뉴스

Smart pipelines: Can AI protect the world’s energy lifelines?

As ageing pipelines face growing risks, the energy industry is increasingly turning to AI and smart monitoring systems to improve their safety and efficiency.

US eyes stake in Azerbaijan's pipelines as economic ties enter new phase after Trump-brokered deal

Washington wants in on Azerbaijan's pipelines and energy infrastructure, a senior US official said in Baku, as the two countries deepen economic ties following Trump's White House peace deal with Armenia.

The ₹ warning: Six actions for biz leaders

The Indian rupee is trading around Rs. 95-96 to the dollar in late May 2026, setting fresh record lows. Markets are openly discussing the Rs. 100 threshold. The rupee has weakened in almost every year since 2014 and has lost approximately half its value against the dollar over that period. The end of this currency depreciation is not in sight. The factors that would stop it are not yet visible.The government is acting. State run oil companies have implemented four fuel price hikes in ten days as of May 25, taking petrol in Delhi past Rs. 102 per litre. This is the right and necessary response to the energy cost reality created by the Iran war. Crucially, the Modi government has also done its part on the macroeconomic front, consistently and aggressively reducing the fiscal deficit as a percentage of GDP to maintain structural stability.Yet, the currency pressure persists. The energy price impact has not yet fully reached Indian consumers and supply chains. It is coming.Uday Kotak said it plainly at the CII Annual Business Summit on May 12: "Be ready for tough times rather than waiting for the shock to hit us." He was right.Also read | Manufactured monopoly: How industrial policy is structuring monopolies in IndiaThis is not a time to panic. But it is a time to act. The leaders who move now will have options. Those who wait will not.The Overriding Factor: The Psychology of the PlayersWhy is the currency declining despite strong domestic fiscal discipline? Because exchange rates are not driven by mathematical models alone. The currency decline is highly affected—and accelerated—by the psychology of all players engaged in this endeavor.Currency movements are deeply behavioral. When a currency visualizes a downward trend, psychology shifts from calculation to self-protection and speculation. Every player in the ecosystem operates under this psychological weight:Corporate CFOs and Treasurers: Instead of hedging normally, they rush to cover future dollar liabilities early, hoarding hard currency and inadvertently worsening the scarcity.Foreign Investors: They begin to judge their returns not by the quality of Indian business operations, but by the eroding value of the conversion rate.Importers and Exporters: Importers advance their payments to avoid paying more tomorrow; exporters delay converting their dollar earnings back into rupees, waiting for a "better" rate. This collective psychology creates a self-fulfilling prophecy.Investors, CFOs, and FDI decision makers extrapolate what is happening now into the future. When they see a currency that has lost approximately half its value since 2014 with no clear floor in sight, their psychological pivot alters market realities.Also read | India tightens checks on overseas flows as currency pressure mounts, sources sayThe cascading timeline of Foreign Portfolio Investor (FPI) equity behavior perfectly mirrors this psychological shift from rational evaluation to systemic risk aversion:2024 (The Calculation Phase): Rupee averages Rs. 83-84. FPI flows remain positive (+$12 billion) as investors trade on strong domestic corporate earnings.2025 (The Self-Protection Phase): Rupee slides past Rs. 89. Collective psychology shifts to risk mitigation. FPIs withdraw a record $18.4 billion from Indian equities—the largest annual equity outflow on record.Early 2026 (The Capitulation Phase): Rupee breaks past Rs. 95. Sentiment turns into an outright exit strategy. In the first four months of 2026 alone, outflows have already reached $19.1 billion, completely bypassing the entire previous year's record loss in a fraction of the time.FDI agreements are being signed, but capital is delayed because players are psychologically hesitant to deploy funds into a depreciating asset.The Trap of Hard Currency Debt: A Broken Business Model There is a highly significant and dangerous phenomenon unfolding in India today that requires immediate exposure. For years, a specific class of Indian corporates adopted a regular strategy of borrowing heavily in hard currency (External Commercial Borrowings, or ECBs). Lured by low nominal global interest rates, several of these companies over borrowed, treating cheap dollar debt as a permanent structural advantage.Today, that strategy has become a trap. The compounding effect of a depreciating rupee, skyrocketing hedging costs, and brutal refinancing realities is fundamentally breaking their business models.Consider the mechanics of this crisis:The Hedging Penalty: Leaving dollar debt unhedged is now corporate roulette. However, buying hedges at current rupee levels has become structurally prohibitive. The cost of protection completely wipes out any interest rate advantage.The Refinancing Wall: Billions in foreign debt are coming due. These over-borrowed companies must now refinance their liabilities at a time when the rupee value has materially deteriorated. They are effectively forced to borrow far more rupees just to pay back the same amount of original dollars.The Crushing Cost of Rupee Capital: As these companies try to pivot back to domestic lenders, they face a severe escalation in their rupee cost of capital.The Growth Verdict: When your cost of capital spikes and your cash flows are consumed by servicing legacy dollar debt, future growth stops. Capital expenditure (CapEx) plans are being frozen. These companies can no longer invest in innovation, capacity, or market expansion. Their business model shifts overnight from aggressive value creation to basic survival. Boards must realize that this is not a temporary treasury headache; it is a structural threat to the company’s future viability.India's forex reserves stand at approximately 10 to 11 months of import cover. Substantial, but being actively deployed to defend the currency. Some imports are non-negotiable: oil, critical inputs, components. These will now cost more. That cost passes through every supply chain.Six Actions for Business Leaders1. Protect your cash and liquidity first. This is the most immediate priority. Map your cash position today. Identify every source of liquidity across the next twelve months. Stress-test it at Rs. 100 and beyond. Which receivables are at risk? Which credit lines are rupee-denominated and which are not? Companies that run into a cash crisis during a currency depreciation cycle lose their options entirely. The CFO must own this analysis and present it to the board within days, not weeks.2. Act now on your foreign currency borrowings, hedging, and refinancing. Do not assume the rupee will recover to Rs. 80. Analyse your full foreign currency exposure across the next three years: every loan, every refinancing date, every hedging contract, every procurement price denominated in foreign currency. Hard currency loans now face refinancing at rupee values that have materially deteriorated. Model every scenario at Rs. 100 and beyond. Your CFO, treasury, and procurement team must be aligned on one instruction: do not run into a liquidity crisis. This analysis must happen now, not at the next quarterly review.3. Build a war room. Most companies have begun thinking about war rooms for supply chain disruptions. Expand the mandate. Currency exposure belongs in the same room. Which of your costs are dollar or euro denominated? Which of your revenues are rupee denominated? Where is the mismatch? What is your break-even exchange rate? If you do not have clear answers today, you are exposed. The war room is not a committee. It is a real-time decision environment with live data, a clear owner, and the authority to act.4. Use the currency depreciation advantage: double your export salesforce. A weaker rupee makes Indian exports more competitive. This window will not stay open indefinitely. Double the salesforce in your export markets now. Use this period to upgrade quality, improve service delivery, and build customer relationships that will last beyond the currency advantage. Indian exporters who invest in capability during this period will emerge stronger regardless of what the rupee does next. Those who simply ride the price advantage without building the underlying business will lose when conditions change.5. Watch your stock and your sector. Banks and financial institutions should already be on high alert. Companies with large foreign currency exposure will see pressure on their financials. Some stock prices are already reflecting this. Go through your sector company by company. Identify who is most exposed. If you are an investor or a lender, this analysis is not optional. The combination of currency depreciation, rising oil prices, and FPI outflows creates a compounding pressure that will surface in earnings before it surfaces in headlines.6. Cut costs aggressively. AI will help. There has never been more urgency to reduce costs than now. And there has never been a better tool to do it. AI can cut most operational costs by as much as 30% across functions: procurement, finance, customer service, logistics, and compliance. McKinsey data confirms companies adopting AI and automation reduce operational costs by 20 to 30 percent. This is not a future opportunity. It is a present imperative. Every rupee of cost removed through AI is a rupee that does not need to be recovered through revenue in a deteriorating currency environment. Start now with your highest-cost functions.The CFO as CaptainCurrency risk is a cash flow risk. Every function that touches foreign currency—procurement, treasury, sales, capex planning— must now report into a single coordinating authority. That authority is the CFO. This is not about hierarchy. It is about clarity. In a currency crisis, fragmented decision-making is as dangerous as wrong decision making. One captain. One consolidated view. Weekly reviews minimum.The Bigger PictureThis currency depreciation is a structural signal, not a cyclical one. India's economy must move from a cheap labour advantage to genuine global value creation.The companies that will survive and thrive are those building products and services that command premium prices in global markets. The rupee's weakness is a reminder that competing on cost alone has limits.The recently concluded trade agreements are a genuine opportunity. Execute them with full force. Build the export pipelines. Add the sales capacity.The businesses that move now, with discipline and clarity, will manage market psychology, navigate the debt trap, and define the next chapter of Indian industry.The shock is coming. Prepare before it arrives.Ram Charan is the author of China’s 90% model. It is restricting India’s industrial progress. Former Director of Hindalco and Muyuan (China).

