Hacker News Front Page
중도 성향
IT/기술
LLMs are eroding my software engineering career and I don't know what to do
Comments
"ERODING" · 총 34건
필터 보기현재 지수
50.3
0 = 부정 우세
50 = 중립
100 = 긍정 우세
최근 7일 기준 88,583건을 분석한 결과, 뉴스 심리지수는 50.3(균형)입니다. 긍정 4,463건(5.0%)·중립 82,021건(92.6%)·부정 2,099건(2.4%)이며, 중립 비중이 뚜렷하게 높습니다. 성향 지수는 종합 15.0(중도 균형)입니다.
Comments
Rather than asking why public trust is eroding, the judiciary forcefully demands that the public restore trust while leaving the underlying causes unaddressed.
More than any other in recent memory, this administration has been willing to be bold in defense of American interests. It must do so for US biotech as well. Our US biotech ecosystem is in crisis: to be blunt, China's industrial policy combined with a sclerotic FDA over the previous decade is stealing and eroding away the industry. This is happening at a time when AI breakthroughs should be accelerating faster and cheaper cures.
An open letter signed by the heads of OpenAI, Anthropic, Google DeepMind, and Microsoft AI warns that advances in AI are eroding barriers to biological weapons development
Recently, another International Workers’ Day (IWD) was concluded with the customary fanfare of vibrant marches, impassioned speeches and recycled pledges to prioritise labour welfare. Yet, for the Nigerian workforce, the gap between political rhetoric and socio-economic reality has never been wider. With inflation relentlessly eroding the naira’s value and the cost of living reaching unprecedented […] The post Demand for a new minimum wage appeared first on Vanguard News.
The stalemate in Middle East negotiations is testing Capitol Hill’s patience and triggering a revolt among lawmakers who aren’t seeking re‑election in November — and therefore no longer fear the president’s wrath
Patience is a virtue that researchers have linked to many parts of well-being. But it’s also something that needs a bit of practice and training – and can be undermined by instant, easy gratification.
AI leaders like Sam Altman and Dario Amodei, usually rivals, have united with other tech CEOs to urge Congress for mandatory screening of DNA synthesis orders. Citing AI's rapid advancement, they warn of eroding knowledge barriers for biological weapons development. The letter advocates for screening requests and recording data to prevent misuse and ensure traceability.
The Indian rupee is trading around Rs. 95-96 to the dollar in late May 2026, setting fresh record lows. Markets are openly discussing the Rs. 100 threshold. The rupee has weakened in almost every year since 2014 and has lost approximately half its value against the dollar over that period. The end of this currency depreciation is not in sight. The factors that would stop it are not yet visible.The government is acting. State run oil companies have implemented four fuel price hikes in ten days as of May 25, taking petrol in Delhi past Rs. 102 per litre. This is the right and necessary response to the energy cost reality created by the Iran war. Crucially, the Modi government has also done its part on the macroeconomic front, consistently and aggressively reducing the fiscal deficit as a percentage of GDP to maintain structural stability.Yet, the currency pressure persists. The energy price impact has not yet fully reached Indian consumers and supply chains. It is coming.Uday Kotak said it plainly at the CII Annual Business Summit on May 12: "Be ready for tough times rather than waiting for the shock to hit us." He was right.Also read | Manufactured monopoly: How industrial policy is structuring monopolies in IndiaThis is not a time to panic. But it is a time to act. The leaders who move now will have options. Those who wait will not.The Overriding Factor: The Psychology of the PlayersWhy is the currency declining despite strong domestic fiscal discipline? Because exchange rates are not driven by mathematical models alone. The currency decline is highly affected—and accelerated—by the psychology of all players engaged in this endeavor.Currency movements are deeply behavioral. When a currency visualizes a downward trend, psychology shifts from calculation to self-protection and speculation. Every player in the ecosystem operates under this psychological weight:Corporate CFOs and Treasurers: Instead of hedging normally, they rush to cover future dollar liabilities early, hoarding hard currency and inadvertently worsening the scarcity.Foreign Investors: They begin to judge their returns not by the quality of Indian business operations, but by the eroding value of the conversion rate.Importers and Exporters: Importers advance their payments to avoid paying more tomorrow; exporters delay converting their dollar earnings back into rupees, waiting for a "better" rate. This collective psychology creates a self-fulfilling prophecy.Investors, CFOs, and FDI decision makers extrapolate what is happening now into the future. When they see a currency that has lost approximately half its value since 2014 with no clear floor in sight, their psychological pivot alters market realities.Also read | India tightens checks on overseas flows as currency pressure mounts, sources sayThe cascading timeline of Foreign Portfolio Investor (FPI) equity behavior perfectly mirrors this psychological shift from rational evaluation to systemic risk aversion:2024 (The Calculation Phase): Rupee averages Rs. 83-84. FPI flows remain positive (+$12 billion) as investors trade on strong domestic corporate earnings.2025 (The Self-Protection Phase): Rupee slides past Rs. 89. Collective psychology shifts to risk mitigation. FPIs withdraw a record $18.4 billion from Indian equities—the largest annual equity outflow on record.Early 2026 (The Capitulation Phase): Rupee breaks past Rs. 95. Sentiment turns into an outright exit strategy. In the first four months of 2026 alone, outflows have already reached $19.1 billion, completely bypassing the entire previous year's record loss in a fraction of the time.FDI agreements are being signed, but capital is delayed because players are psychologically hesitant to deploy funds into a depreciating asset.The Trap of Hard Currency Debt: A Broken Business Model There is a highly significant and dangerous phenomenon unfolding in India today that requires immediate exposure. For years, a specific class of Indian corporates adopted a regular strategy of borrowing heavily in hard currency (External Commercial Borrowings, or ECBs). Lured by low nominal global interest rates, several of these companies