🌐 국제기구 · "ELF" · 총 15건
필터 보기현재 지수
50.0
0 = 부정 우세
50 = 중립
100 = 긍정 우세
최근 7일 기준 5,954건을 분석한 결과, 뉴스 심리지수는 50.0(균형)입니다. 긍정 0건(0.0%)·중립 5,954건(100.0%)·부정 0건(0.0%)이며, 중립 비중이 뚜렷하게 높습니다. 성향 지수는 종합 0.0(중도 균형)입니다.
Galician literature not only narrates, but constructs identity. It is a form of belonging, projecting oneself and inhabiting the world.
Countries: World, Argentina, Barbados, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Panama, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Uruguay Source: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies Panama City, 1 June 2026 — Although forecasts point to a below-average hurricane season in the Atlantic Ocean, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) today recalled that high cyclonic activity is expected in the eastern Pacific. The organization called for sustained investment in preparedness, anticipatory action and early warning systems across more than 25 countries1 in Central America, North America and the Caribbean that are exposed to tropical cyclones. For the 2026 season in the Atlantic basin, which runs from 1 June to 30 November, the United States National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) forecasts, with a 55 per cent probability, below-average cyclonic activity relative to the historical average of 14 named storms and seven hurricanes. This year, NOAA notes, there would be between eight and 14 named storms. Of these, three to six would become hurricanes, including one to three major hurricanes — that is, Category 3 or higher. By contrast, the agency forecasts, with a 70 per cent probability, a more active season in the eastern Pacific Ocean, where it predicts between 15 and 22 named storms, of which nine to 14 would become hurricanes and five to nine of those would reach major hurricane strength. "We will say it again and again: a single storm is enough to destroy communities, overwhelm public services, and displace and endanger hundreds of thousands of people," said Cristian Torres, Deputy Regional Director of the IFRC for the Americas. "Forecasts are critical so that we can act before disasters strike, but beyond knowing how many storms there will be, it is essential to reduce people's vulnerability, expand the coverage of early warning systems, and develop, fund and test inter-agency protocols that protect them from the multiple hazards they face," he added. As part of its commitment to preparedness, the IFRC has already prepositioned in Panama, Santo Domingo and other strategic locations across the region enough relief supplies to provide immediate assistance to up to 60,000 people affected by a large-scale emergency. The stock includes hygiene and kitchen kits, mosquito nets, tarpaulins, cleaning and construction tools, solar lamps, water treatment units and water purification supplies, among other items. Aware that mobilizing humanitarian aid in record time requires the participation, knowledge and collaboration of multiple actors, the IFRC also relies on simulation exercises as a critical tool to test crisis and disaster response mechanisms and protocols. The most recent, held this past May, aimed to measure and improve mobilization times, customs procedures and the inter-agency response capacity of El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras in the face of potential flooding caused by hurricanes. The exercise involved mobilizing Red Cross water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) specialist teams and equipment across these three countries. The initiative brought together civil protection, customs and foreign affairs authorities, along with the National Red Cross Societies. It was supported by European Union humanitarian funding and the German Red Cross, and was carried out within the framework of the Regional Mechanism for International Humanitarian Assistance, the instrument of the Central American Integration System (SICA) for organizing, facilitating and coordinating humanitarian assistance among its member countries. Another of the preparedness measures driven by the IFRC ahead of the hurricane season is the adoption of early action protocols. These protocols bring together measures agreed in advance among communities, authorities, and the Red Cross, which are triggered when certain risk thresholds are reached. Depending on the context, these actions may include cash transfers ahead of an emergency to protect homes and livelihoods, the relocation of essential goods, the reinforcement of critical infrastructure, or the evacuation of people in situations of greater vulnerability. When these systems work, communities receive timely alerts, authorities have more time to coordinate evacuations, and humanitarian teams can mobilize aid before the impact occurs. In Central America alone, the IFRC currently has five early action protocols for floods and tropical storms, financially supported by its Disaster Response Emergency Fund (IFRC-DREF). "Prepositioning relief items, simulation exercises and early action protocols make it possible to protect lives, reduce economic losses and speed up recovery after a disaster," Torres explained. "But rules can also save lives and build community resilience, which is why we call on all countries in the region to advance the international treaty for the protection of persons in disaster situations, currently under consultation at the United Nations." This treaty seeks to ensure that the protection of people exposed to or affected by disasters does not depend on chance, but on clear commitments and coordinated action. Its adoption, expected in 2027, would facilitate international cooperation and reduce the obstacles that can delay the arrival of aid. It would also improve the conditions