‘Buying stuff like it’s going out of fashion’: Biotech M&A on track for best year since pre-Covid

Driven by looming patent cliffs, newly buoyant public markets, and Big Pharma's race to beef up their pipelines, dealmaking in 2026 is off to a strong start.

District administrations gear up for reopening of schools in Vellore, nearby districts

Many schools were given a facelift, like removal of bushes, erection of steel fences around the campus, replacing old electrical lines and water pipelines with new ones

Towngas in talks with govt to raise gas prices

Towngas on Monday said it is in discussions with the government to raise gas fees due to the latest energy price spikes caused by the conflict in the Middle East. Peter Wong, the managing director of Hong Kong's sole gas provider, told a press conference that the prices of naphtha, which accounts for about 40 percent of the raw materials for producing gas, has doubled since the start of the year. "We are currently under pressure to raise charges and we're in close communication with the government over the extent of the price increase. It's also because of the rise in energy prices and inflation," he said. "As to when a decision will be made, It's up to the government. But if we look back to two years ago, our previous price increase was implemented on August 1," he added. Wong, however, did not give a timeline on when the prices would go up. He noted that the firm has so far saved more than HK$20 billion on fuel costs for local customers because of its long-term "take or pay" contract with a supplier in Australia to secure natural gas. Under their 25-year agreement, signed in 2006, the Australian firm would supply natural gas to Towngas for fixed prices during the period. Towngas has also started negotiations with the Australian supplier over the new prices of their contract as the current one is set to expire in 2031, but "it's difficult to assess the new pricing", Wong said. Separately, he forecast that the city's total gas consumption would decline by three percent year-on-year in the first half of the year, partly because of the high temperatures that has reduced residential demand. But he added that the decline is likely to be smaller for the full year, pointing to a recent increase in gas consumption in the hotel and catering sectors. Meanwhile, Wong expressed optimism over the Northern Metropolis development, noting the company is laying pipelines to meet the demand of the expected additional 1.5 million residents and commercial users there. Edited by Aaron Tam

AUKUS undersea drones development boosts regional security: Australia deputy PM

Growing threats to critical underwater infrastructure, such as telecommunications cables and energy pipelines, underscore the need for stronger maritime defence capabilities, Australia's Deputy Prime Minister Richard Marles told CNA's Tan Qiuyi on the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue.

Ukrainian forces strike key hub linking Russia's largest oil pipelines from Siberia to Europe – video

Drones operated by Ukrainian Special Operations Forces (SOF) struck a major oil pipeline control station on a large oil pipeline in Russia's Kirov Oblast, as well as an oil depot in Rostov Oblast, on the night of 30-31 May.

UK, US and Australia to develop 'cutting-edge' underwater drone technology

The new technology is expected to be ready by 2027 and is designed to help defend critical subsea cables and pipelines.

