Denial of Motor Vehicle Defect Petition, DP21-003

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AGENCY: National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), Department of Transportation. ACTION: Denial of a petition for a defect investigation. SUMMARY: This notice sets forth the reasons for the denial of a petition submitted on October 10, 2021, and amended on August 5, 2022, by Mr. Tom Murray and Mr. Byron Bloch, to NHTSA's Office of Defects Investigation (ODI). On November 12, 2021, NHTSA opened DP21-003 to evaluate the petition, which requests that NHTSA conduct a formal investigation of certain alleged safety-related defects in dozens of Kia and Hyundai vehicles (the “subject vehicles”). The petition alleged that there are an “excessive number of vehicle speed control issues and numerous serious `runaway throttle condition' incidents the owners and operators of the subject vehicles suffer,” and that there is “substantial evidence that the accelerator control systems in the subject vehicle populations fail to meet safety standards, including U.S. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards ( e.g., [FMVSS No. 124]), and contain defects which relate to motor vehicle safety.” The amended petition expanded the scope of Kia and Hyundai vehicles from the original petition and referenced additional materials. After examination of the amended petition and available data relating to vehicle speed control performance of the subject vehicles, and review of FMVSS No. 124, NHTSA concluded that an investigation is not warranted. The Agency accordingly denied the petition. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dr. Jianqing Xue, Vehicle Defect Division C, Office of Defects Investigation, NHTSA, 1200 New Jersey Ave. SE, Washington, DC 20590. Email: Jianqing.Xue@dot.gov. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Introduction Interested persons may petition NHTSA requesting that the Agency initiate an investigation to determine whether a motor vehicle or an item of replacement equipment does not comply with an applicable motor vehicle safety standard or contains a defect that relates to motor vehicle safety. 49 U.S.C. 30162(a)(2); 49 CFR 552.1. Upon receipt of a properly filed ( printed page 36942) petition, the Agency conducts a technical review of the petition, which may consist of an analysis of the material submitted with the petition and any additional information. See49 U.S.C. 30162(a)(2); 49 CFR 552.6. The technical review may consist solely of information already in the possession of the Agency or it may include the collection of information from the motor vehicle manufacturer or other sources. After conducting the technical review and considering appropriate factors, which may include, but are not limited to, the nature of the issue, allocation of Agency resources, Agency priorities, the likelihood of uncovering sufficient evidence to establish the existence of a defect and the likelihood of success in any necessary enforcement litigation, the Agency will grant or deny the petition. See49 U.S.C. 30162(a)(2); 49 CFR 552.8. Background Information By letter dated October 10, 2021, Mr. Tom Murray of Huron, OH, and Mr. Byron Bloch of Potomac, MD (collectively “Petitioners”), submitted a petition requesting that the Agency investigate vehicle speed control issues on certain Kia Optima, Kia Sorento, Hyundai Elantra, Hyundai Santa Fe, and Hyundai Sonata vehicles (the “subject vehicles”). More specifically, Petitioners alleged issues “including sudden uncommanded acceleration, runaway throttle conditions, surging, stalling and loss of motive power,” and that the subject vehicles' Electronic Throttle Control (ETC) “systems and componentry . . . is believed to be the primary source of the defective conditions.” In addition, Petitioners alleged that certain Model Year (MY) 2005-2016 Hyundai and Kia motor vehicles do not fully comply with FMVSS No. 124, Accelerator Control Systems. Petitioners alleged that Hyundai and Kia failed to meet the U.S. regulatory obligations—including 49 CFR 573.6, which requires manufacturers to report safety defects and noncompliances to NHTSA—and requested that NHTSA conduct a comprehensive evaluation, technical review, engineering analysis and formal investigation of these alleged defects. The original and amended petitions identified a total of 52 Hyundai and Kia models and model years, which NHTSA estimates encompasses approximately 6 million vehicles. The subject vehicles include: Model Year 2004-2009 Kia Amanti/Opirus Model Year 2008-2022 Kia Forte Model Year 2012-2022 Kia K900 Model Year 2017-2022 Kia Niro Model Year 2005-2020 Kia Optima/K5 Model Year 2006-2019 Kia Rondo Model Year 2005-2022 Kia Sedona Model Year 2006-2022 Kia Sorento Model Year 2008-2022 Kia Soul Model Year 2004-2022 Kia Sportage Model Year 2020-2022 Kia Telluride Model Year 2007-2020 Hyundai Elantra Model Year 2015-2020 Hyundai Genesis G80 Model Year 2005-2022 Hyundai Azera/Grandeur Model Year 2017-2022 