over borrowed, treating cheap dollar debt as a permanent structural advantage.Today, that strategy has become a trap. The compounding effect of a depreciating rupee, skyrocketing hedging costs, and brutal refinancing realities is fundamentally breaking their business models.Consider the mechanics of this crisis:The Hedging Penalty: Leaving dollar debt unhedged is now corporate roulette. However, buying hedges at current rupee levels has become structurally prohibitive. The cost of protection completely wipes out any interest rate advantage.The Refinancing Wall: Billions in foreign debt are coming due. These over-borrowed companies must now refinance their liabilities at a time when the rupee value has materially deteriorated. They are effectively forced to borrow far more rupees just to pay back the same amount of original dollars.The Crushing Cost of Rupee Capital: As these companies try to pivot back to domestic lenders, they face a severe escalation in their rupee cost of capital.The Growth Verdict: When your cost of capital spikes and your cash flows are consumed by servicing legacy dollar debt, future growth stops. Capital expenditure (CapEx) plans are being frozen. These companies can no longer invest in innovation, capacity, or market expansion. Their business model shifts overnight from aggressive value creation to basic survival. Boards must realize that this is not a temporary treasury headache; it is a structural threat to the company’s future viability.India's forex reserves stand at approximately 10 to 11 months of import cover. Substantial, but being actively deployed to defend the currency. Some imports are non-negotiable: oil, critical inputs, components. These will now cost more. That cost passes through every supply chain.Six Actions for Business Leaders1. Protect your cash and liquidity first. This is the most immediate priority. Map your cash position today. Identify every source of liquidity across the next twelve months. Stress-test it at Rs. 100 and beyond. Which receivables are at risk? Which credit lines are rupee-denominated and which are not? Companies that run into a cash crisis during a currency depreciation cycle lose their options entirely. The CFO must own this analysis and present it to the board within days, not weeks.2. Act now on your foreign currency borrowings, hedging, and refinancing. Do not assume the rupee will recover to Rs. 80. Analyse your full foreign currency exposure across the next three years: every loan, every refinancing date, every hedging contract, every procurement price denominated in foreign currency. Hard currency loans now face refinancing at rupee values that have materially deteriorated. Model every scenario at Rs. 100 and beyond. Your CFO, treasury, and procurement team must be aligned on one instruction: do not run into a liquidity crisis. This analysis must happen now, not at the next quarterly review.3. Build a war room. Most companies have begun thinking about war rooms for supply chain disruptions. Expand the mandate. Currency exposure belongs in the same room. Which of your costs are dollar or euro denominated? Which of your revenues are rupee denominated? Where is the mismatch? What is your break-even exchange rate? If you do not have clear answers today, you are exposed. The war room is not a committee. It is a real-time decision environment with live data, a clear owner, and the authority to act.4. Use the currency depreciation advantage: double your export salesforce. A weaker rupee makes Indian exports more competitive. This window will not stay open indefinitely. Double the salesforce in your export markets now. Use this period to upgrade quality, improve service delivery, and build customer relationships that will last beyond the currency advantage. Indian exporters who invest in capability during this period will emerge stronger regardless of what the rupee does next. Those who simply ride the price advantage without building the underlying business will lose when conditions change.5. Watch your stock and your sector. Banks and financial institutions should already be on high alert. Companies with large foreign currency exposure will see pressure on their financials. Some stock prices are already reflecting this. Go through your sector company by company. Identify who is most exposed. If you are an investor or a lender, this analysis is not optional. The combination of currency depreciation, rising oil prices, and FPI outflows creates a compounding pressure that will surface in earnings before it surfaces in headlines.6. Cut costs aggressively. AI will help. There has never been more urgency to reduce costs than now. And there has never been a better tool to do it. AI can cut most operational costs by as much as 30% across functions: procurement, finance, customer service, logistics, and compliance. McKinsey data confirms companies adopting AI and automation reduce operational costs by 20 to 30 percent. This is not a future opportunity. It is a present imperative. Every rupee of cost removed through AI is a rupee that does not need to be recovered through revenue in a deteriorating currency environment. Start now with your highest-cost functions.The CFO as CaptainCurrency risk is a cash flow risk. Every function that touches foreign currency—procurement, treasury, sales, capex planning— must now report into a single coordinating authority. That authority is the CFO. This is not about hierarchy. It is about clarity. In a currency crisis, fragmented decision-making is as dangerous as wrong decision making. One captain. One consolidated view. Weekly reviews minimum.The Bigger PictureThis currency depreciation is a structural signal, not a cyclical one. India's economy must move from a cheap labour advantage to genuine global value creation.The companies that will survive and thrive are those building products and services that command premium prices in global markets. The rupee's weakness is a reminder that competing on cost alone has limits.The recently concluded trade agreements are a genuine opportunity. Execute them with full force. Build the export pipelines. Add the sales capacity.The businesses that move now, with discipline and clarity, will manage market psychology, navigate the debt trap, and define the next chapter of Indian industry.The shock is coming. Prepare before it arrives.Ram Charan is the author of China’s 90% model. It is restricting India’s industrial progress. Former Director of Hindalco and Muyuan (China).
