๐ ๊ตญ์ ๊ธฐ๊ตฌ ยท "SCRIBE" ยท ์ด 13๊ฑด
ํํฐ ๋ณด๊ธฐํ์ฌ ์ง์
52.1
0 = ๋ถ์ ์ฐ์ธ
50 = ์ค๋ฆฝ
100 = ๊ธ์ ์ฐ์ธ
์ต๊ทผ 7์ผ ๊ธฐ์ค 5,387๊ฑด์ ๋ถ์ํ ๊ฒฐ๊ณผ, ๋ด์ค ์ฌ๋ฆฌ์ง์๋ 52.1(์ฝํ ๊ธ์ )์ ๋๋ค. ๊ธ์ 1,390๊ฑด(25.8%)ยท์ค๋ฆฝ 3,440๊ฑด(63.9%)ยท๋ถ์ 557๊ฑด(10.3%)์ด๋ฉฐ, ์ค๋ฆฝ ๋น์ค์ด ๋๋ ทํ๊ฒ ๋์ต๋๋ค. ์ฑํฅ ์ง์๋ ์ข ํฉ 0.0(์ค๋ ๊ท ํ)์ ๋๋ค.
With the current anti-gender attacks on any gender-related work, organisations are being forced to reimagine the manner in which they describe their work.
Country: Myanmar Source: Karen Human Rights Group Please refer to the attached file. This Short Update describes events occurring in Daw Hpah Hkoh (Thandaungyi) Township, Taw Oo (Toungoo) District. On 13 February 2026, the Burma Army dropped two bombs from a drone into Ab--- village, Way Htoo village tract, damaging six villagersโ houses. Then, on 28 March 2026, the Burma Army dropped two bombs from a fighter jet into Ad--- village, Way Htoo village tract, injuring a 16-year-old girl. The girl was sent to Af--- clinic in Way Htoo village tract, believed to be administered by the Karen Department of Health and Welfare (KDHW), where she received treatment for her injury.[1] On 13 February 2026, at 2 pm, a drone of the SAC [State Administration Council,[2] also known as the Burma Army[3]] dropped two bombs into Aa--- (also known as Ab---) village, Way Htoo village tract,[4] Daw Hpah Hkoh (Thandaungyi) Township, Taw Oo (Toungoo) District. [At the time of the incident, no fighting was occurring in the village.] The first bomb landed outside of the village [and caused no injuries or damage]. The second bomb landed and exploded in the upper part of the village, damaging six villagersโ houses. Following the first bombโs explosion, villagers displaced to a riverbank located near the village. So, when the second bomb landed in the upper part of the village, villagers witnessed lots of smoke coming out of that area [the upper part of the village]. After the second bomb exploded, villagers returned to the village and checked what had been damaged. Villagers found out that an elderly villager named Daw[5] A---, 91 years old, did not manage to flee in time, as she was old and could not run. She was hiding under a house. The second bomb had landed and exploded [on a citrus tree] near where she was hiding. [She did not sustain any injuries.] Villagers offered comforting words to her. The second drone strike [bomb] landed and exploded on a citrus tree. The shrapnel also hit other plantations and six villagersโ houses. Mostly, roofs of villagersโ houses were hit and damaged. The owners of the six houses are: Saw[6] B--- (62 years old), U[7] C--- (53 years old), Saw D--- (41 years old), U E--- (58 years old), U F--- (51 years old), and G--- (49 years old). When asked, a former village tract administrator named Saw H--- said that he believes that the drone strike was conducted by the Aung Chan Tar army camp, which is based in Yay Thar Pyu place (in Way Htoo village tract). He continued and provided the information that on 13 February 2026, a graduation ceremony of the Peopleโs Defence Force (PDF)[8] was held at a place 1.5 miles (2.4 km) away from the village. Thus, he hypothesised that the drone strike was targeted at the PDFโs graduation ceremony [and not at the village]; however, it [the drone] mistook the village with the PDFโs graduation place. On 28 March 2026, at around 12:30 pm, a fighter jet of the SAC dropped two 250-pound bombs into Ad--- (also known as Ae---) village, Way Htoo village tract, injuring a villager [child]. The incident happened when Ma[9] I---, 16 years old, was foraging for vegetables, ferns and amaranth green leaves [a type of spinach], and catching fish in a stream [near a church compound]. Two 250-pound bombs dropped from a fighter jet of the SAC and landed behind a Seventh-day Adventist (SDA) churchโs compound, at Ad--- village. The first bomb landed on the ground [and remained unexploded; KHRG does not know what happened to the unexploded bomb]. The second bomb landed and exploded on a tree, scattering the shrapnel around the area, and Ma I--- sustained an injury to the left shoulder blade, as she was foraging for leaves and fish. PDF [soldiers] carried the injured Ma I--- on a motorbike and sent her to Af--- clinic, Way Htoo village tract, where she received treatment, as a nurse applied medicine on her wound. In an interview, she expressed that she believes that the clinic was administered by the KDHW [Karen Department of Health and Welfare][10]. She did not have to pay for the treatment; however, she offered a voluntary contribution as suggested.
