cross-border surveillance, and ensuring that no community is left behind as we work toward the sustainable control and ultimate elimination of these diseases.” The meeting also highlighted growing regional momentum to address the cross-border drivers of disease transmission, including migration, population movement, trade, and climate-related risks, through coordinated surveillance, information sharing, and joint preparedness and response mechanisms. In a significant step forward, and building on recent political commitments, including a Call for Action endorsed by African Ministers at the Seventy-eighth World Health Assembly, countries shared their efforts to develop a joint Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on cross-border collaboration to combat NTDs, which is now being extended to include malaria, thus signaling a concrete commitment to more structured and sustained regional cooperation. Leaders emphasized that this collective effort is essential to protect vulnerable populations, strengthen health system resilience, and accelerate progress toward elimination targets and broader health security goals. The MoU on cross-border collaboration to combat malaria and NTDs is expected to represent a framework for coordinated action leading to accelerated disease elimination efforts and sustained progress across borders. Dr Carol Karutu, Vice-President, The END Fund, stressed the importance of coordinated and evidence-based approaches to sustain progress: “Achieving lasting impact against neglected tropical diseases requires a coordinated push that aligns governments, donors, pharmaceutical companies and implementing partners around scalable and evidence-based approaches. We are seeing strong momentum where countries invest in integrated health systems and prioritize equitable access to care. The challenge now is to accelerate the sharing of best practices and support cross-border strategies that can prevent reinfection and sustain elimination gains, particularly among the most vulnerable populations.” Eliminating malaria and NTDs is essential to achieving Sustainable Development Goal target 3.3 and contributes to broader development outcomes, including poverty reduction, food security, and improved education. During the meeting, WHO and partners called for sustained investment, innovation, and collaboration to protect hard-won gains and accelerate progress toward a world free of malaria and NTDs.

First meeting of the IHR Emergency Committee regarding the epidemic of Ebola Bundibugyo virus disease in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda 2026 – Temporary recommendations

Countries: Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda Source: World Health Organization On 17 May 2026, pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 12 - Determination of a public health emergency of international concern, including a pandemic emergency of the International Health Regulations (2005) (IHR), the Director-General (DG) of the World Health Organization (WHO), after having consulted the States Parties where the event was known to be occurring, determined that the epidemic of Ebola disease caused by Bundibugyo virus in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda constitutes a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC), but did not meet the criteria of pandemic emergency, as defined in the IHR. The DG statement issued on 17 May 2026 also contained “WHO advice” to States Parties to respond to and prepare for the event. On 19 May 2026, the DG convened the first meeting of the IHR Emergency Committee regarding the epidemic of Ebola disease caused by Bundibugyo virus in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda (hereafter “Committee”). The Committee’s advice aligned with the determination by the DG that the event constitutes a PHEIC, but does not meet the criteria for pandemic emergency. The Committee acknowledged that the epidemic is occurring in one of the most challenging operational environments possible, therefore, any response must incorporate key contextual information to improve the chances of a successful response. The DG, considering the advice of the Committee, he is hereby issuing the following temporary recommendations to all States Parties to respond to and prepare to respond to the PHEIC. ==== Temporary recommendations These temporary recommendations are issued for subsets of States Parties according to the public health risk associated with the Bundibugyo virus disease epidemic they face. All current WHO interim technical guidance can be accessed on this page of the WHO website. WHO evidence-based guidance has been and will continue to be updated in line with the evolving situation, updated scientific evidence, and WHO risk assessment. The implementation of these temporary recommendations by States Parties shall be with full respect for the dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms of persons, in accordance with the principles set out in Article 3 of the IHR. For States Parties with documented detection of Bundibugyo virus (the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda) As