Forbes Business
중도 성향
기타
Why Employees Cannot Disconnect From Work During PTO
Employees struggle to disconnect during PTO because work identity, visibility pressure, and constant connectivity make many people feel guilty stepping away.
"DISCONNECT" · 총 33건
필터 보기현재 지수
50.3
0 = 부정 우세
50 = 중립
100 = 긍정 우세
최근 7일 기준 82,779건을 분석한 결과, 뉴스 심리지수는 50.2(균형)입니다. 긍정 4,382건(5.3%)·중립 76,268건(92.1%)·부정 2,129건(2.6%)이며, 중립 비중이 뚜렷하게 높습니다. 성향 지수는 종합 15.3(중도 균형)입니다.
Employees struggle to disconnect during PTO because work identity, visibility pressure, and constant connectivity make many people feel guilty stepping away.
진행자: 간형우, Chelsea Proctor For these young Korean conscripts, military service is no longer lost time 기사 요약: 과거에는 군 복무가 청년기의 공백으로 여겨졌지만, 최근 한국의 젊은 남성들은 향상된 처우와 자율적인 병영 환경을 활용해 수능 준비와 자기계발, 심지어 외모 관리까지 병행하며 군 생활을 미래를 위한 투자와 성장의 시간으로 활용하고 있다. [1] Many Korean men used to describe mandatory military service as a suffocating period spent confined to barracks, bound by rigid routines and largely disconnected from the outside world. suffocate: 숨이 막히다 confine: 국한시키다 rigid: 엄격한 [2] Conscription was widely
Disconnect with sentiments of people, lack of internal democracy are the reasons AG Sampath quit the BJP, he said after resigning.
After Baltic region's synchronisation with the European electricity network and disconnection from the Russian grid, demand for balancing and frequency-control services has increased sharply.
EVERY June, Pakistan’s budget season follows a familiar pattern: business groups repeat their proposals for relief, the government defends its targets, and taxpayers prepare for additional burdens. Yet a more fundamental question is rarely asked — what is the budget ultimately meant to achieve, and does it reflect a clear long-term national purpose? In principle, the budget is the state’s main instrument for promoting growth, improving public services, reducing poverty and raising living standards. In Pakistan, however, it has increasingly come to resemble an accounting exercise: mobilise sufficient revenue to finance a growing state and meet fiscal benchmarks agreed with the IMF. The result is a lopsided process that remains focused on extracting more from those already within the tax net, while paying insufficient attention to the quality of public spending, the need to broaden the base, or the incentives required for investment, employment and productivity. The Tax Policy Office was expected to introduce a longer-term perspective to this debate, but that wider vision is still not evident. The burden continues to fall, predictably, on the formal economy. Corporations, salaried employees, entrepreneurs, exporters, documented businesses and investors remain the most visible and therefore the most easily taxed. What receives much less scrutiny is whether public spending is yielding meaningful improvements in citizens’ lives, particularly in a country where a large share of the population remains below the poverty line. Pakistan has absorbed much of the fiscal cost of devolution without fully realising its potential efficiency gains. This distortion has become more pronounced since the 18th Constitutional Amendment altered Pakistan’s fiscal structure. Health, education, labour welfare and other social services were devolved to the provinces, which now receive a substantial share of national revenues through the National Finance Commission Award. The logic was straightforward: provinces, being closer to citizens, would deliver services more effectively, while the federal government would gradually withdraw from devolved functions and reduce its own size and cost. That second part of the arrangement, however, remains largely unfulfilled. More than a decade later, successive governments have shown limited willingness to undertake the constitutional, administrative and institutional reforms required to right-size the federation. Pakistan has, therefore, absorbed much of the fiscal cost of devolution without fully realising its potential efficiency gains. The results are plain: weak learning, poor healthcare access, child malnutrition, low productivity, millions of children out of school, under-equipped hospitals, inadequate skills training and persistently low female labour-force participation. Yet, even against this backdrop, the provinces are expected to post a combined budget surplus of roughly Rs1.6 trillion. This surplus forms part of the consolidated fiscal framework that enables Pakistan to meet primary surplus targets under the IMF programme. Fiscal discipline is necessary; Pakistan’s record on deficits and debt leaves little room for complacency. But every rupee retained as surplus is also a rupee not directed towards schools, hospitals, technical training and local services. The balance appears to have shifted too far towards meeting accounting targets and too little towards building human capital. The irony is that while existing taxpayers are repeatedly told there is little room for relief, substantial untapped capacity exists elsewhere. Agriculture contributes nearly a quarter of GDP but remains lightly taxed, while property taxation is among the weakest in the region. Large agricultural and urban wealth holdings generate limited recurring revenue because assessment remains weak, enforcement uneven and valuations often disconnected from market reality. Since provinces have constitutional