Euronews
중도 성향
기타
Fire rips through dormitory at girl's school in Kenya, killing at least 16 students
There have been many devastating school fires in Kenya, where boarding schools are common as a colonial legacy of missionaries and British rule.
"DEVASTATING" · 총 145건
필터 보기현재 지수
50.3
0 = 부정 우세
50 = 중립
100 = 긍정 우세
최근 7일 기준 84,991건을 분석한 결과, 뉴스 심리지수는 50.3(균형)입니다. 긍정 4,296건(5.1%)·중립 78,682건(92.6%)·부정 2,013건(2.4%)이며, 중립 비중이 뚜렷하게 높습니다. 성향 지수는 종합 15.0(중도 균형)입니다.
There have been many devastating school fires in Kenya, where boarding schools are common as a colonial legacy of missionaries and British rule.
Its reports and live updates on the devastating tremor were marked at an event in New York on Wednesday.
[Capital FM] Nakuru -- At least 10 students have been confirmed dead following a devastating overnight fire that razed a dormitory at Utumishi Girls Academy in Nakuru.
A devastating late-night shooting in North Hills has left four people dead, including two children, in what police are calling a homicide investigation.
Countries: Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda Source: International Peace Institute On May 15, 2026, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) confirmed its seventeenth recorded outbreak of Ebola, in Ituri province. Since then, the number of cases has risen to over 900 and the virus has crossed into Uganda and reached the provinces of North and South Kivu, now controlled by the Rwanda-backed M23. Initial reports suggesting that the outbreak may have been circulating for weeks and local health authorities were underprepared to swiftly mount a containment strategy. As Ebola Returns to Eastern DRC, International Responders Must Not Repeat the Mistakes of 2018 May 26, 2026by Dirk Druet Ebola task force of MONUSCO and UNICEF Focal point Felicien Malyra (with information pamphlet), inform prisoners at the jail “Kakwangura" in Butembo in North Kivu about how they may protect themselves against the Ebola Virus on August 9, 2019. UN Photo/Martine Perret. On May 15, 2026, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) confirmed its seventeenth recorded outbreak of Ebola, in Ituri province. Since then, the number of cases has risen to over 900 and the virus has crossed into Uganda and reached the provinces of North and South Kivu, now controlled by the Rwanda-backed M23. Initial reports suggesting that the outbreak may have been circulating for weeks and local health authorities were underprepared to swiftly mount a containment strategy. As international concern grows that the deadly virus might be out of control, the mounting public health response is facing an even more challenging environment than during the last major outbreak in 2018. No vaccine exists for this strain of the virus and Goma, the logistical hub of eastern DRC, is occupied by an armed group. The UN peacekeeping operation in the DRC (MONUSCO) has been drawing down its operations and is now confined to Ituri and North Kivu. On top of this, the global health architecture is under strain following the US withdrawal from the World Health Organization (WHO) earlier this year and a growing deficit in funding to address health emergencies. In this challenging and high-risk context, it is critical that the lessons of the last outbreak inform the management of this one. The temptation in a fast-moving outbreak is to treat the response as an urgent technical problem requiring an urgent technical solution: identify cases, trace contacts, isolate the infected, vaccinate where possible, and bury the deceased safely. But as many learned during the COVID-19 pandemic, emergency health responses in complex political situations are not neutral interventions in passive contexts; they are political acts. This is particularly true in conflict environments, where large-scale public health responses distribute resources at scale, legitimize or delegitimize particular actors, reshape local security arrangements, and engage with populations that read them through the lens of the conflict. When the Health Response Became Part of the Conflict in the DRC In eastern DRC, the 2018–2020 Ebola outbreak was described by WHO as a “perfect storm” in which a highly infectious disease was spreading in an area of active conflict. The Congolese public, particularly in the country’s east, widely viewed their government as predatory, and much of the affected population resided in crowded conditions with poor health infrastructure and was located near porous international borders. Given the seriousness of the risks to local and international public health, WHO and partners in the international community launched a massive health and humanitarian response. This operation was grounded in the principle of “no regrets,” which holds that it is better to overreact to a public health emergency and adjust later rather than act too late. This approach was broadly seen as empowering WHO to take direct action in the affected area with only limited consultation with other parts of the UN system. Many of the decisions made during this period had devastating side effects: they empowered officials and security forces notorious for reprisals against local communities and produced what became known as the “Ebola Business”—a war economy with actors invested in prolonging the crisis. This conflation of the Ebola response with the conflict led to community resistance and violence against health workers that inhibited containment and accelerated transmission. By the time the outbreak was declared over in 2020, more than 3,400 people had been infected, of which some 2,200 had died. Moreover, the conflict in eastern DRC had become even more entrenched, with the ADF armed group carrying out sustained atrocities in Beni territory in North Kivu. MONUSCO’s authority was openly contested by host populations, culminating in the torching of its office in Boikene, near the town of Beni, in 2019. The risks to Congolese lives and international public health posed by the latest outbreak merit a large, swift health and humanitarian response. Such a response is all the more urgent following recent cuts to international support to the Congolese national health system, particularly as a result of the dismantling of USAID, which have reduced the country’s epidemic preparedness and likely undermined its capacity for