Why the US-Iran escalation over Hormuz will not be the last

Why the US-Iran escalation over Hormuz will not be the last

Submitted by
Mohamad Elmasry
on
Tue, 07/14/2026 - 12:29

Washington cannot accept Iranian control of the Strait of Hormuz, and Tehran will not surrender it - a deadlock that points to years of confrontation

Ships sail near the Strait of Hormuz off Khor Fakkan, United Arab Emirates, 13 July 2026 (AFP)

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There was optimism when the United States and Iran signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on 17 June, intended to end the US-Israel-Iran war that began on 28 February and to establish a 60-day negotiating period leading to a final agreement on Iran's nuclear programme.

But the 14-point document was hastily put together and includes nebulous articles open to interpretation.

Disagreements over Article 5 - which concerns shipping traffic in the Strait of Hormuz - have caused skirmishes and led ultimately to last week's major escalation.

Article 5 calls on Iran to "make arrangements ... for the safe passage of commercial vessels" in the Strait of Hormuz during the 60-day negotiating window.

Iran has interpreted the article as giving it the right to direct traffic, including instructing ships to take only those routes it has approved as safe. The US understands the article as meaning that Iran is obliged to reopen the strait fully and unconditionally.

When the US began directing ships to a southern corridor along Oman's coast, Iran issued warnings and ultimately fired on vessels.

The US intervention appears to be a not-so-subtle attempt to wrest control over Hormuz away from the Iranians. Both sides have blamed the other for violating the terms of the MOU.

Although the latest escalation initially appeared to be contained - mediators were working to restore calm - the conflict has since widened. The US has struck Iran for a third consecutive night, killing at least three people, and Trump has reinstated a blockade of Iranian shipping in the Gulf.

Conflict is almost certain to persist.

A strategic asset

The Iranians are very unlikely to back down on the Strait of Hormuz.

The Iranian government believes it has acquired a major strategic asset there, one that may be as effective as a nuclear weapon in deterring future aggression against Iran. In the aftermath of the June 2025 and February 2026 US-Israeli attacks, the importance of deterrence for the Islamic Republic cannot be overstated.

But deterrence is not the only benefit of control over the strait. Authority over Hormuz is also increasingly seen by the Islamic Republic as a source of national pride, a kind of spoil of war.

The Iranian government believes it has acquired a major strategic asset at Hormuz, one that may be as effective as a nuclear weapon in deterring future aggression

More importantly, control over the strait could also deliver Iran an economic windfall. The government has said repeatedly that it will begin charging service fees at the end of the negotiation window, which could generate billions in annual income for Tehran.

That revenue is now precisely what Washington is moving to capture for itself. On 13 July, Trump announced that the US would levy a 20 percent charge on cargo transiting the strait, declaring that the US would become "THE GUARDIAN OF THE HORMUZ STRAIT".

Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi replied that whoever provides safe passage should indeed be compensated - and then claimed the role for Tehran. "Iran has always been the GUARDIAN of the Strait and will remain so FOREVER," he wrote. "20% is of course too much. We will be fair."

Given the advantages that control over Hormuz offers, it is exceedingly unlikely that the Iranian government will willingly agree to re-establish the pre-28 February status quo.

But Iranian control over the strait is untenable for the United States, its allies in Europe and the Gulf, and much of the international community.

The situation has produced a strategic impasse: Iran has no incentive to surrender something it gained from the war, while the United States cannot easily accept a new regional order in which Tehran exercises unprecedented control over an international waterway.

For both Washington and Tel Aviv, accepting that outcome would amount to an implicit admission of strategic failure.

A costly miscalculation

The war was supposed to bring down the Iranian government, change the political system into one favourable to US and Israeli interests, and severely weaken Iran's military capabilities.

Instead, the Islamic Republic has survived, expanded its regional leverage and demonstrated its ability to impose substantial pain on the US, Israel and Gulf countries.

The war's outcomes may have shocked leaders in Washington and Tel Aviv, but they did not surprise international affairs experts.

Before the war, experts repeatedly warned that another major attack on Iran could produce significant retaliation across the Gulf. Yet the US and Israel appear to have entered into the war without understanding this likelihood.

In the middle of March, about two weeks into the war, Trump said: "No one expected Iran to attack the Gulf states... we were shocked."

In the lead-up to war, experts also warned against the possibility of Iran threatening shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. The US and Israel both appear to have been caught off guard by this prospect as well.

The "shock" expressed by Trump in March underscores the broader American-Israeli miscalculation about Iran.