for Red Cross Societies, as auxiliary to the public powers, to continue assisting the most vulnerable people: women, girls, older people, people on the move or with disabilities, and communities affected by violence and poverty. This season, shaped by the influence of the coming El Niño phenomenon, illustrates how risk can shift and take different forms across the continent. While Grenada, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Barbados, Jamaica, Cuba, Haiti and the Dominican Republic continue to recover from hurricanes Beryl, Oscar, Rafael and Melissa, other areas face different threats. The Central American Dry Corridor, parts of Chile and areas of the Andean region are bracing for possible droughts, while Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay anticipate heavy rains and flooding. In all of them, Red Cross teams are already working with communities to get ready. Against this backdrop, where climate, health and social risks accumulate and overlap with growing frequency, the IFRC calls for investing without delay in measures that enable States, communities and the Red Cross itself to better protect people in the face of multi-hazard scenarios. Because, as underscored at IFRC's recent XXXIII Pre-Hurricane and Recurrent Hazards Conference, when risks pile up, the difference between a hazard and a humanitarian crisis is usually decided before the impact — in the level of preparedness already in place, and in the capacity to act before the disaster occurs. For more information: [email protected] In Panama: Susana Arroyo +50769993199 In Geneva: Paolo Cravero +41 79 894 83 96
Country: Myanmar Source: Karen Human Rights Group Please refer to the attached file. This Short Update describes events occurring in Daw Hpah Hkoh (Thandaungyi) Township, Taw Oo (Toungoo) District. On 13 February 2026, the Burma Army dropped two bombs from a drone into Ab--- village, Way Htoo village tract, damaging six villagers’ houses. Then, on 28 March 2026, the Burma Army dropped two bombs from a fighter jet into Ad--- village, Way Htoo village tract, injuring a 16-year-old girl. The girl was sent to Af--- clinic in Way Htoo village tract, believed to be administered by the Karen Department of Health and Welfare (KDHW), where she received treatment for her injury.[1] On 13 February 2026, at 2 pm, a drone of the SAC [State Administration Council,[2] also known as the Burma Army[3]] dropped two bombs into Aa--- (also known as Ab---) village, Way Htoo village tract,[4] Daw Hpah Hkoh (Thandaungyi) Township, Taw Oo (Toungoo) District. [At the time of the incident, no fighting was occurring in the village.] The first bomb landed outside of the village [and caused no injuries or damage]. The second bomb landed and exploded in the upper part of the village, damaging six villagers’ houses. Following the first bomb’s explosion, villagers displaced to a riverbank located near the village. So, when the second bomb landed in the upper part of the village, villagers witnessed lots of smoke coming out of that area [the upper part of the village]. After the second bomb exploded, villagers returned to the village and checked what had been damaged. Villagers found out that an elderly villager named Daw[5] A---, 91 years old, did not manage to flee in time, as she was old and could not run. She was hiding under a house. The second bomb had landed and exploded [on a citrus tree] near where she was hiding. [She did not sustain any injuries.] Villagers offered comforting words to her. The second drone strike [bomb] landed and exploded on a citrus tree. The shrapnel also hit other plantations and six villagers’ houses. Mostly, roofs of villagers’ houses were hit and damaged. The owners of the six houses are: Saw[6] B--- (62 years old), U[7] C--- (53 years old), Saw D--- (41 years old), U E--- (58 years old), U F--- (51 years old), and G--- (49 years old). When asked, a former village tract administrator named Saw H--- said that he believes that the drone strike was conducted by the Aung Chan Tar army camp, which is based in Yay Thar Pyu place (in Way Htoo village tract). He continued and provided the information that on 13 February 2026, a graduation ceremony of the People’s Defence Force (PDF)[8] was held at a place 1.5 miles (2.4 km) away from the village. Thus, he hypothesised that the drone strike was targeted at the PDF’s graduation ceremony [and not at the village]; however, it [the drone] mistook the village with the PDF’s graduation place. On 28 March 2026, at around 12:30 pm, a fighter jet of the SAC dropped two 250-pound bombs into Ad--- (also known as Ae---) village, Way Htoo village tract, injuring a villager [child]. The incident happened when Ma[9] I---, 16 years old, was foraging for vegetables, ferns and amaranth green leaves [a type of spinach], and catching fish in a stream [near a church compound]. Two 250-pound bombs dropped from a fighter jet of the SAC and landed behind a Seventh-day Adventist (SDA) church’s compound, at Ad--- village. The first bomb landed on the ground [and remained unexploded; KHRG does not know what happened to the unexploded bomb]. The second bomb landed and exploded on a tree, scattering the shrapnel around the area, and Ma I--- sustained an injury to the left shoulder blade, as she was foraging for leaves and fish. PDF [soldiers] carried the injured Ma I--- on a motorbike and sent her to Af--- clinic, Way Htoo village tract, where she received treatment, as a nurse applied medicine on her wound. In an interview, she expressed that she believes that the clinic was administered by the KDHW [Karen Department of Health and Welfare][10]. She did not have to pay for the treatment; however, she offered a voluntary contribution as suggested.
