Global Voices
중도 성향
기타
Ugandan activists make the case for ecofeminism
In this edition of Undertones, we explore a narrative calling for women to play a central role in climate-related decision-making in Uganda.
🌐 국제기구 · "CISION" · 총 25건
필터 보기현재 지수
50.0
0 = 부정 우세
50 = 중립
100 = 긍정 우세
최근 7일 기준 5,955건을 분석한 결과, 뉴스 심리지수는 50.0(균형)입니다. 긍정 0건(0.0%)·중립 5,955건(100.0%)·부정 0건(0.0%)이며, 중립 비중이 뚜렷하게 높습니다. 성향 지수는 종합 0.0(중도 균형)입니다.
In this edition of Undertones, we explore a narrative calling for women to play a central role in climate-related decision-making in Uganda.
Country: World Source: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies Please refer to the attached file. Message from the IFRC Secretary General Small and medium-sized disasters may not dominate global headlines, but for communities affected they are just as devastating. The IFRC’s Disaster Response Emergency Fund (IFRC-DREF) ensures that these crises are met with speed, dignity and locally-led action. Money is made available fast, without the need to wait for a specific appeal. The DREF 2026 Plan is firmly anchored in the IFRC’s Renewal. In the context of significant global funding constraints, humanitarians must be more focused, disciplined and accountable than ever. The IFRC-DREF is central to this shift - enabling early, flexible financing while reinforcing strong stewardship and clear evidence of results. It is also innovative both in the way it is financed (our world-first indemnity insurance policy was triggered for the first time in 2024) and in how its funds are allocated; funding anticipatory action, before hazards hit, is a growing priority. Our 2026–2030 DREF Ambition involves strengthening not only what we fund, but how we deliver. In 2026, we will continue to streamline processes, improve sequencing between DREF grants and Emergency Appeals and reinforce compliance and operational quality. This ensures that speed is matched by sound decision-making, transparency and impact. Localization remains at the heart of IFRC-DREF. By channeling resources directly to National Societies, we enable action that is timely, context-driven and sustainable. At a time when humanitarian needs are rising and financing is under pressure, this agile and principled mechanism is more essential than ever. The DREF 2026 Plan reflects our commitment to work smarter, better demonstrate impact and ensure that no community facing disaster is ignored. I urge you to read it. Jagan Chapagain Context and rationale for the 2026 plan What is the IFRC-DREF? The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies’ Disaster Response Emergency Fund (IFRC-DREF) is an efficient, fast, transparent, and localized way of getting funding directly to local humanitarian actors – both before and after a crisis. It enables National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies to respond rapidly to emergencies and act ahead of predictable hazards through two complementary pillars: • Response • Anticipatory Action The fund combines speed, flexibility, transparency and localization to support community-led humanitarian action. Context and rationale for the 2026 plan The IFRC’s Disaster Response Emergency Fund (IFRC-DREF) enters 2026 at a pivotal moment, marking the conclusion of its Strategic Ambition 2020–2025 and the release of the IFRC-DREF Strategic Ambition 2026–2030, with 2026 serving as the first year of its operationalization. This transition builds on a period of significant reform, as the revision of procedures introduced in 2025 strengthened accountability, clarified operational and financial rules, and reinforced minimum readiness requirements, including for anticipatory action, while safeguarding IFRC-DREF’s core strengths of speed, flexibility, and reliability. These developments take place within the broader context of the IFRC Renewal, which seeks to strengthen a collective approach by reinforcing localization, quality, accountability, and proximity to communities across the IFRC network (the IFRC secretariat and its 191 member National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies). At the same time, National Societies continue to operate in increasingly complex environments shaped by: · climate-related disasters, · epidemics, · displacement, · economic pressures, · and shrinking humanitarian funding. These realities reinforce the importance of a fast, agile and locally led humanitarian financing mechanism. Global operational realities In 2025, IFRC-DREF allocated CHF 77.4 million across 170 operations in 83 National Societies, supporting 14.5 million people affected by crises worldwide. While most allocations remained under the Response Pillar (CHF 64.9 million), anticipatory action reached a record CHF 12.7 million, representing 16% of total funding. This growth was supported by the approval of 11 new simplified EAPs and 21 new EAPs. Despite a decline from 2024, allocations in 2025 remained 75% higher than in 2021, while operations increased by 27% over the same period. At the same time, the number of countries supported remained relatively stable, reflecting growing concentration of IFRC-DREF usage in highly crisis-affected contexts. Anticipatory action expanded significantly faster than the overall fund between 2021 and 2025, increasing by approximately 150%. This trend is expected to continue in 2026 through simplified procedures and expanded early action mechanisms. Despite growing pressure on humanitarian financing systems, IFRC-DREF allocations in 2025 remained 75% higher than in 2021.
Country: Honduras Source: Famine Early Warning System Network Please refer to the attached file. Key Messages Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes remain widespread across Honduras, with Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes emerging in the Dry Corridor between June and September as above-average prices, below-average labor demand, and previous harvest losses exacerbate seasonal trends. While many households continue to meet minimum food needs through market purchases, they are struggling to cover essential non-food expenditures amid below-average seasonal agricultural labor opportunities and are increasingly relying on coping strategies such as selling small livestock and borrowing. In the Dry Corridor, households negatively impacted by multiple poor agricultural seasons are likely to resort to more severe coping strategies at the height of the lean season. The rest of the country will experience Stressed (IPC Phase 2), while urban centers including Tegucigalpa (Francisco Morazán), La Esperanza (Intibucá), and the Bay Islands remain in Minimal (IPC Phase 1) due to more stable formal and informal income sources. Above-average fuel and fertilizer prices continue to drive high production and transportation costs for a second consecutive month. In April,diesel prices remained nearly 34 percent higher than March, 64 percent higher than last year, and 49 percent higher than the five-year average. Fertilizer prices have also remained elevated, with DAP (18-46-0) and urea rising to 7.2 and 50 percent higher than March, respectively, and 21.2 and 45.1 percent above the five-year average, respectively. These rising input costs contributed to inflation surpassing the 5 percent threshold in April. Staple food costs persist above last year and the five-year average despite relatively stable month-on-month prices, driven by weak domestic production. In April, wholesale white maize prices were 49.2 and 39.8 percent higher than last year and the five-year average, respectively, reflecting increased demand and lingering effects of below-average import volumes in 2025. Wholesale red bean prices are 10 percent above the five-year average but remained stable month-on-month and year-on-year, partly supported by increased bean availability due to crop substitution of maize for beans during primera 2025and improved import volumes. While increased remittance inflows in early 2026 are helping receiving households partially offset higher food costs, most poor households do not receive remittances and remain vulnerable to price increases. Recent rainfall estimates through mid-May indicate widespread below-average precipitation across Honduras, negatively impacting primera land preparation and planting in localized areas. While some localized rainfall has met thresholds for planting requirements, much of this precipitation has been concentrated within short periods (2-3 days), limiting soil moisture adequacy and leading many farmers to postpone planting until more consistent rainfall is established. As a result, smallholders are not expected to initiate primera planting until mid-May. At the same time, elevated input costs are constraining fertilizer use by smallholder farmers, likely contributing to expected below-average primera crop yields by August. The Secretariat of Agriculture and Livestock (SAG), in coordination with agroclimatology boards and with support from the Centro de Estudios Atmosféricos, Oceanográficos y Sísmicos (CENAOS)/Comisión Permanente de Contingencias (COPECO), is monitoring and guiding planting decisions across the country. The forecast transition to El Niño is expected to result in rainfall deficits and above-average temperatures through September, particularly in the Dry Corridor, reducing vegetation health and soil moisture and disrupting crop development throughout the primera season. While the magnitude of the El Niño event remains uncertain, CENAOS has issued region-specific guidance for farmers, recommending early planting (before May 10) in the Dry Corridor areas bordering El Salvador, and slightly later planting (after May 15) in central and eastern departments. Drought-prone areas, including southern Francisco Morazán, El Paraíso, Valle, Choluteca, and southern Comayagua, are likely to experience larger rainfall deficits. SAG is advising some farmers to prioritize planting red beans instead of white maize due to its short production cycle and lower water requirements, improving crop resilience under uncertain rainfall conditions.
