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중도 성향
IT/기술
Stop Using Conventional Commits
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"CONVENTIONAL" · 총 70건
필터 보기현재 지수
50.3
0 = 부정 우세
50 = 중립
100 = 긍정 우세
최근 7일 기준 88,406건을 분석한 결과, 뉴스 심리지수는 50.2(균형)입니다. 긍정 4,398건(5.0%)·중립 81,841건(92.6%)·부정 2,167건(2.5%)이며, 중립 비중이 뚜렷하게 높습니다. 성향 지수는 종합 14.7(중도 균형)입니다.
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A film about Iran's protest movement is making cinema history. "Dreams of Violets" is the first fully AI-generated feature film ever selected by a major international film festival. The 75-minute drama will premiere at New York's Tribeca Festival next week. Created by Iranian-British director Ash Koosha from his home in London, the film took just three months to produce and cost less than 2,000 euros. There were no actors, no cameras, no sets and no film crew. Koosha says the film simply could not have been made through conventional means. Living in exile and unable to safely film inside Iran, he turned to AI to recreate events linked to the country's deadly crackdown on anti-government protesters. The film is based on journalistic reports, photographs and eyewitness accounts, and explores themes of memory, censorship and resistance. But as Tribeca becomes the first major festival to embrace a fully AI-generated feature, the film is also reigniting a fierce debate. Can artificial intelligence tell deeply human stories? Does AI democratise filmmaking or threaten the future of the industry? Eve Jackson speaks to Ash Koosha about Iran, ethics and the future of cinema.
The Energy and Mineral Resources (ESDM) Ministry is fast-tracking regulations on unconventional oil and gas regulations ...
"Teach You a Lesson" had already become one of Netflix Korea's most controversial projects long before its release. Now, it's finally heading to screens. The series follows a special organization established to defend Korea's troubled education system from disruptive students, abusive parents and unethical teachers. It promises a highly cathartic blend of action and social commentary, centered on officials who intervene when conventional systems fail to protect victims. Yet the conversation surr
According to French research, for every daily 100-gram portion of conventionally grown fruits and vegetables replaced by their organic equivalents, the risk of developing postmenopausal breast cancer drops by 10%.
US President Donald Trump has said the conventional meaning of a ceasefire does not apply in the Middle East Read Full Article at RT.com
Grid infrastructure emerged as the forum's defining bottleneck on the last day of Baku Energy Week, as the IGU's chief of staff said that global consumption of oil, gas, coal and renewables is rising simultaneously, directly challenging the conventional narrative.
As geopolitical headwinds make it tougher for equity investors to make money, Dalal Street’s top voice Nilesh Shah, managing director of Kotak Mahindra Asset Management, told a gathering of HNI investors at the ET Alpha Wealth Summit on Thursday that there are four specific investment structures which deserve a place in most portfolios right now.Shah’s first recommendation was the Special Investment Fund, or SIF, a structure that marks a meaningful shift in what is available to Indian investors. Shah noted that the mutual fund industry has, until now, been a long-only business but the SIF changes that. These are long-short, absolute return-oriented funds, designed to generate returns regardless of market direction rather than simply riding the equity tide.The second vehicle Shah flagged is performing credit AIFs. His reasoning was grounded in a simple supply-demand observation that for corporate settlements today, capital is not available from banks, mutual funds, or insurance companies.As institutional lenders have stepped back, borrowers are plenty and lenders very few. Amid this imbalance, Shah said the need is real and returns are attractive. Performing credit AIFs, which lend into this gap, are positioned to benefit directly from the scarcity of competing capital.https://youtube.com/shorts/Xa4AcXFg8hA?feature=shareThe third idea was REITs, and here Shah introduced a timing element. Over the last three years, REITs have delivered index-level returns of around 13.5%. But with interest rates rising, he suggested that the next six to nine months may present an opportunity to enter at better prices. Rising rates typically compress REIT valuations in the near term, and Shah framed any such correction as a potential entry point rather than a risk to avoid. Beyond the return potential, he positioned REITs as a portfolio diversification tool as the asset class behaves differently from equities and fixed income, and that is still underrepresented in most Indian investor portfolios.The fourth recommendation addressed global diversification but came with an important caveat. Mutual fund industry limits for overseas investment are currently full, which means the conventional route for Indian investors to access global markets through domestic mutual funds is closed. Shah pointed to Gift City as the workaround. Structures domiciled there allow investment under the Liberalised Remittance Scheme, and in his view, these Gift City-based LRS products are the practical path for investors who want global exposure while the mutual fund window remains shut.Across all four — the SIF, performing credit AIFs, REITs, and Gift City products — Shah's underlying argument was the same: in a volatile period, the portfolio needs instruments that can generate positive returns through means other than a rising equity market.(Disclaimer: Recommendations, suggestions, views, and opinions given by experts are their own. These do not represent the views of the Economic Times)