Country: Zimbabwe Source: Famine Early Warning System Network Please refer to the attached file. Key Messages Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes are expected through September 2026 in deficit-producing areas as the April to June main crop harvest progresses. Households in these areas are accessing food through their own-produced crop harvest, despite localized impacts to production from excessive rainfall and prolonged dry spells during the November 2025 to March 2026 rainy season. However, households still have limited cash incomes – in part due to below-average access to casual labor, livestock sales, wild produce such as Mopane worms, remittances and other sources – preventing them from meeting essential non-food needs. Minimal (IPC Phase 1) outcomes are ongoing and expected through September in typical surplus-producing areas in the Mashonaland Provinces and other parts of the country. Households can meet their food and non-food needs, despite localized impacts to production from excessive rainfall and dry spells. Households will have access to own-produced stocks and sufficient income from food and cash crop sales, casual labor, self-employment, and other typical sources. Increased availability of staple cereals at household and market levels is resulting in seasonal price declines in surplus-producing areas. Maize grain prices are between 0.23-0.29 USD/kilogram (kg) (or 4-5 USD/17.5 kg bucket), about 40-50 percent lower than prices during the January to March 2026 peak lean season. However, household and open market staple cereal stocks are limited in some deficit-producing southern and eastern areas where crop production was low. The movement of staple cereal from surplus- to deficit-producing areas is still low across most areas, as most farmers with surpluses have not yet finished harvesting and are not yet ready to sell their grain. As a result, staple cereal prices in deficit-producing areas remain elevated, around 0.46 USD/kg (8 USD/bucket). The demand for maize meal in these areas also remains unseasonally high. Above-average water availability following average to above-average cumulative rainfall received during the November 2025 to March 2026 rainy season is supporting winter crop production and seasonal livelihood activities such as casual labor, horticultural production, brick making, and construction labor. Other seasonal activities include the harvesting and sale of wild products such as thatch grass and wild fruits, crafts, and petty trade. Livestock conditions, prices, and income are expected to be above average through the outlook period, supported by fair to good pasture conditions and above-average hay, silage, and stover stocks. However, the prevalence of livestock diseases, such as January disease, lumpy skin disease, foot and mouth disease, and others in some areas will affect livestock conditions, reducing potential income from livestock sales. Fuel price and transport fare increases driven by the conflict in the Middle East continue to negatively impact poor households’ livelihoods, disposable income, and access to markets. Despite relative stability in the prices of some basic food and non-food commodities, increases in production and freight costs and some commodity supply disruptions will likely push price increases for some commodities in the near term. According to the Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency (ZIMSTAT), the May local ZiG (0.5 percent) and USD (0.3 percent) monthly inflation decreased by 0.6 and 0.8 percent, respectively, from April.
Country: Yemen Source: Famine Early Warning System Network Please refer to the attached file. Key Messages In areas controlled by the Sana’a-Based authorities (SBA), Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are expected to persist through September in Al-Hudaydah, Hajjah, and Ta'izz governates, with Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes widespread elsewhere. The slow recovery of operational capabilities at Red Sea ports and a worsening business environment continue to severely constrain income-generating activities. Additionally, in the rural lowlands, high fodder costs and above-average temperatures, along with declining household purchasing power, are expected to limit the seasonal profits of pastoral households during Eid al-Adha, when demand for livestock increases. Intense competition for scarce opportunities, further intensified by the presence of large numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs), is expected to result in extremely limited financial access to food, widespread food consumption gaps, and the persistent use of negative coping strategies. Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes are expected to persist in areas controlled by the internationally recognized government (IRG) through September, with pockets of Emergency (IPC Phase 4), particularly among households with extremely limited sources of food and income. Prolonged economic disruptions, significantly below-average labor demand, and severely limited livelihood opportunities are resulting in income levels insufficient to meet food consumption needs. Demand for agricultural labor is expected to rise moderately throughout May due to the fruit harvesting season, especially for mangoes. However, from June to September, which is typically a dry period across most IRG areas, demand for all types of labor is expected to decline. For the poorest households, food consumption gaps or the use of unsustainable coping strategies to mitigate those gaps remain likely through September. Price fluctuations for basic food, and particularly non-food items, continued in May as demand increased with the approach of Eid al-Adha. Data for