Margareta Dovgal: Vancouver fatality a tragic reminder of B.C.’s health system failures
Another individual known to police falls through cracks of a fragmented system
"FRAGMENTED" · 총 50건
필터 보기현재 지수
49.4
0 = 부정 우세
50 = 중립
100 = 긍정 우세
최근 7일 기준 76,736건을 분석한 결과, 뉴스 심리지수는 49.4(균형)입니다. 긍정 9,273건(12.1%)·중립 55,488건(72.3%)·부정 11,975건(15.6%)이며, 중립 비중이 뚜렷하게 높습니다. 성향 지수는 종합 21.0(보수 경향)입니다.
Another individual known to police falls through cracks of a fragmented system
Israel has the tools to lead in AI, but weak planning, budget gaps, and fragmented data systems are slowing adoption across the public sector.
[UN News] Plastic pollution is choking the ocean, but sustainable alternatives - including seaweed - remain held back by tariffs, fragmented regulations and the overwhelming market advantage enjoyed by fossil fuel-based plastics.
Peru's run-off has no clear winner. Fujimori leads the official count, rapid polls favour Sánchez, and a fragmented, ungovernable congress awaits whoever prevails. The country's crisis is far from over.
“The good physician treats the disease; the great physician treats the patient who has the disease” — Sir William Osler (1849-1919) IN 1986, Carlo Petrini founded the ‘slow food’ movement in Italy to counteract the so-called ‘fast food’, by promoting local food cultures, traditional cooking and sustainable farming. Inspired by this, the concept of ‘slow medicine’ took birth: a patient-centred approach to healthcare that prioritises time, listening, and comprehensive care over rapid, high-tech, intensive interventions. It emphasises quality, the patient’s context and shared decision-making to avoid hurried, unnecessary, harmful treatments. There is no doubt that modern medicine is revolutionising healthcare. In emergency situations diagnoses are generated in minutes. Imaging technologies are replacing exploratory surgery. Algorithms now identify patterns invisible to the human eye. This advancement has saved countless lives. Yet amid this relentless drive for efficiency, questions are emerging: what do we lose in this fast-paced medicine? Most health challenges are the result of an imbalance in our lives, and most quick-fix solutions actually exacerbate these imbalances. The slow medicine approach focuses on identifying the root cause of our health challenges, creating a thoughtful, step-by-step and long-term response to restore balance in our lives, because good care requires time, attention, and reflection. It reminds us that patients are not just a set of signs and symptoms to be fixed, but individuals whose illnesses are embedded in social, psychological and cultural contexts. For countries like Pakistan, slow medicine is particularly relevant. Slow medicine is built on three principles: careful deliberation before intervention; minimal necessary treatment rather than maximal possible treatment; and respect for the patient’s lived experience and values. It asks physicians to pause and think before acting. In medicine, as in life, acting quickly is not always acting wisely. The concept has gained attention in response to the global problem of overdiagnosis, overtreatment and rising costs of healthcare. As diagnostic tools become more sensitive, medicine increasingly detects abnormalities that may never cause harm. Small lesions, borderline results and incidental findings often mean further tests and interventions, leading to unnecessary physical, psychological and financial stress. Slow medicine offers a different approach. It suggests that not every abnormal result or every symptom requires a battery of tests and immediate action. Observation, patience, context and careful history-taking can be more valuable in many situations. Although the principles of slow medicine can be applied to any clinical interaction, there are at least four areas where they are most relevant. Chronic diseases such as diabetes, hypertension and cardiovascular disease evolve over years, shaped by lifestyle, environment and stress. Managing them effectively requires careful and thoughtful history-taking, a good doctor-patient relationship, continuity of care and gradual adjustment. Understanding why the condition exists in the first place is more important than simply making changes to the prescription. Secondly, mental health conditions such as depression, anxiety and trauma are closely related to relationships and social contexts. In healthcare systems like Pakistan, mental health consultations are brief, fragmented and heavily reliant on medications. Very few psychiatric consultations end without a prescription. Yet psychological healing often depends on something more essential: being listened to and understood — things that cannot be rushed. Geriatric care is another area. Older patients frequently have multiple conditions, medications and vulnerabilities. Aggressive interventions may prolong life but at the cost of dignity and comfort. Slow medicine shifts the question from ‘what more can we do?’ to ‘what is worth doing?’ In many cases, less intervention results in better quality of life. End-of-life care perhaps represents the most profound expression of slow medicine philosophy. The goal is no longer cure but care: relief of pain and suffering, preserving dignity, and respecting patients’ and family’s wishes. This requires patience, tolerance and time and cannot be rushed. For countries like Pakistan, slow medicine is particularly relevant. Many of the country’s health problems are shaped by societal conditions: poverty, unemployment, rampant inflation, political uncertainty, violence, etc leading to medicalisation of social distress. Patients and physicians both get trapped in seeing these problems through the biomedical lens, ie, quick assessment in which patients’ complaints are addressed through various lab and radiology tests, followed by medicines, while the root cause of their complaints are hardly ever asked about or addressed. Doctors are neither trained nor feel comfortable enquiring about social factors as most wonder that even if they inquire about them what can they can do about it. No wonder the burden of almost all conditions — communicable and non-communicable — is extremely high in Pakistan. Ultimately, slow medicine is not about rejecting urgency where it is necessary — emergencies demand rapid action, and modern medicine excels in such moments. It is about recognising that much of healthcare does not occur in emergencies. It unfolds over time — in chronic illness, in mental health, in ageing and in recovery. In these areas, haste can do more harm than good. At its heart, slow medicine is a reminder of what medicine has always aspired to be: not just a technical but a human one — one that demands not only scientific advancement, but also wisdom, humility, compassion and humanity. It asks clinicians to see beyond the scan, the lab report and the prescription pad, and to engage with the person behind the patient. It reminds us that the true practice of medicine is in caring for people. In 1953, Sir Robert Hutchison wrote A physician’s prayer: “From inability to let well alone; from too much zeal for the new and contempt for what is old; from putting knowledge before wisdom, science before art, and cleverness before common sense; from treating patients as cases; and from making the cure of the disease more grievous than the endurance of the same, Good Lord, deliver us.” More than 70 years later, his prophetic words remain strikingly relevant to modern medicine. The writer is professor emeritus, psychiatry, Aga Khan University. mmkarticle@gmail.com Published in Dawn, June 6th, 2026
Ultimately, Annamalai’s future trajectory appears insulated from the traditional pitfalls of fading significance or a fragmented return
WORLD Environment Day arrives as the planet edges deeper into climatic uncertainty. New global temperature records are being set with unsettling frequency, and the World Meteorological Organisation has warned that the years from 2026 to 2030 are likely to rank among the hottest ever observed. There is a strong possibility that another record-breaking year will emerge before the decade is out, while average global temperatures are expected to remain close to or above the 1.5°C threshold that governments once hoped would help avert the worst impacts of climate change. The warning may be global, but its implications are intensely local. In May, temperatures in parts of Sindh and Balochistan climbed towards 50°C, triggering heatwave alerts and heightening concerns about pressure on already strained power, water and health systems. At the same time, scientists continue to raise the alarm about the glaciers and snow reserves that feed the Indus basin. For a country whose agriculture, food security and energy production depend heavily on the Indus basin, changes in the region’s ice reserves carry consequences that extend far beyond the mountains. Pakistan knows all too well the consequences of environmental neglect. The catastrophic floods of 2022 inundated vast areas, displaced millions and inflicted losses running into billions of dollars. Yet, despite repeated reminders of the country’s vulnerability, environmental protection continues to occupy a peripheral place in policymaking. Climate adaptation efforts move slowly, urban expansion often proceeds with little regard for sustainability, forests remain under pressure and air pollution continues to burden public health. Shrinking green spaces leave cities increasingly exposed to extreme heat, while weak enforcement of environmental regulations allows ecological degradation to continue largely unchecked. Pakistan is right to remind the world that it contributes only a tiny fraction of global greenhouse gas emissions and deserves greater international support. But that argument carries weight only if it is matched by seriousness at home. Fragmented planning, weak implementation and chronic underinvestment have left the country less prepared than it should be. World Environment Day is often marked by pledges, ceremonies and symbolic gestures. This year, it should prompt something more. As the federal budget approaches, the government has an opportunity to demonstrate that climate resilience is finally being treated as a national priority. Adequate resources must be allocated for adaptation measures, disaster preparedness, water conservation, ecosystem restoration and more livable, heat-resilient cities. Just as importantly, climate considerations must be embedded across development planning rather than confined to a handful of environmental programmes. Pakistan has received ample warning of what lies ahead. The upcoming budget should show that the state understands the scale of the challenge and is prepared to invest accordingly. Published in Dawn, June 5th, 2026