For years, American and Israeli discourse has emphasised the Iranian government's domestic unpopularity and weakness. There was an assumption in both Washington and Tel Aviv that the Islamic Republic was one hit away from complete collapse, and that sufficient external pressure would lead the Iranian masses to rise up and overthrow the government.

The Americans and Israelis helped foment protests in Iran in December and January, and provided weapons to violent Iranian insurrectionists.

But the war has shown that reports of the Islamic Republic's demise were always exaggerated.

While it is true that millions of Iranians oppose their government, it is also true that millions of Iranians support it. The Iranian state was able to crush the protests in a matter of days.

During the 2024 presidential election, about half of the electorate - roughly 30 million people - voted for either Saeed Jalili or Masoud Pezeshkian, both loyal to the country's political system and constitution.

Voting decisions are complex, and the election figures do not conclusively demonstrate that half of the Iranian electorate supports the current system. The numbers do suggest, however, that the system is supported by many more Iranians than Washington and Tel Aviv believe.

The war may have produced a rally-around-the-flag effect and made the Islamic system of government even more popular. In a massive show of solidarity last week, millions of Iranians attended a week-long funeral procession for the late Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who was killed in a US-Israeli strike on 28 February.

Bad choices and worse choices

The Iranian government's newfound leverage and vigour have left the US with bad choices and worse choices.

There is no simple military solution to the Hormuz problem. Iran does not need conventional naval superiority to disrupt shipping in the strait: small speedboats, drones, missiles and mines are sufficient to threaten commercial traffic.

Nor is regime change a realistic option. The US has shown no willingness to deploy the kind of ground forces that would almost certainly be required to overthrow the Iranian government.

Moreover, a major military operation involving ground troops would be costly, unpredictable and unpopular with the US public. Crucially, it would also be politically damaging for Trump and his Republican allies as they prepare for November's midterm elections.

The Trump administration, which has repeatedly signalled that it does not want a return to all-out war, likely understands all of this.

This leaves Washington in a difficult position: it does not want to accept the new reality in the Strait of Hormuz, but is also unwilling to pay the enormous price that would be required to reverse it.

The rest of the MOU is almost equally problematic for the Americans. A number of the agreement's provisions are favourable to Iran, including articles promising major sanctions relief and economic normalisation.

Israel murdered Khamenei, yet the West fails to respect a nation in mourning

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A number of measures sought by Washington were also left out of the agreement.

The MOU makes no mention of Iran's network of allies - Lebanese Hezbollah, Yemen's Houthis, Iraq's Hashd al-Shaabi and Palestinian Hamas. This omission is significant, given that the collapse of the so-called "proxy network" was a major American and Israeli war aim.

The MOU also makes no mention of Iran's ballistic missile programme. This is also a noteworthy exclusion.

At the outset of the war on 28 February, Trump said the US and Israel would "destroy [Iran's] missiles and raze their missile industry to the ground. It will be totally, again, obliterated."

Upon signing the MOU in June, however, Trump executed a major about-face, saying that since Iran's enemies have ballistic missiles, it would be "unfair" for Iran to be prevented from having them.

The shift in Trump's tone signalled tacit acceptance of a new reality in which Iran has meaningful regional power.

The Trump administration remains hopeful that a final agreement on Iran's nuclear programme will produce results that are advantageous to the United States.

But such an outcome is unlikely, primarily because an Iran that believes it has won the war is almost certain to continue to pursue a maximalist negotiating agenda.

The enrichment question

In recent weeks, Tehran has again declared that it reserves the right - under international law and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) - to enrich uranium at peaceful civilian levels.

The US, meanwhile, continues to insist that Iran move to a zero-enrichment policy. On 18 June, one day after the MOU was signed, US Vice President JD Vance said: "The Obama nuclear deal allowed enrichment. Ours will not."

The MOU does not resolve the enrichment question, promising only that the two sides will "discuss the issue of enrichment" during the negotiation period.

Rather than a brief military episode, the conflict increasingly resembles the beginning of a prolonged strategic confrontation

But discussions are very unlikely to cause this dispute - and others related to Iran's stockpile of highly enriched uranium - to disappear.

That is why this week's escalation is unlikely to be the last. The new status quo may be a prolonged period of instability.

Trump promised a quick victory. On 9 March, he called the war a "little excursion" and said it would be over "very soon".

But rather than a brief military episode, the conflict increasingly resembles the beginning of a prolonged strategic confrontation, one that will likely unfold through periodic crises, negotiations and military action.

Both sides will continue to adapt to a regional order that looks very different from the one that existed before 28 February.

New security arrangements, economic partnerships and political alignments are likely to emerge as states adjust to an Iran that is more confident, emboldened and assertive.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye.

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