early detection. However, a response that is not grounded in an understanding of conflict dynamics is likely to hamper efforts to stem transmission. In a 2022 study for the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, I analyzed the national and international response to the 2018–2020 outbreak and proposed a variety of ways international responders could have done things differently. Three recommendations from that study remain relevant for the current outbreak: Treat conflict and political economy analysis as central to the design of the health response: In 2018, WHO did not request MONUSCO’s analysis of the security and political landscape into which it was deploying, and MONUSCO was not informed in advance of several key WHO decisions. These included WHO’s decision to engage personnel from the Agence Nationale de Renseignements, a state security service notorious in eastern DRC for human rights abuses, as “community liaisons” who in practice helped direct where the response deployed. That arrangement, documented by the Congo Research Group, created perverse incentives, securitized the response, and lowered public trust in the health response. Position peace and security actors at arm’s length from health activities: There is a critical distinction between using security actors to provide a generally permissive security environment for a health response and using them to provide direct, proximate security. Using uniformed personnel to escort vehicles, guard clinic perimeters, or cordon off health facilities changes the character of the intervention in the eyes of affected communities. The 2018–2020 experience in Beni and Butembo demonstrated how rapidly the proximity of security actors to the health response led that response to be associated with them, sparking hostility against it. While MONUSCO and national security services may have a role in promoting security during the health response, they should clearly distinguish themselves from humanitarian and health operations. Balance the urgency of epidemic response with community engagement and operational flexibility: The “no regrets” posture that prevailed in 2018 produced the conditions that ultimately undermined its effectiveness. Public health measures only function if affected populations trust them enough to participate; securitized responses that treat communities as obstacles rather than partners are counterproductive. In practice, this means accepting slower initial reach in exchange for community-acceptable delivery—local responders rather than teams parachuted in from Kinshasa, motorcycles rather than Land Cruisers, and burial practices negotiated with families rather than imposed on them. WHO’s Global Health and Peace Initiative, and Its Limits To its credit, WHO has not ignored the 2018–2020 experience. In the years following the outbreak, the organization developed the Global Health and Peace Initiative (GHPI), built around two pillars: (1) making health programming “conflict-sensitive” by extending the “do no harm” principle into operational practice and (2) where conditions allow, making it “peace-responsive” by designing health interventions to actively contribute to peace outcomes such as social cohesion, dialogue, and community resilience. The initiative is likely to influence WHO’s thinking as it rapidly designs and rolls out its response to the current crisis. In a 2023 paper for the International Peace Institute, I argued that while the GHPI’s conceptual direction is broadly correct, its operationalization in violent conflict settings carries risks that have not yet been adequately addressed. Two in particular could present challenges for the response in eastern DRC. First, it is unclear how WHO and its partners in the field, including organizations such as Médecins Sans Frontières, will reconcile the principles of conflict sensitivity and humanitarian impartiality when the two pull in opposing directions. For example, even if a conflict-sensitive analysis identifies that delivering a particular intervention will exacerbate conflict dynamics (e.g., if negotiating access through a non-state armed group will entrench that group’s position), that intervention may still be compelled to proceed under the principle of humanitarian impartiality. The GHPI offers no framework for managing that tradeoff. Second, the initiative holds that programming “must be led at national level—from national authorities down to the community level.” This instinct to promote national ownership was borne of the lessons of the 2014-2016 Ebola crisis in West Africa, where the UN was criticized for bypassing national institutions. However, this principle becomes highly problematic when the state is itself a party to the conflict. In eastern DRC, much of the population views Congolese state institutions with hostility born of long experience. Deferring to national ownership without qualification risks reproducing the legitimacy problem that fueled community resistance in 2018 and could empower the predatory actors the response should be insulated from. The outbreak in the DRC demands a more localized, nuanced process for deciding on the role of national actors, grounded in thorough conflict analysis. The Way Forward The international response in eastern DRC will succeed or fail—and it is critical that it succeed—on its ability to implement emergency public health measures within the region’s long-standing social, political, and security quagmire. This will require three deliberate moves from the outset: (1) joint conflict and political-economy analysis to shape deployment decisions rather than follow them; (2) a security posture of less proximate protection combined with negotiated community-level access; and (3) a response built on localized approaches to engaging existing community structures and calibrating the role of national actors. Many further challenges will emerge that will demand difficult choices—not least the reconciliation of the dilemmas innate to the GHPI—but the decisions international responders make in the next weeks could have profound implications for regional and international public health. Originally Published in the Global Observatory
Brodie Stokes suffered critical head injuries during an alleged altercation near Geraldton in Western Australia's Mid West region.
