🌐 국제기구 · "WARD" · 총 56건
필터 보기현재 지수
50.0
0 = 부정 우세
50 = 중립
100 = 긍정 우세
최근 7일 기준 5,981건을 분석한 결과, 뉴스 심리지수는 50.0(균형)입니다. 긍정 0건(0.0%)·중립 5,981건(100.0%)·부정 0건(0.0%)이며, 중립 비중이 뚜렷하게 높습니다. 성향 지수는 종합 0.0(중도 균형)입니다.
Galician literature not only narrates, but constructs identity. It is a form of belonging, projecting oneself and inhabiting the world.
Country: Afghanistan Source: World Food Programme Please refer to the attached file. Highlights Exchange Rate and Trade Dynamics: During the fourth week of May, the Afghani exchange rate remained stable at AFN 63.8/USD, while remaining stronger than both last year and the three-year average, helping to moderate the impact of imported inflation on domestic markets. Market supply conditions remained generally stable, supported by ongoing domestic harvests and continued imports through regional trade corridors. However, transportation costs, regional trade uncertainties, and high import dependence continue to pose risks to market stability and contribute to localized price fluctuations. Food Items: Overall, national average food prices remained relatively stable during the fourth week of May, with moderate week-on-week declines across major food commodities. However, compared to last year, most key food commodities continue to remain above year-ago levels, particularly wheat grain (+14%), wheat flour (high-price +9%; low-price +12%), rice (high-quality +38%; low-quality +28%), cooking oil (+4%), sugar (+25%), and salt (+10%). Meanwhile, pulses (-12%) and bread (-4%), remain below their respective levels from the same period last year. The higher year-on-year prices reflect increases recorded between Oct-25 and Mar-26 following border closures with Pakistan and the rerouting of trade through Iran and Central Asia. Since then, improved trade flows and market availability have gradually contributed to declining price levels. Vegetables: Vegetable prices continued their seasonal decline, supported by increased domestic production and improved market availability. Tomato prices recorded a significant weekly decrease of 18.5%, while potato prices declined by 2.3%. In contrast, onion prices increased by 4.6%, partially reversing the declines observed in recent months and moving back toward more typical seasonal levels. Compared to last year, tomato prices remain 20% lower and onion prices 35% lower, while potato prices continue to remain substantially above last year’s level (+24%). Increased arrivals of seasonal produce from several provinces, continued to improve market availability and support downward price movements across major markets. Non-Food Items: Diesel prices increased slightly during the week (+1.3%) and remained 14% above last year's level. Fertilizer prices remained broadly stable, with DAP increasing by 0.8% and urea by 0.3% compared to the previous week. Compared to last year, fertilizer prices continue to remain elevated, particularly for urea (+45%) and DAP (+16%), maintaining pressure on agricultural production costs. Improved seed and animal feed prices remained largely unchanged during the week. Livestock and Labour Market: The price of a one-year-old female sheep increased by 6.0%, driven by stronger demand ahead of Eid-ul-Adha, when livestock purchases typically increase across the country. Meanwhile, labour market conditions remained weak during the week, with labour availability declining slightly to 1.9 days per week, compared to the previous week. Labour availability remains substantially below both last year (-20%) and the three-year average (-16%), reflecting continued constraints in employment opportunities and increased competition among casual labourers.
Countries: Lebanon, Syrian Arab Republic Source: Famine Early Warning System Network Please refer to the attached file. Key Messages Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected across South and El-Nabatieh governorates through September 2026, driven by sustained insecurity, collapsed market functionality, and severely constrained humanitarian access. From June through September, a deterioration from Stressed! (IPC Phase 2!) to Crisis (IPC Phase 3) is likely in Akkar, Baalbek-El Hermel, Beirut, and parts of Mount Lebanon, Bekaa, and North, reflecting mounting displacement pressures and declining income-earning opportunities alongside a reduction in humanitarian food assistance after May. Hostilities between Israeli forces and Hezbollah persist in May, with continued airstrikes and ground operations driving large-scale displacement, reducing market access, disrupting agricultural production, and constraining humanitarian operations. Despite a 45-day ceasefire extension announced on May 15, fighting intensified in mid- to late May, with attacks remaining concentrated in southern Lebanon, particularly in Tyre, Nabatieh, Bint Jbeil, and Marjayyoun districts. Israeli air and drone strikes are also increasing in frequency in the Bekaa Valley. Attacks targeting critical infrastructure — including health facilities, water systems, and transportation routes — continue to disrupt supply chains and constrain service delivery, while humanitarian access remains constrained across insecurity-affected areas, further isolating southern populations. Displacements continue to increase, placing additional strain on collective shelters and intensifying social tensions in host communities. Returns to southern Lebanon remain limited due to persisting insecurity, widespread infrastructure destruction, restricted access, and disruptions to markets and essential services. Expanded evacuation orders beyond southern Lebanon are constraining movement and access to assistance across southern Lebanon, the Bekaa Valley, and Beirut’s southern suburbs, with 90 percent of forced displacement orders concentrated in South, triggering further population movements. As of May 21, nearly 130,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) are residing in 635 collective shelters, while the majority of the estimated 1.3 million IDPs remain outside formal sites in Beirut, Mount Lebanon, and North. Within these governorates, large influxes are exacerbating overcrowding, straining local resources, and heightening tensions between displaced populations and host communities. Food and fuel prices remain key constraints on household food access amid Lebanon’s heavy reliance on imports and ongoing insecurity-related disruptions. Below-average 2025 wheat production, intermittent trade disruptions, and localized access constraints, particularly in the south and the Bekaa-Baalbek-Hermel corridor, are placing upward pressure on prices, with bread prices rising 12 percent from mid-February to mid-April and remaining elevated despite national wheat availability that is supported by sustained imports, especially in areas affected by insecurity and transport disruptions. Sharp increases in fuel prices — rising by approximately 84 percent between mid-February and mid-May — due to domestic price adjustments and regional fuel market pressures following the escalation are raising transportation and production costs. These price increases are further eroding household purchasing power, particularly for poor and displaced households. Market functionality and income-earning opportunities remain uneven across Lebanon, reflecting a geographic divide between insecurity-affected areas and areas not directly impacted by hostilities. In South and El-Nabatieh, market functionality remains severely degraded, with limited trader activity, supply chain breakdowns, and restricted physical access constraining food availability. In contrast, markets continue to operate in most displacement-affected areas, though growing strain on local markets — driven by the IDP influx, price inflation, depleting stocks, and overwhelming trader capacity — and declining purchasing power are increasingly constraining food access. Income-earning opportunities remain well below average countrywide, with the collapse of the tourism industry — an 80 percent drop compared to the same period in 2025 — and below-average activity in construction, services, and transport limiting urban labor demand. The increased labor supply from displaced populations is increasing competition and placing downward pressure on wages. In South, El-Nabatieh, and Baalbek-Hermel, agricultural labor opportunities, associated with the start of the typical wheat and barley harvest, are below average and compounded by displacement, land access constraints, and infrastructure damage, which are reducing a key source of seasonal income. Humanitarian food assistance remains ongoing but insufficient to meet rapidly rising needs. A revised extension of the Lebanon Flash Appeal through August — expected to launch in early June — will continue to target up to 1 million people, contingent on the availability of funding, including poor Lebanese, displaced Syrians, and Palestinian refugees. However, implementation remains highly dependent on securing additional funding, with substantial funding gaps limiting partners’ ability to sustain assistance delivery at scale. Since the start of the escalation, partners have delivered more than 10.3 million hot and cold meals, 129,852 ready-to-eat rations, and 37,256 bread bundles across Lebanon, and have supported 618,000 insecurity-affected people with cash assistance as of May 21. Operational effectiveness also continues to vary by area. In insecurity-affected areas, particularly South and El-Nabatieh, ongoing hostilities, movement restrictions, infrastructure damage, and localized market disruptions limit households’ ability to fully utilize cash assistance, while access constraints and convoy limitations continue to restrict the timely delivery of in-kind assistance to the most affected and isolated populations.