The Indian rupee is trading around Rs. 95-96 to the dollar in late May 2026, setting fresh record lows. Markets are openly discussing the Rs. 100 threshold. The rupee has weakened in almost every year since 2014 and has lost approximately half its value against the dollar over that period. The end of this currency depreciation is not in sight. The factors that would stop it are not yet visible.The government is acting. State run oil companies have implemented four fuel price hikes in ten days as of May 25, taking petrol in Delhi past Rs. 102 per litre. This is the right and necessary response to the energy cost reality created by the Iran war. Crucially, the Modi government has also done its part on the macroeconomic front, consistently and aggressively reducing the fiscal deficit as a percentage of GDP to maintain structural stability.Yet, the currency pressure persists. The energy price impact has not yet fully reached Indian consumers and supply chains. It is coming.Uday Kotak said it plainly at the CII Annual Business Summit on May 12: "Be ready for tough times rather than waiting for the shock to hit us." He was right.Also read | Manufactured monopoly: How industrial policy is structuring monopolies in IndiaThis is not a time to panic. But it is a time to act. The leaders who move now will have options. Those who wait will not.The Overriding Factor: The Psychology of the PlayersWhy is the currency declining despite strong domestic fiscal discipline? Because exchange rates are not driven by mathematical models alone. The currency decline is highly affected—and accelerated—by the psychology of all players engaged in this endeavor.Currency movements are deeply behavioral. When a currency visualizes a downward trend, psychology shifts from calculation to self-protection and speculation. Every player in the ecosystem operates under this psychological weight:Corporate CFOs and Treasurers: Instead of hedging normally, they rush to cover future dollar liabilities early, hoarding hard currency and inadvertently worsening the scarcity.Foreign Investors: They begin to judge their returns not by the quality of Indian business operations, but by the eroding value of the conversion rate.Importers and Exporters: Importers advance their payments to avoid paying more tomorrow; exporters delay converting their dollar earnings back into rupees, waiting for a "better" rate. This collective psychology creates a self-fulfilling prophecy.Investors, CFOs, and FDI decision makers extrapolate what is happening now into the future. When they see a currency that has lost approximately half its value since 2014 with no clear floor in sight, their psychological pivot alters market realities.Also read | India tightens checks on overseas flows as currency pressure mounts, sources sayThe cascading timeline of Foreign Portfolio Investor (FPI) equity behavior perfectly mirrors this psychological shift from rational evaluation to systemic risk aversion:2024 (The Calculation Phase): Rupee averages Rs. 83-84. FPI flows remain positive (+$12 billion) as investors trade on strong domestic corporate earnings.2025 (The Self-Protection Phase): Rupee slides past Rs. 89. Collective psychology shifts to risk mitigation. FPIs withdraw a record $18.4 billion from Indian equities—the largest annual equity outflow on record.Early 2026 (The Capitulation Phase): Rupee breaks past Rs. 95. Sentiment turns into an outright exit strategy. In the first four months of 2026 alone, outflows have already reached $19.1 billion, completely bypassing the entire previous year's record loss in a fraction of the time.FDI agreements are being signed, but capital is delayed because players are psychologically hesitant to deploy funds into a depreciating asset.The Trap of Hard Currency Debt: A Broken Business Model There is a highly significant and dangerous phenomenon unfolding in India today that requires immediate exposure. For years, a specific class of Indian corporates adopted a regular strategy of borrowing heavily in hard currency (External Commercial Borrowings, or ECBs). Lured by low nominal global interest rates, several of these companies over borrowed, treating cheap dollar debt as a permanent structural advantage.Today, that strategy has become a trap. The compounding effect of a depreciating rupee, skyrocketing hedging costs, and brutal refinancing realities is fundamentally breaking their business models.Consider the mechanics of this crisis:The Hedging Penalty: Leaving dollar debt unhedged is now corporate roulette. However, buying hedges at current rupee levels has become structurally prohibitive. The cost of protection completely wipes out any interest rate advantage.The Refinancing Wall: Billions in foreign debt are coming due. These over-borrowed companies must now refinance their liabilities at a time when the rupee value has materially deteriorated. They are effectively forced to borrow far more rupees just to pay back the same amount of original dollars.The Crushing Cost of Rupee Capital: As these companies try to pivot back to domestic lenders, they face a severe escalation in their rupee cost of capital.The Growth Verdict: When your cost of capital spikes and your cash flows are consumed by servicing legacy dollar debt, future growth stops. Capital expenditure (CapEx) plans are being frozen. These companies can no longer invest in innovation, capacity, or market expansion. Their business model shifts overnight from aggressive value creation to basic survival. Boards must realize that this is not a temporary treasury headache; it is a structural threat to the company’s future viability.India's forex reserves stand at approximately 10 to 11 months of import cover. Substantial, but being actively deployed to defend the currency. Some imports are non-negotiable: oil, critical inputs, components. These will now cost more. That cost passes through every supply chain.Six Actions for Business Leaders1. Protect your cash and liquidity first. This is the most immediate priority. Map your cash position today. Identify every source of liquidity across the next twelve months. Stress-test it at Rs. 100 and beyond. Which receivables are at risk? Which credit lines are rupee-denominated and which are not? Companies that run into a cash crisis during a currency depreciation cycle lose their options entirely. The CFO must own this analysis and present it to the board within days, not weeks.2. Act now on your foreign currency borrowings, hedging, and refinancing. Do not assume the rupee will recover to Rs. 80. Analyse your full foreign currency exposure across the next three years: every loan, every refinancing date, every hedging contract, every procurement price denominated in foreign currency. Hard currency loans now face refinancing at rupee values that have materially deteriorated. Model every scenario at Rs. 100 and beyond. Your CFO, treasury, and procurement team must be aligned on one instruction: do not run into a liquidity crisis. This analysis must happen now, not at the next quarterly review.3. Build a war room. Most companies have begun thinking about war rooms for supply chain disruptions. Expand the mandate. Currency exposure belongs in the same room. Which of your costs are dollar or euro denominated? Which of your revenues are rupee denominated? Where is the mismatch? What is your break-even exchange rate? If you do not have clear answers today, you are exposed. The war room is not a committee. It is a real-time decision environment with live data, a clear owner, and the authority to act.4. Use the currency depreciation advantage: double your export salesforce. A weaker rupee makes Indian exports more competitive. This window will not stay open indefinitely. Double the salesforce in your export markets now. Use this period to upgrade quality, improve service delivery, and build customer relationships that will last beyond the currency advantage. Indian exporters who invest in capability during this period will emerge stronger regardless of what the rupee does next. Those who simply ride the price advantage without building the underlying business will lose when conditions change.5. Watch your stock and your sector. Banks and financial institutions should already be on high alert. Companies with large foreign currency exposure will see pressure on their financials. Some stock prices are already reflecting this. Go through your sector company by company. Identify who is most exposed. If you are an investor or a lender, this analysis is not optional. The combination of currency depreciation, rising oil prices, and FPI outflows creates a compounding pressure that will surface in earnings before it surfaces in headlines.6. Cut costs aggressively. AI will help. There has never been more urgency to reduce costs than now. And there has never been a better tool to do it. AI can cut most operational costs by as much as 30% across functions: procurement, finance, customer service, logistics, and compliance. McKinsey data confirms companies adopting AI and automation reduce operational costs by 20 to 30 percent. This is not a future opportunity. It is a present imperative. Every rupee of cost removed through AI is a rupee that does not need to be recovered through revenue in a deteriorating currency environment. Start now with your highest-cost functions.The CFO as CaptainCurrency risk is a cash flow risk. Every function that touches foreign currency—procurement, treasury, sales, capex planning— must now report into a single coordinating authority. That authority is the CFO. This is not about hierarchy. It is about clarity. In a currency crisis, fragmented decision-making is as dangerous as wrong decision making. One captain. One consolidated view. Weekly reviews minimum.The Bigger PictureThis currency depreciation is a structural signal, not a cyclical one. India's economy must move from a cheap labour advantage to genuine global value creation.The companies that will survive and thrive are those building products and services that command premium prices in global markets. The rupee's weakness is a reminder that competing on cost alone has limits.The recently concluded trade agreements are a genuine opportunity. Execute them with full force. Build the export pipelines. Add the sales capacity.The businesses that move now, with discipline and clarity, will manage market psychology, navigate the debt trap, and define the next chapter of Indian industry.The shock is coming. Prepare before it arrives.Ram Charan is the author of China’s 90% model. It is restricting India’s industrial progress. Former Director of Hindalco and Muyuan (China).