Country: World Source: ELRHA What if the most powerful indicator in humanitarian response was also the most neglected? When crises unfold, we count displacement, malnutrition, and funding gaps. But months later, one question often remains unanswered - how many people died? That omission matters - because mortality data changes decisions. As the UK Humanitarian Innovation Hub (UKHIH) and Elrha close Phase 2 of our Mortality Estimation in Humanitarian Crises Systems Innovation Partnership, this blog marks the beginning of a series exploring why mortality estimation matters, and how grantees are innovating so the humanitarian system can do it better. Mortality: the metric that changes the conversation Credible and timely mortality figures change conversations and decisions. As Chris Porter from FCDO put it during a 2025 panel discussion: "We often debate malnutrition rates, but deaths stop people in their tracks." Mortality metrics capture crisis severity, scale, and urgency in a way few other indicators can. Mortality data used to be central to humanitarian assessments. Over time, however, it slipped to the margins - seen as too sensitive, too political, too technically complex, or too slow to be useful. The result is a paradox: the metric that best reflects human cost in crises is often missing from decision-making altogether. Why mortality evidence is so hard - and essential Estimating mortality in crises is undeniably challenging. Data is incomplete. Access is constrained. Methods vary. Numbers can be contested or suppressed, particularly in politically charged settings. Different approaches can produce vastly different estimates, eroding trust and confidence. But the cost of not measuring mortality is higher. Without credible mortality evidence the true scale of crises is underestimated; resources are allocated reactively rather than strategically; accountability weakens and advocacy relies on anecdote instead of evidence. Mortality estimation is not just a technical exercise. It is a moral and operational necessity. From reactive funding toward systems change UKHIH-Elrha’s current investments are built on a longer history of mortality-driven action. Funding followed mortality research in Somalia that helped trigger an unusual and early UN intervention in a subsequent developing famine in 2016. That response was not driven by malnutrition figures, but by mortality data. It was rare. And it worked. Recently completed research established that mortality in southern Chad was far higher than humanitarian actors had assumed, with large segments of the affected population missed entirely. This evidence forced uncomfortable reassessments, but also opened pathways to identify deaths that would otherwise have remained uncounted. Those efforts demonstrated what's possible when rigorous methods are applied under pressure. They informed response discussions, shaped advocacy, and challenged assumptions in decision-making. But they also highlight a deeper issue: Mortality estimation has been treated as an emergency add-on rather than a standing capability in crises contexts. UKHIH’s first investment in mortality estimation proved decisive in a politically charged context. Rigorous work helped establish the credibility of mortality estimates from Gaza when official figures were being publicly dismissed. This evidence made it far harder for governments and global institutions to ignore the scale of civilian death, cutting through political pressure and reaffirming the role of independent science. Building on this work, UKHIH launched the Systems Innovation Partnership in 2024 to move beyond isolated projects and towards a durable ecosystem for mortality estimation. One rooted in equitable partnerships, shared infrastructure, and long-term investment, particularly in low- and middle-income countries. What progress looks like in practice UKHIH-Elrha is currently the only dedicated funder focused specifically on mortality estimation in humanitarian crises. Across Phases 1 and 2, we've seen tangible signs of change: Stronger methods, including improved modelling approaches and shared tools and resources like the Somalia Mortality Estimation Data Observatory (S-MED) Deeper learning, through case studies examining how mortality evidence has influenced - or failed to influence - responses in crises More equitable leadership, with LMIC-based partners SIMAD Institute for Global Health (Somalia) and Evidence for Change (Kenya) playing central roles in phases 1 and 2, scaling up partnering in phase 2 with Addis Ababa University, Mekelle University (Ethiopia) and Rebuild Hope for Africa (DRC) among others. Broader dialogue, bringing together researchers, humanitarians, policymakers, and funders to tackle the "last mile" problem of uptake and use Co-funding, for longer-term, strategic investment that builds synergies and amplifies impact across the system with European Commission Humanitarian Aid (ECHO). What this blog series will cover This blog marks the start of a weekly series showcasing the Phase 2 consortia pushing this agenda forward. IMPACT Initiatives are exploring locally led mortality estimation in Somalia, Ethiopia, and the DRC, highlighting what it takes to shift ownership and trust. Johns Hopkins University is focusing on methodological innovation in DRC, alongside practical guidance for local decision-makers on when and how mortality estimates can be generated and used. Save the Children International is developing a governance mechanism among Strategic, Technical and National Stakeholders and building an online platform making guidance, tools, and technical support accessible and equitable across the sector. Together, these consortia address not just how to count deaths, but how to ensure mortality evidence shapes response. Counting deaths to save lives Mortality evidence can't be optional because uncounted deaths represent a failure of accountability, a gap in our understanding, and a missed opportunity to prevent more. When we don’t count deaths, we're not avoiding difficult conversations - we're having them anyway, just without evidence The UKHIH-Elrha partnerships show we can do better. What remains is a choice: to embed mortality estimation as a non-negotiable part of crisis response, or to continue operating in the dark about the very metric that matters most.
Countries: Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Somalia Source: ELRHA In the first blog introducing this series, Adrienne Testa, from the UK Humanitarian Innovation Hub and Elrha discussed how fundamental it is to measure excess mortality if response actors want to understand the severity of a humanitarian crisis and guide aid prioritisation. In our second blog we focus on the work of a consortium led by IMPACT Initiatives. This consortium is drawing attention to the roles that national and local actors play in mortality data collection and use by decision-makers and what is needed to design more localised mortality estimation systems in humanitarian contexts. The structural barriers we need to talk about Many of the challenges for local and national actors to collect mortality data and inform responses are well known, but poorly documented. They have fewer opportunities for technical training; face inequitable access to financial resources for activities; and structural barriers limit their representation in coordination forums where decision-making occurs about whether mortality data should be collected, who collects it, and what findings can mean. Meanwhile, international actors frequently have a seat at the table, and therefore control the narrative, deciding what data matters and how it will shape response priorities. Yet, local and national actors – including non-governmental organisations (NGOs), universities, and public health institutes – are often ideally placed to collect mortality estimates and inform response decisions. They have established connections and access to affected communities and contextual understanding of how to appropriately and effectively operate. They understand political sensitivities and how to navigate these so that mortality estimation findings will carry legitimacy with key stakeholders and decision-makers. Crucially, locally-led mortality estimation initiatives challenge long-standing power imbalances associated with colonial, top-down approaches to humanitarian assistance. Recognising this, three partners in our consortium, Evidence for Change, London School of Tropical Hygiene and Tropical Medicine and SIMAD University, were funded by the Humanitarian Innovation Hub in 2024-25 to imagine what an ideal mechanism might look like to systematically trigger mortality data collection for accountable decision-making in crises. Consultation with global humanitarian stakeholders confirmed: If we want better mortality data, we must widen the pool of people able to generate it. This starts with investing in and strengthening the capacities of local actors. Funding local actors’ priorities and strengthening capacities With follow-on funding from UKHIH-Elrha in 2025-26, our consortium expanded. We teamed up with IMPACT Initiatives along with their partners at Addis Ababa and Mekelle Universities in Ethiopia and World Needs and Help, an NGO in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Together, we’re working to better understand real-world opportunities and obstacles faced by national actors when implementing mortality estimation activities. Our goal is to use this evidence to strengthen advocacy for approaches that support and prioritise local actors in this vital work. Rather than imposing a predefined research plan, each national partner has selected, tailored and implemented a mortality estimation activity to their context. Our consortium operates a ‘help desk’ to foster peer-learning and strengthen capacities across contexts. Activities include: Somalia: New approaches in a fragmented landscape Our previous work in Somalia demonstrated the effectiveness of well-designed data collection exercises to influence humanitarian decision-making - when findings were communicated - in a timely fashion and to the right people. However, we also saw how fragmented the current data landscape is, with mortality data not always collaboratively shared between institutions, and major gaps in mortality data coverage, particularly in areas outside government control. SIMAD University is therefore running a qualitative study with community burial attendants in hard-to-reach areas of Somalia, exploring what would be needed for this to become a feasible and acceptable mechanism of mortality reporting to bridge data gaps. Drawing on a nutrition and mortality surveillance system originally developed in the NGO sector, Evidence for Change is training female health workers to collect mortality data within a large-scale community-based government programme. Ethiopia: Regional partnerships for regional aid prioritisation Previously, universities across Ethiopia ran demographic surveillance sites in their local areas, with mortality and other data flowing to government authorities. Conflict dismantled many of these surveillance programmes. Addis Ababa and Mekelle Universities, which previously ran surveillance sites, are now partnering with regional health authorities in drought-affected Somali region and conflict-hit Tigray to conduct mortality surveys to help guide regional aid prioritisation. Mekelle University is also including a verbal autopsy component to describe the causes of death, something regional authorities found particularly valuable about the pre-war surveillance system because it helped them monitor the health of populations. Democratic Republic of Congo: Navigating insecurity and mistrust Engagements with both formal and informal authorities in eastern Congo can create tension or mistrust, complicating operational permissions and community access. Nevertheless, World Needs and Help is initiating a mortality survey in a conflict‑affected North Kivu region, to document the human toll of ongoing violence and displacement. While the organisation has no prior experience in mortality estimation, our consortium helped them expand their technical skillset. Their experience supporting needs assessments among various partners across the east means they are well positioned to navigate the complex challenges to ensure mortality estimation is possible. Alongside these activities, we are documenting how teams have approached the process, keeping a close eye on context. We are building on social science methodological approaches we developed in phase 1 to help us understand how politics, institutional identities and other evolving challenges shape the ways mortality actors work. Equitable and sustainable systems change None of these challenges have quick fixes. Building an equitable and sustainable approach to mortality estimation will require the concerted efforts of many stakeholders, working together to drive change. Our own consortium is part of that broader momentum. By documenting barriers and testing solutions today, our hope is to inform the strategy that will address these challenges tomorrow, supporting UKHIH’s drive for true systems innovation in humanitarian action.
Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo Source: ELRHA Author Jennifer O’Keeffe, Augustin Gang Karume and Paul Spiegel This blog series accompanies the Mortality Estimation Systems Innovation Partnership (SIP), supported by UKHIH-Elrha, which brings together diverse partners to strengthen how mortality data is collected, interpreted, and used across humanitarian crises. Earlier blogs in this series highlighted why excess mortality measurement is critical for understanding crisis severity, as well as exploring how to maximise local and national actors' leadership in the mortality estimation ecosystem. In this third blog, we turn to Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, where Rebuild Hope for Africa and the Johns Hopkins Center for Humanitarian Health share how their work is making mortality estimation more accurate, accessible, and feasible for national actors best placed to do this work, even in the most challenging settings. “As an indicator, a mortality rate tries to evaluate the size and scale of a crisis in a single metric.” The Public Health Aspects of Complex Emergencies and Refugee Situations, 1997, Michael Toole, Ronald Waldman In 2023, the Humanitarian Congress in Vienna released a statement saying, "The humanitarian imperative is an absolute moral obligation to save lives and alleviate human suffering on the basis of need, without discrimination”. Yet**,** when resources are constrained, allocation is often based on geopolitical interests, media coverage, or how relatable a population may be to high-income donor countries. In short, human lives are valued differentially. The disconnect is not theoretical. In 2022, Rebuild Hope for Africa (RHA) led a nationwide mortality survey in the Central African Republic which estimated up to 5% of the population had died during the previous year. Despite the scale of these findings, the study received little media attention and did not lead to meaningful changes in donor policy. In conflict-affected settings, various, often compounding, factors make primary data collection difficult or impossible. These include forced displacement, insecurity, system failures, poor infrastructure, limited capacity, and restricted access. In practice, mortality is often not measured at all. And as threats to healthcare workers grow, international agencies have become understandably risk averse, collecting data only safer, accessible areas, where death rates are usually lowest. Without reliable data, decision makers and responders depend on fragmented sources and non-robust estimates. The result is a biased and misleading picture of crisis severity, that often portrays crises as less severe than they are. The magnitude of these biases and their effects on decisions by humanitarian actors, governments, and donors who rely on such data, remain largely unexamined. Our partnership between Rebuild Hope for Africa (RHA) and the Johns Hopkins Center for Humanitarian Health (CHH) is working to change this. Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo - An Unquantified Crisis Few places demonstrate the challenges of mortality estimation more than the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), one of the world’s most enduring humanitarian crises. The crisis worsened drastically in January 2025 when the country suffered a devastating double shock: the abrupt withdrawal of USAID funding and a violent military offensive by the Rwandan-backed rebel group M23. The M23 seized large swathes of territory, killing and displacing an unknown number of people in the process. With the departure of many international agencies and a vacuum in humanitarian response, the population has been left vulnerable to the worst effects of the conflict. A year later, the true human cost remains unknown. We recognise that without reliable data, it becomes even harder to mobilise the support that people living in Eastern DRC urgently need. Placing Data and Decision-Making in Congolese hands Augustin Gang Karume, one of the authors of this blog, was born and raised in Eastern DRC, where he still lives and works today. In 2008, he founded RHA to place data and decision-making back in Congolese hands. He understood then that national actors are the future of sustainable humanitarian response. Rooted in the community and living with the long-term consequences of decision-making, national actors have a strong incentive to prioritise community needs over institutional agendas. Using local networks and knowledge, they are the best equipped to conduct primary data collection in insecure settings. While international actors have scaled back amid funding austerity, national organisations like RHA have remained in place, continuing to work for and within their communities. These actors are also proving to be far more cost-effective and efficient. Without international overhead, they can often deliver results at a fraction of the cost of international organisations. As an example, RHA’s 2022 nationwide mortality survey in the Central African Republic, cost a total of 50,000 USD, whereas a single district SMART survey may cost upwards of 15,000 USD*. National actors are the first responders in nearly all crises and remain present long after international attention and funding fade. Bridging Local Leadership with Technical Expertise With funding from the UK Humanitarian Innovation Hub’s Systems Innovation Partnership, we are bridging RHA’s local leadership with technical expertise from the CHH, combining community trust with advanced epidemiological and statistical training. Together RHA and CHH are collaborating on a study to assess potential biases in mortality estimation through both primary data collection and innovative use of statistical approaches. We’re working to make mortality estimation more accurate, credible, and efficient, with the intent to apply the findings across humanitarian settings. In the primary data collection component, our study is comparing three different methods of mortality estimation: a retrospective household survey, rapid key informant listing, and a full census. Using a common reference population and recall period, the study aims to identify where biases arise, quantify which deaths are missed, and assess relative performance of a light-, medium- and resource-intensive approach to mortality measurement. In the statistical component, we are applying innovative use of established causal and design-based methods to assess biases. We are testing the utility and feasibility of these methods to answer questions like: to what extent are hard to capture deaths, such as neonatal and violent deaths, systematically missed; can fewer survey clusters still provide estimates precise enough for decision making; and can analytical adjustments be used to address known biases? We are also supporting localisation by building field-ready guidance tools designed to make mortality estimation more accessible to operational actors. These tools include an algorithm to help teams choose a method, an operational readiness checklist, and a guide to data validation, triangulation, interpretation. Our aim is to make mortality estimation practicable in even the most challenging settings, without compromising quality. As the best-placed actors to assess mortality, we hope to pilot the guidance with national actors in the DRC and elsewhere to ensure it is user-friendly, actionable, and scalable for use in any crisis. Looking Ahead: Making Mortality Count Without credible mortality data, humanitarian response risks being inefficient, inequitable, and disconnected from reality. We cannot respond appropriately to crises we do not understand. When those with the greatest capacity to measure mortality have the least stake in the results, the system fails. The best way to ensure efficiency and effectiveness is to place local organisations at the centre. Connecting local expertise with technical knowledge offers a path toward a fairer humanitarian sector, where the reality of a crisis is described by those living through it. *2017 estimate adjusted for inflation.
Country: Nigeria Source: International Organization for Migration Please refer to the attached file. The state government under the internal displacement solutions fund (IDSF) project launched the Solutions and mobility Index (SMI) in 2025 to evaluate the stability of areas hosting returnees or displaced populations in Agatu, Apa, Buruku, Gboko, Guma, Gwer East, Gwer West, Katsina-Ala, Konshisha, Kwande, Logo, Makurdi, Obi, Tarka, Ukum, Ushongo and Vandeikya LGAs of Benue State. The SMI seeks to understand factors influencing a location's stability to identify priority interventions for transition and recovery, to strengthen the resilience and stability in this conflict and displacement-affected region. The SMI measures perceptions of stability and analyzes factors having a larger impact on the decisions of populations to remain in place or move. The tool is implemented in the Benue State to enable governmental authorities and partners to develop better strategies and to prioritize resources that link humanitarian, recovery, and stabilization approaches. This report presents results of the analysis of the data collected on Solutions and Mobility Index Round I conducted in Nigeria’s Benue State in August 2025.
Country: Moldova Source: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies Please refer to the attached file. Description The late-May 2026 floods were one of Moldova’s sharpest localized hydrometeorological shocks in recent months, with Călărași and Ungheni identified by the government as the most affected districts after the torrential rains of 22 May. The damage profile was dominated by flooded households, damaged roads, pressure on dams and lakes, disrupted rail traffic, and agricultural losses. The human impact was serious but uneven: the confirmed district-level reporting shows at least one death in Călărași, multiple rescue operations, households inundated in both districts, and preventive evacuation planning for additional residents at risk. As of 28 May 2026, authorities were still assessing total monetary losses, so the available picture is operational and preliminary rather than final. The heavy precipitation led to rapid water level rises in rivers, streams, and artificial reservoirs, resulting in multiple cascading impacts: Dam and embankment failures, including a reported rupture of a local dam in Hîrjauca (Călărași district), which caused sudden downstream flooding. Overflow and flooding of lakes and ponds, raising concerns about inadequate maintenance and compliance with safety standards for water basins. Flash floods affecting rural settlements, with water entering households, agricultural land, and public infrastructure. Transport disruption, including blocked roads and temporarily halted rail traffic in affected zones. Power outages and preventive disconnections in several villages due to safety risks. Soil erosion, mudflows, and damage to agricultural assets, including greenhouses and crops. The combination of saturated soils and high runoff intensity significantly amplified the destructive capacity of the floods. The strongest cross-source figures available so far show that across the wider affected zone of Călărași, Strășeni, Ungheni, and Criuleni, the floods damaged or inundated 25 localities, affected 69 households, threatened around 400 households, flooded about 400 hectares of farmland, and damaged 55 km of roads. These are important numbers because they come from the crisis-management structure after the first response phase, so they likely reflect a more consolidated operational picture than the first-night reports. However, they are not yet final compensation figures. What happened The triggering event was the 22 May storm system, which brought torrential rain, strong winds, and major water accumulation. Moldova’s authorities shifted into crisis mode, with emergency teams, police, road services, rail services, and local authorities deployed to pump water, reinforce dikes, reopen transport links, and secure high-risk areas. The government explicitly said that Călărași and Ungheni were the hardest-hit districts. gov.md IGSU The disaster affected dozens of localities across at least two key districts, with secondary impacts reported in neighboring areas. Călărași: damage analysis Călărași appears to have suffered the most intense direct household and infrastructure shock. The immediate crisis was tied to dam failure/partial rupture, especially around Hîrjauca and Mîndra, where multiple reports say over 40 households were affected. Radio Moldova also reported that in Mîndra six households were completely destroyed, while many courtyards, wells, and agricultural plots were flooded. Local officials further said that in some mayoralties 70–80% of infrastructure was affected, with bridges and local transport links damaged. Radio Moldova Radio Moldova Human impact in Călărași was severe. The government confirmed the death of a 48-year-old man in Dereneu, linked to the flooding and heavy rains. Residents were trapped in houses and vehicles, and emergency services prepared for wider preventive evacuation around Bularda/Hîrbovăț if dikes failed. One operational report noted preparations for possible evacuation of over 20 households, while a TVR Moldova report said a field camp was readied for more than 200 people in case conditions worsened. Persons at the “Codru” sanatorium were also evacuated preventively. From an analytical perspective, Călărași’s vulnerability was not just rainfall intensity. It was the combination of intense runoff, small-basin/dam failure, and cascade effects from connected lakes and drainage channels. That made the district especially prone to sudden, high-energy flooding that damaged homes, roads, yards, wells, and local agricultural assets rather than only causing shallow standing water. Ungheni: damage analysis Ungheni’s impact pattern looks broader geographically but somewhat less concentrated in destroyed homes than Călărași, at least from the public reporting now available. The government said 11 localities in Ungheni district were affected. Emergency reports and media coverage describe flooded households and basements, people stranded in vehicles or on rooftops, and drainage work in both rural settlements and the town. The key infrastructure signal in Ungheni was instability around water bodies and transport links. In Rădenii Vechi, landslides damaged two bridges in Novaia Nicolaevca. Authorities also reported an alarming situation at Lake Delia, which had accumulated water from failed upstream basins, while controlled water release operations took place near Mănoilești and Cornova to reduce pressure. Floodwater was also removed from multiple households, basements, and a kindergarten in Ungheni. Ungheni was also significant in the rescue and transport-disruption dimension. Multiple calls for help were recorded there, including incidents with people trapped in vehicles and on rooftops. Rail disruption near Pârlița temporarily stopped the Chișinău–Kyiv train with 142 passengers, illustrating that the flood impact extended beyond houses into inter-district mobility and economic connectivity. Key human impact indicators include: The public reporting allows a careful estimate of population impact, but not yet a precise district-by-district headcount. What is solid: - 69 households were actually affected across the four main districts. Moldpres - More than 400 households were considered at risk, but authorities say they were protected through dike reinforcement and drainage operations. Moldpres - In Călărași, over 40 households were flooded in Hîrjauca and Mîndra, and more than 20 households were under evacuation contingency in Bularda/Hîrbovăț. Radio Moldova Moldpres - In Ungheni, 11 localities were affected, with flooded households, a kindergarten, damaged bridges, and multiple rescue incidents. What remains uncertain: - There is no finalized official headcount of people directly affected in Călărași and Ungheni alone. - There is also no final published monetary damage estimate yet. - One media roundup referred to two deaths across Călărași and Ungheni, but the clearest official district-level confirmation currently available is one death in Dereneu, Călărași. Based on household estimates and rural population density, the directly affected population is estimated at several hundred people, while the indirectly affected population (service disruption, mobility