SBA-controlled areas are limited, but indicate reduced imports and higher shipping costs are driving increased prices for select food and non-food commodities, including cooking oil, which increased 13 percent between March and April. In IRG-controlled areas, the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) in Aden is regulating market prices through the enforcement of an administrative circular, mandating set prices for essential commodities. Additionally, the Supreme Authority for Medicines and Medical Supplies in Aden has issued a requirement that pharmaceutical companies print the official retail price on medicine packaging, aiming to regulate the market and curb price manipulation following sustained price increases since January 2026. Nonetheless, higher shipping costs and more limited enforcement of price controls are leading to price increases of 10-22 percent for cooking oil, diesel, and gasoline, and for cooking gas in reference markets outside of Aden. Extreme heat – with temperatures expected to reach as high as 42 degrees Celsius in coastal and desert areas – is placing additional burdens on poor households and limiting their income-earning capacity. Countrywide, the extreme heat has adversely affected the development of vegetable crops and livestock production: households have limited shelter to protect their animals from the heat, resulting in diminished productivity and reduced profits. In IRG-controlled areas, power outages have worsened in recent months, with outages lasting over 18 hours in Aden in May, further driving down casual labor demand as operational hours and profits for small businesses dwindle. Expenditures on energy and health typically begin to increase at this time of year; however, the intense heat has driven these expenditures to atypical levels. Demand for public water is soaring, and there are reports of increased malaria and Dengue fever incidence. Given extremely low income levels and strained budgets, reports of poor households turning to self-treatment with natural products and food items are increasing. The IRG continues to operate with a fiscal deficit, as revenues remain stagnant and local authorities continue to withhold the transfer of local revenues to the government’s account at the Central Bank of Yemen in Aden (CBY-Aden). The Ministry of Finance announced a 20 percent duty on wheat flour imports from May 1 to October 31 (renewable) in an effort to protect the local milling industry. While likely increasing government revenues, the new duty is unlikely to meaningfully decrease the deficit. Additional policy plans were also introduced in May, which are expected to have mixed effects on government revenues; however, detailed information on implementation is not yet available. A significant amount of currency, estimated at trillions of YER, remains outside the formal banking system, leading to local currency shortages. Many small companies and private-sector employers have had to withhold or delay salary payments due to liquidity issues. However, the severity of the shortage eased slightly in May as the approximately 3 billion YER injected to the Yemeni economy by CBY-Aden in March began to circulate more widely. As a result, the limit for hard currency exchange transactions increased from 100 SAR to 1,000 SAR, providing some relief to households, particularly as the Eid al-Adha holidays approach (a time when remittances from abroad traditionally increase).
A local agricultural collective in Barra do Turvo, Brazil, outside of São Paulo, is empowering women to earn an income, farm their own produce to promote self-sufficiency, and diversify crops.
Countries: World, United Republic of Tanzania Source: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies At a school on the Unguja Island, part of the Tanzanian archipelago known as Zanzibar, volunteers from the Tanzania Red Cross Society explain to a classroom full of students how to protect themselves from the dangers of extreme heat. The volunteers’ efforts were part of a larger heatwave awareness campaign in early 2026, led by the Tanzanian Red Cross, that has reached more than 4,000 people in schools, madrasas, markets, and communities around the island. This is just one of many ways Red Cross and Red Crescent National Societies around the world regularly work to protect people from the dangers of extreme heat – including the very particular dangers of indoor heat. Why focus on indoor heat? When thinking about or preparing for heatwaves, people often think of blistering days outside in the hot sun. But people living or working indoors, in uncooled or poorly ventilated spaces, can sometimes be at even greater risk of heat stroke, dehydration and other heat-related risks. Those most susceptible to rising body temperatures — children and the elderly — are particularly vulnerable and, often, they must spend long periods of the day inside. These are some of the reasons Heat Action Day 2026 focuses on ‘indoor heat’ — putting the spotlight on the health risks people face inside their homes, schools, workplaces, care facilities, transport hubs, prisons and even public vechiles such as busses and taxis. (Learn more about how to #BeatTheHeat and about how to take part in Heat Action Day 2026.) This threat is nothing new to Red Cross and Red Crescent volunteers who often go door-to-door during heatwaves, visiting people who live in densely populated urban neighborhoods, work in poorly insulated industrial areas, or live in camps for people displaced by emergencies. Very often, such facilities or temporary shelters lack insulation or access to energy or water sources that can help keep people cool. Building materials, design characteristics, and urban heat island all play