Countries: Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Somalia Source: ELRHA In the first blog introducing this series, Adrienne Testa, from the UK Humanitarian Innovation Hub and Elrha discussed how fundamental it is to measure excess mortality if response actors want to understand the severity of a humanitarian crisis and guide aid prioritisation. In our second blog we focus on the work of a consortium led by IMPACT Initiatives. This consortium is drawing attention to the roles that national and local actors play in mortality data collection and use by decision-makers and what is needed to design more localised mortality estimation systems in humanitarian contexts. The structural barriers we need to talk about Many of the challenges for local and national actors to collect mortality data and inform responses are well known, but poorly documented. They have fewer opportunities for technical training; face inequitable access to financial resources for activities; and structural barriers limit their representation in coordination forums where decision-making occurs about whether mortality data should be collected, who collects it, and what findings can mean. Meanwhile, international actors frequently have a seat at the table, and therefore control the narrative, deciding what data matters and how it will shape response priorities. Yet, local and national actors โ including non-governmental organisations (NGOs), universities, and public health institutes โ are often ideally placed to collect mortality estimates and inform response decisions. They have established connections and access to affected communities and contextual understanding of how to appropriately and effectively operate. They understand political sensitivities and how to navigate these so that mortality estimation findings will carry legitimacy with key stakeholders and decision-makers. Crucially, locally-led mortality estimation initiatives challenge long-standing power imbalances associated with colonial, top-down approaches to humanitarian assistance. Recognising this, three partners in our consortium, Evidence for Change, London School of Tropical Hygiene and Tropical Medicine and SIMAD University, were funded by the Humanitarian Innovation Hub in 2024-25 to imagine what an ideal mechanism might look like to systematically trigger mortality data collection for accountable decision-making in crises. Consultation with global humanitarian stakeholders confirmed: If we want better mortality data, we must widen the pool of people able to generate it. This starts with investing in and strengthening the capacities of local actors. Funding local actorsโ priorities and strengthening capacities With follow-on funding from UKHIH-Elrha in 2025-26, our consortium expanded. We teamed up with IMPACT Initiatives along with their partners at Addis Ababa and Mekelle Universities in Ethiopia and World Needs and Help, an NGO in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Together, weโre working to better understand real-world opportunities and obstacles faced by national actors when implementing mortality estimation activities. Our goal is to use this evidence to strengthen advocacy for approaches that support and prioritise local actors in this vital work. Rather than imposing a predefined research plan, each national partner has selected, tailored and implemented a mortality estimation activity to their context. Our consortium operates a โhelp deskโ to foster peer-learning and strengthen capacities across contexts. Activities include: Somalia: New approaches in a fragmented landscape Our previous work in Somalia demonstrated the effectiveness of well-designed data collection exercises to influence humanitarian decision-making - when findings were communicated - in a timely fashion and to the right people. However, we also saw how fragmented the current data landscape is, with mortality data not always collaboratively shared between institutions, and major gaps in mortality data coverage, particularly in areas outside government control. SIMAD University is therefore running a qualitative study with community burial attendants in hard-to-reach areas of Somalia, exploring what would be needed for this to become a feasible and acceptable mechanism of mortality reporting to bridge data gaps. Drawing on a nutrition and mortality surveillance system originally developed in the NGO sector, Evidence for Change is training female health workers to collect mortality data within a large-scale community-based government programme. Ethiopia: Regional partnerships for regional aid prioritisation Previously, universities across Ethiopia ran demographic surveillance sites in their local areas, with mortality and other data flowing to government authorities. Conflict dismantled many of these surveillance programmes. Addis Ababa and Mekelle Universities, which previously ran surveillance sites, are now partnering with regional health authorities in drought-affected Somali region and conflict-hit Tigray to conduct mortality surveys to help guide regional aid prioritisation. Mekelle University is also including a verbal autopsy component to describe the causes of death, something regional authorities found particularly valuable about the pre-war surveillance system because it helped them monitor the health of populations. Democratic Republic of Congo: Navigating insecurity and mistrust Engagements with both formal and informal authorities in eastern Congo can create tension or mistrust, complicating operational permissions and community access. Nevertheless, World Needs and Help is initiating a mortality survey in a conflictโaffected North Kivu region, to document the human toll of ongoing violence and displacement. While the organisation has no prior experience in mortality estimation, our consortium helped them expand their technical skillset. Their experience supporting needs assessments among various partners across the east means they are well positioned to navigate the complex challenges to ensure mortality estimation is possible. Alongside these activities, we are documenting how teams have approached the process, keeping a close eye on context. We are building on social science methodological approaches we developed in phase 1 to help us understand how politics, institutional identities and other evolving challenges shape the ways mortality actors work. Equitable and sustainable systems change None of these challenges have quick fixes. Building an equitable and sustainable approach to mortality estimation will require the concerted efforts of many stakeholders, working together to drive change. Our own consortium is part of that broader momentum. By documenting barriers and testing solutions today, our hope is to inform the strategy that will address these challenges tomorrow, supporting UKHIHโs drive for true systems innovation in humanitarian action.
Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo Source: ELRHA Author Jennifer OโKeeffe, Augustin Gang Karume and Paul Spiegel This blog series accompanies the Mortality Estimation Systems Innovation Partnership (SIP), supported by UKHIH-Elrha, which brings together diverse partners to strengthen how mortality data is collected, interpreted, and used across humanitarian crises. Earlier blogs in this series highlighted why excess mortality measurement is critical for understanding crisis severity, as well as exploring how to maximise local and national actors' leadership in the mortality estimation ecosystem. In this third blog, we turn to Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, where Rebuild Hope for Africa and the Johns Hopkins Center for Humanitarian Health share how their work is making mortality estimation more accurate, accessible, and feasible for national actors best placed to do this work, even in the most challenging settings. โAs an indicator, a mortality rate tries to evaluate the size and scale of a crisis in a single metric.โ The Public Health Aspects of Complex Emergencies and Refugee Situations, 1997, Michael Toole, Ronald Waldman In 2023, the Humanitarian Congress in Vienna released a statement saying, "The humanitarian imperative is an absolute moral obligation to save lives and alleviate human suffering on the basis of need, without discriminationโ. Yet**,** when resources are constrained, allocation is often based on geopolitical interests, media coverage, or how relatable a population may be to high-income donor countries. In short, human lives are valued differentially. The disconnect is not theoretical. In 2022, Rebuild Hope for Africa (RHA) led a nationwide mortality survey in the Central African Republic which estimated up to 5% of the population had died during the previous year. Despite the scale of these findings, the study received little media attention and did not lead to meaningful changes in donor policy. In conflict-affected settings, various, often compounding, factors make primary data collection difficult or impossible. These include forced displacement, insecurity, system failures, poor infrastructure, limited capacity, and restricted access. In practice, mortality is often not measured at all. And as threats to healthcare workers grow, international agencies have become understandably risk averse, collecting data only safer, accessible areas, where death rates are usually lowest. Without reliable data, decision makers and responders depend on fragmented sources and non-robust estimates. The result is a biased and misleading picture of crisis severity, that often portrays crises as less severe than they are. The magnitude of these biases and their effects on decisions by humanitarian actors, governments, and donors who rely on such data, remain largely unexamined. Our partnership between Rebuild Hope for Africa (RHA) and the Johns Hopkins Center for Humanitarian Health (CHH) is working to change this. Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo - An Unquantified Crisis Few places demonstrate the challenges of mortality estimation more than the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), one of the worldโs most enduring humanitarian crises. The crisis worsened drastically in January 2025 when the country suffered a devastating double shock: the abrupt withdrawal of USAID funding and a violent military offensive by the Rwandan-backed rebel group M23. The M23 seized large swathes of territory, killing and displacing an unknown number of people in the process. With the departure of many international agencies and a vacuum in humanitarian response, the population has been left vulnerable to the worst effects of the conflict. A year later, the true human cost remains unknown. We recognise that without reliable data, it becomes even harder to mobilise the support that people living in Eastern DRC urgently need. Placing Data and Decision-Making in Congolese hands Augustin Gang Karume, one of the authors of this blog, was born and raised in Eastern DRC, where he still lives and works today. In 2008, he founded RHA to place data and decision-making back in Congolese hands. He understood then that national actors are the future of sustainable humanitarian response. Rooted in the community and living with the long-term consequences of decision-making, national actors have a strong incentive to prioritise community needs over institutional agendas. Using local networks and knowledge, they are the best equipped to conduct primary data collection in insecure settings. While international actors have scaled back amid funding austerity, national organisations like RHA have remained in place, continuing to work for and within their communities. These actors are also proving to be far more cost-effective and efficient. Without international overhead, they can often deliver results at a fraction of the cost of international organisations. As an example, RHAโs 2022 nationwide mortality survey in the Central African Republic, cost a total of 50,000 USD, whereas a single district SMART survey may cost upwards of 15,000 USD*. National actors are the first responders in nearly all crises and remain present long after international attention and funding fade. Bridging Local Leadership with Technical Expertise With funding from the UK Humanitarian Innovation Hubโs Systems Innovation Partnership, we are bridging RHAโs local leadership with technical expertise from the CHH, combining community trust with advanced epidemiological and statistical training. Together RHA and CHH are collaborating on a study to assess potential biases in mortality estimation through both primary data collection and innovative use of statistical approaches. Weโre working to make mortality estimation more accurate, credible, and efficient, with the intent to apply the findings across humanitarian settings. In the primary data collection component, our study is comparing three different methods of mortality estimation: a retrospective household survey, rapid key informant listing, and a full census. Using a common reference population and recall period, the study aims to identify where biases arise, quantify which deaths are missed, and assess relative performance of a light-, medium- and resource-intensive approach to mortality measurement. In the statistical component, we are applying innovative use of established causal and design-based methods to assess biases. We are testing the utility and feasibility of these methods to answer questions like: to what extent are hard to capture deaths, such as neonatal and violent deaths, systematically missed; can fewer survey clusters still provide estimates precise enough for decision making; and can analytical adjustments be used to address known biases? We are also supporting localisation by building field-ready guidance tools designed to make mortality estimation more accessible to operational actors. These tools include an algorithm to help teams choose a method, an operational readiness checklist, and a guide to data validation, triangulation, interpretation. Our aim is to make mortality estimation practicable in even the most challenging settings, without compromising quality. As the best-placed actors to assess mortality, we hope to pilot the guidance with national actors in the DRC and elsewhere to ensure it is user-friendly, actionable, and scalable for use in any crisis. Looking Ahead: Making Mortality Count Without credible mortality data, humanitarian response risks being inefficient, inequitable, and disconnected from reality. We cannot respond appropriately to crises we do not understand. When those with the greatest capacity to measure mortality have the least stake in the results, the system fails. The best way to ensure efficiency and effectiveness is to place local organisations at the centre. Connecting local expertise with technical knowledge offers a path toward a fairer humanitarian sector, where the reality of a crisis is described by those living through it. *2017 estimate adjusted for inflation.