THIS graph shows personal remittances as a percentage of Pakistan’s GDP since the late 1970s.—Source: World Bank, SBP data • Ex-finance minister Hafeez Pasha says foreign inflows could encourage disproportionate investment in real-estate • 1970s oil imbroglio marked the beginning of labour emigration to Gulf, while current crisis could spell its end • PIDE sees around a million workers’ livelihoods being affected if conflict prolongs ONLINE listings for properties in Punjab districts like Mandi Bahauddin and Gujrat yield images of Spanish-style villas, fully decked out with opulent fittings and European design flourishes. This stylised approach to construction is quite deliberate and reflects the social status that comes with having a ‘Kamanay Wala’ (earning member) abroad. In many families, at least one offspring is abroad, creating an alternative source of income that, in many cases, has reduced the incentive to further develop the district’s fertile agricultural land for those that still dwell there. Mandi Bahauddin particularly is one of many districts where household prosperity is closely tied to money sent from overseas. Saying that remittances are Pakistan’s lifeline is no exaggeration. Released in May, the State of Pakistan’s Economy Half-Year Report 2025-26 projects remittances at up to $42 billion this fiscal year, compared to exports of $30.5bn. At the macroeconomic level, remittances help keep the current account deficit in check. At the household level, they act as an essential safety net, providing direct cash support to families. However, cash in hand at the household level tends to drive spending rather than investment in productive activities. Pakistan’s reliance on remittances has laid the foundation for a form of ‘Dutch disease’, where the economy depends on inflows that fuel demand rather than production. The State Bank reports also note that remittances increase currency in circulation, as recipients convert inflows into physical cash for day-to-day expenditures. Data from the Household Integrated Economic Survey FY25 shows that remittances have risen from five per cent to 7.8pc as a source of household income. While this helps households smooth spending during periods of economic stress, it also increases their exposure to external shocks that can suddenly disrupt these inflows. Remittances and real estate Research by the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics indicates that a significant share of remittances is channelled into property and real estate. Anecdotally and empirically, this holds up; the dominant motive behind the decision to migrate is to improve the socio-economic status of the family, which investments in property demonstrate. Nor is Pakistan unique in this regard. India, the world’s largest recipient of remittances, received $136bn in FY25, more than three times Pakistan’s inflows. Non-resident Indians have also become increasingly active in the property market. According to the India Brand Equity Foundation, their share of real-estate investment has risen from 10-12pc in 2019 to a possible all-time high of 20pc in 2025. While property investments are a common feature of remittances, Pakistan faces another conundrum. Former finance minister Hafeez Pasha argues that Pakistan’s real-estate sector neither contributes adequately to tax revenues nor operates fully within the formal economy, yet continues to attract a disproportionate share of investment. “About a decade ago, investment in industry and manufacturing was two and a half times that of real estate. Today, you have the strange situation that real estate is over twice that of industry,” he says, though not solely because of remittances. There are six real estate and property-related taxes, he notes, yet total revenue collection amounts to only 0.2pc of GDP, despite a potential of around 0.8pc. Urban immovable property tax collection in Karachi, for example, generates roughly ten times less revenue than Mumbai in dollar terms because of severe under-taxation, he adds. Oil giveth, oil taketh One oil shock’s legacy, involving the US’s long-standing entanglement with oil markets and support for Israel, was the start of Pakistan’s emigration story. This was also the start of the country’s reliance on remittances. But another such oil shock, involving similar geopolitical players, may well mark the beginning of the end of the Pakistanis-in-Gulf fairy-tale. In 1973, Arab members of Opec imposed an oil embargo on the US in retaliation for its support for Israel. The resulting shock saw prices jump from around $3 to nearly $12 per barrel. The sudden influx of petrodollars supercharged growth across the Gulf, triggering massive infrastructure projects that required large volumes of blue-collar labour. In Pakistan, this coincided with a period of sweeping nationalisation under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, which pushed unemployment higher at a time when passage to Gulf countries was relatively easy to obtain. Hence, Pakistani labour moved in large numbers to the region, driving remittances to a peak as a percentage of GDP in 1983. The ratio fell steadily through the late 1980s and 1990s as oil prices fell, Gulf countries cut construction projects, and demand for Pakistani labour declined. Pakistan’s nuclear tests in 1998 led to sanctions. Pakistan froze foreign currency accounts, trapping diaspora savings deposited in Pakistani banks and eroding confidence in formal channels, leading to a boom in hawala/hundi. Then came 9/11, leading to a global crackdown on informal channels. Pakistan also became