Kerry-Lynne Findlay is hardly 'divisive,' she represents conventional conservatism
A revelatory account of the life of George Forster, whose rejection of racial hierarchies stood out amongst his peers George Forster was 10 when he left his home in present-day Poland and travelled to Russia with his naturalist father. During the expedition, which began in 1765, Forster collected plant specimens and helped with botanical research. Wide-eyed, he journeyed along the Volga river, encountering Muslim Tartar traders and Cossack warriors. There were also the emaciated figures of German settlers, who lived in poverty under the territory’s despotic governor, their campsites little more than holes burrowed into the riverbanks. The experience of cultures so distinct from his own stirred a lifelong enthusiasm for travel and exploration in Forster. It also awakened his compassion for others – irrespective of culture and, especially, race. At a time when racism pervaded public opinion as well as the philosophical texts of luminaries such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant, Forster moved brazenly to critique and correct them. How he was able to transcend the conventional beliefs of his day is the central question of Andrea Wulf’s new book – and the answer is in its title. Continue reading...
Donald Trump has repeatedly criticized NATO and told its European members they will have to take over primary responsibility for the conventional defense of the continent.
WASHINGTON: US Secretary of State Marco Rubio told lawmakers on Wednesday that Washington’s military campaign against Iran, codenamed “Operation Epic Fury”, had concluded and that any subsequent American military action would be defensive in nature rather than part of an ongoing offensive operation. Rubio made the remarks during a House Foreign Affairs Committee hearing when members of Congress questioned the administration’s assessment of the conflict and its aftermath. His comments came amid continuing concerns over regional security, the deployment of US forces across the Middle East and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, a vital maritime route through which a significant share of the world’s oil exports pass. During the hearing, Rubio announced, “We’re no longer conducting sustained strikes inside of Iran to degrade their military, because Epic Fury is over.” Later, he reiterated: “Epic Fury is over … that operation has concluded.” Rubio argued that the operation was a “victory” as Washington achieved its objectives by severely degrading Iran’s conventional military capabilities. According to the secretary, the United States had destroyed Iran’s defence industrial base, significantly reduced its missile launchers and drone stockpile, destroyed what remained of its air force and wiped out its conventional navy. “Those are all gone,” Rubio said. “So, I consider that victory, and we did, too. And that was the purpose of Epic Fury.” He also noted that despite the extensive damage inflicted by the United States and Israel, Iran retained some drone and maritime combat capabilities. Rubio’s comments prompted a sharp exchange with Democratic Representative Sara Jacobs, who questioned the administration’s assertion that the war was over while American troops remained deployed across the region and the Strait of Hormuz remained closed. Jacobs asked: “You can change the name of the operation, it doesn’t change the fact that the Strait’s still closed, and my service members and all of our service members are still in harm’s way.” She continued: “I’d like to talk about the war in Iran. Yesterday, in your testimony, you told Senator Booker that the war in Iran is over. This is news to me. It’s also news to my 2,500 constituents Marines, San Diego, Marines, in the Middle East, the other of my constituents who are deployed there and the thousands more of my constituents who have 48-hour deployment notices whose families are still very concerned.” Jacobs said she was willing to accept the secretary’s claim but still had a question for him: “Who won?” Responding, Rubio defended the administration’s definition of victory and said the operation had accomplished the goals set by Washington. “We’re no longer conducting sustained strikes inside of their military because Epic Fury is over. The second point, as on the question of who won, I can tell you this: we define victory. “We define victory as destroying their defence industrial base significantly, reducing the number of missile launchers that they possess significantly, reducing the stockpile of drones,” he added. “And we achieved all of those in addition to destroying what they had left of an Air Force and wiping out their entire conventional navy. Those are all gone, so I consider that victory and we did too, and that was the purpose of Epic [Fury]“ The lawmaker countered his argument, saying that, “You can change the name of the operation, but it doesn’t change the fact that the Strait of Hormuz is still closed and my service members and all of our service members are still in war.” In a further exchange during the hearing, Jacobs accused Rubio of failing to recognise that the administration was “losing this reckless war of choice”. She added a personal remark, saying: “And just like you couldn’t admit that the shoes the president bought you were too big, you clearly don’t know what winning means.” Secretary Rubio appeared