Country: Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) Source: Famine Early Warning System Network Please refer to the attached file. Key Messages Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are expected to persist countrywide through September, despite gradual macroeconomic improvements. Most poor households remain able to meet their minimum food needs, but face difficulties meeting their essential non-food needs due to extremely high food inflation in local currency and limited purchasing power. However, pockets of poor households – mainly in informal settlements around urban areas – with limited to no sources of income in USD and/or limited to no access to social safety net programs are likely to experience Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes. These households’ incomes in VED are insufficient to cover the rising cost of food, resulting in food consumption gaps or the use of negative coping strategies, without reaching the necessary threshold to change the area-level classification in any state. Macroeconomic conditions are stabilizing, but progress remains slow and incremental. Between March and April, the official exchange rate depreciated by 13.6 percent to 480.76 VED/USD while the parallel market exchange rate appreciated by 2 percent to 645.72 VED/USD. The gap between the official and parallel rates narrowed to 30 percent, declining 10 percentage points from March, supported by improved foreign currency availability throughout the Venezuelan economy. The monthly inflation rate slowed for the third consecutive month (to 10.6 percent), while the annual inflation rate was 611.9 percent (decreasing 37 percentage points from March). In April, the cost of the minimum survival ration (consisting of maize flour, rice, pasta, and oil) continued to increase in local currency at a pace similar to February and March, and increased by 11.5 percent in USD, reversing the downward trend reported last month. These increases reflect exchange rate pressures, high operational costs, increased consumer demand linked to increased social safety net benefits, speculation, and a perception of improving economic conditions, linked to stronger foreign currency inflows. Oil sector performance remained strong in April. Crude oil production exceeded 1 million barrels per day (bpd) in April, according to OPEC, marking the highest output since January 2019. Crude oil export volumes also remained above 1 million bpd, reaching levels not observed since 2018. International benchmark prices have continued to vary, but averaged 110 USD/barrel (Brent) and 104 USD/barrel (WTI) through May 18, supporting increased foreign currency inflows and government revenues, which continue to finance social safety net benefits. Increased foreign currency inflows are reducing the gap between the official and parallel market exchange rates as the Central Bank of Venezuela (BCV) interventions continue to add hard currency into circulation via sales to private banks. In April, weekly intervention amounts ranged between 180 and 450 million USD, sold at an exchange rate of 570.75 VED/USD. According to the BCV, total interventions in May are expected to reach 1.35 billion USD at an exchange rate of 611.00 VED/USD. For eligible households, recent increases in social safety net benefits are improving financial access to food. Although the minimum salary remains unchanged, the Ingreso Contra la Guerra Económica (ICGE) increased an additional 33.3 percent from 150 USD in April to 200 USD in May. Given the persistent gap between the official and parallel market exchange rates, the indexed value of 200 USD is equivalent to slightly less than 150 USD on the parallel market. This amount remains sufficient to cover the minimum survival ration estimated in April to cost 95.90 USD for a household of four and to also cover a portion of essential non-food expenditures. No Comités Locales de Abastecimiento y Producción (CLAP) in-kind food assistance distributions were reported in May.
Countries: Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) Source: UN High Commissioner for Refugees Please refer to the attached file. Operational context Throughout April 2026, Ecuador’s operational environment remained marked by overlapping security, environmental, and socio-economic pressures affecting both host communities and displaced people. While official data indicates a reduction in homicide rates, field-level analysis suggests this reflects a partial containment of violence rather than structural improvement, with criminal dynamics increasingly shifting across territories. These trends suggest monitoring coastal and border regions will be increasingly important in the coming months. According to official data, 2,778 violent deaths were recorded between January–April, compared to 3,150 in the same period last year, an 11.8% decrease. Despite this reduction, the homicide rate remains high nationwide. Security responses continued under prolonged states of exception. Military and police operations intensified in several provinces, including Esmeraldas, Manabí, Guayas, and Sucumbíos, contributing to heightened fear among communities. In border areas such as Carchi, migration control operations prioritized verification of migration status and criminal records, where UNHCR and partners continued to deliver legal assistance to individuals with international protection needs. In Esmeraldas and San Lorenzo, security incidents directly affected communities and humanitarian operations, leading to temporary suspension or adaptation of activities and shifts to remote work modalities. Across Ecuador, UNHCR continues to accompany communities to identify risks and engage in localized responses to their needs. Mobility dynamics at borders remain complex. At Rumichaca, the arrival of displaced families continued, where UNHCR and partners remain committed to facilitating access to assistance and protection services. Environmental shocks further compounded vulnerabilities. Heavy rains and flooding affected the Amazon region, particularly in Orellana and Sucumbíos, leading to evacuations, disruption of basic services, and damage to infrastructure, while response capacity remained constrained. In parallel, coastal regions experienced extreme temperatures, and declining water levels in key hydroelectric reservoirs raised concerns over energy supply, which in the past years caused power cuts of over 14 hours daily. These internal pressures are compounded by regional developments. Escalating violence in southern Colombia continued to influence cross-border movements toward Ecuador. At the same time, shifts in regional migration policies and return intentions are reshaping mobility dynamics. A recent report issued by UNHCR revealed that among Venezuelan survey respondents in Ecuador, around 11% had intentions to return to their country of origin within the next 12 months, and over two thirds would not consider returns in the next five years. This reinforces the need to continue investing in durable solutions and integration in Ecuador.Overall, the context remains highly volatile, with continued reliance on emergency measures, localized violence, and climate-related shocks affecting access to protection, services, and livelihoods. This underlines the need for sustained protection monitoring, strengthened coordination with state and local actors, and continued humanitarian engagement to mitigate risks and support affected populations. In this line, UNHCR continues delivering protection, strengthening national protection systems, while expanding access to services to mitigate risks, uphold rights, and support sustainable integration of displaced populations and vulnerable host communities.
Countries: Ukraine, Belarus, Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Türkiye Source: UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs Drone strike in Romania underscores growing risk of spillover of the war in Ukraine, Security Council hears Madam President, Excellencies, Only last week, the Secretary-General alerted this Council to the serious risk of further escalation of the war in Ukraine, including to the broader region. Last Friday, a dangerous incident crystallized our oft-stated warnings about potential spillover of the war. On the night of 28 to 29 May, an armed drone exploded on the top floor of a ten-story residential building in the eastern Romanian city of Galaţi, injuring two residents, a woman and a child. This was not the first reported breach of Romanian airspace by an armed drone since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. However, it was the first time such an incident resulted in casualties. The United Nations does not have any additional information on the strike in Galaţi. But Friday’s incident came on the heels of a worrying trend of drone incursions into the airspaces and territorial waters of countries bordering either Ukraine or the Russian Federation. Over the past 12 months, such incidents have been reported by the authorities in Moldova, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Finland, Poland, Kazakhstan, and Belarus, as well as in countries in the wider region - Bulgaria, Greece and Türkiye. Madam President, The United Nations strongly condemns all attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure. Such attacks, wherever they occur, violate international humanitarian law and must cease immediately. Civilians must be protected at all times. Madam President, The Galaţi incident comes amidst a sharp escalation of large-scale missile and drone attacks by the armed forces of the Russian Federation on Ukrainian towns and cities, resulting in ever worsening toll of civilian casualties and destruction of civilian infrastructure. There has also been a marked increase in Ukrainian attacks on military, energy and industrial infrastructure in the Russian Federation, which have reportedly resulted in a growing number of civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure. As the Secretary-General stressed last week, the dangerous trajectory of escalation and intensification that we are witnessing today, risks getting out of control. The current course must change. Madam President, The risk of miscalculation is particularly dangerous for the safety of nuclear facilities. Such risk has only increased in recent days. On 30 May, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was informed by the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant that a drone struck a turbine building at the site, reportedly causing a hole in its wall. This was the first such attack within the Plant’s perimeter since April 2024. Yesterday, the IAEA team at the site observed damage to the exterior of a turbine building, noting that it appeared consistent with the impact of a drone. We echo the deep concern expressed by the IAEA Director-General over this serious incident that endangered key nuclear safety principles. Attacks on nuclear sites are reckless and unacceptable. They must stop immediately to prevent any risk of a nuclear accident. Madam President, Amidst heightened tensions, it is incumbent on all concerned to act responsibly and to refrain from any action that could destabilize the situation further. As the Secretary-General emphasized last week, we urgently need immediate steps towards de-escalation, leading to a full and unconditional ceasefire. To that end, we urge dialogue and negotiations to resume at once. Diplomacy needs to be given a meaningful chance to create conditions for achieving peace in Ukraine. A peace that is just, lasting and comprehensive - in line with the Charter of the United Nations, international law, and relevant UN resolutions. A peace that contributes to a more stable regional and international environment. The United Nations will continue to fully support all meaningful efforts to that end. Thank you.
