The New Zealand Herald
중도 성향
기타
Coroner can’t identify Napier woman Debra Jacobs’ cause of death
Now, a coroner has been unable to make recommendations after the unexplained death.
"UNEXPLAINED" · 총 15건
필터 보기현재 지수
50.3
0 = 부정 우세
50 = 중립
100 = 긍정 우세
최근 7일 기준 85,890건을 분석한 결과, 뉴스 심리지수는 50.2(균형)입니다. 긍정 4,433건(5.2%)·중립 79,297건(92.3%)·부정 2,160건(2.5%)이며, 중립 비중이 뚜렷하게 높습니다. 성향 지수는 종합 15.3(중도 균형)입니다.
Now, a coroner has been unable to make recommendations after the unexplained death.
A ground stop has been issued for San Francisco International Airport (SFO) in California, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) announced in an advisory on Sunday.
NAIROBI, Kenya, Jun 5 – Suspended Nairobi County Chief Officer for Urban Development and Planning Patrick Analo has been released a day following his arrest in a raid by EACC detectives. Analo was freed on Friday on a cash bail of Sh500,000 as investigations into corruption, unexplained wealth and money laundering intensify following the recovery […]
EACC has recovered Sh65.3 million in cash and arrested Nairobi County planning chief Patrick Analo as part of a corruption, bribery and unexplained wealth investigation.
India needs to challenge the legal basis of a proposed US tariff action that seeks to impose an additional 12.5% duty on imports from the country under a Section 301 investigation, trade policy think tank Global Trade Research Initiative (GTRI) said on June 3.The recommendation comes after the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) proposed fresh duties on imports from 54 economies following a probe into the enforcement of restrictions on goods linked to forced labour.GTRI said that the investigation stretches the intended scope of Section 301, a trade enforcement mechanism traditionally used to address barriers affecting market access for American businesses in foreign jurisdictions, PTI reported.The current action is focused instead on whether countries regulate imports originating from third nations where forced labour concerns may exist, the think tank observed.Also read | Iran war puts Malhotra & Co in razor-edge policy bindThe proposed tariff rate of 12.5% for India and several other economies is also higher than the tariff ceiling committed by the US under multilateral trade rules, the think tank said.According to GTRI founder Ajay Srivastava, India should maintain that Washington is attempting to extend its domestic import-control framework beyond its borders through unilateral trade measures.He said such an approach falls outside the mandate of Section 301 and raises broader concerns regarding the use of trade policy to influence regulatory practices in other countries.The think tank further noted that concerns surrounding forced labour are often confined to specific products or sectors rather than entire economies. It argued that imposing country-wide tariffs may not be an appropriate response when targeted measures could address the underlying issue more effectively.Also read | CBDT tells tax officers to tighten scrutiny of unexplained income, assetsGTRI also viewed the proposed action in the context of ongoing trade negotiations between India and the United States, suggesting that the move could increase pressure on New Delhi as both countries work toward a bilateral trade agreement. It cautioned that India may face additional investigations under Section 301 in areas such as industrial overcapacity.The USTR initiated two separate Section 301 investigations in March this year covering 60 economies. One inquiry examined issues related to forced labour, while the second focused on concerns over excess manufacturing capacity.Following the conclusion of the forced labour investigation, the US has proposed additional duties on imports from 54 economies. Under the plan, imports from countries including Canada, Ecuador, Mexico, Indonesia, Pakistan and the European Union would face a 10% tariff. A higher duty of 12.5% has been proposed for 48 economies, including India and China.The proposal has not yet been finalised and is currently open for public consultation. Stakeholders have until June 22 to request participation in hearings and submit testimony summaries, while written submissions can be filed until July 6. Public hearings are scheduled for July 7.A final determination is expected in the coming weeks and could be announced before the expiry of the temporary Section 122 tariff measures on July 24. If approved, the additional duties may come into force shortly thereafter.The investigation does not allege the use of forced labour in India's export production. Instead, it examines whether India has adequate restrictions on imports sourced from third countries where forced labour concerns may arise.Inputs from PTI
MANILA, Philippines — The House team of prosecutors on Tuesday expressed disappointment with Vice President Sara Duterte’s answer to the articles of impeachment, assailing her for relying on technicalities instead of confronting the allegations head-on. “We had anticipated that we’ll finally see her answers on the confidential fund, bribery, unexplained wealth and even threats [allegations],
Democrats are banking on a rare chance to regain ground in Iowa, a rural state that has repeatedly eluded them in recent years. Republicans, meanwhile, are grappling with a New Jersey congressman whose unexplained absence could put their already slim majority at risk.