Inside the new IIP index with new base year

India is undertaking the revision of Index of Industrial Production (IIP) and plans to release the new series on June 1, 2026, marking the tenth revision of base year. The Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation (MoSPI) has broadened the scope of the index to include 120 new item groups and enhance the granularity by providing separate indices for numerous sectors.The base year of IIP is being shifted to 2022-23 from 2011-12. The new IIP will track several new items such as magnetic stripe cards including debit and credit cards, CCTV cameras, non-woven textile products, aircraft and spacecraft parts, stents, and vaccines.The revised series significantly widens the scope of industrial activity captured in the index by adding emerging and previously underrepresented sectors such as rare earth minerals, gas supply, water management and waste treatment.MoSPI has also overhauled the product basket to better reflect contemporary industrial production patterns, replacing obsolete items with newer commodities and aligning the series with the updated National Industrial Classification (NIC)-2025 framework. The revised basket now comprises 1,042 products mapped to 463 item groups, including 120 new item groups. MoSPI has dropped 64 item groups from the list, which include kerosene, fluorescent tubes and CFLs, tubes for bicycle, tricycle and rickshaw tyres.The new series introduces more granular sub-indices, including separate tracking of renewable and non-renewable electricity generation, allowing policymakers to better monitor India’s evolving energy mix. The mining and quarrying segment has also been split into dedicated indices for fuel minerals, metallic minerals and non-metallic minerals.The revised methodology also allows statistical authorities to replace permanently shut factories with comparable operating units and induct newly commissioned large factories into the sample base during the life of the series. This is expected to improve the representativeness and timeliness of industrial output data.MoSPI will use a geometric mean-based approach to transition from the 2011-12 base series to the new 2022-23 series.Why is the base year being revised?According to a government release, the IIP base year is revised to reflect structural changes in the economy, technological progress, and the growth of new industries and products. “Revising the base year ensures that the index accurately represents current production patterns and provides more reliable data for economic analysis and policy-making,” MoSPI said.A Report of the Technical Advisory Committee for ‘New Series of All India Index ofIndustrial Production 2022-23’ highlighted the need for periodic revision which arises from the dynamic nature of the economy.“The structure of production, the relative importance of industries, and the range of products manufactured undergo continuous change over time,” it said, adding that regular revisions of the base years of economic indicators like IIP are therefore essential to ensure that they remain representative of current industrial activity.The index must continue to accurately reflect evolving economic realities.Citing “significant” advancements in statistical methodologies and computational capabilities over the period, MoSPI report said that the processes that were difficult to execute have now become relatively easier to implement.The new IIP series retains the existing sectors of Mining, Manufacturing, and Electricity. However, it expands the scope by including Gas Supply and Water Supply, Sewerage & Waste Management activities, giving a broader and more accurate picture of industrial production. In the Mining sector, the new IIP series also includes minor minerals and rare earth minerals along with major minerals, making the index more comprehensive.131367884The item basket for sectors, other than Manufacturing, is selected based on the nature of activities and key measurable outputs of each sector. MoSPI, in certain cases, has held consultation with concerned ministries and departments.The new item baskets are as follows:The ‘Mining & Quarrying’ basket includes 34 minerals comprising fuel minerals and metallic & non-metallic minerals regulated, along with 1 rare earth mineral and 9 minor minerals.The ‘Electricity’ basket covers total electricity generation from both renewable and non-renewable sources.The ‘Gas Supply’ basket uses the volume of gas supplied or distributed through mains/pipelines as the item of measurement.Under the ‘Water Supply, Sewerage & Waste Management’, the government tracks water supply through tap connections, sewerage through sewerage/septage connections and waste management through the quantity of waste collected and processed.MoSPI has formed the item groups for IIP by aggregating products based on similarity within the industry group to ensure consistency, comparability, and operational feasibility in monthly data reporting.The government has also kept the revision of substitution of the factories in the new series of IIP to address the challenges of prolonged non-response or closed factory.While the six use-based categories—Primary Goods, Capital Goods, Intermediate goods, Infrastructure/ Construction Goods, Consumer Durable Goods and Consumer Non-Durable Goods—remain the same as the 2011–12 series, individual item classifications have been reviewed in detail and updated.Why is IIP important?The report recognised that the index is “not just a technical statistical indicator, but an important measure” that stakeholders understand the health and direction of the economy.The IIP provides one of the earliest signals of industrial performance, and hence plays a crucial role in economic planning, policymaking, and market analysis.The index plays a pivotal role in tracking cyclical conditions, informing fiscal and monetary policy deliberations, and shaping expectations of businesses and investors, helped by macro and sectoral analysts.MoSPI believes in the idea that economic statistics must keep pace with the economic transformations, and hence new products, emerging technologies, evolving production systems, and changing patterns of industrial activity are being included in the index calculation.“Industrial statistics cannot remain fixed while industries themselves are rapidly changing,” it said in the report cited above.

UAE and Iraq bolster pipelines to bypass Hormuz bottleneck

Sudan Crisis Situation Analysis (Period: 11/05/26 - 17/05/26)