Countries: Lithuania, Ukraine Sources: International Organization for Migration, UN High Commissioner for Refugees Please refer to the attached file. Background Between 24 February 2022 and October 2025, over 5.7 million individuals are estimated to have fled Ukraine due to the ongoing war.¹ Of these, more than 101,000 have entered the Republic of Lithuania (hereafter referred to as Lithuania). At the time of writing of this report, more than 51,000 individuals held valid temporary residence permits pursuant to the temporary protection mechanism.² This remains the largest arrival of refugees recorded in Lithuania's history. The population that has settled in the country primarily consists of women (47%) and children (31%), along with elderly individuals (13%) and persons with disabilities (6%)—groups that often face heightened risks and require targeted support and services.³ Given the continued instability in Ukraine, it is anticipated that displacement will continue in 2026, with new arrivals seeking refuge in Lithuania and joining those already residing in the country. Lithuania has demonstrated a strong and sustained commitment to welcoming and assisting refugees fleeing Ukraine since 2022. The Ministry of Social Security and Labour leads the national coordination of the refugee response, while municipalities and civil society organizations play active roles in providing direct support and services. This collective effort— driven by government institutions, civil society, and local communities—reflects a comprehensive whole- of-society strategy aimed at ensuring protection and inclusion. Despite these coordinated efforts and the availability of tailored support for individuals with specific needs, many refugees continue to face barriers that limit their ability to fully sustain themselves and support their families. The 2025-2026 Regional Refugee Response Plan (RRP) builds on previous iterations by providing targeted, practical support to host countries. It further aims to ensure groups such as older people, children, people with disabilities and survivors of gender-based violence are receiving specialized assistance to address their needs, and that they are not left behind as the response shifts towards sustainability. To support a coordinated and effective response, access to comprehensive data is crucial for the design, delivery, and assessment of assistance programmes. In this regard, UNHCR Lithuania, working in collaboration with IOM and Lithuanian Red Cross, as well as other key actors engaged in the refugee response within Lithuania, carried out the 2025 Lithuania Socio-Economic Insights Survey (SEIS). The SEIS is a collaborative, inter-agency initiative designed to identify the most urgent needs of refugees coming from Ukraine across key sectors, including protection, health, education, accommodation, and livelihoods. It aligns with the objectives of the Regional Refugee Response Plan (RRP) for the Ukrainian refugee situation5 and specifically supports Lithuania's inter-agency RRP, led by UNHCR. SEIS serves as a source of important and comprehensive data for service providers. The 2025 SEIS in Lithuania was coordinated by UNHCR and developed through a collaborative effort, including with focal points from government, humanitarian actors and civil society, to ensure the survey maintained a multi-sectoral and inter-agency approach. Drawing on their specific expertise, each actor contributed to the design phase of the 2025 SEIS. The process included consultations at a round table event bringing together the key stakeholders involved in the refugee response. This final report serves as a strategic tool to guide humanitarian interventions in Lithuania throughout 2026 and beyond, informing the work of partners and stakeholders. It supports a more targeted and prioritized response and reflects the Grand Bargain commitments6 to improved harmonization and coordination of assessment efforts.
Country: World Source: Pan American Health Organization Please refer to the attached file. Regional situation: In EW 19 of 2026, respiratory virus activity in the Region of the Americas deepens the pattern of inter-hemispheric seasonal transition observed in previous weeks, with an increasingly marked divergence between hemispheres. North America, the Caribbean, and Central America are consolidating the end of the 2025–2026 season, with influenza positivity at low levels close to the interseasonal baseline. In contrast, Brazil and the Southern Cone establish themselves as the subregion of greatest epidemiological relevance for this reporting period, intensifying an accelerated upward trend of the start of the austral winter season, led by Argentina. The Andean Subregion maintains a mixed pattern, with an aggregate decline in influenza but divergent trajectories between countries and with RSV cases that continue to rise. The inter-hemispheric predominance of subtypes persists: influenza B, which has characterized the end of the Northern Hemisphere season, and influenza A, mainly A(H3N2), in the subregions of the Southern Hemisphere. Likewise, RSV shows opposite patterns according to hemisphere: declining in North America and rising in the Andean Region and in Brazil and the Southern Cone, consistent with the start of the austral season. SARS-CoV-2 maintains its generalized decline in all subregions, with no sign of resurgence. The burden of SARI and ILI is declining in the Northern Hemisphere, while the indicators are beginning to reflect an increase in the Southern Cone. Situación regional: En la SE 19 de 2026, la actividad de virus respiratorios en la Región de las Américas profundiza el patrón de transición estacional inter-hemisférica observado en las semanas previas, con una divergencia cada vez más marcada entre hemisferios. América del Norte, el Caribe y Centroamérica consolidan el fin de la temporada 2025–2026, con positividades de influenza en niveles bajos próximos a la línea de base interestacional. En contraste, Brasil y el Cono Sur se afirman como la subregión de mayor relevancia epidemiológica para este periodo de reporte, intensificando una tendencia ascendente y acelerada de inicio de temporada invernal austral, liderada por Argentina. La Subregión Andina mantiene un patrón mixto, con descenso agregado de influenza, pero trayectorias divergentes entre países y con casos de VRS que continúan en ascenso. Persiste el predominio inter-hemisférico de subtipos: influenza B que ha caracterizado el cierre de temporada del hemisferio norte e influenza A, principalmente A(H3N2), en las subregiones del hemisferio sur. Igualmente, el VRS muestra patrones opuestos según hemisferio: en descenso en América del Norte y en ascenso en la Región Andina y en Brasil y el Cono Sur, consistente con el inicio de la temporada austral. El SARS-CoV-2 mantiene su descenso generalizado en todas las subregiones, sin señal de resurgimiento. La carga de IRAG y ETI desciende en el hemisferio norte, mientras los indicadores comienzan a reflejar un incremento en el Cono Sur.