“LOOK at that thing, dude. My gosh. There’s a whole fleet of them. They’re all going against the wind … look at that thing. It’s rotating.” While this may sound like a scene from a sci-fi film, these were the voices of US Navy aviators reacting to an object detected by military sensors, in footage later known as Gimbal. The Pentagon formally released that video, along with two others, in 2020, confirming that they showed what it described as unidentified aerial phenomena. In May 2026, the Pentagon began releasing more declassified UAP material in batches through the Presidential Unsealing and Reporting System for UAP Encounters, known as PURSUE — hundreds of files and more than 50 videos, including historical records of “green orbs”, “discs” and “fireballs”, as well as newer military-linked footage. This, in its simplest form, is known as the unidentified anomalous phenomena. ‘UAP’ is the modern bureaucratic term for what the world once called Unidentified Flying Objects, UFOs. The shift in language is deliberate. UFO came carrying decades of cultural baggage: flying saucers, little green men, crashed discs, secret hangars, conspiracy radio and late-night documentaries. The term ‘UAP’ gives the state a way to talk about the mystery without surrendering to the mythology. But the public does not hear it that way. For UAP enthusiasts, an object trained pilots cannot identify, detected by military systems, moving against the wind or rotating in unusual ways, is not a neutral bureaucratic category. It is the oldest question in a new form: are we alone? And, perhaps, for good reason. The existence of UAPs does not automatically mean they are alien. It means they are unresolved. For decades, the question of UFOs, now UAPs, was made ridiculous before it was examined. The official history of UFO inquiry is full of this contradiction. Governments investigated sightings because they could not ignore them, but often spoke about them as if only the foolish would take them seriously. The infamous ‘Project Blue Book’, the US Air Force’s programme to study and debunk UFOs, became the symbol of this uneasy posture: investigate the unknown, but reassure the public that nothing extraordinary is happening, all the while hundreds of those sightings or cases remained ‘unexplained’. This is the strange irony of the alien question. Hollywood has spent more than half a century making extraterrestrial life profitable. We are culturally fluent in fictional aliens, yet when real pilots, soldiers, radar operators or civilians describe something strange in the sky, the same culture suddenly becomes embarrassed. With all of the newly declassified files, that ridicule is now becoming harder to sustain. Yet as UAPs have moved from the margins into congressional hearings, official reports and military disclosure, the official position has remained cautious. The Pentagon has released videos and records, while its All-Domain Anomaly Resolution Office, or AARO, continues to examine cases. Nasa, too, has entered the conversation, arguing for better data, better sensors and less stigma. Yet both remain careful: they acknowledge that some cases are unresolved, while Nasa’s independent study team has stated that there is no conclusive evidence in peer-reviewed scientific literature suggesting an extraterrestrial origin for UAPs, and that many cases remain difficult to resolve because the data is often incomplete, inconsistent or not collected scientifically. This is where the debate often polarises. One side treats every unexplained sighting as evidence of alien visitation. The other treats every mention of aliens as foolish claims. But both positions are oversimplified. The more honest position is harder. UAPs exist in the limited but important sense that there are sightings, sensor records, and official cases that remain unidentified. That does not automatically mean they are alien. It means they are unresolved. The difference matters. There is a ladder of probability. At the bottom are ordinary explanations: aircraft, balloons, birds, drones, satellites, debris, weather effects, optical illusions, camera artefacts and sensor errors. Many UAP cases eventually fall here. A distant object may appear impossibly fast because of camera angle; a sensor may misread distance; a pilot may misjudge size or speed. A classified aircraft may be unknown to the observer but not to the state. Higher up are more troubling possibilities: advanced surveillance systems, experimental military technology, unknown atmospheric phenomena, or limits in our sensors and perception. Only then does one arrive at the most dramatic explanation: non-human technology. That explanation is not impossible. It is simply not yet proven. The strongest argument for taking UAPs seriously is not that they prove aliens. It is that serious institutions now admit that some cases cannot be fully explained with the data available. That alone is significant. This is also why the release of Pentagon files should not be mistaken for an admission of first contact. A government disclosure is not the cinematic moment where the state finally confesses that visitors have arrived. It is more likely controlled transparency: a response to congressional pressure, public mistrust, national security uncertainty, and decades of secrecy. The alien question survives because both sides have something to explain. The believers must explain why there is still no public, verifiable physical evidence of extraterrestrial technology. The sceptics must explain why trained observers, military systems, and official institutions keep encountering cases that cannot be dismissed as fantasy. Between those two failures is where the real mystery lives. So, the million-dollar question: are we really alone? The universe is too vast for certainty to belong only to sceptics. It would be arrogant to assume life emerged only once, on one small planet, around one ordinary star. But it would also be careless to turn every unknown light in the sky into a visitor from another world. Even as a lifelong ‘believer’ and a UAP enthusiast who has consumed everything from official press conferences to Netflix documentaries on the subject, I suspect first contact may not arrive as a Spielberg-style landing on Earth. It may come more quietly: from one of Nasa’s missions to Europa, hidden in the chemistry of an ocean beneath ice. The writer is the founder of Media Matters for Democracy. Published in Dawn, June 1st, 2026
Residents across Massachusetts reported hearing a loud boom and feeling their homes shake on Saturday afternoon. The unexplained disturbance, occurring shortly after 2 pm, was described by many as an explosion, with vibrations strong enough to rattle homes and alarm pets. Authorities had not identified the source of the widespread event as of Saturday afternoon.
Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo Source: Direct Relief A clinical pharmacist and Direct Relief’s regional director for Africa, Dr. Samuel talks about the current Ebola outbreak, how it's different than past events, and how it can be contained. By Talya Meyers When the first cases of Ebola virus were announced in the Democratic Republic of the Congo this month, Dr. Jeffrey Samuel, traveling in East Africa, read about it on the Direct Relief website. Dr. Samuel, a clinical pharmacist and Direct Relief’s regional director for Africa, was visiting hospital partners in Uganda at the time the country’s first cases were being identified and contained. “We were already engaging with and supporting partners in Uganda through routine medical shipments and other ongoing support,” he explained. “That work was not Ebola-specific, but it reflects the kind of sustained support health systems need before, during, and after an emergency.” Direct Relief also dispatched $2.5 million in emergency medical support to the DRC, the epicenter of the outbreak, to support Ebola containment and treatment. But Dr. Samuel stressed that routine support can’t be disentangled from emergency response. Both are vital to containing an Ebola outbreak or similar public health emergency, and to helping affected communities respond and recover. “Ebola response is about much more than Ebola alone,” he said. “Stronger health systems allow countries to continue delivering essential healthcare services even while responding to an emergency.” Direct Relief: So many people are unfamiliar with Ebola, and it’s frightening. Can you give us some background? How does Ebola spread, what are the symptoms, and how do people stay safe? Jeffrey Samuel: Yeah, absolutely. Ebola is a severe viral disease: It primarily spreads through direct contact with body fluids from someone who is either sick with the disease or has died from it. That includes blood, vomit, diarrhea, urine, saliva, sweat, and other types of bodily fluids like that. It can also spread through contaminated medical equipment, unsafe burial practices, or direct contact with the body of someone who has died from the disease. One important thing I always emphasize with Ebola is that it’s not airborne, like measles or Covid-19. You can’t get Ebola simply by walking past someone. That’s why healthcare workers, the families that take care of these patients, and the people involved in different burial practices are often at the highest risk. Ebola typically starts with non-specific symptoms: stuff like fever, fatigue, muscle aches, headaches, and weakness. It can look like malaria, typhoid and other infectious diseases common in the region, so it’s hard to distinguish at the outset. It’s not until the disease starts to progress that many patients start developing vomiting, diarrhea, and dehydration. Their organs start to fail, and in some cases, patients can experience hemorrhaging in the later stages of illness. The incubation period, which means the time between when a person is exposed to when the symptoms begin, is usually between 2 and 21 days. That’s a very large range, which does not help [with diagnosis and containment] either. Direct Relief: How dangerous is this outbreak? Jeffrey Samuel: Historically, Ebola has been extremely deadly. Fatality rates typically depend on the strain involved, how quickly the outbreak is detected, and the strength of the healthcare system responding to it. Most people are familiar with the Zaire virus, which caused the large Ebola outbreaks from 2014 to 2016 in West Africa. Those outbreaks often had fatality rates around 50 to 70 percent, which is extremely high. The Bundibugyo virus, which is the one that’s causing the current outbreak, has historically had somewhat lower fatality rates – generally around 25 to 50 percent. But that’s still a very serious and potentially fatal disease. Direct Relief: How is Ebola prevented and treated? Jeffrey Samuel: In terms of prevention, the most important measures are early identification of cases, isolation of those suspected cases, infection prevention and control – in other words, good hand hygiene and personal protective equipment – contact tracing of people those patients have been in contact with recently, and safe burial procedures. You need strong community engagement and trust. That’s a big [issue] specifically with this outbreak. There have been reports of Ebola treatment units being attacked and set on fire, which shows how difficult containment becomes when fear, grief, and mistrust are present. Right now, the treatment is supportive care. That includes IV fluids, electrolyte replacement, oxygen support, treatment of secondary infections, management of blood pressure, providing the right nutritional support, and very careful monitoring. These supportive care measures can really improve survival in a massive way. For us at Direct Relief, focusing on supporting these areas is top priority. Direct Relief: Can you talk about the difference between treating the Zaire and Bundibugyo strains? Jeffrey Samuel: Absolutely. The biggest practical difference is that this current outbreak is being caused by the Bundibugyo virus, while the 2014 to 2016 West Africa outbreak was caused by the Zaire Ebola virus. That distinction matters because all of the approved vaccines and monoclonal antibody treatments that were developed over the past decade were specifically designed for the Zaire Ebola virus. But it’s important to remember that during that outbreak, these tools were not widely available. In fact, that outbreak is what accelerated [Ebola] vaccine and therapeutic development globally. Researchers are now working on similar tools for the Bundibugyo virus as well. In the