of 22 May 2026, the WHO Secretariat assessed the risk for these States Parties as “Very high” for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and as “High” for Uganda. It is noted that the epidemiological situation in the two States Parties differs in terms of magnitude of the epidemic and contexts where response efforts are being implemented. Specifically, as of 22 May 2026, Uganda has reported two confirmed cases of Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD), both with epidemiological link traceable to areas in the Democratic Republic of the Congo with documented BVD transmission. In Uganda, as of the same date, no onwards transmission among contacts of the two confirmed BVD cases was documented. The epidemic is caused by Bundibugyo virus (BDBV), a virus belonging to the Orthoebolavirus genus. Unlike Ebola virus causing Ebola virus disease, there is no currently approved therapeutics or vaccines against Bundibugyo virus. While candidate therapeutics are considered for clinical trials and work in ongoing to fast-track candidate vaccines evaluation, the control of the epidemic relies on scaling-up public health interventions as outlined below. Coordination and high-level engagement Declare the Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) epidemic a health emergency, at national or sub-national level, in accordance with domestic laws, and as appropriate. Activate national disaster or health emergency management mechanisms and activate or establish an emergency operation centre, under the authority of the Head of State or relevant government authority, to coordinate response activities across Government sectors, administrative levels, and partners to ensure efficient and effective implementation and monitoring of comprehensive BVD control measures. These measures must include enhanced surveillance, including case identification; contact tracing; infection prevention and control (IPC), risk communication and community engagement; laboratory diagnostic testing, case management, and safe and dignified burials. Coordination and response mechanisms should be established at national level, as well as at subnational level in areas where BDBV has been detected and at-risk areas. Establish and maintain up to date a register of signals consistent with BVD (“alerts”), including status of their investigation. Establish and maintain up to date a line list of suspected cases – including identified through syndromic surveillance, probable cases, and confirmed BVD cases. Establish and maintain up to date the list of contacts of all confirmed and probable BVD cases, and monitor each contact for 21 days after the date of last known exposure. Both the evolution of the epidemic and resources available may require risk-based prioritization of contacts requiring identification and monitoring. Negotiate, as applicable, and establish security corridors, including cross-border, to allow responders to safely reach affected communities, as well as to allow communities to seek appropriate health care. Notify WHO, through the relevant WHO IHR Contact Point in the WHO Regional Office, the detection of suspected, probable and confirmed BVD cases on a daily basis, as per WHO case definitions available here. Risk communication and community engagement Implement large-scale trust building and community engagement interventions – using all trusted available communication channels, and working closely with local religious and traditional leaders, and traditional healers – so that communities are fully aware of the risk and benefits of control measures, and pro-actively contribute and support the early detection and early isolation of cases; the identification and monitoring of contacts; and safe and dignified burial practices. Strengthen community awareness, engagement and participation, to establish and strengthen trust, including by identifying and addressing cultural norms and beliefs that may serve as barriers to their full participation in the response; and by integrating interventions and community feedback, within the wider response, to address the needs of the population, particularly in contexts of the protracted humanitarian crisis in the Eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Train community leaders on the rationale underpinning public health measures, including the isolation of cases, monitoring of contacts, and safe burials in a dignified, non-stigmatizing, and non-punitive manner. Activate local networks, including community health workers, Red Cross volunteers, and other trusted community actors to promote protective behaviours; facilitate early detection and referral of suspected BVD cases; support contact tracing activities; and collect and relay community feedback to enhance the acceptance of public health measures. Enable adherence to movement restrictions, associated with the application of control measures, by providing food, water, communication, financial and psychosocial support. Surveillance and laboratory Strengthen surveillance and laboratory capacity, decentralized across first sub-national administrative levels (e.g., provinces) with