constraints, power outages, and economic losses) likely extends to several thousand residents across the two districts. Casualties and Vulnerable Groups At least one fatality was reported in Călărași district (Dereneu village) as a result of flooding-related incidents. Preventive evacuations were conducted, including from areas near the Codru sanatorium, to avoid loss of life. Vulnerable groups include rural households, elderly populations in isolated villages, and communities located near water basins and low-lying river valleys. The main analytical conclusion is that Călărași suffered the more destructive household and infrastructure blow, while Ungheni experienced wider spatial disruption and acute water-management stress, especially around lakes, slopes, and transport corridors. This distinction matters for recovery planning: Călărași needs more household reconstruction and local infrastructure repair, while Ungheni may need stronger slope stability, drainage, and basin management measures. Why these floods were so damaging The event shows a classic compound local flood pattern: Short, intense rainfall Overflow and failure pressure on ponds/dikes Cascade effects between connected basins Localized flash flooding in villages Secondary impacts on roads, rail, wells, and farmland That combination explains why relatively small localities could suffer disproportionate destruction. In other words, this was not only a “rain event”; it was a water-retention and drainage system stress event. Authorities at national and local levels activated emergency mechanisms: Deployment of emergency response teams, firefighters, police, and road services. Continuous water pumping, reinforcement of embankments, and clearance of blocked infrastructure. High-level field visits by government officials, with ongoing coordination between ministries. Ongoing damage assessment processes, as many impacts remain under evaluation due to receding waters. The situation remains dynamic, with residual risks linked to: further rainfall forecasts, saturated ground conditions, structural vulnerabilities of water retention infrastructure. On 26 May 2026, the leadership of the Red Cross Society of Moldova (MRCS), together with regional directors from affected districts, conducted a field visit toCălărași district, one of the areas most severely impacted by recent flooding caused by heavy rainfall. The mission aimed to assess field conditions, identify urgent community needs, and determine appropriate humanitarian support. In Dereneu village, discussions with local authorities focused on flood impacts, damage to households, and coordination of emergency response efforts. The MRCS team also met with a bereaved family affected by the disaster to express institutional solidarity and assess immediate support needs. In the Bularda area, the delegation met with GIES (IGSU) emergency responders engaged in flood protection works, including embankment reinforcement using sandbags and the creation of diversion channels. The team also reviewed ongoing emergency infrastructure measures and identified operational needs for responders and affected communities. In Mândra village, field visits to affected households were carried out in coordination with social workers to assess urgent humanitarian needs, including material assistance and psychosocial support for vulnerable families. MRCS reaffirmed its continued presence in the affected areas and its commitment to provide humanitarian assistance, psychosocial support, and coordination with local authorities. The organization emphasized its role in strengthening local response capacity and community resilience in line with its humanitarian mandate. By 27–28 May, authorities indicated that the immediate flood danger had been reduced through dike strengthening, pumping, and controlled drainage, but the recovery phase was only beginning. The local emergency commissions were still inventorying losses, and support from local budgets plus central government top-ups was being considered. That means the current picture is best read as initial impact analysis, not a completed loss-and-needs assessment. Călărași and Ungheni were the epicenter of Moldova’s May 2026 flood emergency. Călărași suffered the heaviest direct destruction to homes and local infrastructure, including dam-related flooding and at least one confirmed death. Ungheni experienced widespread multi-locality flooding, bridge damage, water-basin instability, and transport disruption. The total economic loss is still being assessed, but the event already shows a major combined impact on households, roads, farmland, and local resilience. Request For Assistance Government Requests International Assistance: Yes NS Requests International Assistance: No Information Bulletin Published No Actions taken by National Society General Damage/Needs assessment Relief/Supply distribution Psychosocial support services Summary Since the onset of the flooding emergency, the Red Cross Society of Moldova (MRCS) has been actively engaged in field presence, coordination, and rapid needs identification in the most affected districts, including Călărași and Ungheni. During the latest field engagement, MRCS leadership and regional teams conducted on-site visits to affected communities to assess humanitarian needs, strengthen coordination with local authorities and emergency services, and identify priority support areas. Special attention was given to severely affected households, vulnerable families, and cases requiring immediate assistance, including psychosocial support. Based on ongoing assessments, MRCS is preparing targeted assistance for approximately 200 affected households, including the provision of non-food items (NFIs), basic household support, and tailored assistance packages (PFA) where required for the most vulnerable cases. In parallel, the National Society has reinforced coordination with all relevant decision-making actors, including local public authorities, emergency response services, and social assistance structures, to ensure an integrated and timely response. MRCS remains actively present in the field and continues to adjust its response based on evolving needs, with a focus on humanitarian relief, psychosocial support, and strengthening local response capacities. Actions taken by others The Government of the Republic of Moldova is leading the emergency response through national and local authorities, with coordinated operational support on the ground. The General Inspectorate for Emergency Situations (IGSU) has been actively deployed, carrying out evacuations, water pumping, installation of sandbag barriers, and reinforcement of flood protection infrastructure in affected areas. The Ministry of Environment, the State Hydrometeorological Service, and the “Apele Moldovei” Administration have provided technical monitoring, hydrological updates, and support for water management interventions. Local authorities in Călărași and Ungheni are coordinating local response efforts, including damage reporting, community support, and identification of affected households. No large-scale UN emergency deployment has been reported at this stage, while coordination with humanitarian partners and local actors remains ongoing within existing national response mechanisms.
Country: Ukraine Source: UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs Delayed diplomacy in Ukraine deepens the threat to regional and international peace and security, ASG Khiari warns | United Nations Peace Operations Mr. President, As the Secretary-General just stated, today’s meeting takes place against the backdrop of an alarming escalation of the war in Ukraine. On the night of 23 to 24 May, the armed forces of the Russian Federation launched a massive strike across Ukraine, reportedly deploying as many as 90 long-range missiles and 600 drones. Among the weapons used was the so-called “Oreshnik” intermediate-range ballistic missile, which targeted the city of Bila Tserkva in central Ukraine. This marks the third known instance of the use of this weapon by the Russian Federation in Ukraine. At least five people were reported killed and at least 112 others injured across Ukraine, with the heaviest toll in Kyiv. The city’s more than two million residents endured over seven hours of explosions, impacting dozens of residential buildings. According to UNESCO, more than 30 cultural sites were reportedly damaged in this latest wave of attacks. The diplomatic residence of the Albanian Ambassador, and a compound housing the United Nations Resident Coordinator and several UN agencies, were impacted by falling debris from strikes in central Kyiv. Fortunately, no UN staff members were injured. Attacks continued into this week, impacting civilians across southern and eastern Ukraine. Russian Federation authorities have also reported rising civilian casualties from alleged Ukrainian strikes. On 25 May, two civilians were reportedly killed in the Belgorod and Bryansk regions. Mr. President, We remain deeply concerned over the recent announcement by the Russian Federation of plans to conduct, and I quote, “consistent and systemic strikes against Ukrainian defense enterprises in Kyiv – as well as against decision-making centres and command posts”, end of quote. This announcement followed reports of a Ukrainian drone attack on a college building and dormitory in the Ukrainian city of Starobilsk that is presently occupied by the Russian Federation. We strongly condemn all attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure. Such attacks, wherever they occur, violate international humanitarian law. They must cease immediately. Civilians must be protected. Mr. President, The United Nations and our humanitarian partners continue to operate under extremely dangerous conditions to reach civilians in need. In the past two weeks, United Nations humanitarian personnel, humanitarian partners, and assets, have come under attack on five occasions. This is unacceptable. Humanitarian personnel and clearly marked humanitarian missions must be protected at all times in accordance with international humanitarian law. The United Nations stands ready to work with both sides to ensure safe, sustained and unimpeded humanitarian access to communities in need, wherever they may be. Despite the challenging conditions, the United Nations continues to support recovery and reconstruction efforts, as well as human rights monitoring and advocacy. The United Nations is also focused on efforts to facilitate the safe return of deported and forcibly transferred Ukrainian children, including through the Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Children in Armed Conflict. Mr. President, In its fifth year, Russian Federation’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine continues to exact a profound toll – disrupting global trade and economy, deepening regional and international divisions, and eroding trust in the multilateral system. With each passing day diplomacy is delayed, the threat to regional and international peace and security deepens. An urgent return to dialogue and negotiations remains imperative. The United Nations will continue to fully support all meaningful efforts to that end. Thank you.
Country: Lebanon Source: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Please refer to the attached file. HIGHLIGHTS Hostilities continued despite the ceasefire extension announcement, with airstrikes and displacement orders affecting at least 40 new localities in southern Lebanon. A total of 33,897 families (129,724 people) remain displaced across 635 collective shelters. Close to 52 per cent of displaced people in collective shelters are women and girls. Hostilities have killed at least 3,185 people and injured 9,633 people since 2 March, according to Ministry of Public Health. An audit of gender-based violence (GBV) risks in 180 collective shelters has revealed severe protection risks. Between 21 and 25 May, nine incidents targeting health care were recorded, resulting in eight deaths and forty-five injuries among health care workers. Access to maternal health services and acute medical care remains critically constrained in communities south of the Litani River. The Lebanon Flash Appeal is 58 per cent funded. An extension until end August of the appeal will be launched in the first week of June 2026. SITUATION OVERVIEW Airstrikes across Nabatiyeh and South Lebanon Governorate including Tyre district continued, resulting in widespread casualties, displacement, and the destruction of civilian infrastructure. According to the Ministry of Public Health, 3,185 people have been killed since 2 March 2026, including 276 women and 217 children, while 9,633 people have been injured, among them 1,152 women and 854 children. Beyond immediate casualties, the death, injury, or displacement of adult household members is increasingly disrupting family structures. In many cases, women are assuming greater responsibility for care, income, decision-making, and access to assistance. Sustained and flexible funding is urgently needed to ensure that protection, cash, shelter, health, WASH, and livelihoods responses can identify and adequately support households facing these shifting dynamics. Displacement levels continue to rise due to ongoing hostilities and successive displacement orders. During the reporting period, 6 renewed and 6 new displacement orders were issued for 40 localities, the majority located in Tyre District in the South governorate. These orders have triggered significant new population movements across the south. As of 25 May 2026, approximately 129,724 people, representing 33,897 families, were reported as displaced across 635 collective shelters nationwide, reflecting a clear and sustained upward trend in displacement figures. Beirut and Mount Lebanon governorates continue to host the largest number of displaced people, while pressure on shelters across other governorates is also increasing. Despite a ceasefire extension announcement and the adoption of a World Health Assembly resolution calling for the protection of healthcare in Lebanon on 21 May 2026, attacks on medical personnel and facilities have continued. Since 2 March, 173 incidents have been recorded, resulting in 123 deaths and 273 injuries among health care workers, underscoring the urgent need for all parties to respect and uphold their obligations under International Humanitarian Law According to the Health Sector Emergency Situation Report, access to maternal and acute care south of the Litani River remains critically constrained, with patients facing delays of up to 48 hours to secure clearance for referral. Between 60 and 80 per cent of households in affected districts are unable to afford health services. The capacity of health systems is under severe strain, with only 68 per cent of facilities fully functional and 29 per cent partially operational, hampered by insecurity, staff shortages, stock depletion of essential medicines, and weak referral systems. Public health risks in areas affected by the hostilities are rising, with a growing incidence of respiratory infections, diarrheal diseases, mental health conditions, and injuries, compounded by critical shortages of medications for non-communicable diseases, trauma supplies, and fuel to operate health care facilities. On 22 May, the UN Humanitarian Coordinator visited Tyre alongside inter-sector coordination group agency leads. The group met with the Tyre Union of Municipalities and Disaster Risk Reduction Manager, who noted that current displacement numbers exceed those recorded during the 2024 conflict. It was also mentioned that small numbers of displaced families are returning despite ongoing risks, driven largely by economic pressure and strong attachment to their lands. A GBV safety audit of 180 collective shelters revealed severe protection risks, including overcrowding, lack of privacy, poor lighting, and inadequate separation of vulnerable groups, with female-headed households, adolescent girls, and people with disabilities identified as most at risk. Funding constraints remain a major challenge to sustaining life‑saving assistance. As of 25 May, the 2026, Lebanon Flash Appeal, requiring $308 million, is only 58 per cent funded with around $180 million received. The remaining significant funding gap is limiting the ability of humanitarian partners to maintain essential services and expand response capacities especially under continuous waves of renewed displacement.