Country: World Source: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies Please refer to the attached file. Message from the IFRC Secretary General Small and medium-sized disasters may not dominate global headlines, but for communities affected they are just as devastating. The IFRC’s Disaster Response Emergency Fund (IFRC-DREF) ensures that these crises are met with speed, dignity and locally-led action. Money is made available fast, without the need to wait for a specific appeal. The DREF 2026 Plan is firmly anchored in the IFRC’s Renewal. In the context of significant global funding constraints, humanitarians must be more focused, disciplined and accountable than ever. The IFRC-DREF is central to this shift - enabling early, flexible financing while reinforcing strong stewardship and clear evidence of results. It is also innovative both in the way it is financed (our world-first indemnity insurance policy was triggered for the first time in 2024) and in how its funds are allocated; funding anticipatory action, before hazards hit, is a growing priority. Our 2026–2030 DREF Ambition involves strengthening not only what we fund, but how we deliver. In 2026, we will continue to streamline processes, improve sequencing between DREF grants and Emergency Appeals and reinforce compliance and operational quality. This ensures that speed is matched by sound decision-making, transparency and impact. Localization remains at the heart of IFRC-DREF. By channeling resources directly to National Societies, we enable action that is timely, context-driven and sustainable. At a time when humanitarian needs are rising and financing is under pressure, this agile and principled mechanism is more essential than ever. The DREF 2026 Plan reflects our commitment to work smarter, better demonstrate impact and ensure that no community facing disaster is ignored. I urge you to read it. Jagan Chapagain Context and rationale for the 2026 plan What is the IFRC-DREF? The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies’ Disaster Response Emergency Fund (IFRC-DREF) is an efficient, fast, transparent, and localized way of getting funding directly to local humanitarian actors – both before and after a crisis. It enables National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies to respond rapidly to emergencies and act ahead of predictable hazards through two complementary pillars: • Response • Anticipatory Action The fund combines speed, flexibility, transparency and localization to support community-led humanitarian action. Context and rationale for the 2026 plan The IFRC’s Disaster Response Emergency Fund (IFRC-DREF) enters 2026 at a pivotal moment, marking the conclusion of its Strategic Ambition 2020–2025 and the release of the IFRC-DREF Strategic Ambition 2026–2030, with 2026 serving as the first year of its operationalization. This transition builds on a period of significant reform, as the revision of procedures introduced in 2025 strengthened accountability, clarified operational and financial rules, and reinforced minimum readiness requirements, including for anticipatory action, while safeguarding IFRC-DREF’s core strengths of speed, flexibility, and reliability. These developments take place within the broader context of the IFRC Renewal, which seeks to strengthen a collective approach by reinforcing localization, quality, accountability, and proximity to communities across the IFRC network (the IFRC secretariat and its 191 member National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies). At the same time, National Societies continue to operate in increasingly complex environments shaped by: · climate-related disasters, · epidemics, · displacement, · economic pressures, · and shrinking humanitarian funding. These realities reinforce the importance of a fast, agile and locally led humanitarian financing mechanism. Global operational realities In 2025, IFRC-DREF allocated CHF 77.4 million across 170 operations in 83 National Societies, supporting 14.5 million people affected by crises worldwide. While most allocations remained under the Response Pillar (CHF 64.9 million), anticipatory action reached a record CHF 12.7 million, representing 16% of total funding. This growth was supported by the approval of 11 new simplified EAPs and 21 new EAPs. Despite a decline from 2024, allocations in 2025 remained 75% higher than in 2021, while operations increased by 27% over the same period. At the same time, the number of countries supported remained relatively stable, reflecting growing concentration of IFRC-DREF usage in highly crisis-affected contexts. Anticipatory action expanded significantly faster than the overall fund between 2021 and 2025, increasing by approximately 150%. This trend is expected to continue in 2026 through simplified procedures and expanded early action mechanisms. Despite growing pressure on humanitarian financing systems, IFRC-DREF allocations in 2025 remained 75% higher than in 2021.
Country: World Source: Regional Technical Group on Anticipatory Action in Latin America and the Caribbean Please refer to the attached file. The Technical Working Group on Anticipatory Action for Latin America and the Caribbean (GTAA LAC) publishes this briefing note in light of the forecast of an El Niño episode for the second half of 2026, with increasing probabilities of reaching strong to very strong intensity towards the end of the year. The document analyses current ENSO conditions, the differentiated impacts projected by subregion, and the compound effect of the fertilizer crisis stemming from the conflict in the Strait of Hormuz on regional agrifood systems. As of March 2026, the region has active or developing anticipatory action frameworks in 22 countries, with pre-arranged financing of USD 37.8 million. The note documents the ongoing inter-agency activations in the Central American Dry Corridor, funded by CERF with USD 10.5 million to protect up to 145,000 people in Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador, as well as complementary WFP activations in Nicaragua and Belize, IFRC Early Action Protocols, and ongoing actions in South America. The document presents the activation time windows by subregion and includes recommendations for governments, humanitarian actors and donors aimed at scaling up anticipatory action before the impacts of El Niño materialize on the most vulnerable populations in the region.
Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo Source: International Rescue Committee Delayed detection and slow contact tracing suggest virus has likely spread undetected for months Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of Congo, June 1, 2026 — The Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is likely significantly larger and more advanced than official figures suggest, as response efforts struggle with delayed detection and dangerously low levels of contact tracing, the International Rescue Committee (IRC) warned today. With only 20% of contacts currently being traced, health authorities are struggling to identify and isolate new chains of transmission. The virus may have been spreading undetected since before March, potentially as long as three months before the first official case was identified, allowing multiple chains of transmission to establish across communities and provinces. The combination of these factors dramatically increases the likelihood that the true scale of infections is far higher than reported, the IRC warned. Rachel Howard, Senior Technical Emergency Health advisor at the IRC, said: “The true scale of this Ebola outbreak is likely far worse than official figures suggest. When four out of five contacts are not being traced, it becomes incredibly difficult to contain the outbreak or even understand its true scale. We’re especially concerned about the virus spreading to other countries like Burundi or South Sudan.” IRC teams warn that shortages of diagnostic cartridges and testing backlogs are slowing confirmation of cases, further obscuring the true spread of the outbreak. Seven confirmed Ebola patients have reportedly left treatment centers in the DRC, while more than six healthcare workers have died, including two doctors in recent days. The incidents underscore the deep fear and mistrust some communities continue to have toward Ebola prevention and treatment efforts. People are avoiding health facilities, raising fears that those affected are remaining within communities rather than seeking treatment. As a result, transmission is spreading across multiple areas, and communities are losing trust in the response. Strengthening local, community-based prevention and infection control should be the immediate priority to control the outbreak at the source. Without urgent funding, the situation could deteriorate rapidly. This outbreak is increasingly resembling the 2018–2020 North Kivu Ebola crisis, which infected thousands of people and was complicated by insecurity, population movement, and community resistance. However, unlike previous outbreaks, there is currently no approved vaccine available for this Ebola strain. The IRC is calling for urgent international support to scale up contact tracing, surveillance, laboratory testing, treatment capacity, and community engagement efforts before the outbreak escalates further. It is also critical to build trust with affected communities, including through survivor-led awareness and risk awareness activities. In response to the current escalating outbreak, whilst working in close coordination with the government health authorities who are leading the response, IRC has launched prevention and control activities, including distribution of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) as well as awareness raising activities amidst communities at risk, rehabilitation of triage areas and rehabilitation/construction of showers, latrines and waste disposal areas. In Uganda, IRC is working with the Ministry of Health on the border to support infection, prevention and control activities including screening people coming across the border. IRC is also supporting response coordination in Uganda. Media contacts Madiha Raza International Rescue Committee madiha.raza@rescue.org Kim Winkler International Rescue Committee Kim.Winkler@rescue.org IRC Global Communications communications@rescue.org
Country: Ukraine Sources: Voluntas, World Food Programme Please refer to the attached file. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Background As Ukraine enters the fifth year of the full-scale invasion, the country remains heavily affected y ongoing hostilities. As of early 2025, 3.7 million people remain internally displaced, 6.9 million are refugees abroad, and over 40,838 civilian casualties have been recorded.1 The impact is most severe in frontline oblasts such as Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Luhansk, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Sumy, and Zaporizhzhia.2 Continued displacement has deepened poverty, strained social protection systems, and disrupted livelihoods; particularly in rural and conflict-affected areas, where unemployment remains high.3 Social transfers, including pensions and targeted assistance to displaced people, have played a crucial role in preventing further hardship, but coverage may not be reaching hard-to-reach groups such as people without documentation, and hidden groups like Roma communities, LGBTQIA+ individuals, and people living with HIV/AIDS, or men avoiding military conscription.4 The psychological toll of the prolonged conflict is also g owing, with 63 percent of households reporting mental health challenges related to ongoing uncertainty and displacement.5 According to Ukraine’s 2025 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan, 12.7 million people in Ukraine are in need of assistance. Among them, 45 percent are women, 30 percent are older people (60+ years old), 15 percent are children, and 14 percent have disabilities. Within this context, the humanitarian aid landscape is shifting due to funding constraints and a gradual transition from emergency relief to resilience-building efforts 7 Emergency assistance is increasingly concentrated in frontline and war-affected oblasts, while support in cent al and western Ukraine is being scaled back as international organizations shift their strategies away from short-term emergency aid toward resilience- and development-oriented programming in areas perceived as more stable.8 However, humanitarian actors have raised concerns that this shift may create gaps in assistance for vulnerable populations who continue to depend on support in these more stable areas where aid is being scaled back. As operations become more localized, humanitarian actors have also expressed concerns about the capacity of Ukraine’s social security system to take over responsibilities currently handled by international organizations . This is largely due to budget pressures, a shortage of qualified personnel, particularly in social services, and the destruction of essential facilities caused by missile strikes.9 Concerns have also been raised about the long-term sustainability of aid delivery, particularly as the war drags on and humanitarian needs continue to grow. Local organizations also worry that cross-cutting aspects of humanitarian work – such as gender equality, accountability to affected people, the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse, and disability inclusion – may be deprioritized amid international funding cuts, due to limited capacity and competing government priorities. As Ukraine navigates these ongoing challenges, a balanced approach between emergency response and long-term resilience-building is essential to ensure that basic needs are met, social tensions between recipients and non-recipients of aid are minimized, and economic recovery is supported.