documented BDBV detection, as well as in their neighbouring first sub-national administrative levels, through: Dedicated surveillance and response teams within each health zone and in neighbouring health zones determined to be at high risk for the introduction of BVD; Active case finding and enhanced community surveillance for clusters of unexplained illness or deaths; The investigation of “alerts” within 24 hours from detection; The scale-up and strengthen RT-PCR laboratory capacities for timely testing for BDBV, including the establishment of protocols for safe sample collection, sample referral pathways, biosafety training for laboratory workers; The decentralization of the laboratory capacities should be considered to allow for quick turn-around time and support patient care, as well as any clinical trials that may take place. Field laboratories should be set up in accordance with biosecurity and biosafety standards. A near point of care assay might be considered provided that its performance is validated against current RT-PCR standards. NB: The GeneXpert platform cannot detect Bundibugyo virus (BDBV). Identify and monitor, for 21 days after the date of last known exposure, the health of contacts of suspected probable, and confirmed BVD cases. On a daily basis, the health status of contacts being monitored should be assessed and recorded. Any contact developing symptoms compatible with BVD should be assessed, isolated, tested and cared for. Establish a mechanism to monitor the evolution of indicators related to the performance of contact tracing activities. Infection prevention and control in health facilities and in the context of care Strengthen measures to prevent nosocomial infections, including systematic mapping of health facilities, the establishment and dissemination of protocols for triage, targeted IPC interventions and sustained monitoring and supervision. Provide continuous IPC training to health care workers, including the proper use of personal protective equipment (PPE). Provide health facilities with sufficient supplies of appropriate PPE equipment to ensure the safety and protection of their staff, resources for timely payment of their salaries and, as appropriate, hazard pay. Establish channels for health workers to report and be assessed following exposures, and have access to psychosocial support and, when possible post-exposure prophylaxis under compassionate use or clinical trial. All health worker occupational exposure must be investigated to allow for immediate corrective actions. Consider building community IPC capacity by training community leaders, and emphasizing that hand hygiene not only contributes to bring the BVD epidemic under control, but also reduces the risk of transmission of other communicable diseases present in the same areas. Hand hygiene shall be facilitated at critical spots, such as schools, churches, bars, markets, local gatherings sites, points of entry, etc. Patient referral pathway and access to safe and optimized intensive care Establish dedicated BVD isolation and treatment centers or units for suspected, probable, and confirmed cases, located within, or close to, areas with documented BDBV detection, with sufficient staff who are specifically trained and equipped to implement optimized intensive supportive care. Establish protocols for transferring suspected BVD patients safely to dedicated health care facilities for their isolation, assessment and treatment in a humane and patient-centred approach. This includes trained ambulance teams, mechanisms to notify the receiving health care facility, the application of appropriate IPC precautions during transfer, and decontamination protocols for vehicles and equipment. Establish protocols for the handling and disposal of medical waste, in accordance with biosafety principles. Establish survivor follow-up programmes, including clinical care, counselling, semen testing and sexual health advice and condoms where appropriate, along with psychosocial support and stigma-reduction programmes. Maintain the package of essential health services, including by providing IPC equipment for them to operate safely. This includes, at minimum, malaria diagnosis and treatment, and maternal and child health services. Safe and dignified burials Establish protocols ensuring funerals and burials are conducted by well-trained personnel, with provision made for the presence of the family and cultural practices, and in accordance with relevant national laws and regulations. Operations, supplies and logistics Establish logistics support to maintain a robust supply pipeline for PPE, diagnostics, therapeutics, and other medical commodities, IPC materials, including for safe burial. Border health, international travel and mass-gathering events Enhance, through arrangements between countries sharing borders, surveillance at ground crossings and border areas. Implement measures, in accordance with national laws and regulations, to prevent suspected, probable, and confirmed BVD cases, as well as their contacts from undertaking international travel, unless the travel is part of an appropriate medical