ReliefWeb Updates
중도 성향
기타
Philippines: Mayon Volcano Summary of 24Hr Observation 2 June 2026 12:00 AM [EN/TL]
Country: Philippines Source: Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology Please refer to the attached Infographic.
🌐 국제기구 · "LIP" · 총 18건
필터 보기현재 지수
50.0
0 = 부정 우세
50 = 중립
100 = 긍정 우세
최근 7일 기준 3,608건을 분석한 결과, 뉴스 심리지수는 50.0(균형)입니다. 긍정 0건(0.0%)·중립 3,608건(100.0%)·부정 0건(0.0%)이며, 중립 비중이 뚜렷하게 높습니다. 성향 지수는 종합 0.0(중도 균형)입니다.
Country: Philippines Source: Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology Please refer to the attached Infographic.
Countries: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Belgium, Egypt, France, Germany, Italy, Morocco, Netherlands, Sudan Source: International Organization for Migration Please refer to the attached file. Ovaj izvještaj pruža uvid u profile, iskustva, potrebe, rute kretanja i namjere migranata koji se kreću kroz Bosnu i Hercegovinu (BiH). Podaci su prikupljani od 1. do 30 aprila. 2026. godine. IOM je proveo vježbu posmatranja ruta u Republici Srpskoj, Kantonu Sarajevo, Posavskom kantonu, Tuzlanskom kantonu, Bosansko-podrinjskom kantonu i Unsko-sanskom kantonu kako bi pratio trendove ulazaka i izlazaka, kao i modalitete tranzita unutar BiH. Također, IOM je anketirao 108 migranata na lokacijama aktivnog tranzita, poput autobusnih stanica ili na ključnim ulaznim i izlaznim tačkama širom zemlje, te 333 migranata u dva tranzitna prihvatna centra (PPC) u BiH (Lipa, i Blažuj).
Country: Philippines Source: Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology Please refer to the attached Infographic.
Country: Philippines Source: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies Please refer to the attached file. A. SITUATION ANALYSIS Description of the crisis In late 2025, the Philippines faced a series of overlapping disasters that significantly escalated the humanitarian needs on the ground. A powerful earthquake in Cebu province marked the onset of the humanitarian crisis, followed by Typhoons Tino (Kalmaegi) and Uwan (Fung-wong) in quick succession. The compounding nature of these disasters left a trail of massive destruction across various regions displacing thousands of families, severely disrupting livelihoods, and access to essential services. As a result, the cumulative impacts of these disasters further intensified the vulnerabilities of affected communities, indicating that recovery will be a prolonged process. On 30 September 2025, a magnitude 6.9 earthquake struck off the coast of Bogo City in northern Cebu. The shallow depth of the quake resulted in intense ground shaking, leading to the collapse of homes, damage to roads and bridges, and widespread power outages. Several municipalities in the Cebu province, including Daanbantayan, Medellin, San Remigio, Borbon, and parts of Cebu City, were among the hardest hit. Based on Situational report no. 30 issued by the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC)2, more than 217,910 families were affected in Cebu Province alone houses either destroyed or partially damaged. Critical infrastructure such as schools, government buildings, health facilities, and transport networks also sustained significant damage, disrupting access to basic services. Many families were forced to seek temporary shelter in evacuation centres, while others remain in unsafe living conditions due to limited housing options. As communities were just beginning to mobilise relief following the aftermath of the earthquake, Typhoon Tino (Kalmaegi) entered the Philippine Area of Responsibility (PAR) on 02 November 2025. The storm rapidly intensified and made multiple landfalls across Visayas region and Palawan, brought strong winds, heavy rainfall, flooding, and landslides. Multiple areas in Central Cebu, Mimaropa, the Negros Islands Region, and parts of Caraga experienced severe flooding, further damaging homes, livelihoods, and infrastructure. A total of 1,526,203 families were affected - 263,712 people were displaced, and agricultural lands were inundated, affecting food security and income sources for many households3. Shortly after, Super Typhoon Uwan swept through Luzon and nearby coastal provinces, unleashing destructive winds, torrential rains, and causing storm surges. This resulted in additional destruction in some of the repeatedly affected areas. The typhoon led to widespread flooding in low-lying and coastal areas, damaged hundreds of thousands of houses, and disrupted power, water, transport, and communication services. Pre-emptive evacuations helped reduce casualties, but prolonged displacement and slow restoration of essential services continued to place pressure on affected communities. According to the NDRRMC Sitrep no. 24, STY Uwan affected approximately 2,242,319 families across various regions, while 355,992 individuals remained displaced4. As a result of these compounded disasters, an estimated 13 million people were left in need of humanitarian assistance. The scale of the needs on the grounds remains immense, as affected communities continue to face urgent needs in shelter, water and sanitation, health care, food security, and livelihood recovery. The complexity of this humanitarian crisis underscores the importance of sustained and coordinated assistance to enable families recover safely, rebuild disrupted livelihoods, and strengthen community resilience. For a current overview or 6th month update of the current humanitarian situation, please refer to the needs analysis section. This section highlights the status of affected and displaced populations affected by typhoon and earthquake, alongside evolving needs identified through the PRC’s recent multi-sectoral assessments. These findings ensure that our shelter, livelihood, WASH and other recovery interventions remain targeted and relevant to the priority provinces under this appeal.