meantime, the public health response principles remain largely the same. It’s really surveillance, monitoring, contact tracing, infection prevention and control, supportive care, and community engagement. Direct Relief: Why did this outbreak take so long to surface? Jeffrey Samuel: One of the biggest challenges is that early symptoms of Ebola look very similar to many other diseases common in the region. A patient with fever, vomiting, fatigue, or diarrhea may initially be suspected of having malaria, cholera, typhoid, or another common illness. In many outbreaks, the alarm bells only begin once healthcare workers become infected, or if there’s a cluster of unexplained deaths that appear, or if the laboratory testing confirms something unusual. This outbreak is also occurring in an incredibly complex environment. The eastern DRC has faced years of conflict, displacement, insecurity, and strain on the healthcare system. Insecurity can delay surveillance teams from reaching the affected areas. It can limit testing capacity, disrupt transport, and make it harder to trace contacts effectively. There are also trust issues that can emerge during outbreaks. In some communities, people may fear isolation centers or avoid seeking care because they worry about stigma or separation from family members. And because the Bundibugyo virus is relatively uncommon compared to the Zaire Ebola virus, it may not have been the first thing clinicians initially suspected when they were seeing these cases. Direct Relief: Is this going to spread much further? What happens if it does? Jeffrey Samuel: Yes, there’s certainly a risk of further regional spread, which is why neighboring countries have implemented stricter border controls, enhanced surveillance, and other preparedness measures. Rwanda, for example, temporarily closed key border crossings with the DRC. And in the U.S., travelers who have recently visited the DRC, Uganda, or South Sudan are being routed through designated airports for enhanced public health screening. The biggest danger is that outbreaks can overwhelm fragile health systems and healthcare facilities. They can reduce routine care access. They can increase infections in healthcare workers, and interrupt normal services like maternal and child health or vaccination programs. Ebola really creates broader humanitarian impacts, and in settings already affected by conflict or displacement, the response becomes even more difficult. A lot of measures have been put in place to try to prevent it from spreading further regionally. But that doesn’t negate the impact that’s happening on the ground right now. Direct Relief: During the West Africa outbreak, Americans were diagnosed with Ebola – it’s happened during this event too – and they had much better survival rates than the West African people who got sick. Why is that? Jeffrey Samuel: It’s important to state clearly that the differences in outcomes were not biological. They were largely about access to care and the strength of the surrounding healthcare system. Patients treated in highly resourced settings like the U.S. often received earlier diagnosis, intensive monitoring around the clock, aggressive fluid and electrolyte replacement. That’s a real key. They also had access to oxygen support, advanced laboratory testing, PPE, and intensive care when needed. [Note: the federal administration has announced that Americans diagnosed with Ebola during this outbreak are being routed to Kenya, not the U.S., for treatment.] In many outbreak settings, especially in places affected by conflict or displacement, it can be much harder to provide that same level of care consistently because the infrastructure and resources are often much more limited. And that can have a real impact on patient outcomes. Honestly, this is one of the broader lessons Ebola keeps exposing globally: Outbreak preparedness and health system strengthening are deeply connected. Direct Relief: Direct Relief has shipped a significant range of medical support, including PPE, cardiovascular drugs, and IV fluids, to the DRC in response to this Ebola outbreak. How did the organization decide what to send, and what role will that support play? Jeffrey Samuel: All these items play a very practical and important role in the outbreak response. PPE helps protect healthcare workers and prevent transmission inside of healthcare facilities. During Ebola outbreaks, protecting healthcare workers is critical because health worker infections can quickly weaken the overall response capacity. IV fluids are absolutely key to supportive care. Ebola patients often experience severe vomiting, diarrhea, dehydration, and electrolyte loss. So a key part of treatment is being able to replace those fluids and electrolytes. Beyond Ebola-specific supplies, essential medicines like cardiovascular drugs, antibiotics, and other critical treatments help keep the broader health system functioning during an outbreak. Ebola response does not pause the rest of healthcare – patients still need care for chronic diseases, infections, pregnancy complications, and other urgent health needs. And our approach is very much partner-driven. We work directly with local partner organizations, hospitals, and in-country ministries of health to understand the actual operational and clinical needs on the ground. We also look at storage capacity, cold chain requirements, logistics, and feasibility for what we send. The strongest responses happen when that emergency support is layered onto resilient local systems. Emergency response plus long-term system strengthening go hand in hand. The goal is to support countries not only in responding to the current outbreak, but also to build stronger systems for whatever comes next.