ISLAMABAD: Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE), a state-owned think tank, has asked the government to increase the minimum wage by at least 12.5 per cent to Rs45,000 and ensure its rule-based enforcement, rather than a notional announcement, given the country’s economic conditions and inflationary pressures. “In a period marked by persistent inflationary pressures, food and energy shocks, labour market informality, and rising household vulnerability, minimum wage policy must evolve into a credible macro-social policy instrument capable of protecting workers while remaining economically sustainable and administratively enforceable,” PIDE said in its policy note to the government ahead of FY27 budget. This policy brief called for a shift from discretionary and symbolic annual wage announcements towards a transparent, rules-based framework grounded in official evidence and aligned with International Labour Organisation principles. “Rather than relying on a single indicator or arbitrary adjustment, the proposed approach combines purchasing-power protection, worker-family adequacy checks, labour-market affordability, partial productivity sharing, and provincial implementation realities,” it said, adding that the proposed reform architecture was based on four linked elements: transparent evidence-based wage setting, bounded provincial calibration, credible enforcement and compliance mechanisms, and annual reporting on wage-setting evidence and implementation outcomes. Govt think tank urges rule-based enforcement, not symbolic announcements Last year, the Centre made a departure from even a symbolic minimum wage announcement, and Finance Minister Muhammad Aurangzeb then said businesses were unwilling to pay even the previous year’s minimum wage. The institute said that the application of the minimum wage framework to official data from the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics (PBS) and the Ministry of Planning, Development and Special Initiatives, suggested “a national minimum wage reference benchmark of Rs45,000 per month for 2026-27, representing a 12.5pc increase over the current notified wage of Rs40,000. “Minimum wage policy cannot remain a ceremonial annual exercise disconnected from economic realities and labour welfare. Pakistan now requires a credible wage governance system that balances worker protection, productivity, business sustainability, and macroeconomic stability within a transparent institutional framework,” said PIDE Vice Chancellor Dr Nadeem Javaid. He emphasised that a country aspiring for export-led growth and social stability could not afford working poverty, wage uncertainty, and fragmented labour market governance. Sustainable economic reform must also translate into dignity, predictability, and economic security for workers, he added. Under the proposed “national reference benchmark with provincial calibration” model, provinces would retain constitutional authority to notify wages at or above the national floor in accordance with local economic conditions. Indicative provincial calibrations suggest Rs45,000 minimum wage for Punjab and Rs46,000 for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Sindh due to relatively higher urban living costs and formal-sector concentration, and Rs45,500 for Balochistan reflecting geographic and market access vulnerabilities. Dr S. M. Naeem Nawaz, Professor of Economics at PIDE and co-author of the study, said: “A credible wage floor must be one that workers can realistically receive and provinces can realistically enforce. That requires moving beyond CPI-only or poverty-line-only approaches toward a hybrid methodology that respects affordability, compliance capacity, and the reality that nearly 80pc of Pakistan’s employment remains informal.” Published in Dawn, June 3rd, 2026
After unusually lengthy negotiations, the leader of Denmark's Social Democrats has succeeded in forming a center-left coalition, bringing together four parties in a fragmented political landscape.
The global health care sector is under increasing strain. Decades of chronic underinvestment and constraints in recruitment have coincided with a surge in demand for services for aging populations. Gaps in provision are already taking a toll, with fragmented access to care and high rates of stress and burnout among staff. And it’s getting worse.…
“My name is Ozymandias, king of kings: Look on my works, ye mighty, and despair! Nothing beside remains. Round the decay Of that colossal wreck, boundless and bare The lone and level sands stretch far away.” — Percy Bysshe Shelley, Ozymandias “I am in blood, Stepped in so far that, should I wade no more, Returning were as tedious as go o’er.” — William Shakespeare, Macbeth PROLOGUE This is and isn’t about America’s illegal war against Iran. It is primarily about hiding an empire in plain sight and now watching it unravel in plain sight. The war against Iran becomes a consequential event in tandem with other structural weaknesses, a fillip of sorts. It reminds one of the Soviet war on Afghanistan. That war, in and of itself, did not bring down the Soviet Leviathan. The process inhered in the very make-up of the Soviet Union. The war just shoved it over the precipice. But let’s get on with our purpose here. In August 2022, then-US President Joe Biden signed the CHIPS and Science Act into law. A $280 billion legislative package, it sought to revitalise domestic semiconductor manufacturing. The act was a response to a startling vulnerability: the world’s most advanced chips, essential for everything from F-35 fighter jets to surgical equipment to artificial intelligence, are overwhelmingly manufactured by a single company, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), located on an island claimed as sovereign territory by America’s primary strategic rival, China. This dependence is not an accident of geography or a supply chain anomaly. The semiconductor industry wasn’t even hobbled by Covid 19. Despite its complex and far-flung operations, the industry works smoothly. The US dependence is the logical endpoint of a decades-long corporate strategy that maximised profit by outsourcing physical production while retaining only the high-value design and marketing ends of the value chain, the so-called “Smile Curve” strategy. The undoing of the United States in the Iran war may be far more significant than its defeats in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan. It may well mark a historic milestone in the fraying of the position of the US as a global hegemon. But the seeds of this erosion of American dominance, argues Ejaz Haider, were laid long before its misadventure in Iran… The Italian economist and sociologist Giovanni Arrighi, to whom I shall return, would have been amused to see the revered smile curve — taught at prestigious business schools and which encourages firms to outsource capital-intensive manufacturing to focus solely on high-margin research and development (R&D), branding and marketing — as a classic trap of late-stage capitalism. In fact, the CHIPS Act stands as a state-level admission that this strategy, so profitable for individual corporations like Apple and NVIDIA, to name just two, has become a major geopolitical vulnerability for the US. This is the central paradox of America’s declining empire. The very mechanisms that generated unprecedented wealth have systemically dismantled the material and industrial foundations upon which that wealth ultimately rests. The decline of the American empire is not a partisan talking point. The US is a behemoth. It won’t just collapse one day like the Berlin Wall. Nor is a snapshot view the way to go. It is an ongoing structural process and a number of scholars have used longitudinal designs to analyse the trend lines. I argue that it is a slow, systemic unravelling across interconnected domains. First, the financialisation of capital, theorised most rigorously by Arrighi. Capital shifts from productive investment to speculative finance, generating short-term profits at the cost of long-term industrial vitality. It hollows out domestic industrial and political power, a process identified by American sociologist and political scientist Ho-fung Hung, who argues that off-shoring of production destroys the industrial ecosystem, skilled labour base and, ultimately, the social cohesion required for great power competition. Second, the erosion of the alliance system. And no, it’s not just Trump. Three deeper currents are involved: the gradual unravelling of the post-WWII security architecture; the economic failure of neoliberalism; and the imperial outreach baked into the very idea of neoliberalism. Third, the lateral diffusion of technologies, now commodified and everywhere. They help innovative and determined weaker powers offset the asymmetric advantage of bigger powers: Ukraine versus Russia; Hamas/Hezbollah/Houthis versus the US-Zionist duo; and now Iran versus the US-Zionist duo. As I note later in this space, the war against Iran is a much bigger setback for the US than its wars in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq. Corollary: the post-WWII ‘Pax Americana’ is transitioning from a period of hegemonic stability, to use American historian Charles Kindleberger’s concept, into a protracted and likely irreversible, terminal crisis, to borrow Arrighi’s term. But let’s first begin with the peg: the war against Iran. THE PRESENT Since its inception, America has been at war: wars of choice, wars of conquest, wars for resources, wars to defend its hegemony, wars to spread “American values.” How or why does the Iran war stand out? Foremost, the