The Russian government has reached the final stages of implementing a comprehensive ban on diesel and aviation fuel (kerosene) exports following a devastating wave of Ukrainian long-range drone strikes that have knocked out a quarter of the nation’s total oil refining capacity, effectively paralyzing critical energy infrastructure across central Russia. Key energy hubs hit in recent weeks include the Ryazan, Moscow, Kirishi and NORSI (Nizhny Novgorod) refineries processing roughly 238,000 tons per day (83 million metric tons per year), accounting…
The war in Iran and the accompanying shipping bottleneck are triggering a historic crisis in the aluminum market, with potentially devastating knock-on effects across sectors that depend on the base metal. Aluminum is the third most used metal in the world, behind only iron and steel. Aluminum is prized for its high strength-to-weight ratio, corrosion resistance, and excellent conductivity — properties that make it essential for everything from beverage cans and cooking foil to aerospace components and power grids. Key sectors utilizing aluminum…
US President Donald Trump’s Board of Peace has no cash in its official Gaza reconstruction fund, despite member countries pledging billions of dollars, a source familiar with the board told AFP on Wednesday. Trump first conceived of the board to rebuild Gaza, where Israel and Hamas agreed to a US-backed ceasefire in October in a bid to halt two years of devastating war. But he quickly raised eyebrows by sending out wide invitations, including to Russian President Vladimir Putin and to countries far removed from traditional Middle East diplomacy. Since the board was set up, its fund — administered by the World Bank and endorsed by the United Nations — has received no money from donors, the source familiar with the Board of Peace told AFP. The source said money had not been deposited because the fund was designed for the reconstruction and development phase, which has not yet been reached. Israeli military operations in Gaza have continued despite the ceasefire, with at least 910 people killed since then, according to the territory’s health ministry. Israel still retains control over 60 per cent of the Gaza Strip, including all entry and exit points, while the population is concentrated on the coast. Earlier on Wednesday, the Financial Times (FT) reported that the board had received donations directly into a JPMorgan account, citing the board’s spokesperson. There are no “independent transparency requirements” in place for the JPMorgan account, the FT noted. Major European nations have shunned the board, which is heavy on longstanding US partners in the Middle East, ideological allies of Trump and smaller countries eager for Trump’s attention. France and Britain had refused to join. The board is unambiguously led not just by the US but personally by Trump, who holds the final say and can remain in charge past his presidency. Trump previously said that the US would contribute $10 billion to the board, while Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates each promised at least $1 billion. Members of the board are required to pay $1bn for a permanent spot, according to its charter. A European Union-United Nations assessment published in April estimated that more than $71bn will be needed over the next decade for the reconstruction of war-ravaged Gaza, where the UN says the humanitarian situation is “critical.”
Robert Rycroft, 57, put up the huge steel-framed outbuilding in the garden of his home after years of devastating floods left them scrambling to move treasured possessions out of the water's path.
He was supposed to head home after a night out with his family but Muhammad Iqbal El Mubarak ended up coordinating efforts to save the lives of those trapped in a devastating train accident.