Country: Philippines Source: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies Please refer to the attached file. Description of the Event Date of event 30-09-2025 What happened, where and when? On the 30 of September 2025, at precisely 9:59 PM, a strong 6.9-magnitude earthquake struck off the coast of Bogo City, marking it as the strongest recorded earthquake in Cebu province to date. The epicentre was located near Bogo City in northern Cebu, with an estimated shallow depth of about five kilometres, where intense ground shaking led to the collapse of buildings, destruction of roads, and power outages. Neighbouring municipalities, including Daanbantayan, Medellin, San Remigio, and even parts of Cebu City also felt the severe impact of the earthquake. The event’s aftermath affected two regions, Central Visayas (Region VII) and Eastern Visayas (Region VIII), with Northern Cebu in Region VII bearing the brunt of the impact and damages. According to the Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology (PHIVOLCS), the quake was tectonic and was caused by an offshore fault that had remained dormant for over 400 years, which has now been identified as the Bogo Bay Fault. PHIVOLCS issued a tsunami advisory for coastal communities exposed to the risks of abnormal sea level disturbances following the main shock, but this was later lifted after monitoring confirmed that no significant tsunami threat remained. Within the first 48 hours of the event, PHIVOLCS recorded over 7,000 aftershocks, and at the time of reporting, aftershocks continue to be recorded, with the strongest recent aftershock measuring 5.1-magnitude on 06 April 2026.
Country: Burkina Faso Source: Famine Early Warning System Network Please refer to the attached file. Messages clé Des résultats de Crise ! (Phase 3 ! de l’IPC) persistent à Karo-Peli et de Stress ! (Phase 2 ! de l’IPC) à Djelgodji et Yagha en mai 2026. Malgré la disponibilité des céréales sur le marché, les revenus issus de la vente de l’eau, de l’orpaillage et des envois d’argent par les proches sont insuffisants pour effectuer des achats. Grâce à l’assistance alimentaire dans ces zones, les ménages pauvres de Djelgodji et de Yagha ont une consommation alimentaire adéquate ; toutefois, de graves déficits de consommation contraignent ceux de Karo-Peli à limiter les quantités et le nombre de repas quotidiens. Entre juin et septembre, les ménages pauvres à Karo-Peli seront exposés à l’Urgence (Phase 4 de l’IPC). Le recours accru aux produits sauvages, conjugué à un accès limité aux denrées de base, les contraindra à adopter des stratégies d’adaptation sévères, notamment à passer une journée entière sans repas. Les résultats de Crise (Phase 3 de l’IPC) sont attendus entre juin et septembre dans les provinces à fort défi sécuritaire au nord (Djelgodji, Loroum, Oudalan, Séno, Kossin, Sourou) et à l’est (Komandjori, de Yagha, du Gourma, de la Kompienga, du Dyamongou, du Gobnangou). Les ménages pauvres dans ces zones seront principalement dépendants du marché pour leur alimentation, avec toutefois des revenus faibles qui seront insuffisants pour couvrir leurs besoins de consommation. Le recours aux produits de cueillette ne sera pas suffisant pour éviter des écarts importants de consommation. Ils seront contraints de réduire à la fois les quantités et le nombre de repas par jour, ou de limiter la consommation des adultes au profit des enfants. L’offre céréalière s’est améliorée sur les marchés des zones à fort défi sécuritaire (régions du Liptako, Soum et de Tapoa) cette année par rapport aux trois dernières années, bien qu’en dessous de son niveau avant la crise. L’augmentation du nombre de convois de ravitaillement, les ventes subventionnées de céréales et l’existence de flux transfrontaliers entrants (cas des marchés de Gorom-Gorom, Markoye, Kantchari et Diapaga) permettent d’éviter les ruptures de vivres sur les marchés. Par ailleurs, la disponibilité de l’assistance alimentaire contribue à réduire la demande des ménages sur le marché. L’offre céréalière dans ces zones devrait rester supérieure à celle de 2025, au moins jusqu’aux nouvelles récoltes de septembre. En avril, les prix des céréales demeuraient 25 à 35 pour cent en dessous de leurs niveaux de 2025 et 18 à 30 pour cent inférieurs à la moyenne quinquennale dans l’ensemble du pays. Ces prix sont restés stables ou en légère baisse par rapport au mois précédent, ce qui est contraire aux hausses saisonnières typiquement observées. La baisse globale des prix s'explique par une offre supérieure à la demande, des restrictions à l’exportation, ainsi que par des ventes subventionnées ou des opérations de distribution alimentaire. Néanmoins, des hausses de 9 à 23 pour cent par rapport à la moyenne quinquennale persistent dans les zones à fort défi sécuritaire, en particulier sur les marchés d’Arbinda, de Sebba et de Diapaga. Bien que les incidents sécuritaires restent à des niveaux élevés, une baisse relative de 4 pour cent a été