conflict has confirmed the structural limits of US coercive diplomacy in a shifting multipolar world. It has exposed acute structural vulnerabilities in defence economics and inventory endurance, as well as a critical absence of pragmatic post-war planning and a misreading of societal resilience. The conflict has also underscored the changing nature of global alignments in a multipolar world. This comes with the collapse of coercive economic power. For four decades, the US has relied on sophisticated sanctions and lawfare to pressure Iran into subjugation. It has failed, showing the limits of sanctions, especially on fungible commodities. Even sanctions on non-fungible elements like technology can be circumvented. As in Iran’s case, the sanctioned state can develop indigenous expertise through varied strategies. There’s clear evidence that Tehran has developed complex and sophisticated non-dollar lifelines with China and Russia, rendering unilateral sanctions increasingly ineffective. It has used an array of strategies to blunt the effect: interchangeability (can’t sell to X; sell to Y); value retention (barter, use of cryptocurrencies); substitution and evasion (relying on third parties, covert ship-to-ship transfers, use of shell companies). Unlike the insurgencies in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, the US is not involved in ground combat in Iran (so far). It has relied on high-tech aerial and missile attacks through its formidable ISTAR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance) capabilities. Iran has not responded through elusive, hit-and-run ground attacks. It has countered US technology through technology in a non-contact war. But its employment of technology is grounded in asymmetric capabilities: a large arsenal of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and one-way attack drones. The cost-exchange ratio, by most accounts, is unfavourable for the US. For instance, the Iranian Shahed-136 one-way attack drone has an estimated unit cost of $20,000 (some estimates put it at around $10,000). It is a simple, slow-moving, and relatively easy to detect drone. But it is also cheap and plentiful. To intercept it with costly SM-2 or ESSM missiles creates a cost-exchange ratio of between 30 to one and 100 to one. It is also a shoot-and-scoot system. Iran can afford to lose hundreds of such drones and produce some 1,000 per month. The US cannot afford to fire thousands of interceptors at them. And those interceptors take three to four years to manufacture. It is a cost-asymmetric war. Similarly, the US has been pulling out assets from the Pacific to the Gulf. The USS Boxer amphibious group is an example. Diverting naval assets from the Pacific physically manifests deployment overstretch. As Robert Farley, visiting professor at US Army War College notes, resources needed to prevail in one theatre guarantee weakness in another. It’s the same with all force deployments and employments: “Every missile allocated to one target is unavailable for another.” The contrast with Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan is instructive. In those theatres, the US was defeated by determined insurgencies, even as it bombed and bombed. The adversaries were willing to absorb enormous casualties, drag it out and inflict mission fatigue on the US. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, broadly speaking, the US won the conventional war expeditiously but then got bogged down. In the Iran conflict, while Tehran has demonstrated the ability to absorb much pain, the US is not facing elusive insurgents but a state with a sophisticated missile programme, a sharp understanding of force employment, a network of allies across the region (Hezbollah in Lebanon, Ansar Allah in Yemen, and Hashd al-Shaabi in Iraq and Syria), and the ability to close the Strait of Hormuz, through which 20 percent of the world’s oil passes. Iran has also demonstrated adaptation under fire, used the operational strategy of dispersal and delegation, exercised deception, demonstrated growing targeting capabilities through ISR, rapid repair of underground sites after US-Zionist bombing and consistently shifted locations for counterattack operations. Can the US still bomb Iran? Of course. Will that be painful? Yes. Will Iran respond? Hell, yes. Would that raise the overall cost? You can bet your dime on it. It will be proof, yet again, that it is a slow grind and the US cannot achieve its objectives at a sustainable cost. Yet, it is stuck, because to walk away means it loses credibility. Trump needs a win; Iran is not prepared to give him that. The war has changed the ground realities. There is no status quo ante. The objectives remain strategically incompatible — ie we might get a pause, even a long one, but the essential causes remain unaddressed. Spoiler alert: Zionist entity. US President Donald Trump attending the return of the bodies of the first six American soldiers killed during the war with Iran on March 7, 2026: the lateral diffusion of technologies help innovative and determined weaker powers, such as Iran, offset the asymmetric advantage of bigger powers, such as the US | AFP THE POINTILLIST EMPIRE: HOW IT BEGAN American imperialism did not begin with grand pronouncements like the Monroe Doctrine or the Big Stick diplomacy of Theodore Roosevelt, though they give us a potent sense of a rising, expansionist power. It literally began with bird poop, which sounds about right if one were to understand imperialism as a crap enterprise. The Guano Islands Act of 1856 allowed US citizens to claim uninhabited, guano-rich islands. The act set a precedent for later overseas acquisitions. Historian Daniel Immerwahr calls this a “pointillist” empire. This practical, resource-driven, and often hidden expansion set a pattern that would define America’s power and military bases for the next century. The Mexican-American War (1846-1848) established the continental empire, seizing vast territories from Mexico. This wasn’t a war of liberation but a war of conquest, not manifest destiny but a fig leaf to cover the musty crotch of violent expansion, economic greed and racial supremacy. The 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo formalised the seizure of over half of Mexico’s territory. The Spanish-American War of 1898 definitively projected American power overseas. Theodore Roosevelt’s Secretary of State John Hay, in a personal letter to Roosevelt, called it a “splendid little war.” By its end, the US had seized Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam and the Philippines. But the “splendid” label concealed a brutal reality, just like the payload of Trump’s “gorgeous B-2 bombers.” The subsequent Philippine-American War (1899-1902) resulted in Filipino genocide. That savagery has been systematically erased from American popular memory, even as Mark Twain was scathing in his condemnation and also did a fantastic job of calling out Rudyard Kipling for The White Man’s Burden. But this wasn’t all. Immerwahr documents that American forces employed waterboarding (yes, much before the darned ‘War on Terror’), concentration camps (“black sites”), and scorched-earth tactics that would be recognisable to any student of colonial atrocities. After World War I, US President Woodrow Wilson attempted a new form of imperialism: liberal internationalism, rather than direct territorial control. Much has been written about the “Wilsonian moment.” British historian and diplomat E. H. Carr called it a utopian project, divorced from the reality of power politics. In fact, it wasn’t. The project was essentially colonial and Wilson’s liberal internationalism fit it perfectly. The mandates were thriving. The US Senate’s refusal to join the League of Nations left a vacuum that no amount of idealistic pronouncements could fill. War did come. Carr gives us insights into why it became inevitable. The US emerged from the war as the leading power. The post-WWII order was a direct lesson learned from the intervening two decades. No more “isolationism”. The US must play the role of the hegemonic stabiliser. The core argument was simple and powerful: a stable world economy requires a single power to act as lender of last resort, maintain an open market for distressed goods, and coordinate macroeconomic policies. The US did that via the Bretton Woods system, the Marshall Plan and a vast security architecture that spanned the globe. The quid for the quo? American dominance. The US was now fully involved. It bore the cost but the return on investment was handsome. It kept the US in the lead, even during the bipolarity of the Cold War and beyond. With the Berlin wall crumbling, American political scientist Francis Fukuyama became the mascot for neoliberalism. History had ended; all the wagon trains were destined for one town. Some might arrive late, but arrive they would. Europe was pacified and rebuilt. Japan was demilitarised and transformed into a manufacturing powerhouse. The dollar became the world’s reserve currency, giving the US what French President Valery Giscard d’Estaing called “exorbitant privilege.” For three decades, from 1945 to the early 1970s, this system appeared to confirm the virtues of hegemonic stability. Real GDP growth in Western Europe averaged nearly five percent annually, and the US share of world manufacturing output remained above 40 percent. But beneath the surface, the seeds of decline were already being sown. ARRIGHIAN COUNTER World-systems theorists like Immanuel Wallerstein and Giovanni Arrighi were not focused on immediate “imperial overstretch” in the manner of British historian Paul