Country: Sudan Source: Data Friendly Space Please refer to the attached file. Sudan is facing one of the world’s largest humanitarian and displacement crises as the conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which began in April 2023, enters its fourth year in 2026. The conflict has triggered widespread civilian suffering, economic collapse, mass displacement, and severe regional instability, with humanitarian conditions continuing to deteriorate across much of the country. An estimated 19.5 million people are currently experiencing acute food insecurity, making Sudan the world’s largest hunger crisis. Famine conditions have been confirmed in el-Fasher (North Darfur) and Kadugli (South Kordofan), while numerous areas across Darfur and Kordofan remain at high risk of famine amid ongoing conflict, siege tactics, disrupted markets, and severe restrictions on humanitarian access. Children continue to bear a disproportionate burden of the crisis, with millions exposed to acute malnutrition, disease outbreaks, and heightened mortality risks. Fatality estimates remain highly contested due to limited humanitarian access, communication blackouts, and verification constraints. The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) recorded nearly 30,000 reported deaths by late 2024, while several independent investigations and international media estimates suggest the true death toll may exceed 150,000 people. Civilians continue to face widespread violence, including indiscriminate shelling, aerial bombardments, drone attacks, and ethnically targeted killings, particularly in Darfur and parts of Kordofan. Sudan’s health system remains severely degraded, especially in active conflict zones where many facilities are non-operational or functioning only partially. Between 2024 and early 2026, Sudan experienced a nationwide cholera outbreak that spread across all 18 states, infecting more than 124,000 people and causing over 3,500 deaths before authorities declared the outbreak contained in March 2026. However, overcrowded displacement sites, poor sanitation conditions, and limited healthcare access continue to create significant risks of renewed outbreaks of cholera and other communicable diseases. Displacement continues to rise at an unprecedented scale. More than 14 million people have been displaced since the start of the conflict, including approximately 9 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) and more than 4 million refugees who have fled to neighboring countries, making Sudan the world’s largest displacement crisis. At the same time, limited returns to parts of Khartoum and Al Jazirah have increased since early 2026 as frontlines shifted, although returnees continue to face devastated infrastructure, insecurity, limited public services, and severe livelihood shortages. Militarily, the conflict has continued to expand and fragment since late 2025. The RSF has expanded its territorial influence across much of Darfur and intensified offensives in Kordofan, while the SAF has maintained control over key eastern and northern urban centers. Fighting around Kadugli, Dilling, and other strategic locations in Kordofan has trapped large civilian populations under increasingly dire humanitarian conditions. The conflict has also seen a growing use of drones, aerial strikes, and long-range attacks targeting civilian infrastructure, including hospitals, schools, markets, and displacement sites. In December 2025, a drone strike on a kindergarten and hospital in Kalogi reportedly killed at least 114 people, including dozens of children, while separate attacks on peacekeeping personnel highlighted the increasing risks faced by humanitarian actors and civilians alike. Ethnic violence and sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) continue to escalate, particularly in Darfur. Human rights organizations and women-led monitoring networks have documented widespread abuses, including conflict-related sexual violence, forced displacement, arbitrary detention, and attacks targeting ethnic communities. Despite sustained diplomatic pressure, including sanctions imposed by the United States and United Kingdom on RSF leaders and affiliated financial networks, regional and international mediation initiatives have thus far failed to secure a durable ceasefire or political settlement. The conflict is increasingly destabilizing neighboring countries through refugee flows, cross-border insecurity, arms trafficking, and growing pressure on already fragile humanitarian systems across the region. Meanwhile, humanitarian operations remain critically underfunded. The World Food Programme (WFP) warned in 2026 that severe funding shortfalls threaten additional ration cuts and disruptions to emergency food assistance pipelines, placing millions at further risk of hunger and malnutrition. As of mid-2026, Sudan remains trapped in a protracted and increasingly fragmented conflict characterized by territorial fragmentation, widespread civilian targeting, deepening food insecurity, and severe humanitarian access constraints. Without urgent, coordinated, and sustained international engagement—including increased humanitarian financing, civilian protection measures, and renewed diplomatic efforts toward a negotiated settlement—the crisis is likely to continue worsening, with profound implications for Sudan and the wider region.

Building A World Class Creative Tech Hub In Vancouver

The Los Angeles film industry is struggling, but Vancouver's similar sector is thriving with a mix of industry attention, government support and educational pipelines.