enregistrée dans l’ensemble du pays entre janvier et avril 2026. De même, le nombre de décès liés aux conflits a chuté de 45 pour cent pendant la même période par rapport à la moyenne des trois dernières années (ACLED). Les alertes — généralement d’origine sécuritaire et constituant un facteur des déplacements de populations — ont également diminué de 47 et 31 pour cent respectivement, par rapport à la même période en 2025 et 2024 (GCORR). Des déplacements de population ont néanmoins eu lieu durant cette période, mais les effectifs des populations nouvellement déplacées ont été moins élevés (44 577 personnes), ce qui représente une baisse de 77 et de 49 pour cent respectivement par rapport à 2025 et 2024. Ces améliorations favorisent les retours de populations dans leurs localités d’origine et pourraient également favoriser la pratique des activités agricoles pour cette saison qui commence. La mise à jour des prévisions saisonnières de mai prévoit plutôt des cumuls pluviométriques inférieurs à moyens pendant la période de saison pluvieuse de juin à septembre. Ce qui est contraire aux prévisions formulées les mois précédents, qui anticipaient des précipitations moyennes à supérieures à la moyenne dans la région du Sahel. En outre, des séquences de jours sans précipitations significatives, longues et à tendance moyenne, sont également attendues en début de saison. Cette situation pourrait entraîner des resemis plus importants et affecter négativement le calendrier ainsi que l’efficacité d’utilisation des engrais. En outre, les conséquences du conflit au Moyen-Orient sur les prix des engrais entraîneront une hausse des prix sur les marchés et une baisse de l’offre, réduisant ainsi l’accès des producteurs aux engrais. Ces différents facteurs pourraient impacter négativement les perspectives de récolte dans le pays pour la campagne agricole 2026/2027.
Country: World Source: ELRHA What if the most powerful indicator in humanitarian response was also the most neglected? When crises unfold, we count displacement, malnutrition, and funding gaps. But months later, one question often remains unanswered - how many people died? That omission matters - because mortality data changes decisions. As the UK Humanitarian Innovation Hub (UKHIH) and Elrha close Phase 2 of our Mortality Estimation in Humanitarian Crises Systems Innovation Partnership, this blog marks the beginning of a series exploring why mortality estimation matters, and how grantees are innovating so the humanitarian system can do it better. Mortality: the metric that changes the conversation Credible and timely mortality figures change conversations and decisions. As Chris Porter from FCDO put it during a 2025 panel discussion: "We often debate malnutrition rates, but deaths stop people in their tracks." Mortality metrics capture crisis severity, scale, and urgency in a way few other indicators can. Mortality data used to be central to humanitarian assessments. Over time, however, it slipped to the margins - seen as too sensitive, too political, too technically complex, or too slow to be useful. The result is a paradox: the metric that best reflects human cost in crises is often missing from decision-making altogether. Why mortality evidence is so hard - and essential Estimating mortality in crises is undeniably challenging. Data is incomplete. Access is constrained. Methods vary. Numbers can be contested or suppressed, particularly in politically charged settings. Different approaches can produce vastly different estimates, eroding trust and confidence. But the cost of not measuring mortality is higher. Without credible mortality evidence the true scale of crises is underestimated; resources are allocated reactively rather than strategically; accountability weakens and advocacy relies on anecdote instead of evidence. Mortality estimation is not just a technical exercise. It is a moral and operational necessity. From reactive funding toward systems change UKHIH-Elrha’s current investments are built on a longer history of mortality-driven action. Funding followed mortality research in Somalia that helped trigger an unusual and early UN intervention in a subsequent developing famine in 2016. That response was not driven by malnutrition figures, but by mortality data. It was rare. And it worked. Recently completed research established that mortality in southern Chad was far higher than humanitarian actors had assumed, with large segments of the affected population missed entirely. This evidence forced uncomfortable reassessments, but also opened pathways to identify deaths that would otherwise have remained uncounted. Those efforts demonstrated what's possible when rigorous methods are applied under pressure. They informed response discussions, shaped advocacy, and challenged assumptions in decision-making. But they also highlight a deeper issue: Mortality estimation has been treated as an emergency add-on rather than a standing capability in crises contexts. UKHIH’s first