a role in determining indoor temperatures. Rising risks Without respite and access to cooling, high day- and night-time indoor temperatures pose significant health risks, particularly for older people and those with pre-existing medical conditions. Beyond heat stroke, high temperatures can have a wide range of health effects. According to a 2020 study, for example, high indoor temperatures affect multiple aspects of human health, with the strongest evidence for respiratory health, diabetes management and core schizophrenia and dementia symptoms, according to one 2020 study. Other studies show that prolonged exposure to high indoor temperatures is also responsible for sleep disturbances, cognitive impairment of workers, reduced learning uptake in students, and domestic violence. More research needs to be done, however, so policy makers, urban planners and architects can better understand how to reduce extreme urban heat. At the same time, building standards and indoor heat policies need urgent updates. In many places, indoor heat standards do not exist, or they overlook vulnerable populations and climate projections. The good news is that it is possible to improve the way buildings and public spaces are designed and constructed to better protect people living and working indoors. Meanwhile, more governments, agencies and communities are taking action. For example: painting roofs white, keeping windows covered during the hottest times of day, and using passive cooling at night when temperatures outside cool down. There are also many low-cost actions one can take to cool the body: a cool shower, submerging feet in cool water, self-dousing with water, using an evaporative cooler or misting fan, ingesting cold water, wearing clothing made from natural fibres, and sleeping with a wet sheet, among other measures. As part of its 2026 Heat Action Day activation, the IFRC also encourages people to proactively reach out to support the elderly and chronically ill during times of extreme heat, especially those with limited mobility who may need help getting to a cooler space. How can you take part in Heat Action Day? As the organization that created Heat Action Day, the IFRC each year encourages more and more activities to raise awareness and encourage people to take concrete action to prevent heat related illness and death. Whether you're sharing life-saving tips on social media or organizing a community event, there are many ways to get involved and help #BeatTheHeat. Learn more here and register to participate and create your own Heat Action Day event or activity
Country: World Source: International Rescue Committee Please refer to the attached file. Which humanitarian interventions deliver the most impact per dollar? The International Rescue Committee has identified, through years of rigorous research, a set of high-impact interventions that deliver outsized results for every dollar invested. Download the two-pager for the evidence behind each, or read on for a summary. Humanitarian needs have reached record levels while available funding shrinks. Seventeen countries at the intersection of extreme poverty, conflict and climate vulnerability are home to 70% of people in humanitarian need, yet receive a fraction of the funding required. Every dollar must work harder. The two-pager addresses the following questions, drawing on evidence across health and survival, women's empowerment, education, and cash and resilience: How can we reach children with vaccines in conflict zones at low cost? Through the IRC's REACH program with Gavi, mobile teams and pop-up clinics have delivered over 24 million doses, with delivery costs falling to ~$2 per dose at scale. What is the most cost-effective way to treat acute malnutrition? A simplified malnutrition treatment protocol matches standard care outcomes at one-fifth less cost, enabling treatment for more children with the same resources. How can health systems prevent maternal deaths in low-resource settings? Community-based distribution of misoprostol cuts postpartum hemorrhage risk by 80%, extending coverage to communities that facility-based care cannot reach. What is the return on investment for infection prevention in crisis settings? Effective prevention and control halves infection-related deaths and saves over $16 in treatment costs for every $1 invested. How cost-effective is reproductive health programming in humanitarian contexts? Every $1 spent on contraceptive services saves $2.50 in health care costs, while self-injection innovations and community health workers extend access to women in crisis settings. Can humanitarian programming reduce intimate partner violence cost-effectively? An integrated IRC approach in the DRC achieved a 77% reduction in intimate partner violence at 27% lower cost than stand-alone programs. Is remote early learning a cost-effective response to disrupted schooling? The IRC's Remote Early Learning Program delivers a year's worth of preschool gains in 11 weeks via WhatsApp, at 20% lower cost than in-person preschool. How does cash compare to in-kind aid in cost-efficiency? Cash transfers reach 18% more people and generate $2 in local economic activity for every $1 transferred, by removing supply chain costs and giving families direct purchasing choice. Can anticipatory action reduce humanitarian costs before disasters hit? Pre-shock cash and early warning systems help families preserve assets and meet basic needs, reducing the cost burden of post-crisis response. The IRC's anticipatory action model now operates in five countries. As the gap between humanitarian need and available funding widens, these highest-return investments offer the clearest path to reaching more people with fewer resources.