evacuation. Prevent the cross-border movement of the human remains of deceased suspected, probable or confirmed BVD cases, unless authorized through bilateral arrangements. Implement exit screening at all points of entry – airports, ports and ground crossings – consisting of, at a minimum, a questionnaire encompassing history of potential exposure to BVD, a temperature measurement and, in case of fever, an in-depth assessment of the risk of BVD, by personnel trained and equipped with PPE. Any traveller determined to present with an illness consistent with BVD should not be allowed to travel unless the travel is part of an appropriate medical evacuation. Report to WHO, through the relevant WHO IHR Contact Point in the WHO Regional Office, the implementation of any international traffic related measure adopted. Consider postponing mass gatherings until BVD transmission is interrupted. Research and development of medical countermeasures Engage, when feasible, with research partners and international institutions to: Define a robust laboratory strategy, urgently implement head-to-head comparison studies of PCR diagnostics to validate or invalidate the PCR platform (Radione ®) currently used in the field. Implement ethically approved, scientifically robust clinical trials to advance the development and use of candidate therapeutics for treatment and post-exposure prophylaxis and for vaccines. Establish, with a view to support research, expedited and efficient national regulatory and ethics reviews, community engagement, pharmacovigilance (where applicable), data sharing and equitable access arrangements. For States Parties with land borders adjoining States Parties with documented BDBV detection As of 22 May 2026, the WHO Secretariat assessed the regional risk “High”. Establish a national coordination mechanism articulated with subnational levels. Enhance rapidly the status of readiness to respond to BVD cases, including establishing active surveillance across health facilities, with zero reporting; enhancing community-based surveillance for clusters of unexplained deaths; establishing access to laboratories qualified to test for BVD; raising the awareness of health workers regarding BVD; training health workers on IPC precautions; establishing rapid response teams for the investigation and management of BVD patients and their contacts; establishing a mechanism for the identification and monitoring of contacts. Establish the capacity at national reference laboratory(ies) to timely and safely perform testing for BDBV along with relevant differential testing. Considerations may be given to shipment to an international reference laboratory for inter-laboratory comparison as part of external quality assurance implementation. Conduct international contact tracing operations as necessary, including obtaining information from airlines and other conveyances operations; identifying contacts associated with conveyances on an international voyage, and communicate with States Parties known as final destination of those contacts. Intensify risk communication and community engagement activities, in communities residing in border areas and at points of entry, including airports and ports with direct connection with States Parties with documented BDBV detection, and provide the general public with accurate and up to date information regarding the BVD epidemic and measures to reduce the risk of exposure. Exercise arrangements in place to respond to BVD through simulation exercises relating to management of BVD ” alerts”, including cross-border; sample referral; activation of rapid response teams and mechanisms. Establish, with a view to support research, expedited and efficient national regulatory and ethics reviews, community engagement, pharmacovigilance (where applicable), data sharing and equitable access arrangements. Border health and international travel Provide travelers with accurate and up to date information regarding the BVD epidemic and measures to reduce the risk of exposure, including discouraging travel to areas with documented BDBV detection. Enhance, through arrangements between countries sharing borders, surveillance at ground crossings. This includes establishing coordination mechanisms for the detection and assessment of travelers with unexplained febrile illness; and the timely sharing of information regarding contacts who have, or may have, crossed the border, thus enabling continuity of follow-up. Pre-position PPE, other IPC materials, sample collection kits, case investigation forms, and safe burial supplies in border areas adjacent to those with documented BDBV detection. Activate health contingency plans at airport and ports, involving conveyance operators, to detect, assess, and manage travellers from States Parties with documented BDBV detection, presenting with symptoms compatible with BVD, and the identification of their contacts, according to established protocols. This entails the availability of trained personnel, referral mechanisms, application of IPC measures. Coordinate with conveyance operators to facilitate timely communication, prior to arrival and to relevant