Bodies of two teenagers recovered by emergency workers following separate incidents in Kent and Oxford The number of water-related deaths during the UK’s recent heatwave has risen to 11 after the bodies of two teenage boys were recovered in Kent and Oxford. Emergency workers recovered the body of a 14-year-old boy from the River Thames near Donnington Bridge, Oxford, at about 5.30pm on Wednesday. Thames Valley police said the boy’s family had been informed and that his death was being treated as “unexplained but not suspicious”. Continue reading...
The NASA chief said the declassified UFO files reveal decades of 'real unexplained phenomena' that have been hidden away from the American public.
Countries: Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda Source: World Health Organization On 17 May 2026, pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 12 - Determination of a public health emergency of international concern, including a pandemic emergency of the International Health Regulations (2005) (IHR), the Director-General (DG) of the World Health Organization (WHO), after having consulted the States Parties where the event was known to be occurring, determined that the epidemic of Ebola disease caused by Bundibugyo virus in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda constitutes a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC), but did not meet the criteria of pandemic emergency, as defined in the IHR. The DG statement issued on 17 May 2026 also contained “WHO advice” to States Parties to respond to and prepare for the event. On 19 May 2026, the DG convened the first meeting of the IHR Emergency Committee regarding the epidemic of Ebola disease caused by Bundibugyo virus in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda (hereafter “Committee”). The Committee’s advice aligned with the determination by the DG that the event constitutes a PHEIC, but does not meet the criteria for pandemic emergency. The Committee acknowledged that the epidemic is occurring in one of the most challenging operational environments possible, therefore, any response must incorporate key contextual information to improve the chances of a successful response. The DG, considering the advice of the Committee, he is hereby issuing the following temporary recommendations to all States Parties to respond to and prepare to respond to the PHEIC. ==== Temporary recommendations These temporary recommendations are issued for subsets of States Parties according to the public health risk associated with the Bundibugyo virus disease epidemic they face. All current WHO interim technical guidance can be accessed on this page of the WHO website. WHO evidence-based guidance has been and will continue to be updated in line with the evolving situation, updated scientific evidence, and WHO risk assessment. The implementation of these temporary recommendations by States Parties shall be with full respect for the dignity, human rights and fundamental freedoms of persons, in accordance with the principles set out in Article 3 of the IHR. For States Parties with documented detection of Bundibugyo virus (the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda) As of 22 May 2026, the WHO Secretariat assessed the risk for these States Parties as “Very high” for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and as “High” for Uganda. It is noted that the epidemiological situation in the two States Parties differs in terms of magnitude of the epidemic and contexts where response efforts are being implemented. Specifically, as of 22 May 2026, Uganda has reported two confirmed cases of Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD), both with epidemiological link traceable to areas in the Democratic Republic of the Congo with documented BVD transmission. In Uganda, as of the same date, no onwards transmission among contacts of the two confirmed BVD cases was documented. The epidemic is caused by Bundibugyo virus (BDBV), a virus belonging to the Orthoebolavirus genus. Unlike Ebola virus causing Ebola virus disease, there is no currently approved therapeutics or vaccines against Bundibugyo virus. While candidate therapeutics are considered for clinical trials and work in ongoing to fast-track candidate vaccines evaluation, the control of the epidemic relies on scaling-up public health interventions as outlined below. Coordination and high-level engagement Declare the Bundibugyo virus disease (BVD) epidemic a health emergency, at national or sub-national level, in accordance with domestic laws, and as appropriate. Activate national disaster or health emergency management mechanisms and activate or establish an emergency operation centre, under the authority of the Head of State or relevant government authority, to coordinate response activities across Government sectors, administrative levels, and partners to ensure efficient and effective implementation and monitoring of comprehensive BVD control measures. These measures must include enhanced surveillance, including case identification; contact tracing; infection prevention and control (IPC), risk communication and community engagement; laboratory diagnostic testing, case management, and safe and dignified burials. Coordination and response mechanisms should be established at national level, as well as at subnational level in areas where BDBV has been detected and at-risk areas. Establish and maintain up to date a register of signals consistent with BVD (“alerts”), including status of their investigation. Establish and maintain up to date a line list of suspected cases – including identified through syndromic surveillance, probable cases, and confirmed BVD cases. Establish and maintain up to date the list of contacts of all confirmed and probable BVD cases, and monitor each contact