authority over agricultural income and property taxes, meaningful reform in these areas could broaden the base, improve fairness and reduce the state’s dependence on taxing the same formal businesses and individuals year after year. It would also help strengthen the sense that the fiscal burden is being shared more equitably. The next budget should therefore reset fiscal priorities. Rather than treating compliant taxpayers as an inexhaustible source of revenue, policymakers should present a credible path towards relief for documented economic activity: lower excessive tax rates on salaried employees, entrepreneurs and businesses, phase out the Super Tax, remove distortionary levies, reduce cascading taxation and bring greater predictability to policy. Better incentives would support investment, exports, formalisation and job creation — the key objectives of fiscal policy. But relief must be matched by credible efforts to broaden the tax base, improve spending efficiency and mobilise provincial revenues from agriculture and property. Fiscal sustainability cannot rest indefinitely on squeezing a shrinking pool of compliant taxpayers. Provinces, meanwhile, should be judged less by the size of their surpluses than by measurable gains in education, healthcare, skills, productivity and poverty reduction. Pakistan’s fiscal debate remains confined to the narrow question of how to raise more revenue. The more important issue is how public finances can create opportunity, improve living standards and support durable growth. A budget should be more than a balancing exercise between revenue and expenditure; it should also reflect a willingness to reform the structure of the state itself. Unless Pakistan completes the unfinished agenda of devolution, broadens the tax base and channels provincial resources towards human development, it may strive to meet fiscal targets without delivering the broader prosperity its citizens are entitled to expect. The writer is a former CEO of Unilever Pakistan and of the Pakistan Business Council Published in Dawn, June 5th, 2026
"Affordability is a key voter issue, but proposals to fix structural supply shortages are politically unpopular and lack short-term payoffs."
Thanks to the pandemic, Gen Z workers missed out on the “in-office rituals”—and now they’re so isolated it’s hurting their careers.
High achievers often realize too late that the habits driving career success can also create burnout, rigidity, and a growing disconnect from meaningful growth.
• Proposals seek integration of crime data at national level, interprovincial intelligence sharing, CTD for GB • Interior ministry seeks input from all provincial police chiefs ahead of key meeting • FIA DG underscores need for uniform mechanism across provinces, notes ‘serious disconnect’ between different agencies LAHORE: The federal government has sought input from all police departments on a new internal security policy for the next five years, which aims to centralise police operations, improve interprovincial intelligence sharing, integrate crime data, and choke terror financing, among other measures. The National Internal Security Policy 2026-30, which will be discussed at an ‘extraordinary meeting’ of the National Police Management Board (NPMB) later this month, will include inputs from all provincial IGPs as well as the police chiefs of Azad Jammu and Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan. The interior ministry shared a set of proposals, furnished by some retired and serving police officers, with the police chiefs along with the agenda to be discussed at the NPMB meeting that will be held under the aegis of the National Police Bureau (NPB). The NPB, which is led by FIA chief Dr Usman Anwar, is going to assume a greater role in future in devising national reforms and strategies for all police departments. The new policy is significant in light of the visit by the Chief of Defence Force Field Marshal Asim Munir to the National Police Academy in January 2026, where he emphasised that “a strong, professional, and people-centric police force” was indispensable for internal security and the rule of law. Dawn learnt that the security establishment has extended full support to the civil law enforcement agencies (LEAs) for “showing no compromise in making the internal security impregnable”. ‘Enhanced role of NPB’ According to the documents shared with Dawn, certain former IGPs and serving officers contributed to the proposals that sought to enhance the role of the NPB in restructuring the police functions across the country. Some important issues include raising a Counter-Terrorism Department (CTD) in Gilgit-Baltistan, integration of police data at the national level, and centralisation of the International Driving Permit. NPB and FIA Director General Dr Usman Anwar has been made the convener of the upcoming NPMB meeting. Talking to Dawn, he said that there was a “serious disconnect” between various civil LEAs and similarly, many emerging policing challenges needed to be addressed before it was too late. “It is a dire need of the time to establish a uniform mechanism across provinces and collaborate with international and domestic intelligence agencies to fight terrorism and choke terrorist financing,” Dr Usman said. He said the heads of the police organisations have been officially asked to submit their actionable