Country: occupied Palestinian territory Source: Medical Aid for Palestinians On 1 June, Israeli authorities will invite bids from private companies to construct 3,400 new settlement units in the occupied West Bank – a step that would effectively cut off occupied East Jerusalem from the rest of the occupied West Bank, further fragment Palestinian territory, forcibly displace communities including Khan al-Ahmar and restrict access to essential healthcare. This step would consolidate Israeli control over the corridor linking East Jerusalem to the Ma’ale Adumim settlement bloc – an outcome widely recognised by governments as undermining the viability of a contiguous Palestinian state and violating international law. In a joint statement last week, the UK and partner governments warned that companies involved in such settlement activity may face “legal and reputational consequences.” Palestinian families in Khan Al-Ahmar now face imminent forced displacement after Israeli authorities moved last week to revive long-standing demolition orders against the community. Khan Al-Ahmar is one of 18 Bedouin and herding communities in the path of the plan. Around 4,000 Palestinians across the 18 communities could lose their homes and land. Abu Khamees, a community leader in Khan Al-Ahmar, has lived under the shadow of demolition orders for years. Nothing, he says, prepared him for this. “Families here are not prepared to leave. We had been living in limbo for years given a temporary halt on the demolition order. The decision for imminent forced displacement was like an electric shock to us. People are anxious about where to go with their children as well as how to access essential services like health and education. People here have already been suffering because reaching healthcare has been extremely difficult, with interrupted services due to movement restrictions and checkpoints. "This is a nail in the coffin of the so-called two-state solution; with the forced displacement of our community Khan Al-Ahmar, and the completion of the E1 settlement project, which has been considered a redline by Western governments for decades. This also jeopardises regional peace and stability. What is the international community willing to do after all these empty promises?" MAP’s mobile clinics have delivered essential healthcare to over 33,000 Palestinians across 22 communities since 2025. Many of these communities are in “Area C”, which covers approximately 60% of the West Bank and is under full Israeli military control, where access to permanent health services is denied due to Israel’s apartheid policies. In these areas, mobile care is often the only lifeline, reaching isolated communities that are cut off from hospitals and clinics due to movement restrictions and settlement expansion. Israel's illegal settlement expansion across the West Bank has systematically fragmented Palestinian communities, severing patients from hospitals and clinics through settler-only roads, checkpoints and the separation wall. Settler violence has further deterred patients and healthcare workers from travelling. The result is a population denied timely, consistent access to the healthcare they urgently need. Khan al-Ahmar is not an isolated case. A parallel E2 project south of Bethlehem would see around 2,500 new settlement units built in a corridor designed to sever the southern West Bank in half. Israeli authorities have already approved 3,401 new settlement units in the E1 area alone. Israeli settlement expansion is compounded by escalating settler violence, which forms part of a broader coercive environment driving the displacement of Palestinians and entrenching de facto annexation. In a single week (12-18 May 2026), settlers carried out more than 50 attacks, including arson targeting homes, farmland and a mosque. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) , 870 attacks have been recorded across more than 220 communities so far this year – an average of six per day. Since January 2025, settler violence and related access restrictions have displaced thousands of Palestinians across the West Bank, with at least 38-45 rural and herding communities fully or largely emptied. Aseel Baidoun, MAP’s Deputy Director of Advocacy and Communications based in the West Bank, said: “The threatened destruction of Khan al-Ahmar exposes the hollowness of years of international handwringing over illegal settlements. Governments have spent decades calling E1 a red line, warning it would shatter any prospects of a viable Palestinian state, while doing virtually nothing to curb Israel's impunity. "If Khan al-Ahmar is erased from the map, it will not happen quietly or accidentally. It will happen after years of empty statements, diplomatic theatre, and deliberate political cowardice from governments that claim to support international law while allowing Israel to carve apart the West Bank piece by piece. Empty condemnation while illegal settlements expand in plain sight is not diplomacy – it's complicity in the ethnic cleansing.” MAP calls on the UK government to follow in the Netherlands, Spain, Slovenia, and Ireland’s footsteps and end trade with illegal Israeli settlements in the West Bank. This move, backed by 119 MPs, is consistent with the International Court of Justice’s July 2024 ruling that Israel’s decades-long occupation of the West Bank is unlawful. Nearly two years on from the ICJ’s advisory opinion, the UK government has still not published its legal review or set out any concrete steps to implement it. [ENDS] Aseel Baidoun, Deputy Director of Advocacy and Communications, based in Ramallah is available for interview on request. Please contact the press office to arrange at: press@map.org.uk or +44 (0) 203 869 1310 About Medical Aid for Palestinians (MAP) Medical Aid for Palestinians (MAP) works for a future where every Palestinian has access to a comprehensive, effective and locally-led system of healthcare, and the full realisation of their rights to health and dignity. We work in the occupied Palestinian territory and in Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon.
Country: Lebanon Source: Human Rights Watch Cette décision en période de conflit renforce l’opposition mondiale aux mines antipersonnel (Beyrouth, 27 mai 2026) – L’adhésion récente du Liban à la Convention sur l’interdiction des mines antipersonnel, alors même que ce pays traverse une période de conflit armé, met en evidence l’importance vitale de ce traité pour sauver des vies et reconstruire les communautés, a déclaré aujourd’hui Human Rights Watch. La décision du gouvernement libanais, devrait inciter d’autres pays, en particulier au Moyen-Orient et en Afrique du Nord, à soutenir également les normes mondiales contre les mines antipersonnel. « L’adhésion du Liban à la Convention sur l’interdiction des mines antipersonnel, alors même que des combats destructeurs ravagent le pays et la région, constitue une étape importante pour protéger la vie des civils, soutenir les victimes des mines et décontaminer les terres de communautés », a déclaré Verity Coyle, directrice adjointe de la division Crises, conflits et armes à Human Rights Watch. « Les États qui n’ont pas encore adhéré a la Convention devraient d’urgence suivre cet exemple. » Les mines antipersonnel tuent et blessent des personnes de manière indiscriminée. Elles sont généralement posées manuellement, mais peuvent également être dispersées par des avions, des roquettes, des tirs d'artillerie, des drones ou des véhicules spécialisés. Les mines terrestres non déminées restent dangereuses jusqu'à ce qu'elles soient localisées et détruites. La présence de mines dans des terres est susceptible de provoquer le déplacement de civils, d’entraver l'acheminement d'aide humanitaire et d’empêcher les activités agricoles. La Convention sur l’interdiction des mines antipersonnel de 1997 (« Convention d’Ottawa ») interdit totalement l’utilisation des mines antipersonnel et exige des pays qu’ils détruisent leurs stocks, déminent les zones minées et viennent en aide aux victimes. Le Liban est fortement contaminé par des mines terrestres antipersonnel. Malgré les efforts de déminage en cours qui permettent de retirer des milliers de mines chaque année, à la fin de 2024, au moins 15,79 kilomètres carrés de terres restaient contaminés par des mines terrestres et 4,67 kilomètres carrés supplémentaires étaient contaminés par des armes à sous-munitions, qui agissent en fait comme des mines terrestres. En 2023, la Force intérimaire des Nations Unies au Liban (FINUL) a estimé que cette contamination touchait au moins 200 000 personnes au Liban. Entre 2015 et 2024, les mines ou les restes explosifs de guerre ont tué au moins 167 personnes au Liban. Le gouvernement libanais a manifesté son intérêt pour une adhésion à la Convention depuis le début des années 2000, mais a invoqué la situation sécuritaire du pays comme un obstacle. En décembre 2009, le directeur du Centre libanais d'action contre les mines (CLAM) a affirmé que le Liban n’avait « jamais produit ni exporté de mines antipersonnel ». En janvier 2026, le Conseil des ministres libanais a publié un décret approuvant l’adhésion du pays à la Convention d’Ottawa. Le 1er mai, le Liban a déposé son instrument d’adhésion à la Convention auprès des Nations Unies à New York devenant ainsi le 162ème pays à y adhérer. Le traité entrera en vigueur pour le Liban le 1er novembre 2026. L'adhésion du Liban intervient à un moment critique pour la Convention, dont cinq États européens – l’Estonie, la Finlande la Lettonie et la Lituanie et la Pologne – ont annoncé leur retrait en 2025 ; l'Ukraine a tenté de suspendre ses obligations. Tous ces pays ont invoqué des préoccupations de sécurité comme principale raison de leurs décisions. Le Liban est désormais tenu de soumettre un rapport de transparence initial à l’ONU et de commencer à mettre en œuvre les dispositions de la Convention sur tout territoire relevant de sa juridiction ou de son contrôle, en toutes circonstances. D'autres États devraient suivre l'exemple du Liban et adhérer immédiatement à la Convention. Il s’agit notamment des pays suivants, dans la région du Moyen-Orient et de l'Afrique du Nord : l'Arabie saoudite, Bahreïn, l'Égypte, les Émirats arabes unis, l'Iran, Israël, la Libye, le Maroc et la Syrie. « L’adhésion du Liban à au traité interdisant les mines antipersonnel renforce l’opposition mondiale à ces armes horribles, et devrait encourager d’autres États à faire de même », a conclu Verity Coyle. « Le fait que le Liban ait pris cet engagement juridique en pleine crise devrait rappeler aux autres pays pourquoi les traités internationaux protégeant les civils sont si essentiels. »