The ongoing crisis in the Strait of Hormuz has the potential to deliver the most devastating blow to global aviation of our lifetime.
Texas voters on Tuesday voted overwhelmingly to move on from longtime incumbent senator John Cornyn (R-TX), handing the longtime incumbent a devastating defeat and delivering a sharp rebuke to the Republican establishment in Washington. The race was called for Ken Paxton, who went into election day with the backing of President Donald Trump, immediately as ...
MAKKAH: Being in Makkah has been nothing short of blissful for Hassan Qadiri, where participating in the festivities of the Haj pilgrimage is a welcome relief after weeks of devastating war back home in Iran. Qadiri and his family took cover as intense Israeli and American bombing raids targeted his native city of Isfahan in central Iran until an April ceasefire began. “We hear the call to prayer every day, not explosions here,” Qadiri said. “I’m very happy.” Like many Iranians at this year’s Haj, Qadiri and his family are staying in a hotel near the Grand Mosque under the protection of Saudi security personnel, who actively prevent others from approaching the grounds to meet or speak with the pilgrims. The protocol is not provided to other visiting pilgrims. “The Saudi treatment of us is good and everything is fine,” Qadiri added. His wife, who did not give her name and wore a black abaya with a turquoise vest that read “Isfahan”, agreed. “Being here makes the war easier for us to bear,” she added. Throughout the holy city, Iranian flags can be seen printed on white pilgrims’ garments, cloaks, bags and buses. Tense past According to Iran’s IRNA state news agency, due to the “wartime situation” just over 30,000 Iranian pilgrims out of an expected 86,700 made the journey to Saudi Arabia for Haj. The Haj has been an uneasy flashpoint in the past between the Sunni monarchy in Riyadh and the Shia revolutionary government in Tehran. In the years following Iran’s 1979 Islamic revolution, Saudi officials accused Iranian pilgrims of triggering stampedes and other violence, while also yelling political slogans — an act seen as taboo by the religious establishment in Makkah. The last major dispute erupted after one of the pilgrimage’s biggest tragedies, in 2015, when 464 Iranians were among 2,300 pilgrims killed in a stampede, prompting recriminations between Riyadh and Tehran. Relations were severed a year later after protesters attacked Saudi Arabia’s embassy in Tehran and consulate in the northwestern city of Mashhad, following Riyadh’s execution of Shia cleric Nimr al-Nimr. No Iranian pilgrims were allowed that year, as the two sides were unable to organise a protocol for them to attend. The rivals only re-established ties in a 2023 deal brokered by China, which saw embassies reopen in their respective capitals. But the detente was upended following the US and Israeli attack on Iran in late February that set off Iran’s wide-ranging retaliation against its Gulf neighbours. Energy installations, airports, export terminals, ports and other civilian infrastructure were targeted by Tehran, as Iranian attacks on the Strait of Hormuz choked Gulf oil and gas exports to the outside world. No slogans This year, Saudi authorities are working to prevent the war from affecting the environment at the Haj. Saudi Arabia “has been very keen to de-politicise Haj in every manner whether it is about political activities or sloganeering during the pilgrimage,” said Umer Karim, an expert on Saudi foreign policy at the University of Birmingham in Britain. Inside one hotel hosting Iranian pilgrims posters lined the walls written in Arabic and English stating: “Raising flags and saying religious or political slogans is prohibited,” echoing an earlier warning broadcast by the interior ministry. But even as the trajectory of the war remained uncertain, Iranians in Mecca were keen to enjoy their reprieve from the conflict. “It is a very beautiful feeling to be here for the hajj,” Ali Reza said. The sentiment was echoed by Pardis, a woman in her forties from Tehran whose relative was killed by an air strike. “I feel peace and safety here,” she said. Published in Dawn, May 26th, 2026
Country: Yemen Source: United Nations Population Fund Please refer to the attached file. ADEN, Yemen - "I lived in silence, hiding my pain from others, enduring my own gaze before enduring theirs," recalls Safiy, 28 years from Bajil District in Al Hudaydah Governorate. For five years, Safiy carried a pain she could neither understand nor explain. After severe complications during childbirth at a hospital in Bajil, she began experiencing faecal leakage—a condition that would force her to withdraw from from daily life. Amina, 20 years, from Aden Governorate too, faced her own silent battle. Married at fifteen and pregnant nine months later, she had no access to antenatal care in her remote village. When labour came, it lasted three agonizing days with only a traditional