Country: Zambia Source: Famine Early Warning System Network Please refer to the attached file. Executive Summary Zambia is located in southern Africa and is bordered by the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Tanzania, Malawi, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Namibia, and Angola (Figure 1), making it a key transit and trade hub in southern and central Africa. Zambia’s population is estimated to be between 21 and 22 million in 2025, with an annual growth rate of approximately 2.8 to 3.0 percent. The topography features high plateaus, major rivers, and escarpments with an elevation suitable for settlement, rainfed farming, and livestock. Zambia’s agro-ecological regions and zones vary according to rainfall patterns and soil quality, and each region has different agricultural production potential that shapes livelihood opportunities. Agriculture is the main source of livelihood and employment for about 55 percent of Zambia’s workforce, although it contributes a relatively smaller share to the GDP. Smallholder farmers rely on rainfed cropping and produce much of the domestic food supply. Large-scale commercial farming is concentrated in high-potential regions with production of cash crops for export and domestic industrial use. Maize is the dominant staple crop, and other significant food crops include cassava, sorghum, millet, and sugarcane. Major cash crops include cotton, tobacco, soybeans, and wheat. Mining is a central pillar of Zambia’s economy, contributing approximately 10-17 percent of the GDP. Copper and other mineral exports make up about 70 percent of total export earnings, making the sector the primary source of foreign exchange for the country. Rural households primarily rely on own production of crops and livestock for food, supplemented by market purchases, while urban households are mainly market dependent. The main income sources for rural households are crop sales, livestock and livestock-product sales, agricultural labor, fishing, forest product sales, self-employment, and petty trade. In urban areas, income is primarily derived from informal employment, trade, construction and mining services, transport, and retail trade. Food purchases constitute the largest share of household expenditures, particularly for poor households in both urban and rural areas, while better-off households use a smaller share. Household expenditures also include productive inputs, transport, education, and household assets. The main chronic and intermittent hazards affecting Zambia include drought, prolonged dry spells, localized flooding, crop pests, livestock diseases, wildlife damage in valley areas, and market shocks. The food security situation and prevalence of malnutrition are of low to moderate concern at the national level. However, there are notable regional variations, with the more concerning outcomes concentrated in the Western, Northwestern, and Southern provinces. Acute food insecurity is primarily driven by prolonged droughts, erratic rainfall, and high domestic food prices, which reduce households’ own production and drive increased need for market purchases amid constrained purchasing power.
Countries: Nigeria, Somalia Source: Médecins Sans Frontières Obstetric fistula is a devastating yet preventable condition that continues to affect women with limited access to pre- and postnatal care. When Aisha* arrived at Jahun General Hospital in Jigawa state in northern Nigeria she was in deep physical and emotional pain: She had not only lost her child during delivery, but had sustained an injury while giving birth. On the other side of the African continent, Hodan* walked into Bay Regional Hospital in Baidoa, southwestern Somalia, after suffering for eight years from urinary incontinence caused by a difficult delivery. She had been married as a teenager in a village on the rural outskirts of Bur Hakaba. Her first delivery was prolonged and complicated; the baby was delivered with forceps but did not survive. Soon after, Hodan lost control of her bladder, and she was too ashamed to talk about her condition for years. These two women, thousands of miles apart, suffer from the same condition: obstetric fistula. This condition develops when the soft tissue between the birth canal and bladder or rectum is damaged through prolonged, obstructed labor without timely access to emergency obstetric care, creating a permanent opening through which urine or stool leaks continuously. Many of the women who reach us have lived with this condition for years before they even knew what it was. Fistula care is not only about surgery. It is about listening, counseling, and helping women rebuild their confidence. At Jahun General Hospital and at Bay Regional Hospital, teams from Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and the respective state ministries of health provide reconstructive surgery, psychological support, and rehabilitation to women living with obstetric fistula. Risk factors for obstetric fistula The risk for fistula is highest where women marry and give birth young; where childhood malnutrition is widespread; where female genital mutilation is common; and where health systems cannot guarantee an emergency cesarean section in time. In Nigeria and Somalia, these factors overlap. So do insecurity, displacement, and long distances that many women must travel to reach a functioning health facility. Beyond physical injury — which can cause chronic pain, recurring infections, and an increased risk of kidney damage — women living with fistula often face stigma, exclusion from work and community life, and even, in many cases, divorce. How MSF cares for patients with obstetric fistula The 55-bed fistula ward at the Jahun General Hospital is, by design, more than a surgical facility. Care is free. Women stay between two and three months. Each patient may need one or more reconstructive surgeries, supported by physiotherapy, mental health care, and nutrition. “Most of the women who reach us have already given birth somewhere else or tried to — often at home, and often after several days of labor,” says Dr. Raphael Kananga, MSF medical