Country: Lebanon Source: Human Rights Watch Please refer to the attached file. Accession Amid Conflict Strengthens Global Opposition to Antipersonnel Mines (Beirut, May 27, 2026) – Lebanon’s recent accession to the Mine Ban Treaty amid an ongoing armed conflict underscores the treaty’s vital importance for saving lives and rebuilding communities, Human Rights Watch said today. The government’s decision should motivate other countries, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa, to support the global norm against antipersonnel mines. “Lebanon’s adoption of the Mine Ban Treaty during unrelenting fighting and destruction at home and in the region is an important step toward safeguarding civilian lives, assisting mine victims, and restoring land to its communities,” said Verity Coyle, deputy crisis, conflict and arms director at Human Rights Watch. “States that haven’t signed on should urgently follow suit.” Antipersonnel mines kill and wound people indiscriminately. They are typically placed by hand but can also be scattered by aircraft, rockets, artillery, and drones or dispersed from specialized vehicles. Uncleared landmines remain a danger until located and destroyed. Mined land can drive displacement of civilians, hinder the delivery of humanitarian aid, and prevent agricultural activities. The Mine Ban Treaty, which entered into force in 1999, comprehensively prohibits the use of antipersonnel mines and requires countries to destroy their stockpiles, clear mined areas, and help victims. Lebanon is heavily contaminated with antipersonnel landmines. Despite ongoing clearance efforts that remove thousands of mines every year, by the end of 2024 at least 15.79 square kilometers of land remained contaminated with landmines and an additional 4.67 square kilometers were contaminated with cluster munitions, which effectively act as landmines. In 2023, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) estimated that this contamination affects at least 200,000 people in Lebanon. Between 2015 and 2024, mines or explosive remnants of war killed at least 167 people in Lebanon. The Lebanese government has shown interest in the Mine Ban Treaty since the early 2000s but pointed to the security situation in the country as an impediment. In December 2009, Lebanon confirmed that it “has never produced or exported antipersonnel mines.” In January 2026, Lebanon’s Council of Ministers issued a decree approving the country’s accession to the treaty. Lebanon deposited its instrument of accession to the treaty with the United Nations in New York City on May 1, becoming the 162nd country to join. The treaty will enter into force for Lebanon on November 1, 2026. Lebanon’s accession comes at a critical time for the treaty as five European states—Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Finland, and Poland—withdrew from the treaty in 2025, and Ukraine has attempted to suspend its obligations, all citing security concerns as the primary reason for their decision. Lebanon is now required to submit an initial transparency report to the UN and begin to implement the provisions of the Mine Ban Treaty in territory under its jurisdiction or control under all circumstances. Other states should follow Lebanon’s example and join the treaty immediately. Countries in the Middle East and North Africa region that remain outside the Mine Ban Treaty include Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Israel, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and the United Arab Emirates. “Lebanon’s joining the Mine Ban Treaty strengthens global opposition to these horrific weapons and should encourage other states to do so,” Coyle said. “The fact that Lebanon made this legal commitment in the midst of a crisis should remind other countries why international treaties protecting civilians are so critical.”
Country: Sudan Sources: REACH Initiative, Save the Children Please refer to the attached file. CONTEXT & RATIONALE Since April 2023, the conflict in Sudan has continued across various parts of the country, severely affecting civilian populations and disrupting access to essential services. Famine (IPC Phase 5) is ongoing in Kadugli amid intensifying circumstances.¹ Although supply lines and access to the population of Kadugli is expected to improve with the easing of the siege, conflict continues to drive displacement, looting, and severe disruptions to livelihoods, trade, access to services, and mutual and humanitarian aid.² According to internal IMPACT Public Health Landscape data analysis, populations in Kadugli locality lack critical public health information, limiting evidence-based decision-making, program prioritization, and effective response. This assessment aims to generate critical evidence to inform humanitarian programming, guide response planning and support resource mobilization for a large, highly vulnerable population. The rapid needs assessment was conducted in collaboration with Save the Children (SCI) between 6-18 of December 2025, covering 289 households (153 HHs: Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and 136 HHs: host community) with the objective of determining the humanitarian needs of affected populations in Kadugli locality. Findings are indicative only, and can not be generalized beyond the assessed populations.
Countries: Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda Source: International Peace Institute On May 15, 2026, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) confirmed its seventeenth recorded outbreak of Ebola, in Ituri province. Since then, the number of cases has risen to over 900 and the virus has crossed into Uganda and reached the provinces of North and South Kivu, now controlled by the Rwanda-backed M23. Initial reports suggesting that the outbreak may have been circulating for weeks and local health authorities were underprepared to swiftly mount a containment strategy. As Ebola Returns to Eastern DRC, International Responders Must Not Repeat the Mistakes of 2018 May 26, 2026by Dirk Druet Ebola task force of MONUSCO and UNICEF Focal point Felicien Malyra (with information pamphlet), inform prisoners at the jail “Kakwangura" in Butembo in North Kivu about how they may protect themselves against the Ebola Virus on August 9, 2019. UN Photo/Martine Perret. On May 15, 2026, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) confirmed its seventeenth recorded outbreak of Ebola, in Ituri province. Since then, the number of cases has risen to over 900 and the virus has crossed into Uganda and reached the provinces of North and South Kivu, now controlled by the Rwanda-backed M23. Initial reports suggesting that the outbreak may have been circulating for weeks and local health authorities were underprepared to swiftly mount a containment strategy. As international concern grows that the deadly virus might be out of control, the mounting public health response is facing an even more challenging environment than during the last major outbreak in 2018. No vaccine exists for this strain of the virus and Goma, the logistical hub of eastern DRC, is occupied by an armed group. The UN peacekeeping operation in the DRC (MONUSCO) has been drawing down its operations and is now confined to Ituri and North Kivu. On top of this, the global health architecture is under strain following the US withdrawal from the World Health Organization (WHO) earlier this year and a growing deficit in funding to address health emergencies. In this challenging and high-risk context, it is critical that the lessons of the last outbreak inform the management of this one. The temptation in a fast-moving outbreak is to treat the response as an urgent technical problem requiring an urgent technical solution: identify cases, trace contacts, isolate the infected, vaccinate where possible, and bury the deceased safely. But as many learned during the COVID-19 pandemic, emergency health responses in complex political situations are not neutral interventions in passive contexts; they are political acts. This is particularly true in conflict environments, where large-scale public health responses distribute resources at scale, legitimize or delegitimize particular actors, reshape local security arrangements, and engage with populations that read them through the lens of the conflict. When the Health Response Became Part of the Conflict in the DRC In eastern DRC, the 2018–2020 Ebola outbreak was described by WHO as a “perfect storm” in which a highly infectious disease was spreading in an area of active conflict. The Congolese public, particularly in the country’s east, widely viewed their government as predatory, and much of the affected population resided in crowded conditions with poor health infrastructure and was located near porous international borders. Given the seriousness of the risks to local and international public health, WHO and partners in the international community launched a massive health and humanitarian response. This operation was grounded in the principle of “no regrets,” which holds that it is better to overreact to a public health emergency and adjust later rather than act too late. This approach was broadly seen as empowering WHO to take direct action in the affected area with only limited consultation with other parts of the UN system. Many of the decisions made during this period had devastating side effects: they empowered officials and security forces notorious for reprisals against local communities and produced what became known as the “Ebola Business”—a war economy with actors invested in prolonging the crisis. This conflation of the Ebola response with the conflict led to community resistance and violence against health workers that inhibited containment and accelerated transmission. By the time the outbreak was declared over in 2020, more than 3,400 people had been infected, of which some 2,200 had died. Moreover, the conflict in eastern DRC had become even more entrenched, with the ADF armed group carrying out sustained atrocities in Beni territory in North Kivu. MONUSCO’s authority was openly contested by host populations, culminating in the torching of its office in Boikene, near the town of Beni, in 2019. The risks to Congolese lives and international public health posed by the latest outbreak merit a large, swift health and humanitarian response. Such a response is all the more urgent following recent cuts to international support to the Congolese national health system, particularly as a result of the dismantling of USAID, which have reduced the country’s epidemic preparedness and likely undermined its capacity for early detection. However, a response that is not grounded in an understanding of conflict dynamics is likely to hamper efforts to stem transmission. In a 2022 study for the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, I analyzed the national and international response to the 2018–2020 outbreak and proposed a variety of ways international responders could have done things differently. Three recommendations from that study remain relevant for the current outbreak: Treat conflict and political economy analysis as central to the design of the health response: In 2018, WHO did not request MONUSCO’s analysis of the security and political landscape into which it was deploying, and MONUSCO was not informed in advance of several key WHO decisions. These included WHO’s decision to engage personnel from the Agence Nationale de Renseignements, a state security service notorious in eastern DRC for human rights abuses, as “community liaisons” who in practice helped direct where the response deployed. That arrangement, documented by the Congo Research Group, created perverse incentives, securitized the response, and lowered public trust in the health