Country: Ukraine Source: World Food Programme Please refer to the attached file. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2025 was the deadliest for civilians since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began, particularly for people living at the frontlines. It marked a significant escalation in hostilities despite efforts to impose a ceasefire, with Ukraine recording the highest levels of deadly violence for every month compared to previous years. The escalation of the war continues to disrupt domestic production, trade routes, energy supply, and foreign investment, further restricting Ukraine’s economic outlook. Attacks on ports significantly reduced Ukraine’s agricultural export capacity, which translated into higher prices and inflation, directly increasing household vulnerability. The human impact of the war continues to deepen, particularly among households living closest to active hostilities, with those residing within 50 km of the frontline bearing the greatest burden. More than 90% of all conflict events recorded in 2025 occurred within this zone, and 67% of civilian casualties also occurred near the frontline. Approximately 2 million war-affected people in Ukraine are identified as high-priority cases for humanitarian food assistance. More than half of the high-priority cases, about 1.2 million people, live within 50km of the frontline. This number reflects a vulnerability-driven analysis centered on four key issue areas: vulnerable populations within 50km of the frontline, IDPs, evacuees, and people affected by strikes. However, a nationwide analysis show that the overall number of food insecure people in Ukraine continues to rise, with an additional 1.5 million people now requiring food assistance across the country, compared to 2024. Households living within 50 km of the frontline are older, poorer, more dependent, and more reliant on assistance than those living further away. The proportion of elderlyonly households rises to 36% in the 0–50 km zone, compared to 27% beyond 50 km, while older persons living alone are significantly more common close to the frontline. Displacement and return dynamics are more pronounced close to the frontline with up to 30% of surveyed household within 50km of the frontline displaced and 20% returnees. Household-level analysis shows that at least one in four households at the frontlines are food insecure. This is more prevalence in the 20km zone in eastern and southern region where more than 30% of the households are food insecure. Rural households tend to experience higher levels of food insecurity than urban households, although the magnitude of this gap varies by proximity to the frontline. Within the 0– 20 km zone, 27% of rural households are food insecure compared to 22% of urban households. In the 20–50 km zone, food insecurity levels are nearly identical between rural and urban households (both around 21%). The higher share of food insecurity within frontline areas particularly among rural residents reflects both the direct effects of conflict and the concentration of vulnerable populations in these locations. Large families, households with elderly members living alone, and households with a member with a disability show food insecurity levels well above the overall average. Many food-insecure households continue to adopt unhealthy coping strategies including spending their savings, and more than half lack the economic capacity to meet their basic need without humanitarian assistance. consuming less preferred food or spending their savings, and more than half lack the economic capacity to meet their basic need without humanitarian assistance. Frontline households face compounded vulnerabilities. Limited economic opportunities, reduced agriculture production, deterioration in security, shelter and health lead to multidimensional deprivation. In fact, about half of food insecure households within 20km of the frontline are also multidimensionally deprived. While market generally functions, households living closest to the frontline continue to experience significant disruption in market access. About 20% of households within 20km of the frontline report lacking uninterrupted access to markets, and around 13%, particularly those living within 10 km of the frontline, report having no market access at all. Food assistance, provided both as in‑kind and cash transfers, has been central to alleviating immediate food gaps for vulnerable households in the frontline. WFP assistance is targeted toward households with the lowest economic capacity, and analysis shows that it translates into a measurable and meaningful reduction in food insecurity, reducing the probability of low economic capacity among assisted households by close to 20 percentage points. But with humanitarian funding declining and needs continuing to rise, many vulnerable households may soon be unable to access the food assistance they depend on. Three actions are critical to prevent a reversal of hard-won progress: First, sustaining monthly food assistance for the 2 million priority cases is essential, alongside protecting the 0–20 km frontline zone from coverage reductions, where the near-total collapse of local markets means that any cut would have immediate and severe consequences for household food security. Due to market disruption, the 0-20km zone is particularly suited for in-kind food distribution. Second, cash transfer values should be regularly adjusted to reflect documented food inflation, as maintaining outdated transfer levels results in a silent erosion of impact and undermines the purchasing power donors intend their contributions to deliver. Finally, robust impact evidence provides strong proof of effectiveness and should be actively leveraged in dialogue to justify sustained investment in Ukraine, particularly in contexts where assistance has successfully reduced visible needs without eliminating underlying vulnerability.
Country: Lebanon Source: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Please refer to the attached file. HIGHLIGHTS Hostilities continued despite the ceasefire extension announcement, with airstrikes and displacement orders affecting at least 61 additional localities in southern Lebanon. Displacement orders south of the Zahrani River triggered large-scale displacement and overwhelmed collective shelters, particularly in Saida and Tyre districts in South Governorate. A total of 33,731 families (127,714 people) remain displaced across 631 collective shelters; women and girls account for nearly 52 per cent of those sheltered. Since 2 March, the Ministry of Public Health has reported at least 3,324 deaths and 10,027 injuries linked to hostilities. A total of 684,120 conflict-affected people received at least one round of Emergency Multi-Purpose Cash Assistance. Between 25 and 29 May, three incidents affecting health care were reported, resulting in one death and three injuries among health workers. The 2026 Lebanon Flash Appeal, requiring US$308 million, is 60 per cent funded, with approximately US$186 million received. SITUATION OVERVIEW Airstrikes across Nabatiyeh and South Lebanon governorates continued, causing casualties and displacement. A new wave of displacement also emerged from Beirut's Southern Suburbs following new threats of escalation and the destruction of civilian infrastructure. According to the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH), 3,324 people have been killed, and 10,027 people have been injured since 2 March 2026. On 29 May, Imran Riza, the Humanitarian Coordinator for Lebanon issued a statementexpressing alarm at escalating hostilities and widespread displacement orders, which are driving panic and repeated displacement, particularly in southern Lebanon. He underscored numerous attacks on health workers, growing displacement, reiterated the need to protect civilians and called for de-escalation and a sustained halt to hostilities. On the same sate, UNESCOraised concern over damage to protected cultural sites, including Chama’ Citadel and areas near Beaufort Castle, as well as risks to the World Heritage Site of Tyre in South Governorate. It reiterated that sites under enhanced protection must not be targeted. Since the ceasefire announcement on 17 April, a total of 36 attacks were documented against health care professionals, causing 27 deaths and 80 injuries according to the WHO surveillance system for attacks on health care (SSA). This brings the total number of attacks on health care since 2 March to 182, resulting in 125 deaths and 311 injuries. On 28 May, a reported strike hit Choueifat city in Mount Lebanon governorate, south of Beirut, contributing to ongoing displacement driven by continued hostilities and repeated displacement orders. Between 26 and 29 May, 12 new displacement orders were issued for 61 localities. Most of displacement orders were issued for areal in Nabatiyeh and the South Governorate. On 27 May, renewed displacement orders were issued for all areas south of the Zahrani River, triggering mass displacement and overwhelming shelters, with those in Saida and Tyre in the South Governorate reaching their full capacity. Newly displaced people are increasingly being directed toward Beirut and northern areas. Women and girls are directly affected by this renewed displacement, facing heightened protection risks, increased care responsibilities, and greater challenges in accessing essential services. As of 28 May 2026, an estimated 127,714 people (33,731 families) were reported as displaced across 631 collective shelters nationwide, reflecting a clear and sustained upward trend in displacement figures. Beirut and Mount Lebanon governorates continue to host the largest number of displaced people, while pressure on shelters across other governorates is also increasing. Funding constraints remain a major challenge to sustaining life‑saving assistance. With days remaining under the allocated time frame, the 2026Lebanon Flash Appeal has received US$185.9 million, which represents just over 60 per cent of the US$308.3 million required.