oPt: Humanitarian Situation Report | 25 May 2026

Country: occupied Palestinian territory Source: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Please refer to the attached file. Highlights In just one week, more than 50 attacks by settlers across the West Bank resulted in casualties or property damage, including arson attacks that damaged a mosque, homes, farmland and vehicles. OCHA has documented an average of six such attacks per day in 2026. Concerns over the risk of forced displacement of hundreds of Palestinians in eastern Jerusalem governorate intensified after the Israeli Finance Minister called for the rapid implementation of long-standing demolition orders against Khan al Ahmar. In Gaza, humanitarian partners have launched a pest-control campaign in over 1,700 locations, while warning that their efforts are limited by shortages and restrictions. Only half of all aid trucks from Egypt could offload at the Israeli-controlled Kerem Shalom Crossing in the first 18 days of May, based on data tracked by the Logistics Cluster. Overview The Occupied Palestinian Territory remains heavily fragmented; with people not allowed to move between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and movement within each of those areas further restricted by military divisions, physical barriers, and closed zones. Combined with ongoing violence, which keeps claiming civilian lives, these conditions are further deepening people’s humanitarian needs while making it both difficult and unsafe for them to access support. This past week saw new waves of displacement before previous ones had even ended, as attacks and threats once again forced people from their homes or shelters. For humanitarian partners, getting staff and the whole range of critical supplies to where they are needed remains extremely difficult. West Bank Across the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, escalating settler violence, Israeli forces’ operations, demolitions, displacement, and movement restrictions are increasingly heightening protection risks and disrupting Palestinians’ access to essential services. Hundreds of Palestinians living in Area C of eastern Jerusalem governorate are at risk of forced displacement, with concerns intensifying after the Israeli Finance Minister instructed Israeli authorities to rapidly implement long-standing demolition orders against Khan al Ahmar. Bedouin community leaders reported high levels of fear and uncertainty among residents following the announcement. Khan al Ahmar is among 18 Bedouin and herding communities, comprising about 4,000 people, directly affected by the E1 settlement plan between East Jerusalem and Ma’ale Adumim settlement. Humanitarian partners have long warned that the E1 settlement plan would further fragment the West Bank, sever East Jerusalem from the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, heighten the risk of forced displacement of Bedouin communities, and have severe humanitarian consequences for Palestinians across the West Bank. Since 2009, OCHA has documented the demolition of about 550 structures in the 18 communities for lacking Israeli-issued building permits, which are difficult for Palestinians to obtain, including 175 donor-funded structures provided as humanitarian assistance. According to the Shelter Cluster, between 1 January and 30 April, partners reached over 9,300 households, comprising more than 40,300 people, across the West Bank with shelter assistance, targeting displaced families and others affected by conflict-related damage, escalating settler violence, the increasing risk of forcible displacement of entire communities, and deteriorating shelter conditions. Assistance included shelter repairs and rehabilitation; support to displaced families in meeting basic shelter needs; installation of protective measures such as fences, doors, and window mesh; cash assistance for rental support; and the provision of tents, plastic sheeting, bedding kits, kitchen sets, and clothing vouchers. To help Palestinian communities cope with displacement shocks and heightened insecurity, community-based psychosocial support remains the primary intervention modality, complemented by recreational and structured support activities as well as parenting sessions. On average every week, child protection partners provide mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS) to approximately 1,600 children, including about 80 children with disabilities, and more than 670 caregivers. Partners additionally reach a weekly average of about 380 children and 100 caregivers through awareness raising sessions, including explosive ordnance risk education. Over the past week, cash assistance as well as clothing and other in-kind assistance was provided to about 60 children and 12 caregivers to help address urgent needs and reduce exposure to negative coping mechanisms, while 35 children received case management support, including specialized referrals. Casualties and Escalating Settler Violence Between 12 and 18 May (the reporting period in this section), Israeli forces and settlers killed five Palestinians, including one child, while nearly 60 Palestinians, including six children, were injured across the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. More than half of the injuries occurred during settler attacks, while the remainder were mainly recorded in the context of Israeli forces’ search operations and other raids. During the same period, OCHA documented more than 50 Israeli settler attacks against Palestinians that resulted in casualties, property damage, or both, bringing the number of such attacks documented since the beginning of 2026 to over 870 across more than 220 communities – an average of six attacks per day. Israeli forces shot and killed two Palestinian men while they were reportedly attempting to cross the Barrier. On 12 May, Israeli forces opened fire toward two Palestinians attempting to scale the Barrier near Dahiyat al Bareed, in Jerusalem governorate, killing a Palestinian man from Deir Qaddis village (Ramallah governorate) and injuring another. On 17 May, Israeli forces shot a Palestinian man near the Barrier in Beit Ula village, in Hebron governorate, under similar circumstances. He succumbed to his wounds the following day. Since 7 October 2023, when Israeli authorities revoked or suspended most permits issued to Palestinians to access East Jerusalem and Israel for work and other purposes, and as of 11 May, OCHA has documented the killing of 19 Palestinians and the injury of over 290 others who were reportedly attempting to cross the Barrier. On 14 May, Israeli forces shot and killed a Palestinian child in Al Lubban ash Sharqiya village, in Nablus governorate and withheld his body. In a statement, the Israeli military said that soldiers had opened fire toward Palestinians near Road 60 after stones were thrown at Israeli vehicles traveling on the road. Elsewhere in the northern West Bank, on 16 May, Israeli forces shot and killed a Palestinian man at the entrance to Jenin Camp, which has remained a closed military zone since January 2025, reportedly while he was attempting to enter. In a large-scale attack across Sinjil, Jiljiliya and Abwein villages in Ramallah governorate on 13 May, Israeli forces and settlers shot and killed one Palestinian and injured 10 Palestinians. According to local sources and video footage, dozens of Israeli settlers raided the western area of Sinjil and nearby areas in Jiljiliya and Abwein villages, stealing Palestinian-owned livestock and other property. When residents attempted to retrieve stolen flocks, Israeli forces and settlers fired live ammunition, rubber bullets and tear gas canisters. In a statement, the Israeli military said forces had entered the area following reports that Palestinians had stolen sheep from a settlement outpost, and that troops responded with crowd-control measures and live fire after stones were thrown at them while exiting the village. Subsequently, on 16 May, 22 Palestinian Bedouin families, comprising 137 people including 81 children, in the area were forcibly displaced from the area following recurrent settler attacks and