points to be made part of the agenda for the upcoming meeting. A focal person (BS 20 officer) has been designated by the interior ministry for coordination with the provinces in this respect, he added. “The upcoming meeting shall also deliberate upon the functional specialisation, police welfare, transnational crimes, criminal data integration, training needs assessment, women police networking, interprovincial intelligence sharing, and development of CTD in GB,” he said. Meanwhile, former NPB DG Tariq Khosa suggested that the existing National Security Policy was going to be completed in 2026. “We should come up with recommendations on a new national internal security policy 2026-30,” he said. He added that a steering committee headed by NPB should be notified by the interior ministry to furnish recommendations for the standardisation of firearms legislation. Khosa also proposed that a National Criminal Record Access System be developed to integrate police data at the national level. He further suggested that the NPB should act as ‘PHQ’ (Police Headquarters) for the “Pakistan police” like the GHQ is for the Pakistan Army. “In addition to sufficient annual budgetary allocations for NPB, a special allocation of budget (Rs30 million) should be requested from the government,” the former NPB DG said. A retired senior officer said multiple areas in police administration over the years exposed structural fault lines impeding the overall performance of the police department in Pakistan. He said the capacity of the police in countering terrorism, insurgencies, and traditional and emerging crimes was “dismal”. The officer claimed that the move made by the NPB seemed to be the continuation of the policy layout of the ‘hard state’. Published in Dawn, June 4th, 2026
ISLAMABAD: Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE), a state-owned think tank, has asked the government to increase the minimum wage by at least 12.5 per cent to Rs45,000 and ensure its rule-based enforcement, rather than a notional announcement, given the country’s economic conditions and inflationary pressures. “In a period marked by persistent inflationary pressures, food and energy shocks, labour market informality, and rising household vulnerability, minimum wage policy must evolve into a credible macro-social policy instrument capable of protecting workers while remaining economically sustainable and administratively enforceable,” PIDE said in its policy note to the government ahead of FY27 budget. This policy brief called for a shift from discretionary and symbolic annual wage announcements towards a transparent, rules-based framework grounded in official evidence and aligned with International Labour Organisation principles. “Rather than relying on a single indicator or arbitrary adjustment, the proposed approach combines purchasing-power protection, worker-family adequacy checks, labour-market affordability, partial productivity sharing, and provincial implementation realities,” it said, adding that the proposed reform architecture was based on four linked elements: transparent evidence-based wage setting, bounded provincial calibration, credible enforcement and compliance mechanisms, and annual reporting on wage-setting evidence and implementation outcomes. Govt think tank urges rule-based enforcement, not symbolic announcements Last year, the Centre made a departure from even a symbolic minimum wage announcement, and Finance Minister Muhammad Aurangzeb then said businesses were unwilling to pay even the previous year’s minimum wage. The institute said that the application of the minimum wage framework to official data from the Pakistan Bureau of Statistics (PBS) and the Ministry of Planning, Development and Special Initiatives, suggested “a national minimum wage reference benchmark of Rs45,000 per month for 2026-27, representing a 12.5pc increase over the current notified wage of Rs40,000. “Minimum wage policy cannot remain a ceremonial annual exercise disconnected from economic realities and labour welfare. Pakistan now requires a credible wage governance system that balances worker protection, productivity, business sustainability, and macroeconomic stability within a transparent institutional framework,” said PIDE Vice Chancellor Dr Nadeem Javaid. He emphasised that a country aspiring for export-led growth and social stability could not afford working poverty, wage uncertainty, and fragmented labour market governance. Sustainable economic reform must also translate into dignity, predictability, and economic security for workers, he added. Under the proposed “national reference benchmark with provincial calibration” model, provinces would retain constitutional authority to notify wages at or above the national floor in accordance with local economic conditions. Indicative provincial calibrations suggest Rs45,000 minimum wage for Punjab and Rs46,000 for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Sindh due to relatively higher urban living costs and formal-sector concentration, and Rs45,500 for Balochistan reflecting geographic and market access vulnerabilities. Dr S. M. Naeem Nawaz, Professor of Economics at PIDE and co-author of the study, said: “A credible wage floor must be one that workers can realistically receive and provinces can realistically enforce. That requires moving beyond CPI-only or poverty-line-only approaches toward a hybrid methodology that respects affordability, compliance capacity, and the reality that nearly 80pc of Pakistan’s employment remains informal.” Published in Dawn, June 3rd, 2026