momentarily confused by the reference and responded with frustration: “I don’t know what shoes she’s talking about… They’re some Florsheim’s. They’re actually pretty good. They fit fine.” Jacobs then challenged the administration’s claims regarding Iran’s military capabilities, citing intelligence assessments. “Our intelligence community has said that Iran is reconstituting its military industrial base faster than we had predicted,“ she said. “Analysts assess it still holds roughly 70% of its missile stockpile and 70% of its mobile launchers,” said the lawmaker. Jacobs further argued that the strategic situation had deteriorated since the conflict began. “The Strait of Hormuz was open before the war, it is now closed…” Secretary Rubio pushed back on her assertions, disputing the basis of the intelligence being referenced. “Well, first of all, I don’t know what intelligence assessments you’re referring to.” “We wouldn’t discuss intelligence assessments if they were real.” The exchange highlighted the continuing debate in Washington over the consequences of the conflict with Iran. While the administration maintains that the operation successfully achieved its military objectives and has now ended, critics argue that threats to US forces and instability in the Gulf region persist despite the cessation of large-scale American strikes. Rubio’s remarks nevertheless marked the clearest public declaration by the administration to date that the military phase of “Epic Fury” has concluded and that the United States no longer considers itself engaged in an offensive campaign against Iran. Political aims, diplomacy debate Rubio also told lawmakers that while the administration would welcome political change in Iran, it was not the objective of the US military mission. “We would love to see a change in Iran and that they be governed by people,” Rubio told the Committee after Republican Congressman Michael McCaul expressed hopes for a “free Iran”. However, he stressed: “That was not the goal of our mission,” adding that the objective was to deprive Tehran of the ability to threaten the region with missiles, drones and a potential nuclear weapons capability. “The goal of our mission was to take away their ability to threaten the region with an overwhelming number of missiles and drones,” he said, adding that the US had to prevent Iran from “break[ing] out to a nuclear weapon.” The hearing also featured sharp criticism from Democrats. Representative Gregory Meeks, the ranking member of the committee, accused the Trump administration of abandoning diplomacy and escalating regional conflict. In prepared remarks, Meeks said President Trump had promised Americans “no new wars — only to send a new generation of troops back to the Middle East.” He argued that the administration had “traded dialogue for bombs yet again” and claimed that “America First” had left the United States isolated. “The record says otherwise on all three,” Meeks said, referring to Rubio’s pledge to make America “safer, stronger, and more prosperous”. He added that Americans were “not safer while fighting an unnecessary war” and “not more prosperous when this administration has done everything it can to enrich the president and his allies, while everyday Americans struggle to afford groceries, gas, and healthcare”.
Matt Mahan conceded the California governor’s race almost immediately after the polls closed Wednesday, the last moderate Democrat hope crushed between Republicans clamoring for change and partisan Democrats still chasing left-wing dreams. As the first results came in, they reflected what had become conventional wisdom. In the race for governor, Democrat Xavier Becerra and Republican...
At the end of this month, Tulsi Gabbard steps down as the director of national intelligence, following a bumpy 16-month tenure as our nation’s top spy. Gabbard was an unconventional fit, as a Democrat opposed to most foreign wars. In President Donald Trump’s second term, with its multiple military operations around the globe, she became […]
A laboured attempt to resurrect toy IP very few people still care about is a $200m-budgeted waste of everyone’s time It’s not just that He-Man himself is from the 80s that gives 2026’s Masters of the Universe such an aggressive throwback vibe. It’s that trying to assemble a film around the haphazard mythology of a toy and dusting off IP that precious few still care about feels like something Hollywood has slowly been doing a bit less of, especially on a scale such as this. This year, hits have relied on either properties that audiences do have passion for (Scream, Michael Jackson, Mario, The Devil Wears Prada) or, radically, original ideas (Obsession, Backrooms, Goat, Hoppers). We haven’t endured an Underworld sequel or a Tarzan reboot since 2016, a Terminator film since 2019, a Dolittle reboot since 2020 or a GI Joe spin-off since 2021. Mattel might then have struck gold with Greta Gerwig’s Barbie in 2023, but that was both an unconventional, auteur-led one-off and based on a product millions were still buying on the regular (the year before release, the brand made more than $1.4bn). Various directors, from John Woo to Jon M Chu, have been loosely attached to a He-Man movie over the years and various studios, from Sony to Netflix, have tried (the latter streamer having spent a reported $30m on a failed attempt) but, as with many long-gestating projects in Hollywood, those involved forgot to remember Jeff Goldblum’s evergreen Jurassic Park line: “So preoccupied with whether or not they could that they didn’t stop to think if they should.” Continue reading...