response. Position peace and security actors at arm’s length from health activities: There is a critical distinction between using security actors to provide a generally permissive security environment for a health response and using them to provide direct, proximate security. Using uniformed personnel to escort vehicles, guard clinic perimeters, or cordon off health facilities changes the character of the intervention in the eyes of affected communities. The 2018–2020 experience in Beni and Butembo demonstrated how rapidly the proximity of security actors to the health response led that response to be associated with them, sparking hostility against it. While MONUSCO and national security services may have a role in promoting security during the health response, they should clearly distinguish themselves from humanitarian and health operations. Balance the urgency of epidemic response with community engagement and operational flexibility: The “no regrets” posture that prevailed in 2018 produced the conditions that ultimately undermined its effectiveness. Public health measures only function if affected populations trust them enough to participate; securitized responses that treat communities as obstacles rather than partners are counterproductive. In practice, this means accepting slower initial reach in exchange for community-acceptable delivery—local responders rather than teams parachuted in from Kinshasa, motorcycles rather than Land Cruisers, and burial practices negotiated with families rather than imposed on them. WHO’s Global Health and Peace Initiative, and Its Limits To its credit, WHO has not ignored the 2018–2020 experience. In the years following the outbreak, the organization developed the Global Health and Peace Initiative (GHPI), built around two pillars: (1) making health programming “conflict-sensitive” by extending the “do no harm” principle into operational practice and (2) where conditions allow, making it “peace-responsive” by designing health interventions to actively contribute to peace outcomes such as social cohesion, dialogue, and community resilience. The initiative is likely to influence WHO’s thinking as it rapidly designs and rolls out its response to the current crisis. In a 2023 paper for the International Peace Institute, I argued that while the GHPI’s conceptual direction is broadly correct, its operationalization in violent conflict settings carries risks that have not yet been adequately addressed. Two in particular could present challenges for the response in eastern DRC. First, it is unclear how WHO and its partners in the field, including organizations such as Médecins Sans Frontières, will reconcile the principles of conflict sensitivity and humanitarian impartiality when the two pull in opposing directions. For example, even if a conflict-sensitive analysis identifies that delivering a particular intervention will exacerbate conflict dynamics (e.g., if negotiating access through a non-state armed group will entrench that group’s position), that intervention may still be compelled to proceed under the principle of humanitarian impartiality. The GHPI offers no framework for managing that tradeoff. Second, the initiative holds that programming “must be led at national level—from national authorities down to the community level.” This instinct to promote national ownership was borne of the lessons of the 2014-2016 Ebola crisis in West Africa, where the UN was criticized for bypassing national institutions. However, this principle becomes highly problematic when the state is itself a party to the conflict. In eastern DRC, much of the population views Congolese state institutions with hostility born of long experience. Deferring to national ownership without qualification risks reproducing the legitimacy problem that fueled community resistance in 2018 and could empower the predatory actors the response should be insulated from. The outbreak in the DRC demands a more localized, nuanced process for deciding on the role of national actors, grounded in thorough conflict analysis. The Way Forward The international response in eastern DRC will succeed or fail—and it is critical that it succeed—on its ability to implement emergency public health measures within the region’s long-standing social, political, and security quagmire. This will require three deliberate moves from the outset: (1) joint conflict and political-economy analysis to shape deployment decisions rather than follow them; (2) a security posture of less proximate protection combined with negotiated community-level access; and (3) a response built on localized approaches to engaging existing community structures and calibrating the role of national actors. Many further challenges will emerge that will demand difficult choices—not least the reconciliation of the dilemmas innate to the GHPI—but the decisions international responders make in the next weeks could have profound implications for regional and international public health. Originally Published in the Global Observatory
Countries: World, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lebanon, Myanmar, Nigeria, occupied Palestinian territory, Sudan, Ukraine, Yemen Source: Action on Armed Violence The United Nations has issued a dark warning about the state of civilian protection in modern conflict, declaring that the gap between international commitments and the reality faced by civilians “widened further” during 2025. In a major report released by Secretary-General António Guterres ahead of the annual Security Council debate on the protection of civilians, the UN paints a picture of warfare that is increasingly characterised by urban destruction, displacement, hunger and attacks on critical infrastructure. Although the UN recorded more than 37,000 civilian deaths across 20 armed conflicts in 2025, a slight decline after three years of increases, the report stresses that the overall level of suffering remains severe. “Approximately one recorded civilian death every 14 minutes” occurred during the year, the report notes. It also noted that the true toll is likely much higher because many casualties cannot be verified or documented. How many dead lie under the ruins of Gaza or Mariupol is unknown, for instance. Most importantly, perhaps, the report clearly identifies the use of explosive weapons in towns and cities as one of the principal drivers of civilian harm. “The use of missiles, bombs and other explosive weapons in cities and populated areas remained a leading cause of civilian harm,” the Secretary-General writes, highlighting the growing use of drones carrying explosive payloads in urban environments. In documenting this trend, the UN used data gathered by Action on Armed Violence (AOAV). The report specifically cites AOAV’s Explosive Weapons Monitor 2025 in its assessment of civilian fatalities caused by explosive weapons across conflict zones. AOAV’s monitoring has for over a decade tracked the human impact of explosive violence worldwide. Our data consistently shows that when explosive weapons are used in populated areas, around 90% of those killed and injured are civilians. The UN report points to particularly high levels of civilian casualties linked to explosive weapons in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lebanon, Myanmar, Nigeria, Sudan, Ukraine, Yemen and the Occupied Palestinian Territory. It also documents the widespread destruction of hospitals, schools, places of worship, water systems, electricity grids and telecommunications infrastructure. Three conflicts stand out for the scale of devastation they inflicted during 2025: Sudan, Ukraine and the Occupied Palestinian Territory. In Sudan, the UN recorded more than 11,000 civilian deaths, while attacks on power stations, water facilities and dams left large parts of the country without essential services. In Ukraine, civilian deaths rose significantly compared with previous years, with more than 2,500 civilians killed and 12,000 injured. Meanwhile, in Gaza, the report states that at least 20,000 Palestinians were killed or their remains recovered during 2025 alone. The report also highlights the growing role of emerging technologies in warfare. Drone attacks have increased dramatically in recent years, while artificial intelligence is increasingly being used to support military decision-making and target identification. According to the UN, drone attacks in conflict settings increased by at least 4,000% between 2020 and 2024. The Secretary-General warns that such technologies risk expanding the reach of violence and increasing civilian exposure to harm if safeguards are not established. Humanitarian agencies are also facing unprecedented dangers. More than 325 aid workers were reported killed in conflict settings during 2025, marking the third consecutive year of record fatalities. Journalists, too, faced escalating risks, with 60 of the 96 journalist killings recorded globally occurring in conflict zones. “Legal protections and norms are being disregarded, distorted or abandoned altogether,” the Secretary-General warns in the report. He argues that military advantage is increasingly being prioritised over the protection of civilians and civilian infrastructure. Among the report’s recommendations are stronger restrictions on the use of explosive weapons in populated areas, greater accountability for violations of international humanitarian law, and wider implementation of the Political Declaration on Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas. The Secretary-General also calls on states to improve civilian harm tracking and assessment, arguing that understanding both direct and indirect impacts of warfare is essential to reducing future suffering. Dr Iain Overton, Executive Director of Action on Armed Violence (AOAV), said: “The Secretary-General’s report darkly confirms what AOAV’s data has been showing now for years: when explosive weapons are used in populated areas, civilians bear the burden. Behind every data point casts the long shadow of a shattered family or a future stalked by violence. The evidence is clear. Stop bombing cities. The challenge now is whether governments have the political will not to do so.”
Country: South Sudan Source: UN Children's Fund Please refer to the attached file. Highlights Conflict-driven displacement has intensified humanitarian needs, with 276,500 people displaced across Jonglei, Lakes, Upper Nile, and Central Equatoria since December 2025, including 110,000 seeking refuge in Ethiopia, further straining services. Concurrent outbreaks — including a resurgence of cholera alongside measles, mpox, and circulating vaccine-derived poliovirus type 2 (cVDPV2) — are deepening vulnerability, eroding coping capacities, and heightening risks of malnutrition and preventable diseases, especially among children. UNICEF has activated a Level 2 response to strengthen coordination, accelerate decision making, and scale up life-saving assistance amid escalating conflict, disease outbreaks, and humanitarian access constraints. The 2026 Humanitarian Action for Children (HAC) appeal is only 32 per cent funded against the $197 million required, leaving critical gaps in response capacity amid rapidly growing needs.