for 21 days after the date of last known exposure. Both the evolution of the epidemic and resources available may require risk-based prioritization of contacts requiring identification and monitoring. Negotiate, as applicable, and establish security corridors, including cross-border, to allow responders to safely reach affected communities, as well as to allow communities to seek appropriate health care. Notify WHO, through the relevant WHO IHR Contact Point in the WHO Regional Office, the detection of suspected, probable and confirmed BVD cases on a daily basis, as per WHO case definitions available here. Risk communication and community engagement Implement large-scale trust building and community engagement interventions – using all trusted available communication channels, and working closely with local religious and traditional leaders, and traditional healers – so that communities are fully aware of the risk and benefits of control measures, and pro-actively contribute and support the early detection and early isolation of cases; the identification and monitoring of contacts; and safe and dignified burial practices. Strengthen community awareness, engagement and participation, to establish and strengthen trust, including by identifying and addressing cultural norms and beliefs that may serve as barriers to their full participation in the response; and by integrating interventions and community feedback, within the wider response, to address the needs of the population, particularly in contexts of the protracted humanitarian crisis in the Eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Train community leaders on the rationale underpinning public health measures, including the isolation of cases, monitoring of contacts, and safe burials in a dignified, non-stigmatizing, and non-punitive manner. Activate local networks, including community health workers, Red Cross volunteers, and other trusted community actors to promote protective behaviours; facilitate early detection and referral of suspected BVD cases; support contact tracing activities; and collect and relay community feedback to enhance the acceptance of public health measures. Enable adherence to movement restrictions, associated with the application of control measures, by providing food, water, communication, financial and psychosocial support. Surveillance and laboratory Strengthen surveillance and laboratory capacity, decentralized across first sub-national administrative levels (e.g., provinces) with documented BDBV detection, as well as in their neighbouring first sub-national administrative levels, through: Dedicated surveillance and response teams within each health zone and in neighbouring health zones determined to be at high risk for the introduction of BVD; Active case finding and enhanced community surveillance for clusters of unexplained illness or deaths; The investigation of “alerts” within 24 hours from detection; The scale-up and strengthen RT-PCR laboratory capacities for timely testing for BDBV, including the establishment of protocols for safe sample collection, sample referral pathways, biosafety training for laboratory workers; The decentralization of the laboratory capacities should be considered to allow for quick turn-around time and support patient care, as well as any clinical trials that may take place. Field laboratories should be set up in accordance with biosecurity and biosafety standards. A near point of care assay might be considered provided that its performance is validated against current RT-PCR standards. NB: The GeneXpert platform cannot detect Bundibugyo virus (BDBV). Identify and monitor, for 21 days after the date of last known exposure, the health of contacts of suspected probable, and confirmed BVD cases. On a daily basis, the health status of contacts being monitored should be assessed and recorded. Any contact developing symptoms compatible with BVD should be assessed, isolated, tested and cared for. Establish a mechanism to monitor the evolution of indicators related to the performance of contact tracing activities. Infection prevention and control in health facilities and in the context of care Strengthen measures to prevent nosocomial infections, including systematic mapping of health facilities, the establishment and dissemination of protocols for triage, targeted IPC interventions and sustained monitoring and supervision. Provide continuous IPC training to health care workers, including the proper use of personal protective equipment (PPE). Provide health facilities with sufficient supplies of appropriate PPE equipment to ensure the safety and protection of their staff, resources for timely payment of their salaries and, as appropriate, hazard pay. Establish channels for health workers to report and be assessed following exposures, and have access to psychosocial support and, when possible post-exposure prophylaxis under compassionate use or clinical trial. All health worker occupational exposure must be investigated to allow for immediate corrective actions. Consider building community IPC capacity by training community leaders, and emphasizing that hand hygiene not only contributes to bring the BVD epidemic under control, but also reduces the risk of transmission of other communicable diseases present in the same areas. Hand hygiene shall be facilitated at critical spots, such as schools, churches, bars, markets, local gatherings sites, points of entry, etc. Patient referral pathway and access to safe and optimized intensive care Establish dedicated BVD isolation and treatment centers or units for suspected, probable, and confirmed cases, located within, or close to, areas with documented BDBV detection, with sufficient staff who are specifically trained and equipped to implement optimized intensive supportive