authorities, of any suspected BVD cases on board conveyances, and to identify contacts associated with conveyances on an international voyage. The identification of such contacts entails, where applicable, the communication of personal details to the States Parties known as final destination of those contacts. At the time these temporary recommendations are issued, neither the suspension of flights or waterways routes with States Parties with documented BDBV detection, nor denial of entry to travellers and conveyances arriving from those States Parties, are recommended. Report to WHO, through the relevant WHO IHR Contact Point, the implementation of any international traffic related measure adopted. Treat as a health emergency, including through a formal declaration according to domestic laws, the detection of a suspected or confirmed BVD case, of a contact thereof, or of a cluster of unexplained deaths. This include investigating any of those events within 24 hours and, by instituting case isolation and management; establishing a definitive diagnosis; and undertaking the identification and monitoring of contacts. Notify to WHO immediately, through the relevant WHO IHR Contact Point in the WHO Regional Offices, any suspected, probable or confirmed BVD case, as per WHO case definitions available here. In the presence of a BVD case, temporary recommendations for State Parties States Parties with documented BDBV detection apply. For all other States Parties As of 22 May 2026, the WHO Secretariat assessed the risk for these States Parties as “Low”. Make arrangements to detect, assess, report and manage travelers with unexplained febrile illness arriving from areas with documented BDBV tdetection. These include, but are not limited to, disseminating the definition of BVD cases to public and private health care facilities, including travel clinics, and general practitioners; identifying laboratories to conduct testing for BDBV; identifying isolation facilities allowing for safe assessment and clinical care. Provide no-governemntal organizations and other entities deploying personnel internationally to respond to the BVD epidemic with information on risk, measures to minimize the risk of exposure, and advice for managing a potential exposure. Prepare to facilitate the evacuation and repatriation of nationals (e.g., health workers) who have been exposed to BVD cases. Provide the general public with accurate and up to date information regarding the BVD epidemic and measures to reduce the risk of exposure, including discouraging travel to areas with documented BDBV detection. Border health and international travel Provide accurate and up to date information regarding the BVD epidemic to travel clinics, other health facilities and professionals, and discourage travel to areas with documented BDBV detection. Provide incoming travelers, at points of entry, with information about measures to take should they develop symptoms compatible with BVD within 21 days after arrival. Coordinate with the transport sector, including conveyance and points of entry operators, for the timely management of suspected BVD cases, including communication prior to arrival if the individual is on board; as well as for the identification of their contacts on board conveyance. The identification of such contacts entails, where applicable, the communication of personal details to the States Parties known as final destination of those contacts. At the time these temporary recommendations are issued, neither the suspension of flights from States Parties with documented BDBV detection, nor denial of entry to travellers and conveyances arriving from those States Parties, are recommended. Report to WHO, through the relevant WHO IHR Contact Point, the implementation of any international traffic related measure adopted. Notify to WHO immediately, through the relevant WHO IHR Contact Point in the WHO Regional Offices, any suspected, probable or confirmed BVD case, as per WHO case definitions available here. In the presence of a BVD case, temporary recommendations for States Parties with documented BDBV detection apply. All States Parties Reporting on the implementation of temporary recommendations Report quarterly to WHO on the status of, and challenges related to, the implementation of these temporary recommendations, using a standardized tool and channels that will be made available by WHO, also allowing for the monitoring of progress and the identification of gaps in the national response. Media Contacts WHO Media Team World Health Organization Email: mediainquiries@who.int

India’s top-heavy boom and the lesson for Bangladesh