• Nepra holds public hearing after CPPA asks for additional fuel cost adjustment due to Iran war disruptions • Regulator seeks report from K-Electric over ‘excessive loadshedding’ in Karachi ISLAMABAD: The price of electricity is likely to be increased by Rs1.74 per unit in next month’s bills due to the higher fuel cost adjustment, in light of an official demand for over Rs16 billion in additional recoveries from power consumers. The National Electric Power Regulatory Authority (Nepra) held a public hearing on the Central Power Purchasing Agency’s (CPPA) request for an additional fuel cost recovery of Rs1.73 per unit from consumers for the June billing month. CPPA Chief Executive Officer Rehan Akhtar told the hearing that the reference fuel cost for April had been set at Rs8.25 per unit, but the actual cost turned out to be Rs9.975 per unit, mainly because of the US-Iran war and the resultant disruption in LNG supplies, thus necessitating an additional charge of Rs1.73 per unit on consumers in the billing month of June. Technical constraints in shifting cheaper power sources in Sindh to load centres in the upcountry regions facing shortages also contributed to the higher fuel cost adjustment (FCA). The net increase would be Rs1.74 per unit, as an existing minor negative fuel adjustment had also come to an end. The CPPA official said the government decided to undertake load management and limit the use of furnace oil and diesel for power generation, which helped contain the additional FCA at Rs1.73 per unit. He said special arrangements were made for LNG imports and the government decided to charge Rs2,000 per unit for its price instead of Rs3,500 per unit under normal circumstances to limit the tariff hike. In response to a question, he confirmed that lower availability of the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant Unit-2 (K-2) had also contributed to the higher FCA, while its past claims worth Rs3.4bn were another factor behind the increase. Another official explained that the K-2 plant was only partially available because of forced outages due to the problems in the nuclear reactor. The regulator was informed that power supply from the national grid to Karachi continued to benefit both K-Electric consumers and those connected to the national grid. “If KE had not been provided electricity from the national grid, an overall increase of Rs1.46 per unit in FCA and an increase of Rs2.80 per unit in capacity purchase price (CPP) would have resulted for consumers, with a total impact of Rs4.26 per unit for the month of April 2026,” Rehan reported. He said overall power consumption in April this year was 8.5pc lower than last year, as demand declined across all consumer categories except the industrial sector, where the impact of gas disconnections for captive power plants and the incremental tariff package contributed to a 13.5pc growth. Industrial consumers from Karachi, including Rehan Javed, Tanveer Barry and Arif Bilwani, complained that the incremental tariff package had benefited only a few consumers because of its “faulty design”. They called for the package to be reviewed. It was reported that consumption in the domestic sector dropped by almost 15pc, followed by declines of 9.5pc in the commercial sector, 7.2pc in general services, 53pc in agriculture and about 13pc among bulk consumers. Excessive loadshedding in Karachi During the hearing on Tuesday, Nepra also sought a detailed report from K-Electric over “excessive loadshedding” in Karachi amid scorching temperatures. Nepra pointed out that an increasing number of complaints were being received about excessive loadshedding in Karachi. A senior Nepra official reported that these complaints were coming from both high-loss and low-loss areas, which was a matter of concern as loadshedding schedules were not being followed. Moreover, power cuts caused by technical faults were also not being accounted for by the power utility under load management schedules, which was against regulatory performance standards. The K-Electric management, available live online, was asked to provide a detailed report on an urgent basis so the matter could be examined. KE promised to submit its report at the earliest but did not immediately respond to the allegations. In a statement issued after the hearing, a KE spokesperson said that its loadshedding practices were aligned with the principles of the National Electricity Policy 2021, and blamed development work in the city by civic authorities for any localised faults that were reported. Published in Dawn, June 3rd, 2026
Research for Roundhouse in London shows 87% of 18- to 30-year-olds believe they have fewer artistic opportunities Rising costs, the disappearance of third spaces and reduced access to artistic opportunities are causing young people to feel “disconnected, isolated and locked out of creativity”, according to research commissioned by a youth arts charity. The Roundhouse, a multi-arts venue in north London that reopened in 2006 with a focus on running youth programmes, has released the findings to coincide with the publication of its 20-year impact report on Monday. Continue reading...