Country: Lebanon Sources: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator in Lebanon Please refer to the attached files. Beirut, 29 May 2026 This Eid al-Adha, normally a time of reflection and family celebrations, civilians across Lebanon faced an appalling escalation of violence, displacement, and human loss. I am deeply alarmed by the intensification of hostilities and by the impact of displacement orders affecting communities across Lebanon, including in Tyre, Nabatieh, and other locations south of the Zahrani River. The vast scale and unclarity of displacement orders are creating disproportionate panic and distress, pushing countless families to make impossible choices in their search for safety. There have been shocking reports that airstrikes have harmed civilians as they attempted to leave areas under displacement orders. Ongoing hostilities have reportedly hindered efforts by first responders to assist the injured, including people trapped under rubble in the aftermath of Israeli airstrikes. The human costs are immense. According to the Ministry of Public Health, at least 31 people including women and children were killed and 40 injured in hostilities on 26 May alone. This includes 14 people who were reportedly killed in a single airstrike in Borj El Chmali near the city of Tyre. In the past week, 15 children have been killed and 62 injured. Health workers are facing death and injury on a horrific scale. Since 2 March, 182 attacks have resulted in 125 health care personnel killed and 311 injured, according to the WHO surveillance system for attacks on health care (โSSA). International humanitarian law is clear. The protection of civilians, including health workers and first responders, must be ensured. The ceasefire announcement raised hopes for a return to normal life. However, instead of families going home, the displacement of civilians continues unabated. Men, women, and children continue to flee their homes for safety. Shelters are now overflowing. Schools continue to be displacement sites, robbing children from their right to education. It is distressing to see the unique historical heritage of Lebanon, including Tyre, a UNESCO World Heritage Site and a site inscribed under enhanced protection, being threatened by the hostilities. One week ago, I was in Tyre meeting with displaced people in a collective shelter. Some families told me they had been forced to move five times in the last two years. Their wishes were crystal clear: de-escalation, a true stop to hostilities, the possibility of rebuilding their lives, and hope for the futures of their children.
Country: Lebanon Sources: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator in Lebanon Please refer to the attached files. Beirut, 29 May 2026 This Eid al-Adha, normally a time of reflection and family celebrations, civilians across Lebanon faced an appalling escalation of violence, displacement, and human loss. I am deeply alarmed by the intensification of hostilities and by the impact of displacement orders affecting communities across Lebanon, including in Tyre, Nabatieh, and other locations south of the Zahrani River. The vast scale and unclarity of displacement orders are creating disproportionate panic and distress, pushing countless families to make impossible choices in their search for safety. There have been shocking reports that airstrikes have harmed civilians as they attempted to leave areas under displacement orders. Ongoing hostilities have reportedly hindered efforts by first responders to assist the injured, including people trapped under rubble in the aftermath of Israeli airstrikes. The human costs are immense. According to the Ministry of Public Health, at least 31 people including women and children were killed and 40 injured in hostilities on 26 May alone. This includes 14 people who were reportedly killed in a single airstrike in Borj El Chmali near the city of Tyre. In the past week, 15 children have been killed and 62 injured. Health workers are facing death and injury on a horrific scale. Since 2 March, 182 attacks have resulted in 125 health care personnel killed and 311 injured, according to the WHO surveillance system for attacks on health care (โSSA). International humanitarian law is clear. The protection of civilians, including health workers and first responders, must be ensured. The ceasefire announcement raised hopes for a return to normal life. However, instead of families going home, the displacement of civilians continues unabated. Men, women, and children continue to flee their homes for safety. Shelters are now overflowing. Schools continue to be displacement sites, robbing children from their right to education. It is distressing to see the unique historical heritage of Lebanon, including Tyre, a UNESCO World Heritage Site and a site inscribed under enhanced protection, being threatened by the hostilities. One week ago, I was in Tyre meeting with displaced people in a collective shelter. Some families told me they had been forced to move five times in the last two years. Their wishes were crystal clear: de-escalation, a true stop to hostilities, the possibility of rebuilding their lives, and hope for the futures of their children.