India’s top-heavy boom and the lesson for Bangladesh khairul.jahin@… Tue, 05/05/2026 - 11:54 Image India’s top-heavy boom and the lesson for Bangladesh During my 14 months as Minister (Press) at the Bangladesh High Commission in New Delhi, I observed India more from metro rails, trains, buses, provincial roads, and a daily dose of discussions with my colleagues in the diplomatic circle and journalistic peers from the Indian media. Personal travel and official work took me across Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Rajasthan, West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh. I spent long hours reading newspapers, watching television, speaking with journalists, researchers, and policy professionals in Delhi, and observing how ordinary citizens moved through the economy. The impression was consistent. India possesses enormous capability, but it also carries a deep structural imbalance. It is a country of scale without enough spread and wealth without enough diffusion. And also a country with very large ambitions without sufficient economic architecture. The dominant global story is flattering. India is now the world’s fourth-largest economy, with output above $4 trillion. Growth has often ranged between 6% and 8%. Its stock market has surged. It landed a spacecraft near the Moon’s south pole. Its digital payments network is admired internationally. Western capitals increasingly view India as a democratic counterweight to China. None of this is false. But none of it is sufficient. Behind the aggregate numbers lies a more difficult truth. India’s growth model has become top-heavy. The central weakness is straightforward. India has generated elite wealth, urban enclaves of modern prosperity and globally competitive service industries. It has not generated enough broad middle-income employment. The country moved too quickly toward a service-led economy before completing industrialisation. In doing so, it skipped the stage that, elsewhere, historically created stable mass prosperity: labour-intensive manufacturing at scale. Every year, roughly 10-12 million young, educated Indians enter the workforce. That is comparable to adding a country the size of Belgium to the labour market annually. No nation can absorb such numbers through software parks, finance offices and high-end services alone. India has generated elite wealth, urban enclaves of modern prosperity and globally competitive service industries. It has not generated enough broad middle-income employment. The country moved too quickly toward a service-led economy before completing industrialisation. It needs factories, warehouses, construction supply chains, transport systems and medium-sized enterprises capable of hiring by the thousand. India’s economy has not produced enough of them. Official labour statistics and private estimates differ, but the broad picture is unmistakable. Youth unemployment remains high, especially in cities and among graduates. Urban youth unemployment has often been in the mid-to-high teens. In some regions, female youth unemployment has been dramatically higher. Yet even these figures understate the problem because India suffers heavily from disguised unemployment: several family members sharing work that would productively occupy one person. They are counted as employed, but they are not economically advancing. Stagnation in proper placement Nothing captures this scarcity better than recruitment frenzies for low-level public jobs. In 2022, Indian Railways announced around 35,000 vacancies. More than 12 million people reportedly applied—roughly one opening for every 357 applicants. When exam rules changed, protests erupted in Bihar and elsewhere. This was a classic labour-market distress. In Uttar Pradesh, more than 93,000 applicants reportedly sought 62 peon posts in 2024, many of them graduates, engineers and postgraduates. These are jobs involving basic clerical support, file movement and errands. When highly educated youth compete in such numbers for messenger-level work, GDP headlines become less persuasive. Families have paid for degrees, but the economy has not created matching opportunities. Economists call this jobless growth: rising output without sufficient employment creation. India has become one of its clearest large-scale examples. Capital-intensive sectors such as finance, telecoms, digital platforms, and automated manufacturing can rapidly boost GDP while adding relatively few jobs. Shareholders gain faster than workers. Historically, countries that lifted hundreds of millions out of poverty followed a different route. Britain, Germany, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and China all industrialised first. Rural labour moved into factories, productivity rose, exports expanded, and a mass middle class emerged. Vietnam is now following that path. Bangladesh has done so, in part, through garment exports. India was expected to do the same. It did not do enough of it. In 2014, the Indian government launched “Make in India”, promising to turn the country into a manufacturing hub. The ambition was to raise manufacturing’s share of GDP from around 16% to 25%. A decade later, manufacturing’s share remained well below target and by some measures slipped closer to 13%-14%. India did not merely miss the goal; it struggled to change direction. That is the heart of India’s missing middle. At the top sit giant conglomerates such as Reliance Industries, Adani Group and Tata Group. At the bottom sit millions of tiny workshops, traders and household enterprises employing five or fewer people. What is scarce are large mid-sized factories