care. Establish protocols for transferring suspected BVD patients safely to dedicated health care facilities for their isolation, assessment and treatment in a humane and patient-centred approach. This includes trained ambulance teams, mechanisms to notify the receiving health care facility, the application of appropriate IPC precautions during transfer, and decontamination protocols for vehicles and equipment. Establish protocols for the handling and disposal of medical waste, in accordance with biosafety principles. Establish survivor follow-up programmes, including clinical care, counselling, semen testing and sexual health advice and condoms where appropriate, along with psychosocial support and stigma-reduction programmes. Maintain the package of essential health services, including by providing IPC equipment for them to operate safely. This includes, at minimum, malaria diagnosis and treatment, and maternal and child health services. Safe and dignified burials Establish protocols ensuring funerals and burials are conducted by well-trained personnel, with provision made for the presence of the family and cultural practices, and in accordance with relevant national laws and regulations. Operations, supplies and logistics Establish logistics support to maintain a robust supply pipeline for PPE, diagnostics, therapeutics, and other medical commodities, IPC materials, including for safe burial. Border health, international travel and mass-gathering events Enhance, through arrangements between countries sharing borders, surveillance at ground crossings and border areas. Implement measures, in accordance with national laws and regulations, to prevent suspected, probable, and confirmed BVD cases, as well as their contacts from undertaking international travel, unless the travel is part of an appropriate medical evacuation. Prevent the cross-border movement of the human remains of deceased suspected, probable or confirmed BVD cases, unless authorized through bilateral arrangements. Implement exit screening at all points of entry – airports, ports and ground crossings – consisting of, at a minimum, a questionnaire encompassing history of potential exposure to BVD, a temperature measurement and, in case of fever, an in-depth assessment of the risk of BVD, by personnel trained and equipped with PPE. Any traveller determined to present with an illness consistent with BVD should not be allowed to travel unless the travel is part of an appropriate medical evacuation. Report to WHO, through the relevant WHO IHR Contact Point in the WHO Regional Office, the implementation of any international traffic related measure adopted. Consider postponing mass gatherings until BVD transmission is interrupted. Research and development of medical countermeasures Engage, when feasible, with research partners and international institutions to: Define a robust laboratory strategy, urgently implement head-to-head comparison studies of PCR diagnostics to validate or invalidate the PCR platform (Radione ®) currently used in the field. Implement ethically approved, scientifically robust clinical trials to advance the development and use of candidate therapeutics for treatment and post-exposure prophylaxis and for vaccines. Establish, with a view to support research, expedited and efficient national regulatory and ethics reviews, community engagement, pharmacovigilance (where applicable), data sharing and equitable access arrangements. For States Parties with land borders adjoining States Parties with documented BDBV detection As of 22 May 2026, the WHO Secretariat assessed the regional risk “High”. Establish a national coordination mechanism articulated with subnational levels. Enhance rapidly the status of readiness to respond to BVD cases, including establishing active surveillance across health facilities, with zero reporting; enhancing community-based surveillance for clusters of unexplained deaths; establishing access to laboratories qualified to test for BVD; raising the awareness of health workers regarding BVD; training health workers on IPC precautions; establishing rapid response teams for the investigation and management of BVD patients and their contacts; establishing a mechanism for the identification and monitoring of contacts. Establish the capacity at national reference laboratory(ies) to timely and safely perform testing for BDBV along with relevant differential testing. Considerations may be given to shipment to an international reference laboratory for inter-laboratory comparison as part of external quality assurance implementation. Conduct international contact tracing operations as necessary, including obtaining information from airlines and other conveyances operations; identifying contacts associated with conveyances on an international voyage, and communicate with States Parties known as final destination of those contacts. Intensify risk communication and community engagement activities, in communities residing in border areas and at points of entry, including airports and ports with direct connection with States Parties with documented BDBV detection, and provide the general public with accurate and up to date information regarding the BVD epidemic and measures to reduce the risk of exposure. Exercise arrangements in place to respond to BVD through simulation exercises relating to management of BVD ” alerts”, including cross-border; sample referral; activation of rapid response teams and mechanisms. Establish, with a view to support research, expedited and efficient national regulatory and ethics reviews, community engagement, pharmacovigilance (where applicable), data sharing and equitable access arrangements. Border health and international travel Provide travelers with accurate and up to date information regarding the BVD epidemic and