intimidation. The families had previously been displaced from three other communities in 2023 due to settler violence. The reporting period saw a concerning escalation in arson attacks targeting Palestinian property, especially in Ramallah and Hebron governorate, including incidents involving anti-Palestinian graffiti. In one incident, Israeli settlers set fire to a mosque in Jibiya village in Ramallah governorate. In Al Mughayyir and Burqa villages, also in Ramallah governorate, settlers set fire to agricultural land, burning olive trees and cultivated areas, with one fire spreading across about 10 dunums due to strong winds. In Wadi ar Rakhim community near Susiya, in southern Hebron governorate, Israeli settlers threw flammable materials toward a Palestinian home, setting fire to an external kitchen, damaging a parked vehicle, and causing damage to parts of the house. In addition to the arson attacks, Israeli settlers carried out multiple assaults on Palestinian homes and infrastructure across Ramallah, Nablus, Salfit and Hebron governorates. These included physical assaults against Palestinians, attacks on homes while families, including children, were inside, damage to water and electricity infrastructure, theft and vandalism of agricultural property, and the destruction of olive trees and fencing. In one incident in Hebron governorate on 17 May, a large group of settlers reportedly physically assaulted four Palestinians and damaged residential structures and personal property in Umm ad Daraj community near Sa’ir village. In Ramallah governorate, settlers from a recently established outpost near Ein ‘Arik village reportedly raided homes, physically assaulted four Palestinians, vandalized water tanks and construction materials, and seized electric cables. A Palestinian-owned car torched in Jibiya village, Ramallah governorate, where Israeli settlers also set fire to a mosque and spray-painted Hebrew graffiti on its walls during one of more than 50 settler attacks documented across the West Bank during the week of 12-18 May 2026. Photo by OCHA. On 14, 15 and 16 May, during the annual Israeli “Jerusalem Day” and accompanying “Flag March” events, Israeli settlers and other Israelis, including Israeli officials, marched through the Old City of Jerusalem and several Palestinian neighbourhoods in East Jerusalem under protection by Israeli forces. Israeli forces erected barriers, restricted Palestinian movement and access, including to Al Aqsa Mosque, and facilitated the marches throughout the Old City and surrounding areas. During the events, settlers assaulted Palestinians and damaged Palestinian-owned property, including shops and homes, while chanting anti-Arab and anti-Palestinian slogans. In Silwan neighbourhood, settlers physically assaulted and injured a 16-year-old Palestinian boy with a metal stick, causing facial fractures, while in the Old City two Palestinian shop owners were injured after settlers attacked their stores and sprayed them with pepper spray. According to local sources, Israeli forces also physically assaulted and arrested at least 20 Palestinians during the three-day events. Demolitions and Displacement During the reporting period, Israeli authorities demolished four homes and 20 agricultural and livelihood-related structures for lacking Israeli-issued building permits, which are nearly impossible for Palestinians to obtain. Overall, 19 structures were demolished in Area C and five in East Jerusalem, resulting in the displacement of five households comprising 26 people, including nine children, of whom 15 people were displaced in East Jerusalem and 11 in Area C. Eighteen of the 19 structures demolished in Area C were agricultural or livelihood-related structures, including 12 structures demolished in a single incident on 13 May in Area C of Al Marwaha area of Beit Hanina, on the Jerusalem side of the Barrier. During the incident, the Israeli Civil Administration, accompanied by Israeli forces, demolished animal shelters, caravans, and storage and sales facilities for construction materials, in addition to surrounding fences, affecting seven Palestinian households comprising 41 people, including 23 children. The demolition resulted in significant financial losses, as affected families were unable to remove most materials and equipment prior to the operation. Since the beginning of 2026, about 71 per cent of the approximately 400 structures demolished in Area C for lacking Israeli-issued building permits have been agricultural, livelihood-related, or water and sanitation structures. Humanitarian Impacts of Raids and Movement Restrictions During the reporting period, OCHA documented more than 40 raids and other operations by Israeli forces across the West Bank, involving house searches, mass detentions, temporary home evacuations, and movement restrictions, disrupting access to livelihoods, education and essential services and heightening fear and distress among affected communities. In multiple governorates, including Tubas, Salfit, Jenin and Nablus, Israeli forces carried out prolonged raids involving large-scale house searches, temporary takeover of Palestinian homes for military use, detentions, and reported physical assaults. In one raid on 17 May in Burin village, home to about 3,000 Palestinians southwest of Nablus city, Israeli forces closed all entrances to the village for nearly 19 hours, reportedly after alleging that stones had been thrown at Israeli vehicles. The closure disrupted movement and access to work and education, forcing shops to close and leading some schools to postpone exams and suspend classes. Separately, Israeli settlers, reportedly from nearby settlement outposts and often accompanied by Israeli forces, carried out repeated attacks against homes in Burin village during the reporting period. At least two attacks included attempted break-ins, damage to property, and physical assaults against residents. In one of these attacks on 13 May, a 13-year-old Palestinian girl was reportedly struck on the head with a stick by an Israeli settler while her family attempted to protect their livestock during an attack on their home. She was treated at the scene by Palestine Red Crescent Society paramedics. Moreover, about 100 students attempting to reach a Palestinian school in the H2 area of Hebron city through As Salaymeh (160) checkpoint were reportedly subjected to repeated delays and restrictive measures imposed by Israeli forces, including demands to present birth certificates and, in some cases, be accompanied by a parent. On 11 May, 103 students were unable to reach the school altogether. Similar restrictions and delays were again reported on 14 and 18 May, disrupting students’ access to education. For key figures and additional breakdowns of casualties, displacement and settler violence between January 2005 and March 2026, please refer to the OCHA West Bank March 2026 Snapshot. Gaza Strip The humanitarian situation in Gaza remains critical, with many displaced families continuing to shelter in overcrowded tents, schools, or damaged structures due to the lack of safe alternatives. Access to essential services also remains severely constrained, including limited availability of clean water and inadequate waste management systems that are unable to effectively address growing public health risks, including the spread of pests and rodents. Many residential areas across Gaza remain unsafe and exposed to recurrent strikes, shelling, and shooting incidents in or near populated areas. Ongoing insecurity and access constraints are disrupting some humanitarian and community‑based activities, while aid workers continue to report significant access impediments in areas where Israeli authorities require humanitarian teams to coordinate their movements with them. Between 16 and 17 May, humanitarian partners recorded the displacement of more than 150 families from eastern Khan Younis and eastern Gaza city. Affected families said they fled because of tank movements or bombing. Forty of the newly displaced families have been identified by partners as requiring emergency assistance as they fled with only what they could carry, and a response