Kennedy. Kennedy argued that empires declined when their military commitments outpaced their economic base. The US, he warned, was suffering from imperial overreach. For Arrighi, the decline was gradual and subtle. He argued that capitalist hegemonies move through repeating “systemic cycles of accumulation.” A phase of material expansion where capital is invested in production, infrastructure and trade, inevitably gives way to a phase of financial expansion, where capital seeks profit through speculation, lending and financial engineering. The material foundation is hollowed out even as the financial superstructure appears to boom. This was the logic of capitalism. The “autumn” of each hegemon is marked by a dazzling financial belle époque that masks terminal decline. The smile curve strategy is the purest expression of this financialisation and Apple is a textbook case. It designs its products, develops its chips, creates the operating systems, controls the branding, marketing and the retail experience. But it manufactures almost nothing. The iPhones and MacBooks are assembled by Foxconn in Zhengzhou and by Pegatron in Shanghai. The advanced chips are fabricated by TSMC in Taiwan. The displays come from Samsung in South Korea and LG Display. Apple captures an estimated 80-90 percent of the profit from each device, while the suppliers who do the actual physical work fight over the remaining scraps. Business schools love this strategy because it maximises corporate profits and shareholder value. But as Hung argues in his work on global value chains and the Arrighian counter, what maximises corporate profits does not necessarily maximise national power. In fact, it may systematically undermine it. By outsourcing the middle of the smile curve, the US has drastically hollowed out its industrial ecosystem. Combine it with the faith in short, sharp wars of shock and awe through high-tech precision weapons and we get the full picture of what has happened in the war against Iran. This is very different from the WWII industrial base of America. This brings us to TSMC and the chokepoint crisis. It manufactures chips designed by other companies (Nvidia, AMD, Qualcomm) rather than designing and selling its own chips. Over three decades, TSMC has built an unassailable lead in advanced process nodes. By 2025, it was manufacturing 92 percent of the world’s most advanced chips. The entire global technology industry (including the US military and intelligence apparatus) became dependent on a single cluster of fabs (fabrication plants) in Hsinchu, Taichung and Tainan. China, which views Taiwan as a breakaway province to be reunited with the mainland by force if necessary, has the physical means to blockade or invade the island. Whether it would do so or should is a different debate. On ground, the People’s Liberation Army has been systematically building anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, to prevent US intervention in a Taiwan scenario. It’s a fairly absurd position from the US point of view! Its technological supremacy is guaranteed by a factory complex on an island which, in theory, its primary strategic rival could potentially seize or blockade. To circle back to the CHIPS Act, this is the background. TSMC is now building a fab complex in Arizona. Intel is expanding in Ohio and Arizona. Samsung is building in Texas. But, as a 2023 Marketplace report noted, replicating TSMC’s “deep, deep process knowledge” will take years. The fab in Arizona has already faced delays, cost overruns, and labour disputes. Taiwanese engineers are reluctant to relocate to the United States. The set goes to Arrighi. America’s weaponisation of the dollar has accelerated efforts by China, Russia and other BRICS members to create alternatives | Shutterstock THE DOLLAR DILEMMA The dollar’s role as the world’s primary reserve currency has been a central pillar of American power since the Bretton Woods agreement of 1944. This exorbitant privilege allows the US to borrow in its own currency, run persistent trade deficits without penalty and, crucially, impose unilateral financial sanctions on states, corporations, and individuals. This weaponisation of the dollar has accelerated efforts by China, Russia and other BRICS members to create alternatives. China has been aggressively promoting its own Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) as an alternative to Swift. The People’s Bank of China has signed bilateral currency swap agreements with dozens of countries, allowing trade to be settled in renminbi rather than dollars. Russia has demanded payment in rubles for its natural gas exports. India has established a rupee settlement mechanism for trade. Brazil and China have agreed to trade in their own currencies. The Central Bank of Brazil has announced that it is diversifying its reserves away from the dollar. And yet, the actual pace of de-dollarisation has been glacial. Several structural factors explain this “stickiness”, to use American political economist Benjamin Cohen’s term. First, there is network stickiness. The dollar’s dominance is not simply a matter of policy; it is an issue of deep, self-reinforcing infrastructure. Global supply chains, commodity exchanges, derivatives markets, and correspondent banking networks are all built around the dollar. Second, as various experts have argued, there is a lack of viable alternatives. The Chinese renminbi, despite China’s enormous economic weight, is not a free-floating, fully convertible currency. China maintains capital controls, a heavily regulated financial system, and a non-independent central bank. No foreign investor can be certain that their renminbi holdings would not be frozen or devalued by arbitrary state action. The euro, the second-largest reserve currency, is hobbled by the Eurozone’s fragmented fiscal system and the lingering scars of the 2011 debt crisis. Gold is impractical for everyday transactions. And cryptocurrencies are far too volatile and illiquid to serve as a reserve asset. Third is the absence of a deep, liquid and open bond market. A reserve currency requires a “safe asset” in which foreign central banks can park their surplus reserves. The US Treasury market, with $25 trillion in outstanding debt and extraordinary liquidity, is the only game in town. Result: while China and Russia publicly call for de-dollarisation, their central banks have themselves continued to accumulate US Treasury securities, because there is nowhere else to go. Corollary: the near-term prognosis for de-dollarisation is not collapse but slow erosion. IMF data shows the dollar’s share of global reserves has declined from over 70 percent in 2000 to approximately 58 percent in 2025. This is not a precipitous decline, but it is a steady one. The debate is not if the dollar will lose its dominance but when. I have no expertise in this area and I have relied on studying existing expertise. Most analyses measure the timeframe in decades, not years. From that, my understanding is that increasing uncertainty, further weaponisation of the dollar, continuing application of sanctions and asset freezes will (a) erode the confidence that underpins the entire system and (b) force experts (and governments) to find alternatives. EPILOGUE: TERMINAL CRISIS Two other issues are important but I am only flagging them here for paucity of space: the implosion of neoliberalism and its internal effects and the fraying of the transatlantic alliance. Both are exacerbated by Trump but neither is a direct result of his election. Both are extremely consequential. The United States has not collapsed; not yet. Nor can it be defeated from outside. But it can crumble from within. The future is not about a return to US hegemony, certainly not in a unipolar sense. The industrial base may be gone but it can be rebuilt, albeit not overnight. Alliances are frayed; trust cannot be easily restored. The fiscal position is precarious, with a $35 trillion US national debt. Internal politics is deeply polarised, with a significant portion of the American electorate believing that the system is rigged against them. A lot of these factors, singly and in combination with other factors, are self-reinforcing. The future also lies in terra incognita, a contested transition to a multipolar world, whose contours remain unknown. A recent book by German political analyst Marc Saxer, Geopolitical Conflict in the Wolf World, is a sobering structural assessment of where the world and the US are headed. “Homo homini lupus est” (Man is a wolf to man) is how Saxer begins. With that statement, we are back to Plautus and Hobbes. This is not mere rhetorical flourish. Saxer’s wolf world is an analytic category, a systemic condition characterised by the absence of a hegemon capable of enforcing rules, the demise of neoliberalism, the collapse of shared legal-normative frameworks, the return of great-power competition, the rise of Middle Powers, many with regional hegemonic aspirations, and the normalisation of coercion as a primary instrument of statecraft. As I said to Saxer during the launch of his book in Lahore, for the Global South, it has always been a wolf world. Pax Americana did not keep the peace for the periphery. It financed selective peace on credit. The bill has now come due. The writer is a journalist interested in security and foreign policies. X: @ejazhaider Published in Dawn, EOS, May 31st, 2026