employing 500, 2,000 or 10,000 workers and linked to export supply chains. During the global “China Plus One” shift, multinationals seeking diversification did not move overwhelmingly to India. Many expanded in Vietnam, Mexico and Bangladesh. Vietnam, with a population under 100 million, has become a major exporter of electronics, footwear, leather accessories and apparel. Bangladesh, despite far fewer resources, built a garment export machine exceeding $45bn annually in recent years. India lost ground in precisely the labour-intensive sectors that could have employed millions: textiles, leather goods, footwear, toys and light engineering. The reasons are practical. Land acquisition can be slow and politically contentious. Power reliability varies by region. Ports and logistics have improved but remain more costly than those of best-in-class Asian competitors. Contract enforcement through courts can take years. Regulatory burdens remain dense. Medium firms often spend disproportionate time on compliance rather than expansion. An Observer Research Foundation study found more than 69,000 compliance requirements for doing business in India, with over 26,000 carrying imprisonment clauses. A mid-sized manufacturer can face hundreds of annual filings, inspections or procedural obligations. Under such conditions, staying small is often rational. That is the heart of India’s missing middle. At the top sit giant conglomerates such as Reliance Industries, Adani Group and Tata Group. At the bottom sit millions of tiny workshops, traders and household enterprises employing five or fewer people. What is scarce are large mid-sized factories employing 500, 2,000 or 10,000 workers and linked to export supply chains. Those firms built China’s middle class. They remain too few in India. Inequality at its peak Wealth concentration has widened the imbalance. According to the latest Forbes rankings, Mukesh Ambani remains India’s richest person with a net worth of about $97.9bn, while Gautam Adani follows with roughly $63.8bn. India now has 229 billionaires, up from 205 the previous year, and their combined wealth has crossed $1 trillion for the first time. The top ten richest Indians alone control around $368bn. On inequality, the broader picture remains stark. Estimates from the World Inequality Database and Oxfam indicate that the top 1% of Indians own around 40% of national wealth, while the bottom 50% own only around 3%. Exact percentages vary by methodology and year, but the trend in concentration is consistent. World Inequality Database and Oxfam indicate that the top 1% of Indians own around 40% of national wealth, while the bottom 50% own only around 3%. Exact percentages vary by methodology and year, but the trend in concentration is consistent. Consumption patterns reflect this divide. Mercedes-Benz India has posted record sales. Ultra-luxury apartments in Gurugram and Mumbai sell out quickly. Yet entry-level motorcycles, small tractors and low-cost fast-moving consumer goods have often seen sluggish rural demand. Companies have reported weak village sales volumes, meaning poorer households are cutting back not on luxuries but on staples and inexpensive treats. The service sector, long India’s pride, cannot fully offset these weaknesses. For three decades, IT services created one of India’s clearest success stories. Infosys, TCS and Wipro built global businesses on coding, consulting and back-office support. They created an urban middle class and reshaped cities such as Bengaluru and Hyderabad. But artificial intelligence now threatens some of the very entry-level tasks that sustained this model. Studies in advanced economies have found falling demand in occupations most exposed to generative AI. Hiring at major Indian IT firms has slowed sharply. Routine coding, customer service and standardised support work are increasingly automatable. India built much of its middle class by becoming the world’s back office. The back office is now changing. Agriculture remains another drag. Roughly 45%-50% of the workforce still depends on farming, while agriculture contributes around 15%-18% of GDP. Too many people compete for too small a share of national income. Holdings have fragmented across generations; a once-viable ten-acre farm may become several one-acre plots. Such land is hard to mechanise and often unprofitable. Debt cycles and price volatility intensify distress. India’s welfare architecture partly cushions these failures. The government provides free food grains to around 800 million people—close to 60% of the population. Ethically, such support is justified where hardship persists. Economically, it is also revealing. If growth were translating into secure incomes broadly enough, such dependence would be smaller. Despite growth, income inequality is rising in India. Visual: Star Education adds another fracture. India produces graduates at scale, but many employers report that graduates are poorly prepared. Some employability studies have claimed that a large majority of engineering graduates require substantial retraining. Polytechnic outcomes are also uneven. Students often gain