by multiple partners has been initialized. Simultaneously, Israeli strikes continued to be reported during the reporting period, affecting residential areas and makeshift shelters. In one incident on 18 May, an airstrike hit Jabalya Camp, reportedly damaging 35 families’ tents and tarpaulins and displacing dozens of them. Data by the Ministry of Health (MoH) in Gaza indicates that between 12 and 20 May, 24 Palestinians were killed, five bodies were retrieved, two died of wounds, and 159 people were injured. This brings the overall reported casualty toll since the announcement of a ceasefire agreement on 10 October 2025 to 881 fatalities and 2,621 injuries, according to MoH. Severe shortages of engine oil continue to disrupt critical water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) services across the Gaza Strip. The WASH Cluster estimates that approximately 7,000 litres are required every month and life‑saving activities are increasingly curtailed. Key infrastructure is already affected, as demonstrated by the shutdown of the Sheikh Radwan stormwater lagoon in Gaza city on 11 May to preserve generator lifespan after prolonged operation. Water and wastewater levels have since risen significantly, raising the risk of flooding in the coming weeks and posing serious public health threats, according to the WASH Cluster. At the same time, solid waste management continues to rely on temporary dump sites located near active displacement sites. Humanitarian partners report that displaced families are increasingly affected by skin infections and other illnesses, as rats and insects enter shelters and contaminate food. While efforts are ongoing to improve sanitation and pest control, more sustainable responses require restored access to Gaza’s sanitary landfills near the perimeter, where Israeli forces remain deployed, as well as the entry of debris removal machinery and other critical supplies such as trucks, compactors, loaders, containers or personal protective equipment. To address pest infestations, WASH Cluster partners and local organizations, in coordination with the United Nation’s Development Programme (UNDP), have launched a response plan targeting over 1,700 locations across the Gaza Strip on 17 May. It involves spraying, rodent control, and awareness raising activities. The supplies for the campaign – 3 tonnes of rodenticides and 3,000 litres of pesticides – were brought into Gaza last week by UNDP. Partners indicate that a full response to rodents and pests requires the Israeli authorities to facilitate access to Gaza’s landfills where waste can be safely disposed of and approve requests to bring into Gaza items necessary for the removal of debris and the clearance of explosive ordnance – as well as inputs necessary to keep that equipment running. According to the Site Management Cluster (SMC), some 1,600 displacement sites across Gaza are currently hosting about 1.7 million people, or 354,480 households. This is based on non-exhaustive data collected through in-person visits or – in some cases – phone interviews, between 3 February and 10 May. Nearly 88 per cent them reside in makeshift sites, while others are accommodated in collective centres or scattered locations. Population movements over the preceding month indicate largely localized displacement patterns, with most sites reporting no significant change, though some continue to experience inflows and outflows. Incoming Supplies Kerem Shalom and Zikim remain the only operational entry points for humanitarian and commercial goods into Gaza. Between 11 and 17 May, offloading rates were 81 per cent across all corridors, with every other truck from Egypt still unable to offload at the Israeli crossings along Gaza’s perimeter, based on data tracked by the Logistics Cluster; this does not include bilateral humanitarian donations or the private sector. On the commercial front, according to the Chamber of Commerce and other humanitarian partner market assessments, prices remained elevated but generally stable with fresh products continue to show the greatest volatility. The Cash Working Group (CWG) continues to advocate for an increased number of commercial trucks entering Gaza to support market recovery, a reduction in fees applied to essential commodities, and a more appropriate balance between essential and non‑essential items being imported to better meet priority needs and stabilize markets. Between 7 and 20 May, the United Nation Office for Project Services (UNOPS) took into Gaza more than 2.1 million litres of diesel petrol into Gaza and distributed just over 2 million litres of diesel (including from stocks brought in before that period) in support of humanitarian operations. The UN is only able to confirm the entry of supplies tracked by UN 2720. For breakdowns of those, see the online UN 2720 Mechanism Dashboard. For a detailed account of the latest humanitarian operations in Gaza, see Annex 1 below. Funding Annexes Annex 1: Humanitarian Operations in the Gaza Strip by Cluster Read more This section covers 11 to 17 May unless otherwise specified. Food Security As of 18 May, partners provided general food assistance to 122,000 households (440,000 people) as part of the May monthly distribution. Each family receiving two parcels, one 25-kilogram flour bag and 2.5 kilograms of high energy biscuits, covering 75 per cent of the minimum caloric needs – the same as in April. Additional caloric needs are still covered through other modalities. As of 13 May, partners continued preparing and serving about 1 million meals every day through 103 kitchens and to almost 1,800 different locations. While these efforts remain critical, partners have scaled down cooked meal production due to funding constraints and rising operational costs. As the same time, responders are seeking to diversify assistance modalities, to include more cash and livelihood support. Humanitarian partners continue to support bread production through subsidized bakeries, community ovens, and partners’ own baking facilities, producing at least 300 metric tons of bread daily – about 36 per cent of the Strip’s estimated bread needs. More than 35 commercial bakeries are involved in these efforts, alongside flour distributions by partners and bilateral government actors to help families bake bread at home. As of 17 May, 28 subsidized bakeries were producing approximately 130,000 two-kilogram bread bundles per day, with about 80 per cent sold at a subsidized price of 3 NIS (US$0.85) through 168 contracted retailers and the remaining 20 per cent distributed free of charge to over 300 shelters and community sites. Meanwhile, under the “diesel-only” model, five private bakeries supported with free fuel by humanitarian partners resumed operations late April and have gradually increased production, despite ongoing challenges related to high fuel, spare parts, and engine oil costs. A few examples of what is still needed: Scaling up home gardening requires strengthened technical support, including real-time advisory channels, the use of organic compost, seed-saving practices, and the provision of seedlings to improve germination rates. Proper site assessments are also essential to ensure feasibility, taking into account water and soil quality, available space, and safe access for households. At a broader level, restoring local food production depends on the timely and unrestricted entry of agricultural inputs through commercial and humanitarian channels, alongside enabling local importers to directly source and import the materials needed to restart and sustain production at scale. Water, Health and Sanitation (WASH) Fifty-four partners provide approximately 24,000 cubic metres of water per day to people in more than 2,000 locations, as 74 per cent or all households in Gaza rely on such deliveries. Between 4 and 17 May, UNICEF distributed 15,343 hygiene kits, 2,448 dignity kits, and 7,350 jerry cans benefitting almost 116,000 people. A few examples of what is still needed: Generator and vehicle spare parts and consumables – including engine oil, air filters, and tires – are urgently needed, alongside emergency repair kits for the Israeli Mekorot