Secretary of State Marco Rubio said Tuesday that the destruction of Iran’s military has prevented the country from using a “conventional shield” to protect its nuclear program in the future. Rubio suggested that if the United States had not launched Operation Epic Fury earlier this year, Iran would have produced “so many missiles, so many […]
“My name is Ozymandias, king of kings: Look on my works, ye mighty, and despair! Nothing beside remains. Round the decay Of that colossal wreck, boundless and bare The lone and level sands stretch far away.” — Percy Bysshe Shelley, Ozymandias “I am in blood, Stepped in so far that, should I wade no more, Returning were as tedious as go o’er.” — William Shakespeare, Macbeth PROLOGUE This is and isn’t about America’s illegal war against Iran. It is primarily about hiding an empire in plain sight and now watching it unravel in plain sight. The war against Iran becomes a consequential event in tandem with other structural weaknesses, a fillip of sorts. It reminds one of the Soviet war on Afghanistan. That war, in and of itself, did not bring down the Soviet Leviathan. The process inhered in the very make-up of the Soviet Union. The war just shoved it over the precipice. But let’s get on with our purpose here. In August 2022, then-US President Joe Biden signed the CHIPS and Science Act into law. A $280 billion legislative package, it sought to revitalise domestic semiconductor manufacturing. The act was a response to a startling vulnerability: the world’s most advanced chips, essential for everything from F-35 fighter jets to surgical equipment to artificial intelligence, are overwhelmingly manufactured by a single company, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), located on an island claimed as sovereign territory by America’s primary strategic rival, China. This dependence is not an accident of geography or a supply chain anomaly. The semiconductor industry wasn’t even hobbled by Covid 19. Despite its complex and far-flung operations, the industry works smoothly. The US dependence is the logical endpoint of a decades-long corporate strategy that maximised profit by outsourcing physical production while retaining only the high-value design and marketing ends of the value chain, the so-called “Smile Curve” strategy. The undoing of the United States in the Iran war may be far more significant than its defeats in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan. It may well mark a historic milestone in the fraying of the position of the US as a global hegemon. But the seeds of this erosion of American dominance, argues Ejaz Haider, were laid long before its misadventure in Iran… The Italian economist and sociologist Giovanni Arrighi, to whom I shall return, would have been amused to see the revered smile curve — taught at prestigious business schools and which encourages firms to outsource capital-intensive manufacturing to focus solely on high-margin research and development (R&D), branding and marketing — as a classic trap of late-stage capitalism. In fact, the CHIPS Act stands as a state-level admission that this strategy, so profitable for individual corporations like Apple and NVIDIA, to name just two, has become a major geopolitical vulnerability for the US. This is the central paradox of America’s declining empire. The very mechanisms that generated unprecedented wealth have systemically dismantled the material and industrial foundations upon which that wealth ultimately rests. The decline of the American empire is not a partisan talking point. The US is a behemoth. It won’t just collapse one day like the Berlin Wall. Nor is a snapshot view the way to go. It is an ongoing structural process and a number of scholars have used longitudinal designs to analyse the trend lines. I argue that it is a slow, systemic unravelling across interconnected domains. First, the financialisation of capital, theorised most rigorously by Arrighi. Capital shifts from productive investment to speculative finance, generating short-term profits at the cost of long-term industrial vitality. It hollows out domestic industrial and political power, a process identified by American sociologist and political scientist Ho-fung Hung, who argues that off-shoring of production destroys the industrial ecosystem, skilled labour base and, ultimately, the social cohesion required for great power competition. Second, the erosion of the alliance system. And no, it’s not just Trump. Three deeper currents are involved: the gradual unravelling of the post-WWII security architecture; the economic failure of neoliberalism; and the imperial outreach baked into the very idea of neoliberalism. Third, the lateral diffusion of technologies, now commodified and everywhere. They help innovative and determined weaker powers offset the asymmetric advantage of bigger powers: Ukraine versus Russia; Hamas/Hezbollah/Houthis versus the US-Zionist duo; and now Iran versus the US-Zionist duo. As I note later in this space, the war against Iran is a much bigger setback for the US than its wars in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq. Corollary: the post-WWII ‘Pax Americana’ is transitioning from a period of hegemonic stability, to use American historian Charles Kindleberger’s concept, into a protracted and likely irreversible, terminal crisis, to borrow Arrighi’s term. But let’s first begin with the peg: the war against Iran. THE PRESENT Since its inception, America has been at war: wars of choice, wars