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PAKISTAN’S farmers are awaiting the next budget with growing fears and fading hopes. Their concerns this year are fundamental, as the government — amid pressure for reform — continues experimenting with subsidies, procurement prices, input-cost liberalisation and agricultural trade. The cost of this trial-and-error has become an existential problem for farmers and the agricultural sector. The agriculture sector’s fading hopes are a direct result of the government’s inability — or unwillingness — to adopt a long-term policy direction and muster the political will needed for its implementation. Deregulation of agricultural inputs has led to a continuous rise in production costs, which the government hesitates to pass on to consumers because of political consequences. Wheat policy reversals, deregulated input costs and controlled output prices are curtailing farm profitability Consequently, farmers and agri-sector experts alike agree the government should make a clear decision this year, develop a consistent policy framework, and commit resources to it in the coming budget. Iqrar Ahmad Khan, former vice chancellor of the University of Agriculture Faisalabad and author of the Punjab government’s last agricultural policy, supports the farmers’ demands. “After all, this is going to be the third budget of this government; it must decide where it wants to take the sector. If it wants to regulate agricultural inputs and trade, it should do so clearly. If it plans to deregulate, it must do so unambiguously. But it must make the direction clear. “If deregulation is the preferred path, as appears to be the case, then the government should stop interfering in the market on behalf of different stakeholders — whether farmers, consumers, traders or manufacturers — at different levels and times, and let the market find its own equilibrium.” Citing policy somersaults on wheat — the national staple around which much of the agricultural economy revolves — farmers explain how an inconsistent mix of liberalised and controlled policies is proving ruinous for growers. Responding to lenders’ demands, the federal and provincial governments withdrew from the wheat procurement process two years ago. But after a crippling price crash last year, the Punjab government lured commercial wheat buyers into the market by promising to share their financial burden and ensure profitability. Within weeks, as the entire model began to collapse, the province reverted to old tactics: raiding farmers’ stocks, seizing wheat shipments on roads and using administrative power to build up the reserves of private buyers. In the process, it incurred farmers’ wrath twice over — first by withdrawing from the wheat market and then by seizing their produce to rescue a failing liberalisation model. Such somersaults have become routine and now define the government’s handling of the entire agricultural sector. Structural weaknesses Beyond pricing and procurement issues, many believe the crisis in agriculture is also rooted in structural weaknesses that successive governments have failed to address. Dr Asif Ali, vice chancellor of Nawaz Sharif Agriculture University, argues that since landholdings in Pakistan are already highly fragmented — and continue to be divided with each passing generation — the government needs to mitigate the effects through cluster farming and crop zoning. These clusters could then be linked with providers of quality agricultural inputs, including seed, fertiliser and pesticides, which could also conduct training programmes for farmers. Such a model would help improve the marketing of agricultural produce as well. He further points out that nearly 65pc of farmers own less than five hectares of land. For such small landholders, most forms of mechanisation are either financially unaffordable or commercially impractical. He suggests the government announce measures in the budget to establish farm machinery rental centres, enabling small farmers to access equipment without bearing the full cost of ownership. A question of survival While some experts focus on structural reforms, farmers’ representatives insist the most immediate issue remains economic survival. Khalid Khokhar of the Pakistan Kissan Ittehad advocates making agriculture profitable on an urgent basis, arguing that it is no longer economically viable. He suggests the creation of a pricing commission to calculate the cost of production for each crop every year, add a 25pc profit margin and announce the price before the crop reaches the market. “Either put a cap on the cost of inputs or remove the cap on the price of outputs,” he warns. “Otherwise, farmers may soon be pushed out of business and existence.” Running dry Water sector remains the most critical challenge facing agriculture. According to data from the Indus River System Authority, water shortages remained in double digits in six of the last 10 years, touching nearly 30pc in 2022-23. Not a single year during this period was free of a water deficit. Naeem Hotiana, a farmer from central Punjab, points to a stark funding gap: the outgoing Wapda chairman demanded Rs400 billion annually to complete ongoing water projects but received only Rs35 billion — less than 10pc of the required amount. “The irrigation system was originally designed for 65pc land utilisation, whereas the current cropping intensity in Punjab has already crossed 150pc. Now combine the realities of limited surface-water availability, shrinking groundwater reserves and barely one-tenth of the required investment being provided, and imagine the situation that is emerging. Doesn’t it scare one out of one’s senses?” He warns the situation will worsen as environmental pressures mount. “Climate change, which is already testing the limits of existing water supplies, only deepens the anxiety.” Published in Dawn, June 2nd, 2026
PAKISTAN’S farmers are awaiting the next budget with growing fears and fading hopes. Their concerns this year are fundamental, as the government — amid pressure for reform — continues experimenting with subsidies, procurement prices, input-cost liberalisation and agricultural trade. The cost of this trial-and-error has become an existential problem for farmers and the agricultural sector. The agriculture sector’s fading hopes are a direct result of the government’s inability — or unwillingness — to adopt a long-term policy direction and muster the political will needed for its implementation. Deregulation of agricultural inputs has led to a continuous rise in production costs, which the government hesitates to pass on to consumers because of political consequences. Wheat policy reversals, deregulated input costs and controlled output prices are curtailing farm profitability Consequently, farmers and agri-sector experts alike agree the government should make a clear decision this year, develop a consistent policy framework, and commit resources to it in the coming budget. Iqrar Ahmad Khan, former vice chancellor of the University of Agriculture Faisalabad and author of the Punjab government’s last agricultural policy, supports the farmers’ demands. “After all, this is going to be the third budget of this government; it must decide where it wants to take the sector. If it wants to regulate agricultural inputs and trade, it should do so clearly. If it plans to deregulate, it must do so unambiguously. But it must make the direction clear. “If deregulation is the preferred path, as appears to be the case, then the government should stop interfering in the market on behalf of different stakeholders — whether farmers, consumers, traders or manufacturers — at different levels and times, and let the market find its own equilibrium.” Citing policy somersaults on wheat — the national staple around which much of the agricultural economy revolves — farmers explain how an inconsistent mix of liberalised and controlled policies is proving ruinous for growers. Responding to lenders’ demands, the federal and provincial governments withdrew from the wheat procurement process two years ago. But after a crippling price crash last year, the Punjab government lured commercial wheat buyers into the market by promising to share their financial burden and ensure profitability. Within weeks, as the entire model began to collapse, the province reverted to old tactics: raiding farmers’ stocks, seizing wheat shipments on roads and using administrative power to build up the reserves of private buyers. In the process, it incurred farmers’ wrath twice over — first by withdrawing from the wheat market and then by seizing their produce to rescue a failing liberalisation model. Such somersaults have become routine and now define the government’s handling of the entire agricultural sector. Structural weaknesses Beyond pricing and procurement issues, many believe the crisis in agriculture is also rooted in structural weaknesses that successive governments have failed to address. Dr Asif Ali, vice chancellor of Nawaz Sharif Agriculture University, argues that since landholdings in Pakistan are already highly fragmented — and continue to be divided with each passing generation — the government needs to mitigate the effects through cluster farming and crop zoning. These clusters could then be linked with providers of quality agricultural inputs, including seed, fertiliser and pesticides, which could also conduct training programmes for farmers. Such a model would help improve the marketing of agricultural produce as well. He further points out that nearly 65pc of farmers own less than five hectares of land. For such small landholders, most forms of mechanisation are either financially unaffordable or commercially impractical. He suggests the government announce measures in the budget to establish farm machinery rental centres, enabling small farmers to access equipment without bearing the