Country: World Source: ELRHA What if the most powerful indicator in humanitarian response was also the most neglected? When crises unfold, we count displacement, malnutrition, and funding gaps. But months later, one question often remains unanswered - how many people died? That omission matters - because mortality data changes decisions. As the UK Humanitarian Innovation Hub (UKHIH) and Elrha close Phase 2 of our Mortality Estimation in Humanitarian Crises Systems Innovation Partnership, this blog marks the beginning of a series exploring why mortality estimation matters, and how grantees are innovating so the humanitarian system can do it better. Mortality: the metric that changes the conversation Credible and timely mortality figures change conversations and decisions. As Chris Porter from FCDO put it during a 2025 panel discussion: "We often debate malnutrition rates, but deaths stop people in their tracks." Mortality metrics capture crisis severity, scale, and urgency in a way few other indicators can. Mortality data used to be central to humanitarian assessments. Over time, however, it slipped to the margins - seen as too sensitive, too political, too technically complex, or too slow to be useful. The result is a paradox: the metric that best reflects human cost in crises is often missing from decision-making altogether. Why mortality evidence is so hard - and essential Estimating mortality in crises is undeniably challenging. Data is incomplete. Access is constrained. Methods vary. Numbers can be contested or suppressed, particularly in politically charged settings. Different approaches can produce vastly different estimates, eroding trust and confidence. But the cost of not measuring mortality is higher. Without credible mortality evidence the true scale of crises is underestimated; resources are allocated reactively rather than strategically; accountability weakens and advocacy relies on anecdote instead of evidence. Mortality estimation is not just a technical exercise. It is a moral and operational necessity. From reactive funding toward systems change UKHIH-Elrha’s current investments are built on a longer history of mortality-driven action. Funding followed mortality research in Somalia that helped trigger an unusual and early UN intervention in a subsequent developing famine in 2016. That response was not driven by malnutrition figures, but by mortality data. It was rare. And it worked. Recently completed research established that mortality in southern Chad was far higher than humanitarian actors had assumed, with large segments of the affected population missed entirely. This evidence forced uncomfortable reassessments, but also opened pathways to identify deaths that would otherwise have remained uncounted. Those efforts demonstrated what's possible when rigorous methods are applied under pressure. They informed response discussions, shaped advocacy, and challenged assumptions in decision-making. But they also highlight a deeper issue: Mortality estimation has been treated as an emergency add-on rather than a standing capability in crises contexts. UKHIH’s first investment in mortality estimation proved decisive in a politically charged context. Rigorous work helped establish the credibility of mortality estimates from Gaza when official figures were being publicly dismissed. This evidence made it far harder for governments and global institutions to ignore the scale of civilian death, cutting through political pressure and reaffirming the role of independent science. Building on this work, UKHIH launched the Systems Innovation Partnership in 2024 to move beyond isolated projects and towards a durable ecosystem for mortality estimation. One rooted in equitable partnerships, shared infrastructure, and long-term investment, particularly in low- and middle-income countries. What progress looks like in practice UKHIH-Elrha is currently the only dedicated funder focused specifically on mortality estimation in humanitarian crises. Across Phases 1 and 2, we've seen tangible signs of change: Stronger methods, including improved modelling approaches and shared tools and resources like the Somalia Mortality Estimation Data Observatory (S-MED) Deeper learning, through case studies examining how mortality evidence has influenced - or failed to influence - responses in crises More equitable leadership, with LMIC-based partners SIMAD Institute for Global Health (Somalia) and Evidence for Change (Kenya) playing central roles in phases 1 and 2, scaling up partnering in phase 2 with Addis Ababa University, Mekelle University (Ethiopia) and Rebuild Hope for Africa (DRC) among others. Broader dialogue, bringing together researchers, humanitarians, policymakers, and funders to tackle the "last mile" problem of uptake and use Co-funding, for longer-term, strategic investment that builds synergies and amplifies impact across the system with European Commission Humanitarian Aid (ECHO). What this blog series will cover This blog marks the start of a weekly series showcasing the Phase 2 consortia pushing this agenda forward. IMPACT Initiatives are exploring locally led mortality estimation in Somalia, Ethiopia, and the DRC, highlighting what it takes to shift ownership and trust. Johns Hopkins University is focusing on methodological innovation in DRC, alongside practical guidance for local decision-makers on when and how mortality estimates can be generated and used. Save the Children International is developing a governance mechanism among Strategic, Technical and National Stakeholders and building an online platform making guidance, tools, and technical support accessible and equitable across the sector. Together, these consortia address not just how to count deaths, but how to ensure mortality evidence shapes response. Counting deaths to save lives Mortality evidence can't be optional because uncounted deaths represent a failure of accountability, a gap in our understanding, and a missed opportunity to prevent more. When we don’t count deaths, we're not avoiding difficult conversations - we're having them anyway, just without evidence The UKHIH-Elrha partnerships show we can do better. What remains is a choice: to embed mortality estimation as a non-negotiable part of crisis response, or to continue operating in the dark about the very metric that matters most.
Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo Source: ELRHA Author Jennifer O’Keeffe, Augustin Gang Karume and Paul Spiegel This blog series accompanies the Mortality Estimation Systems Innovation Partnership (SIP), supported by UKHIH-Elrha, which brings together diverse partners to strengthen how mortality data is collected, interpreted, and used across humanitarian crises. Earlier blogs in this series highlighted why excess mortality measurement is critical for understanding crisis severity, as well as exploring how to maximise local and national actors' leadership in the mortality estimation ecosystem. In this third blog, we turn to Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, where Rebuild Hope for Africa and the Johns Hopkins Center for Humanitarian Health share how their work is making mortality estimation more accurate, accessible, and feasible for national actors best placed to do this work, even in the most challenging settings. “As an indicator, a mortality rate tries to evaluate the size and scale of a crisis in a single metric.” The Public Health Aspects of Complex Emergencies and Refugee Situations, 1997, Michael Toole, Ronald Waldman In 2023, the Humanitarian Congress in Vienna released a statement saying, "The humanitarian imperative is an absolute moral obligation to save lives and alleviate human suffering on the basis of need, without discrimination”. Yet**,** when resources are constrained, allocation is often based on geopolitical interests, media coverage, or how relatable a population may be to high-income donor countries. In short, human lives are valued differentially. The disconnect is not theoretical. In 2022, Rebuild Hope for Africa (RHA) led a nationwide mortality survey in the Central African Republic which estimated up to 5% of the population had died during the previous year. Despite the scale of these findings, the study received little media attention and did not lead to meaningful changes in donor policy. In conflict-affected settings, various, often compounding, factors make primary data collection difficult or impossible. These include forced displacement, insecurity, system failures, poor infrastructure, limited capacity, and restricted access. In practice, mortality is often not measured at all. And as threats to healthcare workers grow, international agencies have become understandably risk averse, collecting data only safer, accessible areas, where death rates are usually lowest. Without reliable data, decision makers and responders depend on fragmented sources and non-robust estimates. The result is a biased and misleading picture of crisis severity, that often portrays crises as less severe than they are. The magnitude of these biases and their effects on decisions by humanitarian actors, governments, and donors who rely on such data, remain largely unexamined. Our partnership between Rebuild Hope for Africa (RHA) and the Johns Hopkins Center for Humanitarian Health (CHH) is working to change this. Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo - An Unquantified Crisis Few places demonstrate the challenges of mortality estimation more than the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), one of the world’s most enduring humanitarian crises. The crisis worsened drastically in January 2025 when the country suffered a devastating double shock: the abrupt withdrawal of USAID funding and a violent military offensive by the Rwandan-backed rebel group M23. The M23 seized large swathes of territory, killing and displacing an unknown number of people in the process. With the departure of many international agencies and a vacuum in humanitarian response, the population has been left vulnerable to the worst effects of the conflict. A year later, the true human cost remains unknown. We recognise that without reliable data, it becomes even harder to mobilise the support that people living in Eastern DRC urgently need. Placing Data and Decision-Making in Congolese hands Augustin Gang Karume, one of the authors of this blog, was born and raised in Eastern DRC, where he still lives and works today. In 2008, he founded RHA to place data and decision-making back in Congolese hands. He understood then that national actors are the future of sustainable humanitarian response. Rooted in the community and living with the long-term consequences of decision-making, national actors have a strong incentive to prioritise community needs over institutional agendas. Using local networks and knowledge, they are the best equipped to conduct primary data collection in insecure settings. While international actors have scaled back amid funding austerity, national organisations like RHA have remained in place, continuing to work for and within their communities. These actors are also proving to be far more cost-effective and efficient. Without international overhead, they can often deliver results at a fraction of the cost of international organisations. As an example, RHA’s 2022 nationwide mortality survey in the Central African Republic, cost a total of 50,000 USD, whereas a single district SMART survey may cost upwards of 15,000 USD*. National actors are the first responders in nearly all crises and remain present long after international attention and funding fade. Bridging Local Leadership with Technical Expertise With funding from the UK Humanitarian Innovation Hub’s Systems Innovation Partnership, we are bridging RHA’s local leadership with technical expertise from the CHH, combining community trust with advanced epidemiological and statistical training. Together RHA and CHH are collaborating on a study to assess potential biases in mortality estimation through both primary data collection and innovative use of statistical approaches. We’re working to make mortality estimation more accurate, credible, and efficient, with the intent to apply the findings across humanitarian settings. In the primary data collection component, our study is comparing three different methods of mortality estimation: a retrospective household survey, rapid key informant listing, and a full census. Using a common reference population and recall period, the study aims to identify where biases arise, quantify which deaths are missed, and assess relative performance of a light-, medium- and resource-intensive approach to mortality measurement. In the statistical component, we are applying innovative use of established causal and design-based methods to assess biases. We are testing the utility and feasibility of these methods to answer questions like: to what extent are hard to capture deaths, such as neonatal and violent deaths, systematically missed; can fewer survey clusters still provide estimates precise enough for decision making; and can analytical adjustments be used to address known biases? We are also supporting localisation by building field-ready guidance tools designed to make mortality estimation more accessible to operational actors. These tools include an algorithm to help teams choose a method, an operational readiness checklist, and a guide to data validation, triangulation, interpretation. Our aim is to make mortality estimation practicable in even the most challenging settings, without compromising quality. As the best-placed actors to assess mortality, we hope to pilot the guidance with national actors in the DRC and elsewhere to ensure it is user-friendly, actionable, and scalable for use in any crisis. Looking Ahead: Making Mortality Count Without credible mortality data, humanitarian response risks being inefficient, inequitable, and disconnected from reality. We cannot respond appropriately to crises we do not understand. When those with the greatest capacity to measure mortality have the least stake in the results, the system fails. The best way to ensure efficiency and effectiveness is to place local organisations at the centre. Connecting local expertise with technical knowledge offers a path toward a fairer humanitarian sector, where the reality of a crisis is described by those living through it. *2017 estimate adjusted for inflation.
Country: Burundi Source: Famine Early Warning System Network Please refer to the attached file. Key Messages The Eastern and Northern Lowlands, Eastern Dry Plateaus, and Imbo Plains are projected to remain in Stressed (IPC Phase 2) through September. While the arrival of Season B harvests in June will temporarily improve access to food and income, improvement will be hindered by expected localized below-average harvests, sustained high food prices, and market pressures from high demand in areas with large populations of refugees and returnees. Household income-earning opportunities continue to be limited by the continued closure of the Rwanda border since January 2024 and restricted access to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). At the same time, competition for labor for labor opportunities within Burundi is atypically high due to the large recent influxes of refugees and returning Burundians. As a result, household purchasing power is weak, limiting food access, as households remain highly dependent on market purchases. Season B harvests are expected to be near-average in most areas, bolstered by production of tubers and bananas mostly offsetting notable bean crop losses caused by below-average rainfall from late March to mid-April. Beans account for about 25–30 percent of Season B national crop production and nearly 50 percent in the northern regions. The largest losses occurred in the semi-arid Northern Lowlands, where production is now anticipated to be around 40 percent below average. Losses are also estimated at 15–20 percent in the Eastern Lowlands and around 10 percent in the Eastern Dry Plateaus. Fertilizer shortages and high input prices, linked to limited foreign currency availability and the conflict in the Middle East, also weakened agricultural production. There has been a sharp decline in fuel imports to Burundi since March, attributable to the conflict in the Middle East, which is contributing to rising fuel and food prices. Imports of gasoline and diesel are expected to remain atypically low through at least September. The worsening fuel shortage is likely to further increase transportation costs and contribute to additional food price increases. It has also created atypical regional price disparities, with relatively lower prices in surplus-producing areas and significantly higher prices in urban and peri-urban deficit markets. Charcoal prices, in particular, have doubled or even tripled in urban areas. Food prices in April continued their seasonal upward trend and remained considerably higher than the five-year average. Most commodities increased by around 5 percent compared to March, and beans surged by 30 percent nationally and nearly 50 percent in urban areas. This was driven by the depletion of stocks from Season A, which saw below-average production, and price speculation from Season B bean crop losses. Compared to last year, prices for most commodities were 5 to 20 percent higher, except for maize, which was 10 percent lower, supported by average stocks from 2026 Seasons A and C. Compared to the five-year average, staple food prices remained markedly elevated, ranging from 20 to 70 percent above average. The sustained high prices are driven by increasing costs for agricultural inputs and transportation from production areas to markets. Cash assistance to refugees and returnees has also heightened inflation in localities with refugee and returnee populations, notably the Eastern Lowlands and Eastern Dry Plateaus. In April 2026, WFP assisted nearly 975,000 beneficiaries, amid continued funding shortages. Around 151,000 refugees received 75 percent of the minimum daily food requirements through hybrid assistance combining food and cash transfers, while returnees received cash equivalent to 50 percent of minimum food requirements for three months. The pace of repatriation of Burundian refugees from Tanzania slowed in April 2026, with 11,397 returnees assisted by WFP, compared to 26,194 in March and 24,944 in February. Around 40,000 returnees are still expected to exit Tanzania by July 2026. Reports indicate that some refugees expelled from Tanzania are seeking asylum in Uganda, Kenya, and Rwanda, which could reduce the number of expected returnees arriving in Burundi. WFP also provided nutrition assistance to 9,105 beneficiaries in April, including 6,565 children and 2,540 pregnant and breastfeeding women, mainly in Busuma Refugee Camp, along with 914 individuals admitted to malnutrition treatment services.