Danino, who comes from the haredi education system, added that he is "not disconnected" from the issue of haredi enlistment.
This is the place where you face yourself, the you that could be you with a few different parts, a pump for your heart, eyes off color, and fresh off the shelf fake hair (a bit obvious), skin smoothed. You’re not perfect, but it’s a good start. Down to small digits, you’ll be improved. Memory maintained by small motors, as long as these gizmos don’t glitch. What’s before you? Full replacement or a constant game of test and switch, pieces peeled off, disconnected, removed, until you are not yourself, at least, not the self you knew. That self has ceased, bit by bit less you at each release.
Many Korean men used to describe mandatory military service as a suffocating period spent confined to barracks, bound by rigid routines and largely disconnected from the outside world. Conscription was widely seen as an involuntary pause in youth, rather than a continuation of the lives they had been building. But for Woo Tae-hyun, his 18 months in the military were the exact opposite. It was a strategically planned step toward his future goals. Discharged last December, the 22-year-old, current
The Cuban government is digging in its heels in the face of the overwhelming offensive from the United States, becoming increasingly disconnected from its citizens
AFGHANISTAN, Iran and Pakistan are among the few states that formally identify themselves as Islamic republics or emirates. This article examines the extent to which they have adhered to the Islamic principles of efficiency, equity and social justice and how successfully they have promoted inclusive growth, human welfare and shared prosperity in keeping with Islam’s ethical foundations. Afghanistan: Afghanistan has undergone political transitions — from monarchy to communist rule, from the mujahideen to Taliban control, then to Western-backed governments, and finally back to the Taliban. Ironically, the regimes claiming to establish an Islamic emirate and enforce Islamic governance have inflicted greater damage on Afghanistan’s socioeconomic development than many previous governments. Large-scale migration of educated professionals, managers, academics and entrepreneurs has deprived Afghanistan of the human capital needed to run a modern economy. Equally harmful is the ban on girls’ education and restrictions on women’s labour participation, entrenching deep inequities and undermining long-term development prospects. Such policies project a distorted image of Islam to the world and reinforce Islamophobic narratives that contradict Islam’s stress on knowledge, justice and human dignity. Afghanistan’s per capita income is around $420, placing it among the world’s poorest countries. Poverty and food insecurity are widespread. Gains achieved between 2002 and 2021 in literacy, school enrolment and health indicators have stagnated or been reversed. The literacy rate is only 37 per cent — female literacy is around 27pc. Fertility remains high — nearly five children per woman. The economy depends heavily on imports financed through humanitarian aid and donor support. Although there’s better security, this hasn’t translated into sustained economic activity or investment. Pakistan was once Afghanistan’s principal trading partner for transit trade and bilateral commerce. However, tensions and border closures have disrupted trade and damaged livelihoods for thousands of Afghans in transport, retail and cross-border business. Safe havens allegedly provided to the TTP despite talks and mediation efforts have weakened Islamic solidarity and regional cooperation. Iran: The 1979 Revolution overthrew the monarchy and established a revolutionary Islamic state. The subsequent hostage crisis and US-Iran tensions led to extensive sanctions that have persisted for decades. Iran endured an eight-year war with Iraq and more recently military confrontations with both Israel and the US. Despite these pressures, it has shown remarkable resilience in economic and social development. Though all this has imposed hardship on its people, Iran has invested heavily in human capital, scientific research and technological innovation. Adult literacy has risen to around 93pc; youth literacy is nearly universal. The gender gap in basic education has effectively disappeared. Women constitute nearly 60pc of university entrants and dominate enrolment in medical, health and STEM disciplines. Iran’s capabilities in nanotechnology, aerospace, biotechnology, AI and stem cell research are now globally recognised and Iran is among the leading developing states in scientific publications and research output. Sustained investment in research, development and higher education has led to the development of indigenous capabilities in reverse-engineering and manufacturing of advanced industrial and defence technologies. Iran produces far more scientists and PhDs per capita than Pakistan and has a diversified industrial base. The experiences of three Islamic republics — Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan — diverge sharply. Iran’s per capita income has risen from around $2,500 in 1980 to nearly $5,000. Poverty has declined, while non-oil sectors account for almost 90pc of GDP. Industry contributes strongly to national income. Iran exports pharmaceuticals, steel, cement and agricultural products. Social indicators have improved considerably. Fertility rates have fallen from over six children per woman in the 1980s to below replacement level, while life expectancy has increased from around 50 to nearly 78 years due to improved healthcare, electrification and access to potable water. Iran’s experience shows that a