Hyundai Ioniq/Ioniq 5 Model Year 2020-2022 Hyundai Palisade Model Year 2006-2022 Hyundai Santa Fe Model Year 2005-2022 Hyundai Sonata Model Year 2009-2021 Hyundai Tucson Summary of the Petition Petitioners alleged the following defects related to vehicle speed control: Lack of Failsafe Features in ETC System: Petitioners stated that “ETC systems are designed with certain failsafe features, including redundant sensors and self-diagnostic capabilities.” Petitioners alleged that the Hyundai/Kia ETC systems lack these “critical safety functions.” Sudden Uncommanded Acceleration (SUA)—Surging—Runaway Throttle Conditions: As described by Petitioners, “[e]ssentially, this petition includes all incidents where the driver does not command the vehicle to accelerate or decelerate—but the vehicle (and ETC system) does so in a manner not commanded by the driver.” Loss of Motive Power (LOMP)—Stalling—Sudden Uncommanded Deceleration: Petitioners stated that “[p]ublic complaints and class action lawsuits claim that the subject Kia-Hyundai vehicles suffer from defects that can cause engine seizure, stalling, engine failure, and even non-collision engine fires.” Petitioners provided a non-exhaustive list of specific componentry they believe is susceptible to failure. Petitioners also alleged a noncompliance: Failure to comply with FMVSS No. 124: Petitioners stated that they and numerous independent consultants and vehicle safety experts have reviewed evidence and believe that certain MY 2005-2016 Hyundai and Kia motor vehicles do not fully comply with FMVSS No. 124, Accelerator Control Systems. In support of these claims, petitioners pointed to various internal sources (to Kia and Hyundai entities, as well as tier 1 component suppliers) that they requested NHTSA obtain through information requests. Petitioners also pointed to external sources, and submitted three Addenda: Addendum 1: NHTSA's Vehicle Owner Questionnaire (VOQ) or ODI Nos. related to SUA. Petitioners alleged 566 unique VOQs. Addendum 2: VOQ or ODI Nos. related to LOMP. Petitioners alleged 601 unique VOQs. Addendum 3: Incident List of Alleged SUA Accidents for Defect Petition to NHTSA. Petitioners alleged seven VOQ cases and five non-VOQ cases. Petitioners also submitted a scientific journal paper as evidence of vulnerability with the ETC systems in the subject vehicles: Sungji Park et al., Experimental Study for the Reproduction of Sudden Unintended Acceleration Incidents, 267 Forensic Sci. Int'l, 35-41 (2016) They also pointed to an oral presentation by Republic of Korea National Forensic Service, “Experimental study of reappearance of sudden acceleration incidents,” along with various online forums and articles potentially related to their allegations. Concerning the online articles that related to alleged SUA incidents involving Hyundai/Kia vehicles, ODI believes that it is difficult to validate or make a sound technical assessment of the allegations for various reasons, including the incident-involved Hyundai/Kia vehicles not being available for any NHTSA inspection or investigation. Office of Defects Investigation Analysis ODI performed trend analyses of the VOQs related to vehicle speed control issues for all of the subject vehicles and found that none of the 52 Model/Model Year Hyundai/Kia vehicles demonstrated actionable trends that warrant an investigation. Regarding the VOQs related to alleged SUA in Addendum 1, ODI found 512 relevant VOQs (rather than the alleged 566), with two ODI numbers duplicated. Figure 1 shows a VOQ distribution by Make, Model and Model Year. Figure 2 shows a VOQ distribution by VOQ received date. For 510 VOQs of unique ODI numbers, 202 were incidents involving crashes, from which 61 subject Hyundai/Kia vehicles were inspected by Hyundai/Kia dealer technicians, Hyundai/Kia engineers, and/or third-party representatives. ODI found the inspections identified no vehicle defects related to the ETC ( printed page 36943) system. Of the 202 crash-involved VOQs, 50 vehicles were MY 2013 or newer, which are equipped with Event Data Recorders (EDR). Of the 50 vehicles, 10 EDR records were downloaded successfully and nine of those indicated driver error ( i.e., pedal misapplication where the driver depressed the accelerator instead of the brake). The remaining EDR report indicated the vehicle speed was almost constant for the last 5 seconds before the crash and the throttle was open at 12% until 0.5 seconds before the crash. It also showed the brake was not applied until just before the crash. Hyundai inspected this vehicle and could not duplicate the alleged incident (stuck throttle or gas pedal). In addition, ODI notes that various vehicle control systems/components were alleged to have been the root cause in the 510 VOQs mentioned above, including, cruise control malfunction, throttle body position sensor malfunction, accelerator pedal sensor malfunction, transmission control module malfunction, and stuck accelerator pedal. However, based on review of available evidence, ODI