of conquest, wars for resources, wars to defend its hegemony, wars to spread “American values.” How or why does the Iran war stand out? Foremost, the conflict has confirmed the structural limits of US coercive diplomacy in a shifting multipolar world. It has exposed acute structural vulnerabilities in defence economics and inventory endurance, as well as a critical absence of pragmatic post-war planning and a misreading of societal resilience. The conflict has also underscored the changing nature of global alignments in a multipolar world. This comes with the collapse of coercive economic power. For four decades, the US has relied on sophisticated sanctions and lawfare to pressure Iran into subjugation. It has failed, showing the limits of sanctions, especially on fungible commodities. Even sanctions on non-fungible elements like technology can be circumvented. As in Iran’s case, the sanctioned state can develop indigenous expertise through varied strategies. There’s clear evidence that Tehran has developed complex and sophisticated non-dollar lifelines with China and Russia, rendering unilateral sanctions increasingly ineffective. It has used an array of strategies to blunt the effect: interchangeability (can’t sell to X; sell to Y); value retention (barter, use of cryptocurrencies); substitution and evasion (relying on third parties, covert ship-to-ship transfers, use of shell companies). Unlike the insurgencies in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan, the US is not involved in ground combat in Iran (so far). It has relied on high-tech aerial and missile attacks through its formidable ISTAR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance) capabilities. Iran has not responded through elusive, hit-and-run ground attacks. It has countered US technology through technology in a non-contact war. But its employment of technology is grounded in asymmetric capabilities: a large arsenal of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and one-way attack drones. The cost-exchange ratio, by most accounts, is unfavourable for the US. For instance, the Iranian Shahed-136 one-way attack drone has an estimated unit cost of $20,000 (some estimates put it at around $10,000). It is a simple, slow-moving, and relatively easy to detect drone. But it is also cheap and plentiful. To intercept it with costly SM-2 or ESSM missiles creates a cost-exchange ratio of between 30 to one and 100 to one. It is also a shoot-and-scoot system. Iran can afford to lose hundreds of such drones and produce some 1,000 per month. The US cannot afford to fire thousands of interceptors at them. And those interceptors take three to four years to manufacture. It is a cost-asymmetric war. Similarly, the US has been pulling out assets from the Pacific to the Gulf. The USS Boxer amphibious group is an example. Diverting naval assets from the Pacific physically manifests deployment overstretch. As Robert Farley, visiting professor at US Army War College notes, resources needed to prevail in one theatre guarantee weakness in another. It’s the same with all force deployments and employments: “Every missile allocated to one target is unavailable for another.” The contrast with Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan is instructive. In those theatres, the US was defeated by determined insurgencies, even as it bombed and bombed. The adversaries were willing to absorb enormous casualties, drag it out and inflict mission fatigue on the US. In both Iraq and Afghanistan, broadly speaking, the US won the conventional war expeditiously but then got bogged down. In the Iran conflict, while Tehran has demonstrated the ability to absorb much pain, the US is not facing elusive insurgents but a state with a sophisticated missile programme, a sharp understanding of force employment, a network of allies across the region (Hezbollah in Lebanon, Ansar Allah in Yemen, and Hashd al-Shaabi in Iraq and Syria), and the ability to close the Strait of Hormuz, through which 20 percent of the world’s oil passes. Iran has also demonstrated adaptation under fire, used the operational strategy of dispersal and delegation, exercised deception, demonstrated growing targeting capabilities through ISR, rapid repair of underground sites after US-Zionist bombing and consistently shifted locations for counterattack operations. Can the US still bomb Iran? Of course. Will that be painful? Yes. Will Iran respond? Hell, yes. Would that raise the overall cost? You can bet your dime on it. It will be proof, yet again, that it is a slow grind and the US cannot achieve its objectives at a sustainable cost. Yet, it is stuck, because to walk away means it loses credibility. Trump needs a win; Iran is not prepared to give him that. The war has changed the ground realities. There is no status quo ante. The objectives remain strategically incompatible — ie we might get a pause, even a long one, but the essential causes remain unaddressed. Spoiler alert: Zionist entity. US President Donald Trump attending the return of the bodies of the first six American soldiers killed during the war with Iran on March 7, 2026: the lateral diffusion of technologies help innovative and determined weaker powers, such as Iran, offset the asymmetric advantage of bigger powers, such as the US | AFP THE POINTILLIST EMPIRE: HOW IT BEGAN American imperialism did not begin with grand pronouncements like the Monroe Doctrine or the Big Stick diplomacy of Theodore Roosevelt, though