full cost of ownership. A question of survival While some experts focus on structural reforms, farmers’ representatives insist the most immediate issue remains economic survival. Khalid Khokhar of the Pakistan Kissan Ittehad advocates making agriculture profitable on an urgent basis, arguing that it is no longer economically viable. He suggests the creation of a pricing commission to calculate the cost of production for each crop every year, add a 25pc profit margin and announce the price before the crop reaches the market. “Either put a cap on the cost of inputs or remove the cap on the price of outputs,” he warns. “Otherwise, farmers may soon be pushed out of business and existence.” Running dry Water sector remains the most critical challenge facing agriculture. According to data from the Indus River System Authority, water shortages remained in double digits in six of the last 10 years, touching nearly 30pc in 2022-23. Not a single year during this period was free of a water deficit. Naeem Hotiana, a farmer from central Punjab, points to a stark funding gap: the outgoing Wapda chairman demanded Rs400 billion annually to complete ongoing water projects but received only Rs35 billion — less than 10pc of the required amount. “The irrigation system was originally designed for 65pc land utilisation, whereas the current cropping intensity in Punjab has already crossed 150pc. Now combine the realities of limited surface-water availability, shrinking groundwater reserves and barely one-tenth of the required investment being provided, and imagine the situation that is emerging. Doesn’t it scare one out of one’s senses?” He warns the situation will worsen as environmental pressures mount. “Climate change, which is already testing the limits of existing water supplies, only deepens the anxiety.” Published in Dawn, June 2nd, 2026
‘Megafires’ in California, Canada, South Korea and Europe in 2025, but changes to farming slowed spread in parts of Africa “Devastating” wildfires ripped across the wealthier parts of the world in 2025, a study has found, even as globally, the area ravaged by flames fell. Catastrophic blazes claimed lives, homes and jobs last year in California, Canada, Europe and South Korea. But the 335m hectares burned was the second-lowest since 2002, the review found, largely owing to the expansion of African farms that have fragmented landscapes and hampered the spread of large savannah fires. Continue reading...
A military official from Pakistan has said that the country’s “resolute response” to India during the May 2025 conflict had effectively debunked the notion of space for war in South Asia. Commander I Corps Lieutenant General Nauman Zakria made these remarks during a special session at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on Saturday. In May 2025, a four-day conflict between Pakistan and India was sparked by an attack on tourists in occupied Kashmir, which New Delhi, without evidence, linked with Pakistan. Islamabad strongly denied responsibility while calling for a neutral investigation. After New Delhi launched deadly air strikes in Punjab and Azad Kashmir on May 7, Pakistan said it downed five Indian planes in air-to-air combat, later raising the tally to eight. After tit-for-tat strikes on each other’s airbases, it took American intervention on May 10 for both sides to finally reach a ceasefire. Speaking at the Shangri-La conference, Lieutenant General Zakria said strategic stability in South Asia remained shaped by nuclear deterrence, conventional asymmetry, enduring political tensions, and unresolved territorial and ideological disputes between India and Pakistan. And despite the complexities of great power contestation, China constituted a constructive and stabilising factor, contributing to strategic balance, regional connectivity and economic cooperation, he added. Lt Gen Zakria said the May 2025 conflict demonstrated Pakistan’s effective multi-domain operations, which were enabled by tri-service synergy, integrated use of cyber, electronic warfare, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, space-based capabilities and synergetic information manoeuvre, generating cross-domain effects. “Pakistan’s resolute response has effectively debunked the notion of space for war in South Asia,” he said. “Postconlict dynamics have further constrained the prospects for conventional war. However, continued Indian militarisation coupled with persistent adversarial rhetoric and absence of robust crisis management mechanisms continue to undermine regional stability,” he added. In this evolving environment, he said, South Asia’s strategic equilibrium was increasingly contingent upon escalation control and effective crisis communication frameworks. “Navigating the complex challenges of a fast-transforming geopolitical environment warrants a shift from competition-only postures to cooperative risk management across multiple domains, while remaining committed to upholding international norms,” he stressed. Firstly, he said, states must prioritise responsible governance of emerging technologies. “Technological innovation cannot be divorced from ethical responsibility and strategic accountability.” States should work towards internationally accepted norms regarding the military use of artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, cyber operations and space technologies. Human oversight must remain central in decisions involving the use of force, especially in systems with strategic implications, he said. Lt Gen Zakria added that confidence-building measures, transparency mechanisms and technical dialogues among states were essential to reduce misunderstanding and prevent destabilising arms races. Secondly, he said, institutionalised crisis management mechanisms and strategic communication channels needed to be strengthened, he said. “Even during periods of geopolitical rivalry, dialogue must never collapse. History repeatedly demonstrates that strategic stability is preserved not only through deterrence but through communication as well.” Thirdly, he said, nations needed to collaborate in codifying norms regarding space testing, prohibitions on attacks on civilian infrastructure, and human oversight requirements for autonomous weapon systems. “Norms do not discourage competitiveness, but they do set boundaries that make deterrence more calculable. “International law and multilateral institutions must be adaptive to emerging realities. Technological transformation is outpacing our existing institutional and legal frameworks,” he said. Lt Gen Zakria said that strengthening global cooperation on cyber governance, responsible AI development, space security, digital ethics and information integrity was imperative to maintaining the geostrategic equilibrium. “No country, regardless of its size or technological sophistication, can manage the emerging multifaceted risks alone. The challenges we face are transnational by nature and therefore require collaborative responses,” he asserted. Moreover, strategic stability was not only about military capability but also about societal endurance, he pointed out. “Countries must strengthen cyber resilience, protect critical infrastructure, improve digital and technical literacy and build institutional credibility. “Public trust is a strategic asset. Resilient societies are far less vulnerable to external manipulation and internal destabilisation through misinformation, polarisation, and technological disruption,” he said. At its core, strategic stability was ultimately about responsible statecraft, he added. “Technology itself is not inherently destabilising. But the real challenge lies in how technologies are governed, integrated, and employed. Human judgement, political wisdom, and international cooperation for the greater good remain indispensable. “We must resist the temptation for the greater good. We must resist the temptation to view every technological breakthrough solely through the lens of competition and militarisation, rather as a function of balance between innovation and responsibility, national security and global stability, strategic competition and collective survival,” he said. Lt Gen Zakria added, “Let us remember that peace and stability have never been involuntary outcomes of technological progression. They have always depended on political responsibility, strategic restraint and sustained international engagement.” Earlier in his address, he said the operationalisation of the emerging domains alongside the legacy domains had significantly complicated the strategic stability landscape. “Rapid advances in AI, autonomous systems, cyber capabilities, quantum technologies, and multi-domain operations are transforming military decision making, command and control structures, and strategic competition, while simultaneously introducing new vulnerabilities, risks of miscalculations, attribution challenges, and unintended escalation,” he said. As states, societies, and critical infrastructures become increasingly dependent on interconnected technological ecosystems, the erosion of predictability and compression of decision-making timelines were fundamentally reshaping the nature of inter-state conflict and strategic deterrence, he added. Lt Gen Zakria said the information was becoming increasingly fragmented, as digital platforms, AI-generated content, and disinformation campaigns eroded trust, distorted narratives and compressed decision-making timelines. “In this evolving landscape, the control of information and data integrity has emerged as a critical determinant of strategic stability, alongside conventional military balance,” he stressed.