Country: Moldova Source: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies Please refer to the attached file. Description The late-May 2026 floods were one of Moldovaโs sharpest localized hydrometeorological shocks in recent months, with Cฤlฤraศi and Ungheni identified by the government as the most affected districts after the torrential rains of 22 May. The damage profile was dominated by flooded households, damaged roads, pressure on dams and lakes, disrupted rail traffic, and agricultural losses. The human impact was serious but uneven: the confirmed district-level reporting shows at least one death in Cฤlฤraศi, multiple rescue operations, households inundated in both districts, and preventive evacuation planning for additional residents at risk. As of 28 May 2026, authorities were still assessing total monetary losses, so the available picture is operational and preliminary rather than final. The heavy precipitation led to rapid water level rises in rivers, streams, and artificial reservoirs, resulting in multiple cascading impacts: Dam and embankment failures, including a reported rupture of a local dam in Hรฎrjauca (Cฤlฤraศi district), which caused sudden downstream flooding. Overflow and flooding of lakes and ponds, raising concerns about inadequate maintenance and compliance with safety standards for water basins. Flash floods affecting rural settlements, with water entering households, agricultural land, and public infrastructure. Transport disruption, including blocked roads and temporarily halted rail traffic in affected zones. Power outages and preventive disconnections in several villages due to safety risks. Soil erosion, mudflows, and damage to agricultural assets, including greenhouses and crops. The combination of saturated soils and high runoff intensity significantly amplified the destructive capacity of the floods. The strongest cross-source figures available so far show that across the wider affected zone of Cฤlฤraศi, Strฤศeni, Ungheni, and Criuleni, the floods damaged or inundated 25 localities, affected 69 households, threatened around 400 households, flooded about 400 hectares of farmland, and damaged 55 km of roads. These are important numbers because they come from the crisis-management structure after the first response phase, so they likely reflect a more consolidated operational picture than the first-night reports. However, they are not yet final compensation figures. What happened The triggering event was the 22 May storm system, which brought torrential rain, strong winds, and major water accumulation. Moldovaโs authorities shifted into crisis mode, with emergency teams, police, road services, rail services, and local authorities deployed to pump water, reinforce dikes, reopen transport links, and secure high-risk areas. The government explicitly said that Cฤlฤraศi and Ungheni were the hardest-hit districts. gov.md IGSU The disaster affected dozens of localities across at least two key districts, with secondary impacts reported in neighboring areas. Cฤlฤraศi: damage analysis Cฤlฤraศi appears to have suffered the most intense direct household and infrastructure shock. The immediate crisis was tied to dam failure/partial rupture, especially around Hรฎrjauca and Mรฎndra, where multiple reports say over 40 households were affected. Radio Moldova also reported that in Mรฎndra six households were completely destroyed, while many courtyards, wells, and agricultural plots were flooded. Local officials further said that in some mayoralties 70โ80% of infrastructure was affected, with bridges and local transport links damaged. Radio Moldova Radio Moldova Human impact in Cฤlฤraศi was severe. The government confirmed the death of a 48-year-old man in Dereneu, linked to the flooding and heavy rains. Residents were trapped in houses and vehicles, and emergency services prepared for wider preventive evacuation around Bularda/Hรฎrbovฤศ if dikes failed. One operational report noted preparations for possible evacuation of over 20 households, while a TVR Moldova report said a field camp was readied for more than 200 people in case conditions worsened. Persons at the โCodruโ sanatorium were also evacuated preventively. From an analytical perspective, Cฤlฤraศiโs vulnerability was not just rainfall intensity. It was the combination of intense runoff, small-basin/dam failure, and cascade effects from connected lakes and drainage channels. That made the district especially prone to sudden, high-energy flooding that damaged homes, roads, yards, wells, and local agricultural assets rather than only causing shallow standing water. Ungheni: damage analysis Ungheniโs impact pattern looks broader geographically but somewhat less concentrated in destroyed homes than Cฤlฤraศi, at least from the public reporting now available. The government said 11 localities in Ungheni district were affected. Emergency reports and media coverage describe flooded households and basements, people stranded in vehicles or on rooftops, and drainage work in both rural settlements and the town. The key infrastructure signal in Ungheni was instability around water bodies and transport links. In Rฤdenii Vechi, landslides damaged two bridges in Novaia Nicolaevca. Authorities also reported an alarming situation at Lake Delia, which had accumulated water from failed upstream basins, while controlled water release operations took place near Mฤnoileศti and Cornova to reduce pressure. Floodwater was also removed from multiple households, basements, and a kindergarten in Ungheni. Ungheni was also significant in the rescue and transport-disruption dimension. Multiple calls for help were recorded there, including incidents with people trapped in vehicles and on rooftops. Rail disruption near Pรขrliศa temporarily stopped the ChiศinฤuโKyiv train with 142 passengers, illustrating that the flood impact extended beyond houses into inter-district mobility and economic connectivity. Key human impact indicators include: The public reporting allows a careful estimate of population impact, but not yet a precise district-by-district headcount. What is solid: - 69 households were actually affected across the four main districts. Moldpres - More than 400 households were considered at risk, but authorities say they were protected through dike reinforcement and drainage operations. Moldpres - In Cฤlฤraศi, over 40 households were flooded in Hรฎrjauca and Mรฎndra, and more than 20 households were under evacuation contingency in Bularda/Hรฎrbovฤศ. Radio Moldova Moldpres - In Ungheni, 11 localities were affected, with flooded households, a kindergarten, damaged bridges, and multiple rescue incidents. What remains uncertain: - There is no finalized official headcount of people directly affected in Cฤlฤraศi and Ungheni alone. - There is also no final published monetary damage estimate yet. - One media roundup referred to two deaths across Cฤlฤraศi and Ungheni, but the clearest official district-level confirmation currently available is one death in Dereneu, Cฤlฤraศi. Based on household estimates and rural population density, the directly affected population is estimated at several hundred people, while the indirectly affected population (service disruption, mobility constraints, power outages, and economic losses) likely extends to several thousand residents across the two districts. Casualties and Vulnerable Groups At least one fatality was reported in Cฤlฤraศi district (Dereneu village) as a result of flooding-related incidents. Preventive evacuations were conducted, including from areas near the Codru sanatorium, to avoid loss of life. Vulnerable groups include rural households, elderly populations in isolated villages, and communities located near water basins and low-lying river valleys. The main analytical conclusion is that Cฤlฤraศi suffered the more destructive household and infrastructure blow, while Ungheni experienced wider spatial disruption and acute water-management stress, especially around lakes, slopes, and transport corridors. This distinction matters for recovery planning: Cฤlฤraศi needs more household reconstruction and local infrastructure repair, while Ungheni may need stronger slope stability, drainage, and basin management measures. Why these floods were so damaging The event shows a classic compound local flood pattern: Short, intense rainfall Overflow and failure pressure on ponds/dikes Cascade effects between connected basins Localized flash flooding in villages Secondary impacts on roads, rail, wells, and farmland That combination explains why relatively small localities could suffer disproportionate destruction. In other words, this was not only a โrain eventโ; it was a water-retention and drainage system stress event. Authorities at national and local levels activated emergency mechanisms: Deployment of emergency response teams, firefighters, police, and road services. Continuous water pumping, reinforcement of embankments, and clearance of blocked infrastructure. High-level field visits by government officials, with ongoing coordination between ministries. Ongoing damage assessment processes, as many impacts remain under evaluation due to receding waters. The situation remains dynamic, with residual risks linked to: further rainfall forecasts, saturated ground conditions, structural vulnerabilities of water retention infrastructure. On 26 May 2026, the leadership of the Red Cross Society of Moldova (MRCS), together with regional directors from affected districts, conducted a field visit toCฤlฤraศi district, one of the areas most severely impacted by recent flooding caused by heavy rainfall. The mission aimed to assess field conditions, identify urgent community needs, and determine appropriate humanitarian support. In Dereneu village, discussions with local authorities focused on flood impacts, damage to households, and coordination of emergency response efforts. The MRCS team also met with a bereaved family affected by the disaster to express institutional solidarity and assess immediate support needs. In the Bularda area, the delegation met with GIES (IGSU) emergency responders engaged in flood protection works, including embankment reinforcement using sandbags and the creation of diversion channels. The team also reviewed ongoing emergency infrastructure measures and identified operational needs for responders and affected communities. In Mรขndra village, field visits to affected households were carried out in coordination with social workers to assess urgent humanitarian needs, including material assistance and psychosocial support for vulnerable families. MRCS reaffirmed its continued presence in the affected areas and its commitment to provide humanitarian assistance, psychosocial support, and coordination