they give us a potent sense of a rising, expansionist power. It literally began with bird poop, which sounds about right if one were to understand imperialism as a crap enterprise. The Guano Islands Act of 1856 allowed US citizens to claim uninhabited, guano-rich islands. The act set a precedent for later overseas acquisitions. Historian Daniel Immerwahr calls this a “pointillist” empire. This practical, resource-driven, and often hidden expansion set a pattern that would define America’s power and military bases for the next century. The Mexican-American War (1846-1848) established the continental empire, seizing vast territories from Mexico. This wasn’t a war of liberation but a war of conquest, not manifest destiny but a fig leaf to cover the musty crotch of violent expansion, economic greed and racial supremacy. The 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo formalised the seizure of over half of Mexico’s territory. The Spanish-American War of 1898 definitively projected American power overseas. Theodore Roosevelt’s Secretary of State John Hay, in a personal letter to Roosevelt, called it a “splendid little war.” By its end, the US had seized Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam and the Philippines. But the “splendid” label concealed a brutal reality, just like the payload of Trump’s “gorgeous B-2 bombers.” The subsequent Philippine-American War (1899-1902) resulted in Filipino genocide. That savagery has been systematically erased from American popular memory, even as Mark Twain was scathing in his condemnation and also did a fantastic job of calling out Rudyard Kipling for The White Man’s Burden. But this wasn’t all. Immerwahr documents that American forces employed waterboarding (yes, much before the darned ‘War on Terror’), concentration camps (“black sites”), and scorched-earth tactics that would be recognisable to any student of colonial atrocities. After World War I, US President Woodrow Wilson attempted a new form of imperialism: liberal internationalism, rather than direct territorial control. Much has been written about the “Wilsonian moment.” British historian and diplomat E. H. Carr called it a utopian project, divorced from the reality of power politics. In fact, it wasn’t. The project was essentially colonial and Wilson’s liberal internationalism fit it perfectly. The mandates were thriving. The US Senate’s refusal to join the League of Nations left a vacuum that no amount of idealistic pronouncements could fill. War did come. Carr gives us insights into why it became inevitable. The US emerged from the war as the leading power. The post-WWII order was a direct lesson learned from the intervening two decades. No more “isolationism”. The US must play the role of the hegemonic stabiliser. The core argument was simple and powerful: a stable world economy requires a single power to act as lender of last resort, maintain an open market for distressed goods, and coordinate macroeconomic policies. The US did that via the Bretton Woods system, the Marshall Plan and a vast security architecture that spanned the globe. The quid for the quo? American dominance. The US was now fully involved. It bore the cost but the return on investment was handsome. It kept the US in the lead, even during the bipolarity of the Cold War and beyond. With the Berlin wall crumbling, American political scientist Francis Fukuyama became the mascot for neoliberalism. History had ended; all the wagon trains were destined for one town. Some might arrive late, but arrive they would. Europe was pacified and rebuilt. Japan was demilitarised and transformed into a manufacturing powerhouse. The dollar became the world’s reserve currency, giving the US what French President Valery Giscard d’Estaing called “exorbitant privilege.” For three decades, from 1945 to the early 1970s, this system appeared to confirm the virtues of hegemonic stability. Real GDP growth in Western Europe averaged nearly five percent annually, and the US share of world manufacturing output remained above 40 percent. But beneath the surface, the seeds of decline were already being sown. ARRIGHIAN COUNTER World-systems theorists like Immanuel Wallerstein and Giovanni Arrighi were not focused on immediate “imperial overstretch” in the manner of British historian Paul Kennedy. Kennedy argued that empires declined when their military commitments outpaced their economic base. The US, he warned, was suffering from imperial overreach. For Arrighi, the decline was gradual and subtle. He argued that capitalist hegemonies move through repeating “systemic cycles of accumulation.” A phase of material expansion where capital is invested in production, infrastructure and trade, inevitably gives way to a phase of financial expansion, where capital seeks profit through speculation, lending and financial engineering. The material foundation is hollowed out even as the financial superstructure appears to boom. This was the logic of capitalism. The “autumn” of each hegemon is marked by a dazzling financial belle époque that masks terminal decline. The smile curve strategy is the purest expression of this financialisation and Apple is a textbook case. It designs its products, develops its chips, creates the operating systems, controls the branding, marketing and the retail experience. But it manufactures almost nothing. The iPhones and MacBooks are assembled by Foxconn in Zhengzhou and by Pegatron in Shanghai. The advanced chips are fabricated by TSMC in