coordinator in Nigeria. “By the time they arrive at our hospital, they have already sustained an injury, often with additional infections and complications. Surgical repair is possible, but this should have been prevented from happening in the first place.” Since the project opened in 2008, the teams have performed more than 6,000 fistula surgeries in Jahun. In 2025, 295 women were admitted and 224 had reconstructive surgery. From January to March 2026, 64 more women had already been admitted to the facility, with 48 already receiving surgical care. Most of the women who reach us have already given birth somewhere else or tried to — often at home, and often after several days of labor. By the time they arrive at our hospital, they have already sustained an injury, often with additional infections and complications. Aisha has already had two surgeries and is preparing for a third. “At first, I thought I would never be cured,” she says. “Then I came here and saw other women with the same condition. I realized I was not alone.” In southwestern Somalia, the fistula unit at Bay Regional Hospital offers free surgical repair, pre- and post-operative care, counseling, and nutrition support. Since opening in 2025, 38 women have been treated. Across the country, several thousand more women are estimated to need this care but are unable to access it. Dr. Idris Suleiman Abubakar, fistula surgeon at Jahun General Hospital Courage to come forward The most terrible thing about obstetric fistula is that women suffer it when they bring another life into this world. Here you have a woman trying to bring another life, and at the end, she suffers, she often loses the child, and she is left with this condition. We have seen women in our practice [struggle with their mental health] because of this condition. It is something even the woman herself is ashamed of. So it takes courage, and a great deal of self-confidence, for her to come forward at all. Imagine a woman who has lost all hope of ever living a normal life again, and through the work you do, she is returned to what she thought she would never reach again. That is when you see real happiness in another person. And that gives me joy. That is what keeps taking me back. ... From there, I understood why I am drawn back to fistula work. If we really want to tackle obstetric fistula, every pregnant woman must deliver in a properly equipped facility, with personnel trained in midwifery. Without that, even women who reach a health facility will continue to develop fistulas — because the skilled care needed to prevent them is not actually there. Barriers to accessing fistula care "Many of the women who reach us have lived with this condition for years before they even knew what it was, or that anything could be done about it,” says Frida Athanassiadis, MSF medical coordinator in Somalia. “Fistula care is not only about surgery. It is about listening, counseling, and helping women rebuild their confidence.” Hodan lived with the condition for eight years before a relative told her about the new service in Baidoa. “For a long time, I did not know there was a name for what was wrong with me. I did not know there was treatment,” she says. At first, I thought I would never be cured. Then I came here and saw other women with the same condition. I realized I was not alone. Jahun is the only facility with the capacity to provide vesicovaginal fistula reconstructive surgical services in Jigawa state. In Somalia, the fistula unit at Bay Regional Hospital in Baidoa is the only facility in Southwest state and one of the few facilities in the country able to offer specialized repair. The limited number of services, combined with insecurity, displacement, poverty, and long travel distances, means this care remains beyond reach for most women who need it. How to prevent obstetric fistula Fistula is completely preventable. What stops fistula from occurring in the first place is clear: prenatal care that identifies risks early, trained midwives within reach of the women they serve, a functional referral pathway, and access to emergency cesarean section before prolonged labor causes tissue damage. There is an urgent need for sustained investment in maternal and newborn care in both Somalia and Nigeria. Prenatal services, skilled birth attendants, timely emergency obstetric care, and specialized repair must be available for women who need it. * Names changed for privacy
Countries: Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda Source: International Peace Institute On May 15, 2026, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) confirmed its seventeenth recorded outbreak of Ebola, in Ituri province. Since then, the number of cases has risen to over 900 and the virus has crossed into Uganda and reached the provinces of North and South Kivu, now controlled by the Rwanda-backed M23. Initial reports suggesting that the outbreak may have been circulating for weeks and local health authorities were underprepared to swiftly mount a containment strategy. As Ebola Returns to Eastern DRC, International Responders Must Not Repeat the Mistakes of 2018 May 26, 2026by Dirk Druet Ebola task force of MONUSCO and UNICEF Focal point Felicien Malyra (with information pamphlet), inform prisoners at the jail “Kakwangura" in Butembo in North Kivu about how they may protect themselves against the Ebola Virus on August 9, 2019. UN Photo/Martine Perret. On May 15, 2026, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) confirmed its seventeenth recorded outbreak of Ebola, in Ituri province. Since then, the number of cases has risen to over 900 and the virus has crossed into Uganda and reached the provinces of North and South Kivu, now controlled by the Rwanda-backed M23. Initial reports suggesting that the outbreak may have been circulating for weeks and local health authorities were underprepared to swiftly mount a containment strategy. As international concern grows that the deadly virus might be out of control, the mounting public health response is facing an even more challenging environment than during the last major outbreak in 2018. No vaccine exists for this strain