with local authorities. The organization emphasized its role in strengthening local response capacity and community resilience in line with its humanitarian mandate. By 27โ28 May, authorities indicated that the immediate flood danger had been reduced through dike strengthening, pumping, and controlled drainage, but the recovery phase was only beginning. The local emergency commissions were still inventorying losses, and support from local budgets plus central government top-ups was being considered. That means the current picture is best read as initial impact analysis, not a completed loss-and-needs assessment. Cฤlฤraศi and Ungheni were the epicenter of Moldovaโs May 2026 flood emergency. Cฤlฤraศi suffered the heaviest direct destruction to homes and local infrastructure, including dam-related flooding and at least one confirmed death. Ungheni experienced widespread multi-locality flooding, bridge damage, water-basin instability, and transport disruption. The total economic loss is still being assessed, but the event already shows a major combined impact on households, roads, farmland, and local resilience. Request For Assistance Government Requests International Assistance: Yes NS Requests International Assistance: No Information Bulletin Published No Actions taken by National Society General Damage/Needs assessment Relief/Supply distribution Psychosocial support services Summary Since the onset of the flooding emergency, the Red Cross Society of Moldova (MRCS) has been actively engaged in field presence, coordination, and rapid needs identification in the most affected districts, including Cฤlฤraศi and Ungheni. During the latest field engagement, MRCS leadership and regional teams conducted on-site visits to affected communities to assess humanitarian needs, strengthen coordination with local authorities and emergency services, and identify priority support areas. Special attention was given to severely affected households, vulnerable families, and cases requiring immediate assistance, including psychosocial support. Based on ongoing assessments, MRCS is preparing targeted assistance for approximately 200 affected households, including the provision of non-food items (NFIs), basic household support, and tailored assistance packages (PFA) where required for the most vulnerable cases. In parallel, the National Society has reinforced coordination with all relevant decision-making actors, including local public authorities, emergency response services, and social assistance structures, to ensure an integrated and timely response. MRCS remains actively present in the field and continues to adjust its response based on evolving needs, with a focus on humanitarian relief, psychosocial support, and strengthening local response capacities. Actions taken by others The Government of the Republic of Moldova is leading the emergency response through national and local authorities, with coordinated operational support on the ground. The General Inspectorate for Emergency Situations (IGSU) has been actively deployed, carrying out evacuations, water pumping, installation of sandbag barriers, and reinforcement of flood protection infrastructure in affected areas. The Ministry of Environment, the State Hydrometeorological Service, and the โApele Moldoveiโ Administration have provided technical monitoring, hydrological updates, and support for water management interventions. Local authorities in Cฤlฤraศi and Ungheni are coordinating local response efforts, including damage reporting, community support, and identification of affected households. No large-scale UN emergency deployment has been reported at this stage, while coordination with humanitarian partners and local actors remains ongoing within existing national response mechanisms.
Country: Democratic Republic of the Congo Sources: Logistics Cluster, World Food Programme Please refer to the attached file. Summary These are the Standard Operating Procedures to access Logistics Cluster common logistics services. The Logistics Cluster services are provided at no cost to the user. Content Overview This document provides an overview of the logistics services made available through the DRC Logistics and Telecommunications Cluster (LTC) to support humanitarian actors responding to the Ebola crisis, how to access them and the conditions under which these services are to be provided. The objective of these services is to enable responding organisations to establish an uninterrupted supply chain that supports the delivery of humanitarian relief items to the affected population in DRC. The services include warehousing and transport provided under the specific conditions described below. These services are not intended to replace the logistics capacities of other organizations or compete with local service providers. Rather, they are intended to fill identified operational gaps and provide a last-resort option in case other service providers are not available, and/or existing capacity is inadequate to respond to humanitarian needs. These services are planned to be available until 30 August 2026, with the possibility of further extension. However, partial or complete withdrawal of the services may occur prior to this date due to specific circumstances: Changes in the situation on the ground Services are no longer an agreed upon/identified need Funding constraints This document is subject to regular updates based on evolving operational requirements and situational changes. Service requestors are responsible for consulting the latest version prior to submitting any requests. Updated versions will be shared on the DRC Operations page.
Country: World Sources: Insecurity Insight, Safeguarding Health in Conflict Please refer to the attached file. A Decade After UNSCR 2286, the Promise to Protect Health Care in Conflict Remains Unfulfilled Care in the Crosshairs: Violence Against Health Care in Conflict in 2025, released today by the Safeguarding Health in Conflict Coalition (SHCC), documents 2,546 incidents of violence against or obstruction of health care across 33 countries in 2025, including 790 incidents where hospitals were damaged or destroyed and 455 health workers killed. International humanitarian law prohibits attacks on health care, a commitment all 15 UN Security Council members reaffirmed when they unanimously adopted Resolution 2286 ten years ago. Yet perpetrators are rarely held to account, even as some hospitals and health workers continue to be strategically targeted. "In 2025, reported violence on health care rose in 13 countries. Today, as we release our 2025 findings, at least 18 first responders have been killed in Lebanon in sequential strikes targeting rescue workers responding to an initial air strike, while health facilities treating Ebola patients in eastern Congo are being set on fire as conspiracy theories about the origin of the virus spread online," said Christina Wille, Executive Director of SHCC member Insecurity Insight, which oversaw data collection and analysis processes for the report. "When health workers are kidnapped, tortured, or killed, societies lose irreplaceable expertise not only for conflict injuries, but for the full range of health emergencies and basic needs that follow. War is already devastating to health, but attacking hospitals makes it doubly so: health needs surge while services are destroyed. Outbreaks spread, trauma rises, and preventative care is all but lost in these situations. This lasts for years, if not for decades," said Rohini Haar, Co-Chair of the SHCC and Adjunct Associate Professor at the University of California, Berkeley. Kidnappings, Arrests, and Funding Cuts In 2025, health workers faced escalating danger on multiple fronts: in addition to the 455 health workers killed, kidnappings rose 58 percent to at least 218 cases, with sharp increases in eastern DRC, Mali, Haiti, Pakistan, and Syria, as violence against health care attributed to non-state actors rose. More than 260 health workers were arrested or detained across 17 countries. At least seven died in custody in Ethiopia, Gaza, Sudan, and Syria. Since 2021, state actors have consistently been reported as being responsible for more violence against health care than non-state armed groups, and 64% of all violence against health care was attributed to states in 2025. Compounding the crisis, USAID funding cuts and a broader decline in official development assistance forced the immediate closures of health services across conflict-affected areas, reducing essential services by up to 70 percent, in some settings. The cuts have also compromised the evidentiary record: in some countries, apparent drops in reported incidents likely reflect collapsed reporting capacity driven by funding cuts as well as insecurity and communication disruptions, and not improved security on the ground. โArmed drones are not striking health facilities by accident.โ Armed drone strikes against health care surged 43% in 2025, accounting for 34% of all explosive weapons incidents affecting health facilities, up from 16% in 2024. Ukraine and Sudan drove much of that increase. In Sudan, incidents rose dramatically, from three to 24. In at least one case, first responders treating the wounded were hit in a deliberate follow-up drone strike. The civilian impacts of these drone strikes are large, as one doctor described: "Some days I see 20 patients; other days, after a missile or a drone hits, 200." A Decade of Unfulfilled Commitments Care in the Crosshairs: Violence Against Health Care in Conflict in 2025 is released ten years after the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2286, which condemned attacks on medical facilities and personnel, demanded compliance with international humanitarian law, and called on member states to investigate violations, prosecute perpetrators, and reform military doctrine and training. "Ten years of Resolution 2286 have produced ten years of largely unfulfilled commitments. Laws meant to protect the wounded and the workers caring for them are being deliberately reinterpreted to give states greater impunity. The people paying the price are patients and the health workers trying to care for them. Protecting health care in conflict is not only a matter of international humanitarian law, but also key to a healthy society post-conflict,"said Joseph Amon, Co-Chair of the SHCC and Professor at the Johns Hopkins Center for Public Health and Human Rights. The SHCC calls on the UN Secretary-General and member states to finally honor the commitments made in Resolution 2286: reform military doctrine and training, incorporate robust protections into domestic law, conduct thorough investigations of violations, and bring perpetrators to justice.