a front-line state in the ‘War on Terror’, leading to the lifting of sanctions. The drive by the authorities in recent years to regularise and incentivise remittances has led to flows back into formal channels. Returning labour External shocks — particularly movements in oil prices and developments in the Gulf — have historically shaped Pakistan’s remittance story. The Middle East accounts for roughly 55pc of Pakistan’s remittances and absorbs between 700,000 and 800,000 new Pakistani workers each year. The ongoing conflict involving Iran, the United States and Israel has damaged infrastructure, disrupted energy markets and introduced fresh uncertainty across the region, reducing demand for Pakistani labour. A recent policy viewpoint by the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics estimates that if the conflict is prolonged, around half a million Pakistani workers may be unable to secure overseas employment this year, while another half a million could be forced to return home. Such a reversal would have serious implications for Pakistan’s labour market, particularly in KP and Punjab, where overseas migration traditionally absorbs nearly one-third of new labour-force entrants. The flow of money that transformed villages, financed homes and underpinned aspirations for generations may no longer be as certain as it once seemed. Published in Dawn, June 4th, 2026
As a teenager, imagining the world 30 years from now no longer stirs the familiar anxiety of whether I'll land a good job or build a loving family. The fear runs deeper than that — whether the world will even be livable. With the threats of climate change mounting and political commitment to address them steadily eroding, the lives of future generations are genuinely at stake. Korea is currently attempting to protect the fundamental rights of those future generations through an ongoing reform of
‘FUNDING, funding and regular funding’ is what Pakistani women athletes say they need most to compete internationally. Talent alone, they point out, cannot take them to the world stage; it must be backed by quality equipment, top-notch coaching, proper training facilities, nutrition and the means to travel and compete. For most athletes, both male and female, except those supported by the departmental sports system such as the Pakistan Army, Wapda, the Higher Education Commission, National Bank, Pakistan Railways, police and airlines, the struggle begins long before competition day: finding the resources simply to stay in the game. State patronage is limited, private sponsorship even scarcer — and for women, almost non-existent. Even for female athletes with supportive families or relatively privileged backgrounds, funding remains a constant struggle. Eman Khan, who won the gold at the 2024 International Mixed Martial Arts Federation Asian Championships, receives only sporadic private sponsorships. To sustain her career in the intensely male-dominated and often ‘violent’ world of the martial arts, she relies on coaching others to fund her own training and competition expenses. The barriers are even greater for girls from Pakistan’s remotest and poorest districts. Without sponsors or financial backing, many are forced to quit before their talent is ever discovered; this is not just an individual but also a national loss. Stadiums are largely empty and media attention wanes when it comes to women playing sports. In Jacobabad, the Star Women’s Sports Academy, the only women’s sports club in Larkana division, trains 32 girls from low-income homes in football, hockey, cricket and tennis for free. But with little funding and a severe shortage of equipment, many aspiring players are turned away. The club cannot afford to send athletes to private tournaments. Founded in 2017 by hockey player Erum Baloch, in April the academy had to appeal on social media for basic gear — goalkeeping kits, hockey sticks and balls. Baloch, who teaches at a private institution, uses much of her own salary to keep the club — her passion — running. Help poured in from ordinary citizens and philanthropists. Even a sportswoman from Peshawar rushed to ensure the girls had the equipment they needed to continue playing. The appeal is a stark reflection of the lack of official support for women’s sports. Similarly, last year, after reading about the plight of these athletes, the Australian high commission helped fund a hockey training camp for them in Islamabad. However, ad hoc support and one-off training cannot produce national or international athletes. When coaches constantly scramble for basic equipment, training becomes inconsistent, eroding the very backbone of competitive sport. Star Academy is far from the only women’s sports club trudging along with limited resources. Founders in Karachi, Hyderabad and Mirpurkhas say they often reach into their own pockets to keep girls playing — from water to rickshaw fares, they even buy shoes for those who cannot afford them. At the same time, they have to spend hours convincing hesitant parents to let their daughters continue. But this financial strain is intertwined with harassment within the system. Coaches have observed that girls from poorer, more conservative homes — some describe their charges as ‘less educated, less confident and unable to speak in English’ — often become a target of sexual harassment. Many girls stay quiet for fear of being pressured to leave the sports premises — or the sport itself. Others, the coaches allege, are sidelined (even if talented) as ‘punishment’ for refusing the inappropriate advances of male officials who