Taiwan. The displays come from Samsung in South Korea and LG Display. Apple captures an estimated 80-90 percent of the profit from each device, while the suppliers who do the actual physical work fight over the remaining scraps. Business schools love this strategy because it maximises corporate profits and shareholder value. But as Hung argues in his work on global value chains and the Arrighian counter, what maximises corporate profits does not necessarily maximise national power. In fact, it may systematically undermine it. By outsourcing the middle of the smile curve, the US has drastically hollowed out its industrial ecosystem. Combine it with the faith in short, sharp wars of shock and awe through high-tech precision weapons and we get the full picture of what has happened in the war against Iran. This is very different from the WWII industrial base of America. This brings us to TSMC and the chokepoint crisis. It manufactures chips designed by other companies (Nvidia, AMD, Qualcomm) rather than designing and selling its own chips. Over three decades, TSMC has built an unassailable lead in advanced process nodes. By 2025, it was manufacturing 92 percent of the world’s most advanced chips. The entire global technology industry (including the US military and intelligence apparatus) became dependent on a single cluster of fabs (fabrication plants) in Hsinchu, Taichung and Tainan. China, which views Taiwan as a breakaway province to be reunited with the mainland by force if necessary, has the physical means to blockade or invade the island. Whether it would do so or should is a different debate. On ground, the People’s Liberation Army has been systematically building anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, to prevent US intervention in a Taiwan scenario. It’s a fairly absurd position from the US point of view! Its technological supremacy is guaranteed by a factory complex on an island which, in theory, its primary strategic rival could potentially seize or blockade. To circle back to the CHIPS Act, this is the background. TSMC is now building a fab complex in Arizona. Intel is expanding in Ohio and Arizona. Samsung is building in Texas. But, as a 2023 Marketplace report noted, replicating TSMC’s “deep, deep process knowledge” will take years. The fab in Arizona has already faced delays, cost overruns, and labour disputes. Taiwanese engineers are reluctant to relocate to the United States. The set goes to Arrighi. America’s weaponisation of the dollar has accelerated efforts by China, Russia and other BRICS members to create alternatives | Shutterstock THE DOLLAR DILEMMA The dollar’s role as the world’s primary reserve currency has been a central pillar of American power since the Bretton Woods agreement of 1944. This exorbitant privilege allows the US to borrow in its own currency, run persistent trade deficits without penalty and, crucially, impose unilateral financial sanctions on states, corporations, and individuals. This weaponisation of the dollar has accelerated efforts by China, Russia and other BRICS members to create alternatives. China has been aggressively promoting its own Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) as an alternative to Swift. The People’s Bank of China has signed bilateral currency swap agreements with dozens of countries, allowing trade to be settled in renminbi rather than dollars. Russia has demanded payment in rubles for its natural gas exports. India has established a rupee settlement mechanism for trade. Brazil and China have agreed to trade in their own currencies. The Central Bank of Brazil has announced that it is diversifying its reserves away from the dollar. And yet, the actual pace of de-dollarisation has been glacial. Several structural factors explain this “stickiness”, to use American political economist Benjamin Cohen’s term. First, there is network stickiness. The dollar’s dominance is not simply a matter of policy; it is an issue of deep, self-reinforcing infrastructure. Global supply chains, commodity exchanges, derivatives markets, and correspondent banking networks are all built around the dollar. Second, as various experts have argued, there is a lack of viable alternatives. The Chinese renminbi, despite China’s enormous economic weight, is not a free-floating, fully convertible currency. China maintains capital controls, a heavily regulated financial system, and a non-independent central bank. No foreign investor can be certain that their renminbi holdings would not be frozen or devalued by arbitrary state action. The euro, the second-largest reserve currency, is hobbled by the Eurozone’s fragmented fiscal system and the lingering scars of the 2011 debt crisis. Gold is impractical for everyday transactions. And cryptocurrencies are far too volatile and illiquid to serve as a reserve asset. Third is the absence of a deep, liquid and open bond market. A reserve currency requires a “safe asset” in which foreign central banks can park their surplus reserves. The US Treasury market, with $25 trillion in outstanding debt and extraordinary liquidity, is the only game in town. Result: while China and Russia publicly call for de-dollarisation, their central banks have themselves continued to accumulate US Treasury securities, because there is nowhere else to go. Corollary: the near-term prognosis for de-dollarisation is not collapse but slow erosion. IMF data shows the dollar’s share of global reserves has declined from over 70 percent in 2000 