investment in mortality estimation proved decisive in a politically charged context. Rigorous work helped establish the credibility of mortality estimates from Gaza when official figures were being publicly dismissed. This evidence made it far harder for governments and global institutions to ignore the scale of civilian death, cutting through political pressure and reaffirming the role of independent science. Building on this work, UKHIH launched the Systems Innovation Partnership in 2024 to move beyond isolated projects and towards a durable ecosystem for mortality estimation. One rooted in equitable partnerships, shared infrastructure, and long-term investment, particularly in low- and middle-income countries. What progress looks like in practice UKHIH-Elrha is currently the only dedicated funder focused specifically on mortality estimation in humanitarian crises. Across Phases 1 and 2, we've seen tangible signs of change: Stronger methods, including improved modelling approaches and shared tools and resources like the Somalia Mortality Estimation Data Observatory (S-MED) Deeper learning, through case studies examining how mortality evidence has influenced - or failed to influence - responses in crises More equitable leadership, with LMIC-based partners SIMAD Institute for Global Health (Somalia) and Evidence for Change (Kenya) playing central roles in phases 1 and 2, scaling up partnering in phase 2 with Addis Ababa University, Mekelle University (Ethiopia) and Rebuild Hope for Africa (DRC) among others. Broader dialogue, bringing together researchers, humanitarians, policymakers, and funders to tackle the "last mile" problem of uptake and use Co-funding, for longer-term, strategic investment that builds synergies and amplifies impact across the system with European Commission Humanitarian Aid (ECHO). What this blog series will cover This blog marks the start of a weekly series showcasing the Phase 2 consortia pushing this agenda forward. IMPACT Initiatives are exploring locally led mortality estimation in Somalia, Ethiopia, and the DRC, highlighting what it takes to shift ownership and trust. Johns Hopkins University is focusing on methodological innovation in DRC, alongside practical guidance for local decision-makers on when and how mortality estimates can be generated and used. Save the Children International is developing a governance mechanism among Strategic, Technical and National Stakeholders and building an online platform making guidance, tools, and technical support accessible and equitable across the sector. Together, these consortia address not just how to count deaths, but how to ensure mortality evidence shapes response. Counting deaths to save lives Mortality evidence can't be optional because uncounted deaths represent a failure of accountability, a gap in our understanding, and a missed opportunity to prevent more. When we don’t count deaths, we're not avoiding difficult conversations - we're having them anyway, just without evidence The UKHIH-Elrha partnerships show we can do better. What remains is a choice: to embed mortality estimation as a non-negotiable part of crisis response, or to continue operating in the dark about the very metric that matters most.
Countries: Nigeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Mali Source: International Organization for Migration Please refer to the attached file. The West and Central Africa (WCA) region faces some of the world's most complex displacement crises. Across the Lake Chad Basin, the Liptako Gourma tri-border area, and the coastal countries of the Gulf of Guinea, millions of people are affected by armed conflict, intercommunal violence, climate shocks, and governance challenges, driving large-scale population movements, straining services, and undermining community resilience. In response, IOM's Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) has deployed the Solutions and Mobility Index (SMI) to measure perceived stability at the locality level and provide actionable evidence for humanitarian, development, and peacebuilding actors. This report presents a comparative analysis of SMI results for 2023-2024 across three crisis contexts: Lake Chad Basin: Nigeria (BAY States), Cameroon (Far North), Niger (Diffa), and Chad (Lac Province); Liptako Gourma: Burkina Faso (Est, Sahel), Mali (Gao, Kidal, Mopti, Ségou, Timbuktu), and Niger (Dosso, Tahoua, Tillabéri); Coastal Countries: Benin (Alibori, Atakora), Côte d'Ivoire (Bounkani), and Ghana (North East, Upper East, Upper West). Drawing on over 5,000 locality-level assessments, the report enables cross-crisis comparison and highlights differentiated priorities for each setting. While crisis-level averages provide a useful summary, they are aggregations of conditions that vary significantly across localities. Different areas face distinct challenges and require differentiated, context-specific support. A stable average can therefore coexist with significant subnational variation.