influence selection and careers. Another reason why women’s sport remains chronically underfunded compared to men’s, said Dr Sadia Sheikh, founder of Pakistan’s first women’s sports club, Diya Academy (established in 2002), is that: “Women’s sports are less marketable.” “Inn ki tau kal shadi ho jai ge; hum ko kiya return milay ga?” (Tomorrow these women will get married; if we invest in them, what returns will we get?) is a common excuse by corporations for turning them away, she said. This dismissive attitude, pointed out Dr Sheikh, is reinforced by the lacklustre viewership: stadiums remain largely empty and media attention wanes when it comes to women playing sports. However, in sports such as cricket and football, there has been some positive development of late. The state and private sponsors are investing in female athletes. The latter receive enviable packages (though not equal to their male counterparts’) consisting of comfortable accommodation, good meals, daily allowances and even salaries or stipends, when compared to female athletes in other sports. They are even sent abroad for training and also get a chance to play against international teams. Yet women in field hockey remain under the radar. It would be worth asking if our women’s national hockey team has qualified for the 2026 16-nation World Cup set to be held in Belgium and the Netherlands in August. Surely a country whose national sport is hockey must have a strong women’s team to be sent alongside its male counterpart! Recently, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif approved budgetary allocations to promote sports and supported a sports endowment fund for veterans, while also pledging “all-out support” and equal opportunities for women in sport. However, a dedicated national fund for women athletes is yet to be announced. But there is still time to act. The Pakistan Sports Board, along with the national federations, is drafting a four-year athlete development programme and has sought a budget increase from Rs1.2 billion to Rs4.9bn to support training, coaching, infrastructure and international participation. Before the PM gives his final approval, and before flagship projects, such as the Rs2.85bn Arshad Nadeem High Performance Sports Academy in Islamabad or the Rs 241 million multi-purpose sports complex in Faisalabad move ahead, it is worth asking what place, if any, women athletes occupy in this vision. Their struggles are systemic. The answer lies not only in more funding, but in fairer allocation, stronger governance, greater media visibility and genuine inclusion. Without that, financial investment will not change the game. The writer is an independent journalist based in Karachi. X: @zofeen28 Published in Dawn, June 3rd, 2026
Last night, Hampshire Police released body-worn camera video of Henry Nowak's arrest. It shows officers responding to a dynamic incident, in the dark, having been sent to deal with an allegation of racially-motivated assault. The murderer, Vickrum Digwa, gave a shamefully persuasive performance as the victim, aided by his family. Yet, as Labour MP and [...]Read More...
Countries: Lebanon, Syrian Arab Republic Source: Famine Early Warning System Network Please refer to the attached file. Key Messages Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected across South and El-Nabatieh governorates through September 2026, driven by sustained insecurity, collapsed market functionality, and severely constrained humanitarian access. From June through September, a deterioration from Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!) to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) is likely in Akkar, Baalbek-El Hermel, Beirut, and parts of Mount Lebanon, Bekaa, and North, reflecting mounting displacement pressures and declining income-earning opportunities alongside a reduction in humanitarian food assistance after May. Hostilities between Israeli forces and Hezbollah persist in May, with continued airstrikes and ground operations driving large-scale displacement, reducing market access, disrupting agricultural production, and constraining humanitarian operations. Despite a 45-day ceasefire extension announced on May 15, fighting intensified in mid- to late May, with attacks remaining concentrated in southern Lebanon, particularly in Tyre, Nabatieh, Bint Jbeil, and Marjayyoun districts. Israeli air and drone strikes are also increasing in frequency in the Bekaa Valley. Attacks targeting critical infrastructure — including health facilities, water systems, and transportation routes — continue to disrupt supply chains and constrain service delivery, while humanitarian access remains constrained across insecurity-affected areas, further isolating southern populations. Displacements continue to increase, placing additional strain on collective shelters and intensifying social tensions in host communities. Returns to southern Lebanon remain limited due to persisting insecurity, widespread infrastructure destruction, restricted access, and disruptions to markets and essential services. Expanded evacuation orders beyond southern Lebanon are constraining movement and access to assistance across southern Lebanon, the Bekaa Valley, and Beirut’s southern suburbs, with 90 percent of forced displacement orders concentrated in South, triggering further population movements. As of May 21, nearly 130,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) are residing in 635 collective shelters, while the majority of the estimated 1.3 million IDPs remain outside formal sites in Beirut, Mount Lebanon, and North. Within