Countries: Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda Source: International Peace Institute On May 15, 2026, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) confirmed its seventeenth recorded outbreak of Ebola, in Ituri province. Since then, the number of cases has risen to over 900 and the virus has crossed into Uganda and reached the provinces of North and South Kivu, now controlled by the Rwanda-backed M23. Initial reports suggesting that the outbreak may have been circulating for weeks and local health authorities were underprepared to swiftly mount a containment strategy. As Ebola Returns to Eastern DRC, International Responders Must Not Repeat the Mistakes of 2018 May 26, 2026by Dirk Druet Ebola task force of MONUSCO and UNICEF Focal point Felicien Malyra (with information pamphlet), inform prisoners at the jail โKakwangura" in Butembo in North Kivu about how they may protect themselves against the Ebola Virus on August 9, 2019. UN Photo/Martine Perret. On May 15, 2026, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) confirmed its seventeenth recorded outbreak of Ebola, in Ituri province. Since then, the number of cases has risen to over 900 and the virus has crossed into Uganda and reached the provinces of North and South Kivu, now controlled by the Rwanda-backed M23. Initial reports suggesting that the outbreak may have been circulating for weeks and local health authorities were underprepared to swiftly mount a containment strategy. As international concern grows that the deadly virus might be out of control, the mounting public health response is facing an even more challenging environment than during the last major outbreak in 2018. No vaccine exists for this strain of the virus and Goma, the logistical hub of eastern DRC, is occupied by an armed group. The UN peacekeeping operation in the DRC (MONUSCO) has been drawing down its operations and is now confined to Ituri and North Kivu. On top of this, the global health architecture is under strain following the US withdrawal from the World Health Organization (WHO) earlier this year and a growing deficit in funding to address health emergencies. In this challenging and high-risk context, it is critical that the lessons of the last outbreak inform the management of this one. The temptation in a fast-moving outbreak is to treat the response as an urgent technical problem requiring an urgent technical solution: identify cases, trace contacts, isolate the infected, vaccinate where possible, and bury the deceased safely. But as many learned during the COVID-19 pandemic, emergency health responses in complex political situations are not neutral interventions in passive contexts; they are political acts. This is particularly true in conflict environments, where large-scale public health responses distribute resources at scale, legitimize or delegitimize particular actors, reshape local security arrangements, and engage with populations that read them through the lens of the conflict. When the Health Response Became Part of the Conflict in the DRC In eastern DRC, the 2018โ2020 Ebola outbreak was described by WHO as a โperfect stormโ in which a highly infectious disease was spreading in an area of active conflict. The Congolese public, particularly in the countryโs east, widely viewed their government as predatory, and much of the affected population resided in crowded conditions with poor health infrastructure and was located near porous international borders. Given the seriousness of the risks to local and international public health, WHO and partners in the international community launched a massive health and humanitarian response. This operation was grounded in the principle of โno regrets,โ which holds that it is better to overreact to a public health emergency and adjust later rather than act too late. This approach was broadly seen as empowering WHO to take direct action in the affected area with only limited consultation with other parts of the UN system. Many of the decisions made during this period had devastating side effects: they empowered officials and security forces notorious for reprisals against local communities and produced what became known as the โEbola Businessโโa war economy with actors invested in prolonging the crisis. This conflation of the Ebola response with the conflict led to community resistance and violence against health workers that inhibited containment and accelerated transmission. By the time the outbreak was declared over in 2020, more than 3,400 people had been infected, of which some 2,200 had died. Moreover, the conflict in eastern DRC had become even more entrenched, with the ADF armed group carrying out sustained atrocities in Beni territory in North Kivu. MONUSCOโs authority was openly contested by host populations, culminating in the torching of its office in Boikene, near the town of Beni, in 2019. The risks to Congolese lives and international public health posed by the latest outbreak merit a large, swift health and humanitarian response. Such a response is all the more urgent following recent cuts to international support to the Congolese national health system, particularly as a result of the dismantling of USAID, which have reduced the countryโs epidemic preparedness and likely undermined its capacity for early detection. However, a response that is not grounded in an understanding of conflict dynamics is likely to hamper efforts to stem transmission. In a 2022 study for the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, I analyzed the national and international response to the 2018โ2020 outbreak and proposed a variety of ways international responders could have done things differently. Three recommendations from that study remain relevant for the current outbreak: Treat conflict and political economy analysis as central to the design of the health response: In 2018, WHO did not request MONUSCOโs analysis of the security and political landscape into which it was deploying, and MONUSCO was not informed in advance of several key WHO decisions. These included WHOโs decision to engage personnel from the Agence Nationale de Renseignements, a state security service notorious in eastern DRC for human rights abuses, as โcommunity liaisonsโ who in practice helped direct where the response deployed. That arrangement, documented by the Congo Research Group, created perverse incentives, securitized the response, and lowered public trust in the health response. Position peace and security actors at armโs length from health activities: There is a critical distinction between using security actors to provide a generally permissive security environment for a health response and using them to provide direct, proximate security. Using uniformed personnel to escort vehicles, guard clinic perimeters, or cordon off health facilities changes the character of the intervention in the eyes of affected communities. The 2018โ2020 experience in Beni and Butembo demonstrated how rapidly the proximity of security actors to the health response led that response to be associated with them, sparking hostility against it. While MONUSCO and national security services may have a role in promoting security during the health response, they should clearly distinguish themselves from humanitarian and health operations. Balance the urgency of epidemic response with community engagement and operational flexibility: The โno regretsโ posture that prevailed in 2018 produced the conditions that ultimately undermined its effectiveness. Public health measures only function if affected populations trust them enough to participate; securitized responses that treat communities as obstacles rather than partners are counterproductive. In practice, this means accepting slower initial reach in exchange for community-acceptable deliveryโlocal responders rather than teams parachuted in from Kinshasa, motorcycles rather than Land Cruisers, and burial practices negotiated with families rather than imposed on them. WHOโs Global Health and Peace Initiative, and Its Limits To its credit, WHO has not ignored the 2018โ2020 experience. In the years following the outbreak, the organization developed the Global Health and Peace Initiative (GHPI), built around two pillars: (1) making health programming โconflict-sensitiveโ by extending the โdo no harmโ principle into operational practice and (2) where conditions allow, making it โpeace-responsiveโ by designing health interventions to actively contribute to peace outcomes such as social cohesion, dialogue, and community resilience. The initiative is likely to influence WHOโs thinking as it rapidly designs and rolls out its response to the current crisis. In a 2023 paper for the International Peace Institute, I argued that while the GHPIโs conceptual direction is broadly correct, its operationalization in violent conflict settings carries risks that have not yet been adequately addressed. Two in particular could present challenges for the response in eastern DRC. First, it is unclear how WHO and its partners in the field, including organizations such as Mรฉdecins Sans Frontiรจres, will reconcile the principles of conflict sensitivity and humanitarian impartiality when the two pull in opposing directions. For example, even if a conflict-sensitive analysis identifies that delivering a particular intervention will exacerbate conflict dynamics (e.g., if negotiating access through a non-state armed group will entrench that groupโs position), that intervention may still be compelled to proceed under the principle of humanitarian impartiality. The GHPI offers no framework for managing that tradeoff. Second, the initiative holds that programming โmust be led at national levelโfrom national authorities down to the community level.