Country: Philippines Source: Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology Please refer to the attached Infographic.
Country: Philippines Source: Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology Please refer to the attached Infographic.
Country: Philippines Source: Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology Please refer to the attached Infographic.
Country: Philippines Source: Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology Please refer to the attached Infographic.
Countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Viet Nam Source: ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance Please refer to the attached Infographic. REGIONAL SUMMARY: During the twenty-first week of 2026, a total of 50 disaster events were reported across the ASEAN region, including floods, landslides, storms, and wind-related disasters in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Viet Nam. In Indonesia, Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana (BNPB) reported disaster events across Aceh, Jakarta, West Java, Central Java, East Java, South Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan, East Kalimantan, North Maluku, and Central Sulawesi. In Malaysia, Agensi Pengurusan Bencana Negara (NADMA) reported flooding in Sabah. In the Philippines, National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC) and Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) reported flooding, landslides, storms, and wind-related disasters in Davao, North Cotabato, and Zamboanga City. Meanwhile, in Thailand, Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation (DDPM) reported flooding, storms, and wind-related disasters in Nan, Lampang, and Nakhon Ratchasima. Lastly, in Viet Nam, Viet Nam Disaster and Dyke Management Authority (VDDMA) reported storms, winds, flooding, and landslides in An Giang, Lam Dong, Ca Mau, Tuyen Quang, Son La, Phu Tho, Lang Son, Dien Bien, Tthai Nguyen, and Quang Ninh. HIGHLIGHT: In Indonesia, flooding affected both Pasuruan Regency and Pasuruan City in East Java Province following heavy rainfall on 19 May. In Pasuruan Regency, intense rainfall in the upstream areas of Pandaan, Purwodadi, and Purwosari increased water discharge in the Kedunglarangan and Welang river basins, resulting in flooding across Purwosari, Bangil, Pandaan, Pohjentrek, and Kraton. Meanwhile, in Pasuruan City, heavy rainfall between 1930H and 2130H UTC+7 overwhelmed drainage systems, causing water overflow and inundation in Gadingrejo, Purworejo, and Panggungrejo. According to BNPB, as of 22 May, these flooding situations affected approximately 3.3K households and impacted around 3.3K houses across both Pasuruan Regency and Pasuruan City. In addition, 13 road access points were disrupted. Relevant authorities are undertaking the necessary response measures to address the situation.
Country: World Sources: Government of Algeria, Government of Andorra, Government of Australia, Government of Austria, Government of Belgium, Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Government of Botswana, Government of Brazil, Government of Bulgaria, Government of Cabo Verde, Government of Cambodia, Government of Canada, Government of Chile, Government of Colombia, Government of Costa Rica, Government of Croatia, Government of Cyprus, Government of Denmark, Government of El Salvador, Government of Estonia, Government of Finland, Government of France, Government of Gabon, Government of Georgia, Government of Germany, Government of Greece, Government of Guatemala, Government of Guyana, Government of Hungary, Government of Iceland, Government of Indonesia, Government of Ireland, Government of Italy, Government of Japan, Government of Jordan, Government of Kenya, Government of Kyrgyzstan, Government of Latvia, Government of Lebanon, Government of Liberia, Government of Montenegro, Government of Mozambique, Government of Myanmar, Government of New Zealand, Government of Norway, Government of Panama, Government of Peru, Government of Poland, Government of Portugal, Government of Romania, Government of San Marino, Government of Senegal, Government of Sierra Leone, Government of Singapore, Government of South Africa, Government of Spain, Government of Sudan, Government of Sweden, Government of Switzerland, Government of the Bahamas, Government of the Central African Republic, Government of the Czech Republic, Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Government of the Dominican Republic, Government of the Netherlands, Government of the Philippines, Government of the Republic of Armenia, Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Government of the Republic of Korea, Government of the Republic of Moldova, Government of the Republic of Slovenia, Government of the Slovak Republic, Government of the State of Palestine, Government of the United Kingdom, Government of Timor-Leste, Government of Türkiye, Government of Ukraine, Government of Uruguay, Government of Viet