these governorates, large influxes are exacerbating overcrowding, straining local resources, and heightening tensions between displaced populations and host communities. Food and fuel prices remain key constraints on household food access amid Lebanon’s heavy reliance on imports and ongoing insecurity-related disruptions. Below-average 2025 wheat production, intermittent trade disruptions, and localized access constraints, particularly in the south and the Bekaa-Baalbek-Hermel corridor, are placing upward pressure on prices, with bread prices rising 12 percent from mid-February to mid-April and remaining elevated despite national wheat availability that is supported by sustained imports, especially in areas affected by insecurity and transport disruptions. Sharp increases in fuel prices — rising by approximately 84 percent between mid-February and mid-May — due to domestic price adjustments and regional fuel market pressures following the escalation are raising transportation and production costs. These price increases are further eroding household purchasing power, particularly for poor and displaced households. Market functionality and income-earning opportunities remain uneven across Lebanon, reflecting a geographic divide between insecurity-affected areas and areas not directly impacted by hostilities. In South and El-Nabatieh, market functionality remains severely degraded, with limited trader activity, supply chain breakdowns, and restricted physical access constraining food availability. In contrast, markets continue to operate in most displacement-affected areas, though growing strain on local markets — driven by the IDP influx, price inflation, depleting stocks, and overwhelming trader capacity — and declining purchasing power are increasingly constraining food access. Income-earning opportunities remain well below average countrywide, with the collapse of the tourism industry — an 80 percent drop compared to the same period in 2025 — and below-average activity in construction, services, and transport limiting urban labor demand. The increased labor supply from displaced populations is increasing competition and placing downward pressure on wages. In South, El-Nabatieh, and Baalbek-Hermel, agricultural labor opportunities, associated with the start of the typical wheat and barley harvest, are below average and compounded by displacement, land access constraints, and infrastructure damage, which are reducing a key source of seasonal income. Humanitarian food assistance remains ongoing but insufficient to meet rapidly rising needs. A revised extension of the Lebanon Flash Appeal through August — expected to launch in early June — will continue to target up to 1 million people, contingent on the availability of funding, including poor Lebanese, displaced Syrians, and Palestinian refugees. However, implementation remains highly dependent on securing additional funding, with substantial funding gaps limiting partners’ ability to sustain assistance delivery at scale. Since the start of the escalation, partners have delivered more than 10.3 million hot and cold meals, 129,852 ready-to-eat rations, and 37,256 bread bundles across Lebanon, and have supported 618,000 insecurity-affected people with cash assistance as of May 21. Operational effectiveness also continues to vary by area. In insecurity-affected areas, particularly South and El-Nabatieh, ongoing hostilities, movement restrictions, infrastructure damage, and localized market disruptions limit households’ ability to fully utilize cash assistance, while access constraints and convoy limitations continue to restrict the timely delivery of in-kind assistance to the most affected and isolated populations.
Labor MP Mike Freelander says party must continue to help under-pressure workers, including considering further income tax cuts Get our breaking news email, free app or daily news podcast Labor will seek to highlight Pauline Hanson’s record of opposing cost-of-living relief for working people as it tries to prevent One Nation further eroding its voter base. As the government grapples with how to deal with Hanson’s surge, one Labor MP predicted One Nation’s support had peaked and the rightwing populist party wouldn’t be able to replicate its polling success at a federal election. Continue reading...
The main opposition forces of Uruguay coincided on Sunday in questioning the public response of President Yamandú Orsi to the discount of approximately USD 25,000 he obtained in the purchase of a zero-kilometre Hyundai Santa Fe SUV a few days before assuming the presidency on 1 March 2025. The Board of Transparency and Public Ethics (Jutep) will review the transaction after receiving three formal citizen complaints, in an episode that is eroding one of the main political assets of the president, associated with an image of transparency and austerity.
The main opposition forces of Uruguay coincided on Sunday in questioning the public response of President Yamandú Orsi to the discount of approximately USD 25,000 he obtained in the purchase of a zero-kilometre Hyundai Santa Fe SUV a few days before assuming the presidency on 1 March 2025. The Board of Transparency and Public Ethics (Jutep) will review the transaction after receiving three formal citizen complaints, in an episode that is eroding one of the main political assets of the president, associated with an image of transparency and austerity.
DIASPORA AFFAIRS: J Street senior vice president Ilan Goldenberg tells The Jerusalem Post that he believes that a liberal Zionist position will help Israeli relations with the US.