birth attendant by her side. By the time she reached a hospital, her baby had died. An emergency cesarean section saved her life, but left her with an obstetric fistula—a devastating childbirth injury that would isolate her for a year and a half. Safiy and Amina's stories reflect a harsh reality facing thousands of women across Yemen. Global estimates reveal that Yemen has the highest prevalence of obstetric fistula in the Arab States region—113 cases per 100,000 women as of 2020, compared to 86 per 100,000 across Arab States and 36 per 100,000 in Asia and the Pacific. Obstetric fistula—a hole between the birth canal and bladder or rectum caused by prolonged, obstructed labour without timely medical intervention—is both preventable and treatable. Yet in Yemen, a perfect storm of factors has made it a persistent crisis: early marriage and adolescent pregnancy, critically low rates of skilled birth attendance, and a healthcare system devastated by over a decade of conflict. When Systems Collapse, Women Pay the Price The conflict and humanitarian crisis have pushed Yemen's healthcare system to the brink. An estimated 19.4 million people lack access to basic healthcare, including reproductive health services. Nearly half of all health facilities remain fully or partially functional, and only one in five of them provide maternal and newborn care. Almost half of all childbirths occur outside a health facility. Nearly a quarter of pregnant women do not receive antenatal care, while only 3 in five women give birth with skilled assistance. For women like Safiy and Amina, the barriers to treatment are formidable: limited functional facilities with operating theatres and specialized fistula care, financial and transportation obstacles, weak referral systems in remote areas, and a severe shortage of trained fistula surgeons. Most devastating is the social stigma—the isolation and psychological trauma that discourage women from seeking care at all. A Lifeline in Darkness Safiy decided not to surrender. After being examined at a health facility in Al Huban, she was referred to a UNFPA-supported fistula treatment centre at Al Sadaqa Hospital in Aden. "When the doctor told me about my condition, she said treatment was possible," Safiy remembers. "Those words alone gave me back my breath." She underwent surgery successfully at no cost, and received financial support to cover the transportation. "I could not believe the pain that had accompanied me for five years could come to an end," she says. "Today, I am recovering step by step. I am reclaiming my health, my dignity, and my life." Amina's path to healing followed a similar trajectory. When she learned about the fistula treatment centre she contacted the coordinator and traveled to Al Sadaqa Hospital. After successful surgery, her recovery began. "The hospital not only treated my condition but restored my dignity and renewed my confidence in life," Amina says. "They gave me the chance for a new beginning.” Building Back Better UNFPA supports two dedicated obstetric fistula treatment centers in Yemen—at Al Sadaqa Hospital in Aden and Al Thawra Hospital in Sana'a—providing surgical repair, training midwives, supporting safe childbirth practices, and ensuring women with complications can access skilled care. Since 2023, nearly 300 obstetric fistula repair surgeries have been successfully completed at these two centres. Through partnerships with Ministry of Public Health and local organizations like Deem for Development Organization, UNFPA is working to strengthen referral systems, expand access to emergency obstetric care, and address the root causes that result in obstetric fistula. But the need far outweighs current capacity with steep funding cuts threating the suspension of UNFPA’s support to these two centres "Yes, my story is full of pain, but it is also full of hope,” recalls Safiy. On the International Day to End Obstetric Fistula, that hope needs to transform into action. Obstetric fistula is preventable and treatable; ending it is within our reach.
Social media is the biggest threat to children's wellbeing, parents have said, while raising children is now harder and more conflict ridden, the damning report has found.
Social media is the biggest threat to children's wellbeing, parents have said, while raising children is now harder and more conflict ridden, the damning report has found.
When I was at medical school, a close friend took me aside one evening and told me something I've never forgotten. He could feel nothing during sex.
Southern California officials said the risk of a devastating vapor explosion has been avoided in an incident involving a storage tank containing methyl methacrylate, a toxic chemical used to manufacture resins and plastics. NBC News' Steve Patterson reports on the subdued threat.
The warning comes after Russia launched a devastating weekend attack on Kyiv and the surrounding region using a combination of drones and missiles.