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A military official from Pakistan has said that the country’s “resolute response” to India during the May 2025 conflict had effectively debunked the notion of space for war in South Asia. Commander I Corps Lieutenant General Nauman Zakria made these remarks during a special session at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on Saturday. In May 2025, a four-day conflict between Pakistan and India was sparked by an attack on tourists in occupied Kashmir, which New Delhi, without evidence, linked with Pakistan. Islamabad strongly denied responsibility while calling for a neutral investigation. After New Delhi launched deadly air strikes in Punjab and Azad Kashmir on May 7, Pakistan said it downed five Indian planes in air-to-air combat, later raising the tally to eight. After tit-for-tat strikes on each other’s airbases, it took American intervention on May 10 for both sides to finally reach a ceasefire. Speaking at the Shangri-La conference, Lieutenant General Zakria said strategic stability in South Asia remained shaped by nuclear deterrence, conventional asymmetry, enduring political tensions, and unresolved territorial and ideological disputes between India and Pakistan. And despite the complexities of great power contestation, China constituted a constructive and stabilising factor, contributing to strategic balance, regional connectivity and economic cooperation, he added. Lt Gen Zakria said the May 2025 conflict demonstrated Pakistan’s effective multi-domain operations, which were enabled by tri-service synergy, integrated use of cyber, electronic warfare, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, space-based capabilities and synergetic information manoeuvre, generating cross-domain effects. “Pakistan’s resolute response has effectively debunked the notion of space for war in South Asia,” he said. “Postconlict dynamics have further constrained the prospects for conventional war. However, continued Indian militarisation coupled with persistent adversarial rhetoric and absence of robust crisis management mechanisms continue to undermine regional stability,” he added. In this evolving environment, he said, South Asia’s strategic equilibrium was increasingly contingent upon escalation control and effective crisis communication frameworks. “Navigating the complex challenges of a fast-transforming geopolitical environment warrants a shift from competition-only postures to cooperative risk management across multiple domains, while remaining committed to upholding international norms,” he stressed. Firstly, he said, states must prioritise responsible governance of emerging technologies. “Technological innovation cannot be divorced from ethical responsibility and strategic accountability.” States should work towards internationally accepted norms regarding the military use of artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, cyber operations and space technologies. Human oversight must remain central in decisions involving the use of force, especially in systems with strategic implications, he said. Lt Gen Zakria added that confidence-building measures, transparency mechanisms and technical dialogues among states were essential to reduce misunderstanding and prevent destabilising arms races. Secondly, he said, institutionalised crisis management mechanisms and strategic communication channels needed to be strengthened, he said. “Even during periods of geopolitical rivalry, dialogue must never collapse. History repeatedly demonstrates that strategic stability is preserved not only through deterrence but through communication as well.” Thirdly, he said, nations needed to collaborate in codifying norms regarding space testing, prohibitions on attacks on civilian infrastructure, and human oversight requirements for autonomous weapon systems. “Norms do not discourage competitiveness, but they do set boundaries that make deterrence more calculable. “International law and multilateral institutions must be adaptive to emerging realities. Technological transformation is outpacing our existing institutional and legal frameworks,” he said. Lt Gen Zakria said that strengthening global cooperation on cyber governance, responsible AI development, space security, digital ethics and information integrity was imperative to maintaining the geostrategic equilibrium. “No country, regardless of its size or technological sophistication, can manage the emerging multifaceted risks alone. The challenges we face are transnational by nature and therefore require collaborative responses,” he asserted. Moreover, strategic stability was not only about military capability but also about societal endurance, he pointed out. “Countries must strengthen cyber resilience, protect critical infrastructure, improve digital and technical literacy and build institutional credibility. “Public trust is a strategic asset. Resilient societies are far less vulnerable to external manipulation and internal destabilisation through misinformation, polarisation, and technological disruption,” he said. At its core, strategic stability was ultimately about responsible statecraft, he added. “Technology itself is not inherently destabilising. But the real challenge lies in how technologies are governed, integrated, and employed. Human judgement, political wisdom, and international cooperation for the greater good remain indispensable. “We must resist the temptation for the greater good. We must resist the temptation to view every technological breakthrough solely through the lens of competition and militarisation, rather as a function of balance between innovation and responsibility, national security and global stability, strategic competition and collective survival,” he said. Lt Gen Zakria added, “Let us remember that peace and stability have never been involuntary outcomes of technological progression. They have always depended on political responsibility, strategic restraint and sustained international engagement.” Earlier in his address, he said the operationalisation of the emerging domains alongside the legacy domains had significantly complicated the strategic stability landscape. “Rapid advances in AI, autonomous systems, cyber capabilities, quantum technologies, and multi-domain operations are transforming military decision making, command and control structures, and strategic competition, while simultaneously introducing new vulnerabilities, risks of miscalculations, attribution challenges, and unintended escalation,” he said. As states, societies, and critical infrastructures become increasingly dependent on interconnected technological ecosystems, the erosion of predictability and compression of decision-making timelines were fundamentally reshaping the nature of inter-state conflict and strategic deterrence, he added. Lt Gen Zakria said the information was becoming increasingly fragmented, as digital platforms, AI-generated content, and disinformation campaigns eroded trust, distorted narratives and compressed decision-making timelines. “In this evolving landscape, the control of information and data integrity has emerged as a critical determinant of strategic stability, alongside conventional military balance,” he stressed.