• 1pc advance tax removal may bring a meagre Rs100bn relief • Textile sector pushes for broader reforms, refunds, and lower energy costs • 68pc tax burden eroding competitiveness; industry demands restoration of Final Tax Regime SLAMABAD: The government is considering abolishing the one per cent advance tax on exporters in the upcoming federal budget, a move that could provide relief of around Rs100 billion. However, no broader fiscal support for the struggling sector is currently on the table. Officials familiar with the budget discussions told Dawn on Friday that the proposal is under active consideration as part of limited, targeted measures for the export industry, particularly the textile sector, which has been pressing for wide-ranging reforms. The 1pc advance tax, charged on export proceeds, has long been criticised by exporters as a liquidity-draining measure that ties up working capital despite thin margins and delayed refunds. Industry data showed that exporters alone had paid nearly Rs200bn in excess on account of 1pc advance income tax during FY25 and FY26. “This is essentially returning a fraction of what has already been collected,” said a leading exporter, pointing to the cumulative burden of taxes, high energy costs, and blocked refunds that continue to constrain operations. The textile sector, which accounts for the bulk of Pakistan’s exports, submitted a comprehensive set of proposals ahead of the budget, including the restoration of the Final Tax Regime (FTR), a reduction in energy tariffs, clearance of over Rs327bn in pending refunds, and the revival of export incentives. However, sources indicated that most of these demands are unlikely to be accommodated in the upcoming budget, which remains constrained by revenue targets and ongoing stabilisation commitments. Industry data place Pakistan at a significant disadvantage in terms of effective taxation. Exporters face an estimated burden of over 68.27pc, exceeding regional competitors. By contrast, Vietnam maintains a corporate tax rate of around 20pc, Bangladesh ranges from 22.5 to 27.5pc, and India applies a graduated structure from 26 to 34pc. These comparatively lower and more predictable regimes enable exporters in competing countries to retain margins and reinvest in capacity expansion. The gap indicates that Pakistan’s taxation framework is not only higher but also more complex, with multiple levies contributing to the cumulative burden. Exporters pointed out that the advance tax is particularly burdensome because it is applied at the point of transaction, regardless of profitability, effectively increasing the cost of doing business in an already high-tax environment. The proposed relief of Rs100bn, while significant in absolute terms, is modest when viewed against the sector’s liquidity requirements and accumulated tax payments. Energy pricing emerges as one of the most critical constraints. Industrial electricity tariffs in Pakistan stand at approximately 11.5 cents per kilowatt-hour, compared to 6.3 cents in India, 8 cents in Vietnam, and as low as 5 cents in Uzbekistan. Gas prices show an even sharper divergence, with Pakistan at about $13.5 per mmBtu versus $6 to $7 in India and Vietnam and around $3 in Uzbekistan. In addition to higher tariffs, Pakistan faces supply reliability issues, whereas countries such as China and Vietnam offer stable supply along with preferential industrial tariffs. The combined effect is a substantial increase in production costs, directly affecting export competitiveness. Indirect taxation Pakistan’s indirect tax regime is characterised by a uniform 18pc GST on both inputs and finished goods, with refund delays extending from months to several years. In contrast, regional competitors apply differentiated rates and efficient refund systems. Bangladesh applies reduced or zero-rated value-added tax (VAT) on export inputs, India operates a structured GST system with refunds typically processed within two to four weeks, while Vietnam and China offer near-immediate or automated refund mechanisms. This divergence creates a liquidity disadvantage for Pakistani exporters, as working capital remains tied up in delayed refunds. Pakistan Textile Exporters Association (PTEA) Patron-in-Chief Khurram Mukhtar, in a statement, said Pakistan’s export sector and the entire textile value chain are unfortunately fighting against a mindset that appears bent on penalising the very ecosystem that earns foreign exchange, creates jobs and sustains documented economic activity. The harsh reality today is that the more exporters grow, the more they are burdened. In many cases, the more you export, the more you lose, he said. The government’s own documented figures reveal that the shift from the FTR to the Normal Tax Regime (NTR) has resulted in an estimated additional revenue extraction of approximately Rs90bn. Exporters should have the option to remain under FTR or to voluntarily opt for NTR. This was perhaps one of the rare moments in Pakistan’s history when the entire textile chain converged on a concrete and balanced proposal. Unfortunately, even this unified recommendation does not appear to be receiving serious consideration, he added. The Export Facilitation Scheme (EFS) was one of the few excellent reforms introduced in recent years. It was fully digitalised, bringing transparency and efficiency to the system. However, the exclusion of domestic commerce from EFS significantly increased the burden on exporters and disrupted the integrated textile value chain, he remarked. “We have repeatedly stressed that the super tax should be abolished in a phased manner along with Minimum Turnover Tax (MTR), inter-company dividend taxation and taxation on bonus shares, particularly when bonus shares are a non-cash item and do not represent actual income generation”, he said. Similarly, exporters proposed a progressive GST framework: raw materials may be taxed at 5pc, fabrics at 10pc, and finished products at the standard GST rate, thereby ensuring that primary revenue collection occurs at the finished product stage rather than trapping capital throughout the manufacturing chain. Published in Dawn, May 30th, 2026