Country: Somalia Source: Action Against Hunger Population: 19 million People in Need: 6 million People Facing Hunger: 9.8 million People Helped Last Year: 3,201,516 Our Team: 116 employees Program Start: 1992 In Somalia, birth is never a quiet, private thing. Grandmothers whisper blessings. Neighbors hold your hand. For as long as anyone can remember, mothers have brought babies into the world this way; guided by the women who came before them. That wisdom is real. It matters. But it is not always enough. In Somalia, fewer than one in three mothers give birth with a trained health worker by their side. Too many mothers and babies die from problems that good medical care can prevent. So, how do you keep the wisdom of grandmothers and add the safety of modern medicine? You build a place that families trust. That is exactly what happened at Makkah Hospital in Mogadishu, with support from the United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), World Health Organization Somalia, and Action Against Hunger. And that is where two young mothers—strangers to each other—walked through the same door and changed the future of their families. Dahiro was 24 years old. She traveled a long way from her village in Jilib, a small town far from the capital. She had already given birth twice before, both times at home, and both times without a doctor or a nurse. “I always feared hospitals for delivery,” she said, holding her newborn daughter close. “In Jilib, you trust what your grandmother told you.” Dahiro holds her newborn baby at the Makkah Hospital, supported by Action Against Hunger Dahiro was a careful, loving mother. She breastfed her older children because her aunt told her it was the right thing to do. The practice also helped space out her pregnancies in a natural way. She followed the traditions and believed she was doing everything right. “But I didn’t know,” she says quietly, “that I was only doing half the job to protect them.” She had recently realized through conversation with the hospital staff that, while breastfeeding built her babies’ immune systems, they needed vaccines as an additional shield. Her older children, still back in the village, had never been vaccinated because she simply didn’t know they needed to be. Down the hall, 25-year-old Nafisa sat with her children gathered around her. She was a single mother, and life had not been easy. A bad drought pushed her family from their home and into a displacement camp. Nafisa has a consultation at Makkah Hospital, supported by Action Against Hunger. Nafisa first came to Makkah Hospital in June 2025 because her two young children were dangerously thin. They were malnourished and needed special milk and therapeutic food to survive. While the medical team treated her children, they noticed Nafisa was pregnant and signed her up for check-ups right away. In September 2025, she returned to the hospital and delivered her baby safely. But even then, she could not stop worrying. A measles outbreak was spreading near her camp. “I feared my children might get sick from Jadeeco [the Somali word for measles],” she said . Her voice was steady, but her eyes showed fear. The team at Makkah Hospital did not treat Dahiro’s and Nafisa’s appointments as time to address isolated issues. They treated them as an opportunity for holistic care. This is the “one-stop-shop” approach: when a mother walks through the door for any reason—a birth, a sick child, or hunger—the team checks on everything. Every child. Every need. Dahiro is helped by a midwife in the postnatal room in Makkah Hospital, supported by Action Against Hunger. Action Against Hunger and WHO Somalia have built a healthcare system that sees the whole family. When Makkah Hospital brings vaccines, nutrition, and maternal care under one roof, they are turning Somalia’s National Transformation Plan (NTP) – the country’s roadmap for rebuilding and modernizing the country through 2029 – into a reality that mothers can actually feel. One ordinary morning at Makkah Hospital, something small and powerful happened. Dahiro and Nafisa were both in the ward at the same time. Dahiro’s newborn daughter received her very first vaccine. Nafisa’s children got their life-saving shots and were checked to make sure they were growing well. Two families, side by side, stepping into safety at the same time. Nafisa in the Makkah Hospital This is how big goals like Universal Health Coverage and the Sustainable Development Goals (particularly SDG 3: Good Health and Well-Being) stop being words on paper and start becoming real life. Every visit becomes a chance to catch what might otherwise be missed. Dahiro and Nafisa headed home, carrying their children and a new shield of knowledge. “I will go back home with what I know now,” Dahiro says with new confidence. “I will speak to other mothers. My aunts gave me their wisdom, and now I will give other mothers the wisdom I have found here.” She is not rejecting what her grandmother taught her; she is adding to it. Nafisa does not say much as she leaves. She just breathes with relief and holds her children a little tighter, knowing they are finally safe. These two women walked into Makkah Hospital as strangers, each carrying her own fears. They are walking out as proof of what becomes possible when the right support meets a mother’s love. When you give a mother the tools, she protects the family. And family by family, they are rewriting the future of a nation.
Country: World Source: World Health Organization Please refer to the attached file. The WHO Botswana Biennial Report 2024–2025 showcases a period of strong progress, resilience, and transformative partnerships in advancing national health priorities. Botswana reached a historic milestone as the first country globally to attain Gold Tier status for eliminating mother‑to‑child transmission of HIV, demonstrating the impact of sustained political commitment and integrated primary health care. Across the health system, key achievements include strengthening immunization, health security, and disease control programmes, while advancing reforms toward Universal Health Coverage and National Health Insurance. The country also enhanced preparedness through the Joint External Evaluation and development of a fully costed National Action Plan for Health Security. At the same time, Botswana continues to address emerging challenges, including non‑communicable diseases, health system investments, and recovery of routine services. WHO Botswana extends heartfelt appreciation to all WHO staff and to national, regional, and global stakeholders and partners for their invaluable collaboration in strengthening Botswana’s health sector. We look forward to further deepening these partnerships to advance a healthier, more resilient future for all.
Country: Cameroon Source: Famine Early Warning System Network Please refer to the attached file. Key Messages Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to persist through September across Logone-et-Chari, Mayo-Sava, and Mayo-Tsanaga divisions in the Far North. Ongoing insecurity and recurrent Islamist violence continue to disrupt household participation in main season agricultural land preparation. Income from off-season crop sales and agricultural labor is expected to remain below average and, combined with rising lean season food prices, will further erode household purchasing capacity and limit access to staple foods. The number of households facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes is expected to increase during the June-August lean season, with a small proportion of households, particularly those with severely depleted coping capacity, likely to face Emergency (IPC Phase 4). Seasonal flooding beginning in July will likely exacerbate displacement through at least October, further isolating conflict-affected households from food and income sources. Given below-average harvest prospects, gains from the main season are likely to be limited, preventing meaningful improvements in food security outcomes. In the Northwest and Southwest regions, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) is expected through June, with additional households deteriorating to Emergency (IPC Phase 4), followed by some improvements to Stressed (IPC Phase 2) through September. The June green harvest of maize, beans, potatoes, legumes, and vegetables will provide relief from lean season pressures for cultivating households, but many will remain reliant on market purchases at above-average prices through June. Beginning in July, improved access to own production and crop income is expected to strengthen household food consumption and support a transition to Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes across most areas. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) will likely persist in more insecure and remote divisions — such as Ndian, Lebialem, Menchum, Momo, and Bui — where households will continue reducing essential non-food expenditures and diet quality and quantity due to market and production disruptions. A small proportion of the worst‑affected households — particularly those with little or no harvests and exhausted coping capacity — are expected to remain in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). In Yaoundé and Douala, Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are expected to persist through September, as above-average food prices continue to erode purchasing power, particularly among poor urban and displaced households with limited or disrupted livelihoods. Food prices are projected to remain significantly above the five-year average in urban markets due to reduced inflows from conflict-affected areas, strong urban demand, and elevated transport costs. Poor urban households are likely to face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) as prices peak during May and June ahead of the harvest. Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are expected to persist in Mbere (Adamawa), Kadey, and Lom et Djerem divisions (East) through September. The large population of refugees from the Central African Republic continues to place pressure on food prices, employment opportunities, and natural resources, constraining income for both host and refugee households. Many households will struggle to meet essential non-food needs and will likely rely on negative coping strategies, including reducing non-food expenditures and reducing meal frequency and number. While the July-September harvest will improve household food availability and consumption, area-level outcomes are expected to remain Stressed (IPC Phase 2). Poor households — particularly refugees with limited livelihoods and exhausted coping capacities — are likely to remain in Crisis (IPC Phase 3). Countrywide food assistance needs are projected to peak annually in May-June, coinciding with the end of the southern lean season and the onset of the northern lean season. In the south, needs are expected to ease with the July-September main harvest, though they will remain elevated due to the ongoing impacts of conflict. In the north, needs will continue to rise until the September harvest, driven by the combined effects of conflict and flooding on livelihoods. Across the country, however, the delivery of humanitarian food assistance is expected to remain critically constrained by severe funding gaps. In April, WFP warned that severe funding shortfalls could disrupt up to 90 percent of planned deliveries from May onward. Such disruptions will have serious consequences for critical lean-season food assistance for refugees and internally displaced persons in the northern zone. Fuel, fertilizer, and food prices in Cameroon have remained relatively stable despite the Middle East conflict, owing to the country’s limited reliance on Gulf-region imports, substantial fuel subsidies, and the availability of older fertilizer stocks. According to FEWS NET price monitoring, the slight increases in fertilizer costs observed during this period have been driven mainly by rising shipping expenses, speculative trading behavior and seasonally higher demand at the start of the cropping season. Nonetheless, Cameroon remains vulnerable to global spillovers. Elevated international fuel prices, tightening supply conditions, and increasing shipping costs are expected to place upward pressure on import-dependent goods, amplifying inflation risks. In addition, smuggled fuel from Nigeria — used in areas bordering Nigeria, specifically the Far North, Northwest, and Southwest — has risen by 20-25 percent during this period, reflecting increased pump prices in Nigeria.