โ This instinct to promote national ownership was borne of the lessons of the 2014-2016 Ebola crisis in West Africa, where the UN was criticized for bypassing national institutions. However, this principle becomes highly problematic when the state is itself a party to the conflict. In eastern DRC, much of the population views Congolese state institutions with hostility born of long experience. Deferring to national ownership without qualification risks reproducing the legitimacy problem that fueled community resistance in 2018 and could empower the predatory actors the response should be insulated from. The outbreak in the DRC demands a more localized, nuanced process for deciding on the role of national actors, grounded in thorough conflict analysis. The Way Forward The international response in eastern DRC will succeed or failโand it is critical that it succeedโon its ability to implement emergency public health measures within the regionโs long-standing social, political, and security quagmire. This will require three deliberate moves from the outset: (1) joint conflict and political-economy analysis to shape deployment decisions rather than follow them; (2) a security posture of less proximate protection combined with negotiated community-level access; and (3) a response built on localized approaches to engaging existing community structures and calibrating the role of national actors. Many further challenges will emerge that will demand difficult choicesโnot least the reconciliation of the dilemmas innate to the GHPIโbut the decisions international responders make in the next weeks could have profound implications for regional and international public health. Originally Published in the Global Observatory
Country: Chad Source: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies Please refer to the attached file. SUMMARY OF THE SIMPLIFIED EARLY ACTION PROTOCOL The IFRC Disaster Response Emergency Fund (DREF) has allocated CHF 122,718for the implementation anticipatory actions to reduce and mitigate the impact of (Rainfall flooding) in (Chad). This simplified Early Action Protocol includes an allocation of CHF 73,734 to preposition stock and undertake annual readiness activities in order to implement early actions, if and when the trigger is reached. The early actions to be conducted have been pre-agreed with the National Society and are described in the simplified Early Action Protocol. This report summarizes the annual readiness and preposition activities done in the reporting period. Chad is a country highly exposed to the effects of climate change, as confirmed by the analyses of the Climate Change Vulnerability Index (CCVI). In addition, an assessment conducted by Verisk Maplecroft, a global risk monitoring and advisory organization, also ranks Chad among the most vulnerable countries in the world to climate change. The increasing frequency of extreme weather events such as floods, droughts, heatwaves and high winds is a clear manifestation of climate change, with significant humanitarian consequences for the population. Given this increased vulnerability, lack of resources and challenges related to the humanitarian response, actors in the sector are mobilizing to develop anticipatory actions to better deal with future crises. It is in this context that the Red Cross Society of Chad (CRT), in partnership with its partners, has obtained technical and financial validation for the Simplified Early Action Protocol (sEAP) for rainwater floods. This protocol aims to implement anticipatory activities to mitigate the impacts of flooding in six provinces: Mayo Kebbi East, Mandoul, Tandjilรฉ, Logone Oriental, Moyen Chari and Salamat. Chad's sEAP was approved on 20/08/2024. Following this, the Red Cross Society of Chad (CRT) coordinated closely with the National Meteorological Services to monitor triggers, using seasonal rainfall data. The National Meteorological Agency of Chad (ANAM) has shared the 2025 seasonal forecast data with the Disaster Management Department of the Red Cross of Chad. According to these forecasts, excess rainfall accumulations are expected in both the Sudanian and Sahelian areas of the country, with an increased risk of flooding from July to September. This situation triggered the preparation activities, including the holding of information meetings with all stakeholders, the validation of target areas at the provincial level, the pre-positioning of stocks as well as the training of intervention teams. However, during the rainy season, the Chad Red Cross (CRT) continued to monitor triggers and thresholds in close coordination with ANAM. Finally, the weekly forecasts of the Extreme Prediction Index (EFI) remained below the threshold for the activation of the simplified sEAP, which resulted in the non-activation of the anticipated actions. During the reporting period, the Chad Red Cross Society (CRT) made significant progress in strengthening its preparedness for the implementation of the anticipated actions. To support this effort, the CRT organized meetings in each target province with local administrative authorities, provincial action committees (PCAs), community members, and Red Cross staff and volunteers. These meetings provided an opportunity to present the project to stakeholders and identify areas at risk of flooding at the provincial level. Fortunately, all of the targeted provinces already had contingency plans in place that included these flood zones. In addition, the sEAP was presented to local authorities and CPA members to ensure their ownership and active involvement in the implementation of the anticipated actions. The CRT also organized two-day training sessions in each province, reaching a total of 70 Chadian Red Cross staff and volunteers. These trainings focused on beneficiary targeting techniques, distribution procedures, as well as community awareness sessions on early warning, anticipatory actions and hygiene promotion. These training Hydrographic Map of Chad sessions were held in the provinces of Mayo Kebbi East, Mandoul, Tandjilรฉ, Logone Oriental, Moyen Chari and Salamat, with 70 participants, including 19 women and 51 men who successfully completed the training. At the end of the training, these trained people are ready and able to intervene when the early actions are activated. An important milestone was also reached with the signing of an agreement (Accord) between the CRT and ANAM, thus strengthening their partnership and collaboration in data sharing and monitoring of triggers under the sEAP. The CRT has also acquired and pre-positioned sanitation equipment, including: 350 wheelbarrows, 700 rakes, 700 shovels, 700 pickaxes, 20,000 empty 100 kg bags, as well as 350 Essential Household Goods (AME) kits including 350 3-seater mats, 350 mosquito nets, 350 blankets, 350 20-liter jerry cans, 350 plastic cups, 350 15-liter buckets and 700 liters of bleach. Coordination through regular meetings between the CRT, the IFRC, the French Red Cross (FRC), UN agencies and government technical services demonstrates a strong commitment to partnership and effective anticipatory action. These meetings provide valuable platforms to address emerging challenges, review ongoing initiatives, and align strategies to provide timely and effective responses in high-risk areas.