Country: World Source: UN Women Crises are not gender-neutral. Women and girls are disproportionately affected due to pre-existing gender inequalities and discriminatory social norms, which limit their access to humanitarian aid, services, resources, and decision-making power. It is not surprising that the 30-year review of progress on the landmark Beijing Declaration and Platform of Action found that progress for women and girls is slowest in conflict and crisis-affected countries. The review raised the alarm about how ongoing trends may further thwart progress. The data is stark: Women and girls in extremely fragile contexts are 7.7 times more likely to live in households below the poverty line of USD 2.15 per day than those in non-fragile contexts. Under a worst-case climate scenario, up to 158.3 million additional women and girls could be pushed into poverty by 2050 as a direct result of climate change, surpassing the number of men and boys by 16 million. The number of food-insecure women and girls could rise by as much as 236 million, compared with an additional 131 million men and boys. The average incidence of child marriage in conflict-affected countries is 14.4 percentage points higher than in non-conflict settings. More than a third of maternal deaths occurred in 48 fragile and conflict-affected countries. Sexual violence in conflict zones has risen sharply in recent years, while impunity for these violations has remained the norm. Girls’ educational attainment continues to lag in conflict-affected countries. Behind these numbers are women and girls who have lost their lives, had their safety and health shattered, their rights eroded, their dignity compromised, and their potential squandered. From Gaza and Sudan to Haiti, Lebanon, and elsewhere, the gendered impacts are both immediate and long term, affecting individuals and societies. They are also not contained within borders. For example, according to a UN Women gender alert on the military escalation in the Middle East, rising food and fuel prices and supply disruptions risk deepening food insecurity and livelihood erosion and increasing unpaid care burdens for women and girls across the Arab region, Asia-Pacific, Africa, and beyond. A humanitarian system under pressure The unfolding tragedy of escalating and protracted conflicts and crises and growing humanitarian needs is taking place against a backdrop of several important global trends. First, recent years have seen a rising backlash against gender equality taking place within the wider context of democratic erosion and shrinking civic space in various countries and regions. This is influencing government policies as well as mainstream opinions and attitudes – and threatening hard-won gains for women and girls. Second, the world is experiencing a severe contraction of international aid precisely when it is needed the most. Recent data from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development shows that international aid fell in 2025 by 23.1 per cent in real terms compared with 2024, representing the largest annual drop in the history of official development assistance. This brings aid back to 2015 levels – the year the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development began. As the Global Humanitarian Overview 2025 lays bare, the massive cuts to aid have forced the humanitarian system to do the “cruel math of doing less with less” and “hyper-prioritize” assistance toward those assessed to be in the direst need. The Humanitarian Reset, launched through the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) in March 2025, aims to make the system faster, lighter, more accountable, and more impactful. Against this backdrop, the international community needs to take bold and urgent action based on ample evidence of what works and rooted in existing commitments to gender equality and women’s rights. Put gender equality at the center of the reset First, gender equality needs to be a cornerstone of the ongoing Humanitarian Reset and not seen as a peripheral issue. In the drive for efficiency, simplification, and focus on strictly defined and hyper-prioritized life-saving assistance, there is a risk that implementation of the IASC’s commitments to gender equality may fall short. As funding contracts and established universal norms are under attack, now is the time to double down and prioritize interventions led by women and in support of their lives, dignity, and rights. Under the reset, there is a commitment that the humanitarian system will “defend” norms and principles, including on gender equality. The reset’s outcomes will depend on how consistently and concretely this is done at different levels – globally and in countries. A critical pillar is to recognize women’s vital and rich contributions in crisis-affected settings and enable their full and equal participation and leadership in decision-making processes. Women and girls are not passive victims or mere recipients of aid – they are responders on the front lines and are shaping the outcomes of crises, as community leaders and organizers, primary caregivers, educators, economic contributors, and peacebuilders. There is plenty of evidence that their leadership is a precondition for effective humanitarian responses, as well as for addressing the root causes of conflicts and for building sustainable recovery and peace. And yet we are far from achieving longstanding commitments to women’s participation and leadership as per the Sustainable Development Goals and the Women, Peace and Security agenda. All too often, participation remains tokenistic and women may have seats but no real influence over decisions made. Whether in internationally led mediation processes, in country-level humanitarian teams and cluster coordination groups, in funding allocation advisory boards, or in other decision-making forums – women need to be equally present and heard, and their perspectives recognized and heeded. They need to be able to exercise this fundamental right safely and without negative repercussions. Fund women-led and women’s rights organizations Second, women-led and women’s rights organizations working in conflict and crisis-affected countries need urgent funding. They were already underfunded and overstretched prior to recent funding cuts. UN Women’s report, At a breaking point, warns that these cuts have placed enormous additional strain on their vital work and even their very existence. Both the quantity and the quality of funding matter. Funding needs to be flexible, multi-year, and reflective of the holistic and transformative nature of their work, which is not only life-saving and life-sustaining but also often encompasses longer-term development, peace, democracy building, human rights, and gender-equality objectives. Both funding and broader political support need to take into account the significant, often overlooked, risks faced in crisis settings by women, girls, gender-diverse leaders, and human rights defenders. Work across the humanitarian–development–peace nexus Finally, it is critical that humanitarian, development, and peace actors work more closely and effectively together to address the complex challenges of today’s protracted and multifaceted crises. Meeting immediate needs should go hand in hand with building community resilience to disasters, strengthening governance systems, and addressing the root causes of conflict. Gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls need to be embedded throughout this nexus and its various components – from defining collective gender outcomes, to conducting joint gender analysis and assessments, to harmonizing funding streams with gender markers and ambitious targets for funding projects and interventions that address women’s specific needs, advance gender equality, or empower women. The stakes could not be higher. As the international community navigates an era of shrinking resources, eroding norms, and multiplying crises, the choices made now will determine whether women and girls are left further behind or emerge as the architects of more just and resilient societies. Delivering on commitments to gender equality in crisis settings is not a matter of idealism – it is a prerequisite for effective, sustainable, and principled responses. The evidence is clear and the commitments exist. The world cannot afford the cost of inaction. This article is reprinted with permission from SDG Action. About the author Asya Varbanova has 20 years of experience advancing sustainable development and gender equality in complex political, post-conflict and crisis contexts, across Europe, Central and South Asia, and the Middle East. Currently serving as Head of Humanitarian Section/Deputy Chief. She has led Country Offices of UN Women in Turkiye, Moldova, Serbia and North Macedonia. She has managed development programmes and humanitarian responses in diverse settings, translating normative commitments on women’s rights and empowerment into operational results and spearheading multi-stakeholder partnerships across the UN, government institutions, civil society and private sector to advance impact at scale and institutional and systemic change.
Country: occupied Palestinian territory Source: UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East Please refer to the attached files. All information updated for 20 - 25 May 2026 [1] Days 955 - 960 since the start of the war in the Gaza Strip Highlights The Gaza Strip The Gaza Strip has seen a renewed military escalation over recent weeks, with increasing civilian casualties and displacement of people. Israeli forces have issued multiple evacuation orders as well as shelter-in-place orders in areas west of the Israeli-militarised “Yellow Line” zone, including in Gaza City, Der al Balah, Maghazi, Bureij, and Nuseirat. Shelter-in-place orders have also affected two UNRWA installations, including a school-turned-shelter in Nuseirat, hosting displaced people. UNRWA medical surveillance teams continue to report an increase in ectoparasitic infections, such as scabies, as well as rodent bites, chickenpox cases, and acute watery diarrhoea among both children under five years and individuals above five years. When briefing about her recent visit to Gaza, the WHO’s representative in the OPT, Dr. Renee Van de Weerdt stated that dire conditions in Gaza marked by continuing violence, rodent infestations and the spread of infectious disease are being made worse by blockages of essential medical supplies. Furthermore, she insisted that “nobody can replace what UNRWA is doing.” Nutrition partners observed a 21 per cent increase in malnutrition admissions between January – April 2026 compared to the same period in 2025, despite the ceasefire. On 20 May, UNRWA began operating a new Temporary Learning Space (TLS) at a displacement site south of Khan Younis, marking the first TLS established in a location where there are no operational UNRWA installations. Within a week, 1,600 children registered in the new TLS, which is made up of multiple tents. This initiative is part of the Agency’s efforts to reach children where the needs are greatest, and it was made possible through strong community engagement and the support of education cluster partners. The West Bank, including East Jerusalem The Israeli Minister of Finance instructed the Israeli Civil Administration to advance the enforcement of demolition orders related to the Palestine Refugee Bedouin community of Khan al Ahmar. The community, located east of Jerusalem in the E1 corridor slated for Israeli settlement expansion, is home to more than 700 Palestine Refugees. The UN Secretary-General condemned the decision of Israeli authorities to establish Israeli military facilities on the premises of the UNRWA compound in East Jerusalem, which was expropriated in January 2026, stating that he “urges the Government of Israel to rescind its decision and immediately return to the United Nations the UNRWA Sheikh Jarrah compound.” From Ibrahim, 57 years old, a father in Gaza: “There is no life without water.”
Country: occupied Palestinian territory Source: Data Friendly Space Please refer to the attached file. Overview The following overview has been generated using the information available up to May 4, 2026. It provides a synthesized summary and key insights into the crisis based on the most recent data accessible at that time. Summary The Occupied Palestinian Territory is facing a severe humanitarian crisis, with both Gaza and the West Bank experiencing unprecedented levels of violence and deprivation. In Gaza, following the collapse of a brief pause in hostilities in March 2025, Israeli forces resumed intensive bombardment while maintaining a complete blockade that has now entered its eighth week, preventing all humanitarian aid and commercial supplies from entering. This has left Gaza's 2.2 million residents facing starvation as food stocks deplete, bakeries cease operations due to lack of flour and fuel, and nearly 90% of the population remains displaced with critical infrastructure almost entirely destroyed. A new U.S.-backed peace plan led to a pause in hostilities agreement coming into effect on 10 October 2025, raising cautious hopes for increased humanitarian access and a potential reduction in hostilities after months of relentless violence. However, despite the pause in hostilities, sporadic violations, limited aid entry, and continued displacement highlight the fragility of the pause in hostilities and the deep humanitarian strain that persists across Gaza. Meanwhile, the West Bank has seen a dramatic escalation in military operations, particularly since the launch of "Operation Iron Wall" in January 2025, which has resulted in mass displacement of Palestinians and widespread destruction across refugee camps. Israeli forces have displaced approximately 40,000 people, with officials stating that residents will not be allowed to return for at least a year, while expanded checkpoints and military presence severely restrict movement between Palestinian cities. International organisations and UN bodies have expressed increasing concern about systematic violations of international humanitarian law in the West Bank, including accelerating settlement expansion, land reclassification and forced displacement that multiple observers warn are driving de facto annexation dynamics. These concerns have intensified following the International Court of Justice's 2024 advisory opinion on the illegality of the prolonged occupation and the Israeli authorities' security cabinet decisions of 8 February 2026 expanding civil and administrative control over West Bank land and governance. Key Insights 1. Gaza has entered famine conditions, with projections suggesting the crisis could spread to central and southern areas by September, affecting up to 640,000 people. Between May and September 2025, 470,000 people (22% of the population) were in Catastrophe/IPC Phase 5, over 1 million in Emergency/Phase 4, and the rest in Crisis/Phase 3—meaning the entire population faces severe food insecurity. By the end of September, famine conditions were expected to extend beyond Gaza City into Deir al-Balah and Khan Yunis. Humanitarian aid remains far below needs due to restrictions on access and delivery, driving acute malnutrition, especially among children, while health and nutrition services collapse under the strain. 2. Over the 2025 April–March period, ~71,000 children under five are projected to suffer from acute malnutrition, with ~14,100 of these being severe cases. Similarly, nearly 17,000 pregnant and breastfeeding women are expected to require treatment for acute malnutrition. The rapid rise of malnutrition in children, especially in Gaza City is a red flag: it both signals and drives higher mortality risks. 3. In the West Bank, "Operation Iron Wall" launched in January 2025 has led to the largest forced displacement since 1967, with approximately 40,000 Palestinians displaced from refugee camps including Jenin, Tulkarem, Nur Shams, and El Far\'a, with Israeli officials stating residents cannot return for at least a year. 4. Israeli forces deployed tanks in the northern West Bank in February 2025 for the first time in 20 years, while establishing at least 20 new iron gates and numerous checkpoints throughout the territory, severely restricting movement between Palestinian cities and villages. 5. According to World Bank assessments (February 2025), reconstruction and recovery needs in Gaza require approximately US$53 billion, with housing accounting for 53% of damages, while commerce and industry represent 20%, and critical infrastructure including health, water, and transport comprising 15%. 6. The collapse of local food systems is near total , 98% of cropland in Gaza is reported as destroyed or inaccessible, and fishing has been banned or heavily restricted. Because of wartime blockades and displacement, the normal supply chains for food, fuel, water, and medical supplies have been disrupted or severed. In Gaza City and Khan Yunis, wheat flour prices have reportedly jumped ~3,000% compared to earlier months. Many households are resorting to extreme coping strategies: selling clothes, foraging or collecting trash, or going whole days without food.