measures to reduce the risk of exposure, including discouraging travel to areas with documented BDBV detection. Enhance, through arrangements between countries sharing borders, surveillance at ground crossings. This includes establishing coordination mechanisms for the detection and assessment of travelers with unexplained febrile illness; and the timely sharing of information regarding contacts who have, or may have, crossed the border, thus enabling continuity of follow-up. Pre-position PPE, other IPC materials, sample collection kits, case investigation forms, and safe burial supplies in border areas adjacent to those with documented BDBV detection. Activate health contingency plans at airport and ports, involving conveyance operators, to detect, assess, and manage travellers from States Parties with documented BDBV detection, presenting with symptoms compatible with BVD, and the identification of their contacts, according to established protocols. This entails the availability of trained personnel, referral mechanisms, application of IPC measures. Coordinate with conveyance operators to facilitate timely communication, prior to arrival and to relevant authorities, of any suspected BVD cases on board conveyances, and to identify contacts associated with conveyances on an international voyage. The identification of such contacts entails, where applicable, the communication of personal details to the States Parties known as final destination of those contacts. At the time these temporary recommendations are issued, neither the suspension of flights or waterways routes with States Parties with documented BDBV detection, nor denial of entry to travellers and conveyances arriving from those States Parties, are recommended. Report to WHO, through the relevant WHO IHR Contact Point, the implementation of any international traffic related measure adopted. Treat as a health emergency, including through a formal declaration according to domestic laws, the detection of a suspected or confirmed BVD case, of a contact thereof, or of a cluster of unexplained deaths. This include investigating any of those events within 24 hours and, by instituting case isolation and management; establishing a definitive diagnosis; and undertaking the identification and monitoring of contacts. Notify to WHO immediately, through the relevant WHO IHR Contact Point in the WHO Regional Offices, any suspected, probable or confirmed BVD case, as per WHO case definitions available here. In the presence of a BVD case, temporary recommendations for State Parties States Parties with documented BDBV detection apply. For all other States Parties As of 22 May 2026, the WHO Secretariat assessed the risk for these States Parties as “Low”. Make arrangements to detect, assess, report and manage travelers with unexplained febrile illness arriving from areas with documented BDBV tdetection. These include, but are not limited to, disseminating the definition of BVD cases to public and private health care facilities, including travel clinics, and general practitioners; identifying laboratories to conduct testing for BDBV; identifying isolation facilities allowing for safe assessment and clinical care. Provide no-governemntal organizations and other entities deploying personnel internationally to respond to the BVD epidemic with information on risk, measures to minimize the risk of exposure, and advice for managing a potential exposure. Prepare to facilitate the evacuation and repatriation of nationals (e.g., health workers) who have been exposed to BVD cases. Provide the general public with accurate and up to date information regarding the BVD epidemic and measures to reduce the risk of exposure, including discouraging travel to areas with documented BDBV detection. Border health and international travel Provide accurate and up to date information regarding the BVD epidemic to travel clinics, other health facilities and professionals, and discourage travel to areas with documented BDBV detection. Provide incoming travelers, at points of entry, with information about measures to take should they develop symptoms compatible with BVD within 21 days after arrival. Coordinate with the transport sector, including conveyance and points of entry operators, for the timely management of suspected BVD cases, including communication prior to arrival if the individual is on board; as well as for the identification of their contacts on board conveyance. The identification of such contacts entails, where applicable, the communication of personal details to the States Parties known as final destination of those contacts. At the time these temporary recommendations are issued, neither the suspension of flights from States Parties with documented BDBV detection, nor denial of entry to travellers and conveyances arriving from those States Parties, are recommended. Report to WHO, through the relevant WHO IHR Contact Point, the implementation of any international traffic related measure adopted. Notify to WHO immediately, through the relevant WHO IHR Contact Point in the WHO Regional Offices, any suspected, probable or confirmed BVD case, as per WHO case definitions available here. In the presence of a BVD case, temporary recommendations for States Parties with documented BDBV detection apply. All States Parties Reporting on the implementation of temporary recommendations Report quarterly to WHO on the status of, and challenges related to, the implementation of these temporary recommendations, using a standardized tool and channels that will be made available by WHO, also allowing for the monitoring of progress and the identification of gaps in the national response. Media Contacts WHO Media Team World Health Organization Email: mediainquiries@who.int
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