and UAE water pipelines as well as water pipes of various sizes. Additional priorities include reverse osmosis units, spare parts and accessories for existing systems, and solid waste compactors, as well as access to landfills near Gaza’s perimeter to ease pressure on temporary dump sites in southern Gaza. Health Between 11-17 May, partners supported the medical evacuation of 59 patients, including six children, to Egypt via Rafah Crossing, alongside 87 caregivers. Partners provided medical consultations, with reportable diseases accounting for 21.4 per cent of the consultations across 181 reporting sites. Increasing trends were observed in skin diseases, acute watery diarrhea, and bloody diarrhea, while acute respiratory infections declined, likely reflecting seasonal variation. Environmental surveillance results for March and April 2026 confirmed all samples negative for Poliovirus, marking 12 consecutive months without detection; in line with WHO guidance, the outbreak may be considered over pending Poliovirus Outbreak Response Assessment (OBRA) desk review. A risk assessment for rodent-associated diseases remains ongoing. Partners completed a training on infection prevention and control (IPC) and isolation protocols for over 400 clinical staff across five major hospitals, as well as more than 100 environmental cleaners and emergency medical services personnel. A few examples of what is still needed: Water testing equipment and liquid chlorine supplies are lacking in hospitals, primary health-care centres, and medical points because of administrative impediments from Israeli authorities. For more information, see the online Heath Cluster Dashboard. Shelter Between 11 and 17 May, partners provided 14,429 households with shelter and non-food assistance through in-kind and cash-based modalities. Assistance included 14,936 bedding items, 3,173 bedding kits, 2,922 tarpaulins, 1,114 sealing-off kits, and 839 clothing kits. The Rapid Joint Distribution Mechanism supported 55 households with emergency shelter and essential household items, including 10 packages of tents and non-food items and 45 sealing-off kits. Partners installed 115 emergency shelters in Gaza and Khan Younis using Shelter Cluster Emergency Shelter Kit designs and specifications. A few examples of what is still needed: More essential household items are needed, as available stocks are merely enough to support fewer than 3,400 additional households. Administrative impediments imposed by Israeli authorities should be lifted along with restrictions on shelter items. For more information, see the Shelter Cluster website. Protection Between 11 and 17 May, 11 protection partners delivered lifesaving and protection-related services to almost 11,000 people: Mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS), including psychological first aid and individual and group counselling, was provided to 8,259 people; Legal aid and legal awareness support was provided to 219 people; Referrals and case follow-up were provided to 232 people; Other support was provided to 341 persons with disabilities; Group psychosocial support sessions were provided to 350 people; Mine action and explosive ordnance risk education were provided to 168 people; Relief was distributed to 1,265 people; Staff-care activities were conducted for 25 responders. During the same period, partners offered services to 146 returnees from Egypt; since the reopening of the Rafah border and as of 14 May, 2,429 returnees have been assisted, including 885 currently receiving follow-up protection services. Protection monitoring activities continued through eight focus group discussions and 130 key informant interviews across 16 neighbourhoods, reaching 1,155 people. A few examples of what is still needed: It is critical to address the psychological distress affecting staff members, alongside persistent fuel shortages, rising transportation costs, cash flow constraints, and the limited availability of essential materials and spare parts. For more information, see the online Protection Cluster dashboard. Child Protection Between 11 and 17 May, partners: provided MHPSS services to over 4,000 children and approximately 1,500 caregivers. Services included structured psychosocial support sessions, recreational and resilience-building activities, art and drama interventions, individual counselling, Psychological First Aid, parenting support, and community-based psychosocial programmes. conducted child protection awareness and community-based protection activities for another 4,700 children and caregivers through awareness sessions, risk mitigation activities, positive parenting sessions, safety mapping exercises, and community outreach across shelters, camps, schools, and displacement sites; provided individual case management support to 56 newly identified high-risk children, while continuing follow-up for more than 3,000 active child protection cases involving children without parental care, highly distressed children, and children exposed to violence, neglect, exploitation, family separation, and unsafe living conditions. conducted 135 follow-up contacts for unaccompanied and separated children to assess wellbeing, care arrangements, and protection concerns; A few examples of what is still needed: Additional funding and operational support are needed to sustain high-risk child protection case management, MHPSS services, outreach activities, and child-friendly spaces, many of which face disruptions. Partners also require increased fuel, transportation, and operational supplies to maintain home visits, referrals, and follow-up activities, particularly in underserved and newly displaced areas. Additional trained case workers, MHPSS specialists, accessible safe spaces, and psychosocial materials are also needed to respond to growing protection concerns among children and adolescents across Gaza. Mine Action UNMAS conducted 36 explosive hazard assessments in support of debris removal and other partner activities, and three inter-agency missions. Partners conducted explosive ordnance risk education activities, reaching almost 3,480 people between 10 and 14 May. Since the October 2025 ceasefire announcement, 109 accidents have been recorded, leading to 265 Palestinians injured and 49 killed. Emergency Telecommunications Between 11 and 17 May, ETC continued close collaboration with UNDSS on the Communications Plan, providing final technical inputs with completion expected by 31 May. Coordination also continued with PRCS and ICRC to support technical recovery of the damaged VHF network in Gaza, building on earlier VHF coverage assessments conducted along the Gaza city–Zikim route. A few examples of what is still needed: Despite progress, connectivity in Gaza remains severely constrained, limiting humanitarian coordination. The VHF network remains only partially functional due to security constraints and limited technical capacity.

Rosalind: A genomics toolkit in Rust running whole-genome pipelines on a laptop

Comments

What 300 Emails Say About Americans and the Army’s Direct Commission Program

For nine months in 2024 and 2025, I had an additional duty — monitoring an inbox that connected potential direct commission candidates with the Army’s individual branches. I served on the Army Reserve’s senior leadership team, helping to stand up a brokerage between mid-career professionals and the decentralized branch pipelines that controlled direct commission slots.During that time, I personally reviewed over 300 inquiries from accomplished professionals — data scientists, logistics engineers, cyber specialists, and strategic communicators — all of whom wanted to serve their country in uniform. The experience taught me two main lessons. First, people either regret not serving The post What 300 Emails Say About Americans and the Army’s Direct Commission Program appeared first on War on the Rocks.

Will the Iran war end Strait of Hormuz oil supremacy?

The conflict has brutally exposed the energy market's Achilles' heel. While global powers China, India and the EU push renewables, Gulf leaders are advancing plans for new bypass pipelines to safeguard their oil empires.