Nam, League of Arab States Please refer to the attached file. We, 88 delegations, stand together to reaffirm that the protection of civilians must remain at the center of the United Nations’ peace and security, humanitarian, and human rights efforts. At a time of growing needs, shrinking resources, and institutional reform, we commit to translate political will into concrete action to make civilian protection a reality on the ground. Accordingly: 1) We commit to place the Protection of Civilians agenda as a core political priority across the United Nations system, including the Security Council, General Assembly, and other relevant fora throughout the cycle of conflict. To this end, through our multilateral engagement, we will advance dialogue, diplomacy, mediation, and the peaceful settlement of disputes as the most effective means of protecting civilians. We will strive to prevent conflict escalation and address drivers of violence before they result in civilian harm. We will respect international humanitarian law, as well as international human rights law and refugee law, and we will use our diplomatic influence to promote its respect, recognizing that respecting international law is an essential prerequisite for the protection of civilians. We will ensure timely, consistent, and decisive political action wherever civilians are at risk or suffering serious harms during armed conflict, advocate for safe, rapid and unimpeded humanitarian access to all civilians in need and seek accountability for attacks on humanitarian personnel. We will also engage to ensure accountability for all violations, including by advocating for systematic investigations and prosecution of suspects, acknowledgement of harm caused, and meaningful amends to affected civilians 2) We commit to support ongoing reform processes, including institutional restructuring and system-wide efficiency measures, with a view to strengthen rather than weaken protection outcomes for civilians. To this end, in the framework of UN80 and other reforms, we will advocate for reforms that sustain field-level protection capacities and preserve information gathering to allow for evidence-based reporting and decision-making. We will leverage ongoing discussions to strengthen protection mechanisms and further deepen synergies across the Peace and Security, Development, and Human Rights pillars of the United Nations. We will support a humanitarian reset that enables principled humanitarian action with protection at its core. We will work to ensure that any changes in humanitarian financing, coordination, and operational models do not increase risks to local actors or leave vulnerable populations behind. 3) We commit to prioritize the protection of civilians in times of financial constraints and limited resources. To this end, we will strive so that budget reductions and financial austerity do not undermine protection functions and enable the adequate implementation of protection mandates. We will guide resource allocation decision with a view to protect civilians. We will strive to provide sustained, flexible, and direct funding to local and national protection actors, recognizing that they are the first to respond and last to leave. We will promote the strategic use of limited resources to strengthen protection outcomes and pursue predictable and sustainable financing for activities that reduce harm to civilians and uphold their rights. We will repeat it as long as it is needed: civilians must be protected. It is not only an obligation under international law, but also a moral duty. I thank you. 1. Switzerland 2. Algeria 3. Andorra 4. Armenia 5. Australia 6. Austria 7. Bahamas 8. Belgium 9. Bosnia and Herzegovina 10. Botswana 11. Brazil 12. Bulgaria 13. Cabo Verde 14. Cambodia 15. Canada 16. Central African Republic 17. Chile 18. Colombia 19. Costa Rica 20. Croatia 21. Cyprus 22. Czech Republic 23. Democratic Republic of the Congo 24. Denmark 25. Dominican Republic 26. El Salvador 27. Estonia 28. Finland 29. France 30. Gabon 31. Georgia 32. Germany 33. Greece 34. Guatemala 35. Guyana 36. Hungary 37. Iceland 38. Indonesia 39. Ireland 40. Italy 41. Japan 42. Jordan 43. Kazakhstan 44. Kenya 45. Kyrgyzstan 46. Latvia 47. League of Arab States 48. Lebanon 49. Liberia 50. Liechtenstein 51. Lithuania 52. Luxembourg 53. Malta 54. Mexico 55. Monaco 56. Mongolia 57. Montenegro 58. Morocco 59. Mozambique 60. Myanmar 61. Netherlands 62. New Zealand 63. Norway 64. State of Palestine 65. Panama 66. Peru 67. Philippines 68. Poland 69. Portugal 70. Republic of Korea 71. Republic of Moldova 72. Republic of Türkiye 73. Romania 74. San Marino 75. Senegal 76. Sierra Leone 77. Singapore 78. Slovakia 79. Slovenia 80. South Africa 81. Spain 82. Sudan 83. Sweden 84. Timor-Leste 85. Ukraine 86. United Kingdom 87. Uruguay 88. Viet Nam Signatories as of 22 May 2026
Country: Philippines Source: Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology Please refer to the attached Infographic.
Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo Source: World Vision Ituri Province is home to more than 900,000 internally displaced people. Thousands of children are exposed to a high risk of infection. The newly identified Ebola variant does not match any previously known strain and currently has no vaccine available. Kinshasa, 18 May 2026 – The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo has declared a new Ebola outbreak in the health zones of Bunia, Mongwalu, and Rwampara in Ituri Province. The initial toll, considered alarming, reports 246 suspected cases and 80 deaths, including 4 confirmed positive cases. This new outbreak comes amid an already fragile humanitarian situation marked by massive population displacement, persistent insecurity, and limited access to basic healthcare services. Children are among the groups most exposed to this health threat. ***“Our main concern is for children, who are the most vulnerable in a region already heavily affected by conflict and where humanitarian assistance remains insufficient due to a lack of resources. Drawing on our experience and working alongside all stakeholders, we are taking appropriate measures to limit the spread of this outbreak and save lives, particularly through hygiene promotion, with a special focus on areas hosting increasing numbers of internally displaced people. World Vision is working closely with health authorities to respond to this new disease,”***said Philippe Guiton, National Director of World Vision DRC. David Munkley, East zone Director, also stressed the urgency of a rapid response: ***“Ituri is already facing an alarming situation of acute malnutrition, which further weakens people’s immune systems, combined with extremely limited access to healthcare in remote areas. A rapid and coordinated response will help save lives and reach the greatest number of affected people,”***he said. While expressing its sympathy to families grieving as a result of this outbreak, World Vision RDC reaffirms its commitment to supporting the response alongside health authorities and humanitarian partners, particularly in the areas of child protection, prevention through the promotion of good hygiene practices, and infection prevention and control. World Vision has a long history of responding to Ebola outbreaks, not only in DR Congo but also in Uganda, Sierra Leone, and West Africa. During the 2018–2019 outbreak in eastern DRC, World Vision trained faith leaders and motorbike riders to deliver life-saving messages to remote communities. The Channels of Hope approach helped counter misinformation and stigma, building trust and resilience at the grassroots level. World Vision also contributed to the recent response to the Ebola outbreak in Bulape in Kasai by providing support to more than 200,000 children and patients, which enabled it to respond immediately to the outbreak, which was declared over in December 2025. As the situation in Ituri evolves, World Vision is calling for: Urgent funding for frontline response: We urge donors to release emergency funds to support health workers, community mobilisation, and protective equipment in Ituri and neighbouring provinces and countries. Strengthened regional coordination: We call on humanitarian actors and the DRC Government to enhance cross-border surveillance and preparedness, especially in high-risk zones. END Notes to Editor: For further information or to arrange an interview, please contact: -Philippe Guiton, National Director, Philippe_Guiton@wvi.org, +243970053733 -David Munkley, East Zone Director, David_Munkley@wvi.org, +243974053351 -Dr Philippe Ngenda, Health & Nutrition Specialist, Philippe_Ngenda@wvi.org, +243991008490 -Patrick Abega, Communications & PE Manager, Patrick_Abega@wvi.org, +243993692903 For more information, visit: www.wvi.org/congo
Countries: Haiti, Lebanon, Philippines, Somalia, Ukraine Source: International Organization for Migration Genève, 22 mai 2026 – Alors que les envois de fonds de la diaspora dépassent désormais l’aide publique au développement et les investissements directs étrangers réunis, l’Organisation internationale pour les migrations (OIM) a publié aujourd’hui une nouvelle étude montrant comment un engagement renforcé avec les communautés de la diaspora peut améliorer la réponse humanitaire et soutenir les efforts de relèvement dans le monde entier. Le document met en lumière la manière dont les communautés de la diaspora mobilisent rapidement des ressources, atteignent les populations touchées par l’intermédiaire de réseaux de confiance et fournissent des solutions localement adaptées et culturellement pertinentes, tout en demeurant encore partiellement intégrées aux systèmes humanitaires formels. Les communautés de la diaspora comptent parmi les partenaires les plus agiles et les plus dignes de confiance dans la réponse aux crises, a déclaré Ugochi Daniels, Directrice générale adjointe de l’OIM chargée des opérations. Ce rapport montre comment dépasser la solidarité spontanée pour établir de véritables partenariats structurés qui renforcent les réponses locales avant, pendant et après les crises. En reliant les communautés de la diaspora aux efforts humanitaires, l’OIM contribue à garantir que l’aide parvienne rapidement, efficacement et dans un climat de confiance aux personnes qui en ont besoin. S’appuyant sur des études de cas menées en Haïti, au Liban, aux Philippines, en Somalie et en Ukraine, le rapport présente des résultats concrets. La diaspora ukrainienne a levé 283 millions de dollars des États-Unis au cours de la première année du conflit, tandis que plus de 100 organisations de la diaspora se sont mobilisées en quelques jours après le séisme de 2021 en Haïti. Ces exemples reflètent une tendance plus large. En 2024, les envois de fonds de la diaspora vers les pays à revenu faible et intermédiaire ont atteint un montant estimé à 700 milliards de dollars des États-Unis, dépassant l’aide publique au développement et les investissements directs étrangers réunis. Le rapport montre comment un engagement structuré de la diaspora a renforcé la préparation, permis des interventions vitales et accéléré le relèvement grâce à des systèmes d’alerte précoce, des solutions de logement plus sûres, des services de santé, des mécanismes de financement innovants et des initiatives de relèvement menées par les communautés. Le document présente également des priorités pratiques à l’intention des donateurs et des partenaires, notamment des mécanismes de financement flexibles, des outils numériques de coordination, le renforcement des partenariats en matière de données et un appui ciblé au développement des capacités. Il s’inscrit dans le cadre des efforts plus larges de l’OIM et alimente l’élaboration prochaine d’une Stratégie de l’OIM sur la diaspora, qui positionne l’engagement de la diaspora comme un pilier central de l’action de l’Organisation. Pour de plus amples informations, veuillez consulter le Centre des médias de l’OIM.