credentials without marketable skills. Families borrow or liquidate assets to finance degrees that do not guarantee mobility. This creates what sociologists call waithood: young adults no longer students, not yet securely employed, waiting through repeated exams, coaching centres and temporary gigs. Across north India, tea stalls and rented rooms are full of candidates preparing for delayed government recruitment tests that may never transform their lives. Lessons for Bangladesh Bangladesh should study this carefully. Our own economy has grown strongly, averaging around 6% for much of the 2010s. Garment exports rose from roughly $12 billion in 2009 to above $45 billion in recent years. Around four million workers, mostly women, gained factory employment. Poverty fell sharply, life expectancy rose above 73 years, infant mortality declined, and female participation in paid work increased. Bangladesh benefited from precisely the labour-intensive manufacturing route India underused. Millions moved from subsistence dependence toward wage income, and that wage income financed schooling, rural housing, small businesses and consumption. Few policy choices in South Asia have produced a larger social return than integrating low-income women into export manufacturing. India has generated elite wealth, urban enclaves of modern prosperity and globally competitive service industries. It has not generated enough broad middle-income employment. The country moved too quickly toward a service-led economy before completing industrialisation. Yet Bangladesh also shows top-heavy tendencies. Garments account for around 80%-85% of merchandise exports, leaving the country vulnerable to recessions in Europe and North America, compliance shocks, buyer concentration and changes in global trade rules. A narrow export basket is profitable until demand turns. Banking-sector stress remains chronic, with high levels of non-performing and repeatedly rescheduled loans that weaken confidence and starve productive firms of credit. The tax-to-GDP ratio has often been below 9%, among the lowest in comparable emerging economies, limiting state capacity in health, education, transport and urban management. Dhaka property values have surged to levels comparable to those of many European and North American capitals, while many districts remain dependent on remittances, informal trade, and low-wage work. This is a classic sign of distorted capital allocation: money chasing land rather than machinery, skills or technology. Like India, Bangladesh has many microfirms and a few large groups, but too few medium industrial exporters outside garments. Pharmaceuticals are a bright spot, as are ceramics, footwear, bicycles, light engineering and shipbuilding niches, yet none has matched apparel at scale. The lesson is clear: Bangladesh now needs a second-generation growth model built on diversification. That means stronger ports, cheaper logistics, more reliable power, cleaner bank balance sheets, vocational training, deeper capital markets and easier scaling for medium enterprises. It also means moving up the garment value chain into design, branding, synthetic fabrics and technical textiles rather than relying mainly on basic cut-and-sew production. India still has formidable strengths, including a vast domestic market, entrepreneurial energy, English-language capabilities, digital infrastructure, and geopolitical relevance. It is not collapsing. But resilience is not a strategy. If jobless growth, weak manufacturing depth, educational mismatch and extreme inequality persist, the superpower narrative will remain incomplete. India has two decades before demographic ageing becomes more pronounced. That is the window to build factories, simplify regulations, improve the courts, upgrade skills, and widen opportunities. Without those reforms, India may grow larger without becoming broadly rich, more visible without becoming more balanced, and more powerful abroad while remaining brittle at home. Bangladesh also has a narrower window than many assume. The demographic dividend will not last indefinitely. Fertility has fallen sharply, the population is gradually ageing, and the economy will face rising pressure to create higher-productivity jobs before wage competitiveness erodes. That means the next fifteen to twenty years are critical. This is the period to diversify exports, reform banks, modernise tax administration, improve courts and contract enforcement, expand technical education, and make cities more liveable and productive. Without those reforms, Bangladesh may grow bigger (like India) without becoming significantly richer, urbanise without becoming efficient, and export more without developing real industrial depth. The country’s progress over the past two decades is substantial and real. But, as India’s example shows, growth alone does not guarantee balance, resilience or lasting prosperity. Faisal Mahmud is a Dhaka-based journalist. He was the former Minister (Press) of the Bangladesh High Commission in India. Send your articles for Slow Reads to slowreads@thedailystar.net. Check out our submission guidelines for details.