found no defect trend in the allegations of SUA for any of the 52 Model/Model Year Hyundai/Kia vehicles. ( printed page 36944) In Addendum 2 to the petition, the VOQs that relate to alleged LOMP, ODI found four ODI numbers were duplicated. Figure 3 shows a VOQ distribution by Make, Model and Model Year. Figure 4 shows a VOQ distribution by VOQ received date. For 597 VOQs of unique ODI numbers, seven were incidents involving crashes, from which four subject Hyundai/Kia vehicles were inspected by Hyundai/Kia dealer technicians, Hyundai/Kia engineers, and/or third-party representatives. ODI found the inspections identified no vehicle defects related to the ETC system. Of the seven crash-involved VOQs, three vehicles were MY 2013 or newer ( i.e., equipped with EDRs). One EDR record was downloaded successfully. The EDR report indicated that the engine stalled (0 RPMs) for the last 5 seconds before the crash while the throttle was opened at 8% until the crash. The brake pedal was pressed between 2.5 seconds and 1.0 seconds before crash, which reduced the vehicle speed from 30 mph to 25 mph. ODI notes there are a limited number of alleged crashes (7) out of the LOMP reports (597). In summary, ODI found no defect trend in the allegations of LOMP resulting from ETC malfunction for any of the 52 Model/Model Year Hyundai/Kia vehicles. ( printed page 36945) ODI has also investigated LOMPs or non-crash engine fires on certain subject Hyundai/Kia vehicles included in this petition (Investigation Nos. RQ17-003, RQ17-004, PE19-003, and PE19-004). These investigations identified no defect trend in the ETC system as the cause of LOMP or fires in any of the vehicles investigated. In Addendum 3 to the petition, five of the seven VOQ cases were incidents involving crashes, of which four subject Hyundai/Kia vehicles were inspected by Hyundai/Kia dealer technicians, Hyundai/Kia engineers, and/or third-party representatives. ODI found no indication of vehicle defects related to the ETC system. One EDR record was downloaded, which indicated the root cause of the alleged SUA to be pedal misapplication. Of the five non-VOQ cases, one involved a vehicle that is out of scope of this petition (MY 2002 Hyundai Santa Fe equipped with diesel engine). One subject vehicle's EDR data was evaluated by a team of public sector experts in South Korea, which indicated the root cause of the alleged SUA to be pedal misapplication. No details were available for three of the four remaining cases. NHTSA also reviewed the scientific journal paper cited by Petitioners that ( printed page 36946) was published in Forensic Science International in 2016 by Mr. Park et al. In the test setup, the vehicle's 12-volt battery was replaced by a programmable test battery. The power supply used in the test was changed from 12 volts to a constantly fluctuating voltage pattern ranging from 7 volts to 14 volts in one cycle that lasted 8.8 seconds. ODI believes this power supply modification does not represent a real-world condition. ODI reviewed five test video files related to this paper. In two road test videos, wide-open throttle position was achieved using the modified power supply setup and certain accelerator pedal positions (34-36% in one test and 50-55% in another test). This caused the vehicle speed to increase. However, when the accelerator pedal was released, the throttle decreased, and when the brake pedal was applied, the vehicle speed decreased rapidly. In summary, ODI does not believe there is evidence of uncontrollable SUA in the tests reviewed. NHTSA's Office of Vehicle Safety Compliance (OVSC) also reviewed the allegations regarding the potential noncompliance with FMVSS No. 124. Petitioners provided only conclusory information about this issue, and it appeared tied to the assertion that there is SUA occurring in the vehicles. Based on the information provided, the Agency concluded there was insufficient information to warrant investigating a potential noncompliance. Based on the information available as of the time of the agency's decision on the defect petition and full consideration of appropriate factors, NHTSA determined that the petition did not warrant a formal investigation.[1] Therefore, the petition was denied. The denial of this petition does not foreclose the Agency from taking further action if warranted, or the potential for a future finding that a safety-related defect or noncompliance exists based upon additional information the Agency may receive. 1. NHTSA denied the petition on June 20, 2023. https://static.nhtsa.gov/odi/inv/2021/INCLA-DP21003-9396.PDF. NHTSA stated in the closing resume announcing denial of the petition that it would publish a Federal Register notice further detailing the reasons for denial of the petition. The publication of this notice was inadvertently delayed. 2. The authority to determine whether to approve or deny defect petitions under 49 U.S.C. 30162(d) and 49 CFR part 552 has been further delegated to the Associate Administrator for Enforcement.