Countries: Haiti, Lebanon, Philippines, Somalia, Ukraine Source: International Organization for Migration Las remesas de la diáspora ponen de manifiesto un potencial sin explotar en la respuesta a las crisis: nuevo informe de la OIM Miembros de la comunidad somalí en el Reino Unido participan en un taller de alfabetización financiera digital de la OIM, impartido junto con Women’s Inclusive Team, RISE Projects y Dahabshiil, para promover remesas más seguras y asequibles. Foto: OIM 2024/Joe Newman. Ginebra, 22 de mayo de 2026 – En un contexto en el que las remesas de la diáspora superan ya, en conjunto, la ayuda oficial al desarrollo y la inversión extranjera directa, la Organización Internacional para las Migraciones (OIM) ha publicado hoy un nuevo informe que muestra cómo un mayor compromiso con las comunidades de la diáspora puede mejorar la respuesta humanitaria y apoyar los esfuerzos de recuperación en todo el mundo. El informe destaca que las comunidades de la diáspora movilizan recursos con rapidez, llegan a las poblaciones afectadas a través de redes de confianza y ofrecen soluciones adaptadas al contexto local y cultural, aunque siguen estando solo parcialmente integradas en los sistemas humanitarios formales. "Las comunidades de la diáspora se encuentran entre los socios más ágiles y fiables en la respuesta a las crisis", afirmó Ugochi Daniels, Directora General Adjunta de la OIM para Operaciones. "Este informe muestra cómo podemos pasar de la solidaridad espontánea a alianzas reales y estructuradas que refuercen las respuestas locales antes, durante y después de las crisis. Al conectar a las comunidades de la diáspora con los esfuerzos humanitarios, la OIM contribuye a garantizar que el apoyo llegue a las personas de manera rápida, eficaz y basada en la confianza". Basándose en estudios de caso de Haití, el Líbano, Filipinas, Somalia y Ucrania, el informe documenta resultados concretos: la diáspora ucraniana recaudó 283 millones de dólares estadounidenses durante el primer año del conflicto, mientras que más de 100 organizaciones de la diáspora se movilizaron en cuestión de días tras el terremoto de Haití en 2021. Estos ejemplos reflejan una tendencia más amplia: en 2024, las remesas de la diáspora hacia los países de ingreso bajo y mediano alcanzaron una cifra estimada de 700.000 millones de dólares estadounidenses, superando en conjunto la ayuda oficial al desarrollo y la inversión extranjera directa. El informe muestra cómo un compromiso estructurado con la diáspora ha reforzado la preparación ante crisis, posibilitado respuestas que salvan vidas y acelerado la recuperación mediante sistemas de alerta temprana, soluciones de alojamiento más seguras, servicios de salud, mecanismos de financiación innovadores y esfuerzos de recuperación liderados por las comunidades. El documento también define prioridades prácticas para donantes y socios, como mecanismos de financiación flexibles, herramientas digitales de coordinación, el fortalecimiento de las alianzas en materia de datos y un apoyo específico al desarrollo de capacidades. Contribuye a los esfuerzos más amplios de la OIM y sirve de base para una próxima Estrategia de la OIM sobre la diáspora, que sitúa la participación de la diáspora como un pilar central del trabajo de la Organización. Para más información, visite el Centro de Medios de la OIM.