Country: World Source: ELRHA What if the most powerful indicator in humanitarian response was also the most neglected? When crises unfold, we count displacement, malnutrition, and funding gaps. But months later, one question often remains unanswered - how many people died? That omission matters - because mortality data changes decisions. As the UK Humanitarian Innovation Hub (UKHIH) and Elrha close Phase 2 of our Mortality Estimation in Humanitarian Crises Systems Innovation Partnership, this blog marks the beginning of a series exploring why mortality estimation matters, and how grantees are innovating so the humanitarian system can do it better. Mortality: the metric that changes the conversation Credible and timely mortality figures change conversations and decisions. As Chris Porter from FCDO put it during a 2025 panel discussion: "We often debate malnutrition rates, but deaths stop people in their tracks." Mortality metrics capture crisis severity, scale, and urgency in a way few other indicators can. Mortality data used to be central to humanitarian assessments. Over time, however, it slipped to the margins - seen as too sensitive, too political, too technically complex, or too slow to be useful. The result is a paradox: the metric that best reflects human cost in crises is often missing from decision-making altogether. Why mortality evidence is so hard - and essential Estimating mortality in crises is undeniably challenging. Data is incomplete. Access is constrained. Methods vary. Numbers can be contested or suppressed, particularly in politically charged settings. Different approaches can produce vastly different estimates, eroding trust and confidence. But the cost of not measuring mortality is higher. Without credible mortality evidence the true scale of crises is underestimated; resources are allocated reactively rather than strategically; accountability weakens and advocacy relies on anecdote instead of evidence. Mortality estimation is not just a technical exercise. It is a moral and operational necessity. From reactive funding toward systems change UKHIH-Elrha’s current investments are built on a longer history of mortality-driven action. Funding followed mortality research in Somalia that helped trigger an unusual and early UN intervention in a subsequent developing famine in 2016. That response was not driven by malnutrition figures, but by mortality data. It was rare. And it worked. Recently completed research established that mortality in southern Chad was far higher than humanitarian actors had assumed, with large segments of the affected population missed entirely. This evidence forced uncomfortable reassessments, but also opened pathways to identify deaths that would otherwise have remained uncounted. Those efforts demonstrated what's possible when rigorous methods are applied under pressure. They informed response discussions, shaped advocacy, and challenged assumptions in decision-making. But they also highlight a deeper issue: Mortality estimation has been treated as an emergency add-on rather than a standing capability in crises contexts. UKHIH’s first investment in mortality estimation proved decisive in a politically charged context. Rigorous work helped establish the credibility of mortality estimates from Gaza when official figures were being publicly dismissed. This evidence made it far harder for governments and global institutions to ignore the scale of civilian death, cutting through political pressure and reaffirming the role of independent science. Building on this work, UKHIH launched the Systems Innovation Partnership in 2024 to move beyond isolated projects and towards a durable ecosystem for mortality estimation. One rooted in equitable partnerships, shared infrastructure, and long-term investment, particularly in low- and middle-income countries. What progress looks like in practice UKHIH-Elrha is currently the only dedicated funder focused specifically on mortality estimation in humanitarian crises. Across Phases 1 and 2, we've seen tangible signs of change: Stronger methods, including improved modelling approaches and shared tools and resources like the Somalia Mortality Estimation Data Observatory (S-MED) Deeper learning, through case studies examining how mortality evidence has influenced - or failed to influence - responses in crises More equitable leadership, with LMIC-based partners SIMAD Institute for Global Health (Somalia) and Evidence for Change (Kenya) playing central roles in phases 1 and 2, scaling up partnering in phase 2 with Addis Ababa University, Mekelle University (Ethiopia) and Rebuild Hope for Africa (DRC) among others. Broader dialogue, bringing together researchers, humanitarians, policymakers, and funders to tackle the "last mile" problem of uptake and use Co-funding, for longer-term, strategic investment that builds synergies and amplifies impact across the system with European Commission Humanitarian Aid (ECHO). What this blog series will cover This blog marks the start of a weekly series showcasing the Phase 2 consortia pushing this agenda forward. IMPACT Initiatives are exploring locally led mortality estimation in Somalia, Ethiopia, and the DRC, highlighting what it takes to shift ownership and trust. Johns Hopkins University is focusing on methodological innovation in DRC, alongside practical guidance for local decision-makers on when and how mortality estimates can be generated and used. Save the Children International is developing a governance mechanism among Strategic, Technical and National Stakeholders and building an online platform making guidance, tools, and technical support accessible and equitable across the sector. Together, these consortia address not just how to count deaths, but how to ensure mortality evidence shapes response. Counting deaths to save lives Mortality evidence can't be optional because uncounted deaths represent a failure of accountability, a gap in our understanding, and a missed opportunity to prevent more. When we don’t count deaths, we're not avoiding difficult conversations - we're having them anyway, just without evidence The UKHIH-Elrha partnerships show we can do better. What remains is a choice: to embed mortality estimation as a non-negotiable part of crisis response, or to continue operating in the dark about the very metric that matters most.