country can build indigenous technological capability and improve human development through sustained investment in education, science and industrialisation. But inflation, currency depreciation and political restrictions still generate public dissatisfaction and protests. Pakistan: Despite inheriting a weak economic base in 1947, Pakistan had emerged by 1990 as one of the more successful developing economies, achieving an average annual GDP growth of about 6pc for four decades, significantly outperforming India. Since the 1990s, however, the momentum has weakened; the growth rate has fallen to around 3-4pc, while India’s has accelerated to 6-7pc. Pakistan’s reversal is due to weak governance, policy inconsistency, institutional decay and an elitist growth model that benefits narrow segments of society. With an economy of some $400 billion and per capita income near $1,600, future prospects are uncertain unless reforms are undertaken to promote inclusion and broad-based opportunity. Structural challenges impede progress. Population growth remains high at about 2.5pc, fertility rates are still around 3.5 births per woman, and poverty has risen, affecting nearly 30pc of the people. Pakistan also ranks among countries most vulnerable to climate change, especially in water, food and energy security. Adult literacy is around 60pc; female literacy is slightly above 50pc. Graduate unemployment is high, reflecting the disconnect between education and labour market needs. Rural-urban, regional and gender disparities continue to widen. Pakistan’s HDI ranking has declined, and its position on the Global Gender Gap Index remains among the world’s lowest. Without adequate investment in research, higher education and scientific capability, it performs poorly on innovation and technological adoption. Divergent outcomes: The experiences of the three Islamic republics reveal striking contrasts. Iran, despite sanctions and international isolation, has invested heavily in human development, science and industrial capability, creating a foundation for self-reliance and technological advancement. Its successes in female education and scientific progress contradict the ideological assumptions underlying Taliban policies in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s earlier history shows that substantial progress is possible when governance and economic management are sound. Yet a persisting elitist growth structure has prevented it from realising its potential. Afghanistan, meanwhile, has moved into reverse gear. Excessive dependence on foreign aid, suppression of women’s education and employment, and economic isolation have undermined efficiency and social justice — the very principles Islam seeks to promote. Ultimately, an Islamic republic’s legitimacy doesn’t rest merely on constitutional titles or religious slogans. It must be judged by its ability to deliver justice, reduce poverty, expand opportunities and ensure dignity and inclusion for all citizens. The writer is a former governor of the State Bank of Pakistan. Published in Dawn, May 30th, 2026
Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo Source: ELRHA Author Jennifer O’Keeffe, Augustin Gang Karume and Paul Spiegel This blog series accompanies the Mortality Estimation Systems Innovation Partnership (SIP), supported by UKHIH-Elrha, which brings together diverse partners to strengthen how mortality data is collected, interpreted, and used across humanitarian crises. Earlier blogs in this series highlighted why excess mortality measurement is critical for understanding crisis severity, as well as exploring how to maximise local and national actors' leadership in the mortality estimation ecosystem. In this third blog, we turn to Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, where Rebuild Hope for Africa and the Johns Hopkins Center for Humanitarian Health share how their work is making mortality estimation more accurate, accessible, and feasible for national actors best placed to do this work, even in the most challenging settings. “As an indicator, a mortality rate tries to evaluate the size and scale of a crisis in a single metric.” The Public Health Aspects of Complex Emergencies and Refugee Situations, 1997, Michael Toole, Ronald Waldman In 2023, the Humanitarian Congress in Vienna released a statement saying, "The humanitarian imperative is an absolute moral obligation to save lives and alleviate human suffering on the basis of need, without discrimination”. Yet**,** when resources are constrained, allocation is often based on geopolitical interests, media coverage, or how relatable a population may be to high-income donor countries. In short, human lives are valued differentially. The disconnect is not theoretical. In 2022, Rebuild Hope for Africa (RHA) led a nationwide mortality survey in the Central African Republic which estimated up to 5% of the population had died during the previous year. Despite the scale of these findings, the study received little media attention and did not lead to meaningful changes in donor policy. In conflict-affected settings, various, often compounding, factors make primary data collection difficult or impossible. These include forced displacement, insecurity, system failures, poor infrastructure, limited capacity, and restricted access. In practice, mortality is often not measured at all. And as threats to healthcare workers grow, international agencies have become understandably risk averse, collecting data only safer, accessible areas, where death rates are usually lowest. Without reliable data, decision makers and responders depend on fragmented sources and non-robust estimates. The result is a biased and misleading picture of crisis severity, that often portrays crises as less severe than they are. The magnitude of these biases and their effects on decisions by humanitarian actors, governments, and donors who rely on such data, remain largely unexamined. Our partnership between Rebuild Hope for Africa (RHA) and the Johns Hopkins Center for Humanitarian Health (CHH) is working to change this. Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo - An Unquantified Crisis Few places demonstrate the challenges of mortality estimation more than the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), one of the world’s most enduring humanitarian crises. The crisis worsened drastically in January 2025 when the country suffered a devastating double shock: the abrupt withdrawal of USAID funding and a violent military offensive by the Rwandan-backed rebel group M23. The M23 seized large swathes of territory, killing and displacing an unknown number of people in the process. With the departure of many international agencies and a vacuum in humanitarian response, the population has been left vulnerable to the worst effects of the conflict. A year later, the true human cost remains unknown. We recognise that without reliable data, it becomes even harder to mobilise the support that people living in Eastern DRC urgently need. Placing Data and Decision-Making in Congolese hands Augustin Gang Karume, one of the authors of this blog, was born and raised in Eastern DRC, where he still lives and works today. In 2008, he founded RHA to place data and decision-making back in Congolese hands. He understood then that national actors are the future of sustainable humanitarian response. Rooted in the community and living with the long-term consequences of decision-making, national actors have a strong incentive to prioritise community needs over institutional agendas. Using local networks and knowledge, they are the best equipped to conduct primary data collection in insecure settings. While international actors have scaled back amid funding austerity, national organisations like RHA have remained in place, continuing to work for and within their communities. These actors are also proving to be far more cost-effective and efficient. Without international overhead, they can often deliver results at a fraction of the cost of international organisations. As an example, RHA’s 2022 nationwide mortality survey in the Central African Republic, cost a total of 50,000 USD, whereas a single district SMART survey may cost upwards of 15,000 USD*. National actors are the first responders in nearly all crises and remain present long after international attention and funding fade. Bridging Local Leadership with Technical Expertise With funding from the UK Humanitarian Innovation Hub’s Systems Innovation Partnership, we are bridging RHA’s local leadership with technical expertise from the CHH, combining community trust with advanced epidemiological and statistical training. Together RHA and CHH are collaborating on a study to assess potential biases in mortality estimation through both primary data collection and innovative use of statistical approaches. We’re working to make mortality estimation more accurate, credible, and efficient, with the intent to apply the findings across humanitarian settings. In the primary data collection component, our study is comparing three different methods of mortality estimation: a retrospective household survey, rapid key informant listing, and a full census. Using a common reference population and recall period, the study aims to identify where biases arise, quantify which deaths are missed, and assess relative performance of a light-, medium- and resource-intensive approach to mortality measurement. In the statistical component, we are applying innovative use of established causal and design-based methods to assess biases. We are testing the utility and feasibility of these methods to answer questions like: to what extent are hard to capture deaths, such as neonatal and violent deaths, systematically missed; can fewer survey clusters still provide estimates precise enough for decision making; and can analytical adjustments be used to address known biases? We are also supporting localisation by building field-ready guidance tools designed to make mortality estimation more accessible to operational actors. These tools include an algorithm to help teams choose a method, an operational readiness checklist, and a guide to data validation, triangulation, interpretation. Our aim is to make mortality estimation practicable in even the most challenging settings, without compromising quality. As the best-placed actors to assess mortality, we hope to pilot the guidance with national actors in the DRC and elsewhere to ensure it is user-friendly, actionable, and scalable for use in any crisis. Looking Ahead: Making Mortality Count Without credible mortality data, humanitarian response risks being inefficient, inequitable, and disconnected from reality. We cannot respond appropriately to crises we do not understand. When those with the greatest capacity to measure mortality have the least stake in the results, the system fails. The best way to ensure efficiency and effectiveness is to place local organisations at the centre. Connecting local expertise with technical knowledge offers a path toward a fairer humanitarian sector, where the reality of a crisis is described by those living through it. *2017 estimate adjusted for inflation.
The volatility spread between single stocks and the index makes a world of a difference for options traders.
Hours after an Israeli airstrike killed Hamas military wing chief Mohammed Odeh, Gaza's Eid markets were full, revealing a disconnect with Hamas.