DR Congo: Africa Region | Ebola (BVD) Epidemic Emergency Appeal №: MDRS1007
Countries: Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda Source: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies Please refer to the attached file. On 15 May, the Institut National de Recherche Biomédicale (INRB) Kinshasa confirmed an outbreak of the Ebola virus in Ituri Province, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The virus, reported to have originated from the Mongbwalu, Bunia, and Rwampara health zones of Ituri province, has been confirmed as the Bundibugyo Virus Disease (BVD), a severe and often fatal strain. As of 19 May, more than 500 suspected cases, including 130 suspected deaths, have been reported by the Ministry of Health. So far, 33 cases have been confirmed in the DRC. The World Health Organisation (WHO) declared the outbreak a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC), due to the risk of further spread within the region, including across borders. Unlike previous outbreaks caused by the Zaire strain, this Bundibugyo strain does not currently have a licensed vaccine or specific targeted treatment, making community-based measures, early detection, supportive healthcare, and prevention efforts more critical than ever. The outbreak appears to have circulated for several weeks (with the first known case dated 24 April 2026) prior to confirmation as Ebola. The early presentation of cases with nonspecific febrile symptoms, common to endemic diseases such as malaria, combined with initial laboratory testing focused on the more common Zaire strain, contributed to delays in identification. As a result, transmission occurred in both community and healthcare settings before targeted control measures were fully implemented. Alongside multiple existing health risks in the eastern DRC, gaps in health practices may contribute to ongoing transmission of the Bundibugyo strain among communities and healthcare settings. Infection prevention and control (IPC) measures are not consistently applied, increasing the risk of transmission among health workers. The absence of an approved vaccine or specific treatment further emphasises reliance on core public health measures, including early detection, isolation, contact tracing, and supportive care, which require sustained operational capacity and resources. The outbreak comes just months after the DRC’s sixteenth Ebola outbreak in Kasai Province, which was declared over in December 2025. Authorities in Uganda have confirmed two BVD cases linked to cross-border movement from DRC into Kampala. The outbreak in Ituri Province in the DRC lies along the country’s northeastern border with Uganda, placing it in close geographic proximity to neighbouring Ugandan districts. Key affected areas in DRC, including Mongbwalu, Rwampara, and Bunia, are located within relatively short distances of the border, in some cases approximately 100-150 km, and are linked through active cross border routes. Bunia, the provincial capital, is connected to Uganda by a major road corridor of roughly 180 km, facilitating the regular movement of people and goods, while Lake Albert also provides commonly used boat crossing route. This geographic proximity, combined with high levels of cross-border mobility for trade, mining, and service access, substantially elevates the risk of cross-border transmission into Uganda. There is a heightened risk that refugee settlements in Uganda, particularly in the West Nile region, could be affected. These areas host large refugee populations from the eastern DRC and are situated close to the border, with strong social, economic, and family ties spanning both countries. Continuous population movement, already evidenced by imported cases into Uganda, combined with active trade routes, increases the likelihood of exposure. In addition, refugee settlements often face structural constraints such as overcrowding and limited health, water, and sanitation services, which could facilitate transmission if the virus is introduced. A key underlying driver of risk is high population mobility, especially along established transport corridors and informal border crossings. The movement of traders, transport workers, and mining communities between the eastern DRC and Uganda plays a significant role in potential disease spread, as mobility patterns are closely linked to early Ebola transmission dynamics. These cross‑border linkages, reinforced by routine economic activity and service access, further elevate the likelihood of transmission and underscore the need for strengthened surveillance, community engagement, and coordinated cross‑border response. South Sudan also faces a high risk of BVD importation due to its proximity to the DRC and increased cross-border movement, compounded by very high vulnerability and insecurity, with limited readiness capacity despite some baseline measures such as Safe and Dignified Burial (SDB) protocols and trained SDB teams.