Country: World Source: Global Polio Eradication Initiative At this yearโs World Health Assembly in Geneva, delegates debated some of the worldโs most difficult and divisive issues. Discussions touched on conflict, humanitarian crises, geopolitical tensions and the growing pressures facing global health systems. At times, the debates reflected a world that feels increasingly fragmented. And yet, amid all these differences, one thing stood out with remarkable clarity: every Member State remained united behind one common goal โ the eradication of polio. Countries that disagree profoundly on many political issues nevertheless continue to stand shoulder to shoulder when it comes to protecting children from lifelong paralysis. Iran and Israel. Russia and Ukraine. Countries from every region, every political system and every level of development all reaffirmed their commitment to achieving and sustaining a polio-free world. One colleague observing the Assembly discussions described this as a โLichtblickโ โ a German word meaning a โray of hopeโ. It is a fitting description. Because in todayโs world, polio eradication represents something much greater than a disease programme alone. It is one of the few remaining examples of a truly universal humanitarian cause โ one capable of uniting governments, civil society, health workers and communities around a shared human objective. That unity matters. And perhaps there are lessons in it for the broader future of global cooperation. Throughout the Assembly, delegates also repeatedly returned to another important question: what should the future global health architecture look like in an increasingly complex and fragmented world? One message emerged particularly clearly from those discussions: global health cannot be driven by governments alone. Member States repeatedly emphasized that civil society, communities and local actors must remain central to both decision-making and implementation. In many ways, the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) already represents one of the strongest examples of this model in practice. For more than three decades, governments, multilateral organizations, scientists, frontline health workers and civil society partners such as Rotary International have worked side by side toward a shared humanitarian goal. The result has been not only extraordinary progress toward eradication, but also the creation of one of the largest and most effective public-private partnerships in global health history. At a time when the world is actively reflecting on how to strengthen multilateral cooperation and global health systems, there may be important lessons to learn from the GPEI experience โ particularly the recognition that lasting progress depends not only on institutions, but also on communities, trust and shared ownership. This spirit of cooperation was also reflected in broader Assembly discussions on climate change, air pollution and energy poverty, where Member States and partners emphasized the need for coordinated global action and stronger community-centred health systems. While these challenges differ in nature, they share an important lesson with polio eradication: no country can solve them alone, and lasting progress depends on trust, partnership and collective responsibility. Together, GPEI partners have reduced wild poliovirus cases globally by more than 99.9%. In doing so, they have also built something much larger: surveillance systems, laboratories, emergency operations centres, community trust networks and outbreak response capacities that today support broader health security efforts worldwide. But perhaps most importantly, they have built trust and common ground. History has shown repeatedly that polio eradication efforts can create space for dialogue even in the most difficult environments. During the civil conflict in Cรดte dโIvoire in the early 2000s, local Rotary members helped bring together government and opposition forces to negotiate temporary ceasefires so vaccination teams could safely respond to a polio outbreak in the north of the country. Those humanitarian discussions later helped open channels for broader peace negotiations. More recently, synchronized vaccination campaigns have continued across parts of Afghanistan and Pakistan despite periods of heightened political tension. In Gaza, extraordinary humanitarian coordination helped enable vaccination campaigns that successfully interrupted outbreak transmission. Again and again, the effort to protect children from polio has demonstrated that even where politics divides, humanity can still unite. Of course, the world faces many urgent challenges. Financing pressures, conflicts, competing priorities and humanitarian crises all place strain on global health systems and international cooperation alike. But perhaps that is precisely why polio eradication matters so much today. Because it reminds us that multilateralism can still work. That collective action remains possible. And that even in a divided world, there are still causes capable of bringing humanity together around a shared purpose. The world is now closer than ever to eradicating polio forever. But the final phase matters precisely because every remaining case is not simply a statistic โ it is a child whose life will be permanently affected by paralysis. That is why this effort continues to matter so deeply. If we succeed, the achievement will not belong to one country, one organization or one generation alone. It will belong to all of humanity.
Country: Bangladesh Source: United Nations Population Fund SHERPUR, Bangladesh โ Banessa Bibi, now in her nineties, cannot remember how many children she brought into this world. She only recalls the three daughters and two sons who survived. In her village, childbirth once meant labouring in the dark corner of a room into the hands of an unskilled birth attendant. Little had changed even by the time her two daughters, Jamena and Jamila, had children. For both, the consequences were devastating. Jamila, now 45, experienced severe complications as she delivered her second child at home. Prolonged obstructed labour caused an obstetric fistula, a traumatic childbirth injury. Preventable and treatable Obstructed labour is a deadly condition if not urgently treated โ and treatment is both well established and available in most referral health facilities. Usually, this means a Caesarean section delivery. When women are unable to access care, the consequences can include death of the baby, death of the mother, or long-lasting physical injuries like obstetric fistula. The fistula, a hole in the birth canal, often causes incontinence and stigma. Women with this injury are often ostracized. Preventing and treating obstetric fistula is a human rights imperative, according to UNFPA, the United Nations Population Fund, which is the UNโs sexual and reproductive health agency. A flicker of hope After her obstructed labour, Jamila was left with regularly leaking urine and a foul odor coming from her body. Out of shame and humiliation, she withdrew from public life for two decades. Even her own granddaughter refused to go near her, she described. Jamila still shudders recalling years of feeling trapped in isolation. When she first learned her fistula could be cured by doctors at the UNFPA-supported Dhaka Medical College Hospital, she finally felt a flicker of hope. Two free surgeries followed, bringing the miracle of recovery. โThey gave me my life back,โ Jamila said. โAt first, I was scared of what would happen to me. But their kindness, counselling and stories of other recovered women gave me strength. For the first time in nearly a quarter of a century, Jamila could breathe freely, sit comfortably beside others and live with dignity. Jamena, 55, also developed an obstetric fistula while delivering the first of her seven children. For years, she concealed her injury, fearing she might lose her job as a domestic worker. In 2025, after hearing about her younger sisterโs surgery, she started to believe that healing might be possible for her too. With support from a UNFPA-supported fistula coordinator, Jamena sought treatment. Today, both sisters are healthy. They laugh, work, socialize and move through their community without fear or shame. A better future For as long as anyone can remember, gaps in maternal healthcare services in Sherpur had left pregnant women at high risk of fistula. But today, midwives conduct weekly outreach sessions, bringing maternal healthcare directly to local community clinics and reaching women who might otherwise never seek care. This includes midwives deployed by UNFPA with funding from Global Affairs Canada. UNFPA has also trained healthcare workers in the area, helping to dismantle long-standing barriers to care. As maternal health services improve, childbirth complications are being addressed, helping to prevent obstetric fistula from happening in the first place. And health teams are in place to provide comprehensive follow-up and treatment if it does occur. Even deep-rooted notions that home births are cheaper and less "troublesome" than going to a hospital are shifting through public awareness campaigns supported by UNFPA and the Government of Bangladesh. Banessa and her daughters lived a painful reality, one shared by generations of women in the past โ but not the future.