to approximately 58 percent in 2025. This is not a precipitous decline, but it is a steady one. The debate is not if the dollar will lose its dominance but when. I have no expertise in this area and I have relied on studying existing expertise. Most analyses measure the timeframe in decades, not years. From that, my understanding is that increasing uncertainty, further weaponisation of the dollar, continuing application of sanctions and asset freezes will (a) erode the confidence that underpins the entire system and (b) force experts (and governments) to find alternatives. EPILOGUE: TERMINAL CRISIS Two other issues are important but I am only flagging them here for paucity of space: the implosion of neoliberalism and its internal effects and the fraying of the transatlantic alliance. Both are exacerbated by Trump but neither is a direct result of his election. Both are extremely consequential. The United States has not collapsed; not yet. Nor can it be defeated from outside. But it can crumble from within. The future is not about a return to US hegemony, certainly not in a unipolar sense. The industrial base may be gone but it can be rebuilt, albeit not overnight. Alliances are frayed; trust cannot be easily restored. The fiscal position is precarious, with a $35 trillion US national debt. Internal politics is deeply polarised, with a significant portion of the American electorate believing that the system is rigged against them. A lot of these factors, singly and in combination with other factors, are self-reinforcing. The future also lies in terra incognita, a contested transition to a multipolar world, whose contours remain unknown. A recent book by German political analyst Marc Saxer, Geopolitical Conflict in the Wolf World, is a sobering structural assessment of where the world and the US are headed. “Homo homini lupus est” (Man is a wolf to man) is how Saxer begins. With that statement, we are back to Plautus and Hobbes. This is not mere rhetorical flourish. Saxer’s wolf world is an analytic category, a systemic condition characterised by the absence of a hegemon capable of enforcing rules, the demise of neoliberalism, the collapse of shared legal-normative frameworks, the return of great-power competition, the rise of Middle Powers, many with regional hegemonic aspirations, and the normalisation of coercion as a primary instrument of statecraft. As I said to Saxer during the launch of his book in Lahore, for the Global South, it has always been a wolf world. Pax Americana did not keep the peace for the periphery. It financed selective peace on credit. The bill has now come due. The writer is a journalist interested in security and foreign policies. X: @ejazhaider Published in Dawn, EOS, May 31st, 2026
The federal cabinet has approved the nationwide implementation of a Track and Trace system for pharmaceutical products across Pakistan, Minister for Health Mustafa Kamal announced on Tuesday. According to an official handout, the system aims to strengthen public health and safeguard citizens from counterfeit medicines. The cabinet has also approved the necessary amendments to the Drug Labeling and Packing Rules, enabling the introduction of “a modern digital system for tracking and verifying medicines throughout the supply chain”, the statement said. “This decision marks a major and historic step towards eliminating counterfeit, fake and substandard medicines from Pakistan,” said Kamal according to the statement. “For the first time, every medicine in the country will be digitally traceable and verifiable, ensuring greater transparency, safety, and accountability,” he said. The statement noted that under the new regulatory framework, all pharmaceutical manufacturers and importers will be required to place standardised 2D barcodes and serialisation data on medicine packaging. The system will enable regulators to monitor medicines from production to consumption, helping to identify and eliminate counterfeit products from the market, it said. The health minister stated that once the system was implemented, consumers would be able to access authentic information regarding a medicine’s expiry date, price and verification status. This would empower them to make informed healthcare decisions and enhance public trust in the pharmaceutical sector, according to Kamal. The Drug Regulatory Authority of Pakistan (Drap) will oversee the nationwide rollout of the system. It will also issue detailed technical guidelines to facilitate the pharmaceutical industry’s compliance, the statement said. “Consultative meetings with relevant stakeholders have already been conducted to ensure a smooth transition,” it added. Kamal emphasised that the initiative would “significantly strengthen the security and quality of Pakistan’s pharmaceutical supply chain”, replacing conventional monitoring mechanisms with a modern digital framework. He highlighted that the adoption of advanced technology would position Pakistan among the leading countries in the region in pharmaceutical regulation and oversight. “The track and trace system will establish a strong and effective barrier against counterfeit medicines and ensure the protection of public health, lives and trust,” the press release quoted the minister as saying.
Russia has presented a domestically developed neuromorphic processor called “Altai”, a brain-inspired chip designed to perform artificial intelligence tasks with significantly lower power consumption than conventional processors.