of the virus and Goma, the logistical hub of eastern DRC, is occupied by an armed group. The UN peacekeeping operation in the DRC (MONUSCO) has been drawing down its operations and is now confined to Ituri and North Kivu. On top of this, the global health architecture is under strain following the US withdrawal from the World Health Organization (WHO) earlier this year and a growing deficit in funding to address health emergencies. In this challenging and high-risk context, it is critical that the lessons of the last outbreak inform the management of this one. The temptation in a fast-moving outbreak is to treat the response as an urgent technical problem requiring an urgent technical solution: identify cases, trace contacts, isolate the infected, vaccinate where possible, and bury the deceased safely. But as many learned during the COVID-19 pandemic, emergency health responses in complex political situations are not neutral interventions in passive contexts; they are political acts. This is particularly true in conflict environments, where large-scale public health responses distribute resources at scale, legitimize or delegitimize particular actors, reshape local security arrangements, and engage with populations that read them through the lens of the conflict. When the Health Response Became Part of the Conflict in the DRC In eastern DRC, the 2018–2020 Ebola outbreak was described by WHO as a “perfect storm” in which a highly infectious disease was spreading in an area of active conflict. The Congolese public, particularly in the country’s east, widely viewed their government as predatory, and much of the affected population resided in crowded conditions with poor health infrastructure and was located near porous international borders. Given the seriousness of the risks to local and international public health, WHO and partners in the international community launched a massive health and humanitarian response. This operation was grounded in the principle of “no regrets,” which holds that it is better to overreact to a public health emergency and adjust later rather than act too late. This approach was broadly seen as empowering WHO to take direct action in the affected area with only limited consultation with other parts of the UN system. Many of the decisions made during this period had devastating side effects: they empowered officials and security forces notorious for reprisals against local communities and produced what became known as the “Ebola Business”—a war economy with actors invested in prolonging the crisis. This conflation of the Ebola response with the conflict led to community resistance and violence against health workers that inhibited containment and accelerated transmission. By the time the outbreak was declared over in 2020, more than 3,400 people had been infected, of which some 2,200 had died. Moreover, the conflict in eastern DRC had become even more entrenched, with the ADF armed group carrying out sustained atrocities in Beni territory in North Kivu. MONUSCO’s authority was openly contested by host populations, culminating in the torching of its office in Boikene, near the town of Beni, in 2019. The risks to Congolese lives and international public health posed by the latest outbreak merit a large, swift health and humanitarian response. Such a response is all the more urgent following recent cuts to international support to the Congolese national health system, particularly as a result of the dismantling of USAID, which have reduced the country’s epidemic preparedness and likely undermined its capacity for early detection. However, a response that is not grounded in an understanding of conflict dynamics is likely to hamper efforts to stem transmission. In a 2022 study for the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, I analyzed the national and international response to the 2018–2020 outbreak and proposed a variety of ways international responders could have done things differently. Three recommendations from that study remain relevant for the current outbreak: Treat conflict and political economy analysis as central to the design of the health response: In 2018, WHO did not request MONUSCO’s analysis of the security and political landscape into which it was deploying, and MONUSCO was not informed in advance of several key WHO decisions. These included WHO’s decision to engage personnel from the Agence Nationale de Renseignements, a state security service notorious in eastern DRC for human rights abuses, as “community liaisons” who in practice helped direct where the response deployed. That arrangement, documented by the Congo Research Group, created perverse incentives, securitized the response, and lowered public trust in the health response. Position peace and security actors at arm’s length from health activities: There is a critical distinction between using security actors to provide a generally permissive security environment for a health response and using them to provide direct, proximate security. Using uniformed personnel to escort vehicles, guard clinic perimeters, or cordon off health facilities changes the character of the intervention in the eyes of affected communities. The 2018–2020 experience in Beni and Butembo demonstrated how rapidly the proximity of security actors to the health response led that response to be associated with them, sparking hostility against it. While MONUSCO and national security services may have a role in promoting security during the health response, they should clearly distinguish themselves from humanitarian and health operations. Balance the urgency of epidemic response with community engagement and operational flexibility: The “no regrets” posture that prevailed in 2018 produced the conditions that ultimately undermined its effectiveness. Public health measures only function if affected populations trust them enough to participate; securitized responses that treat communities as obstacles rather than partners are counterproductive. In practice, this means accepting slower initial reach in exchange for community-acceptable delivery—local responders rather than teams parachuted in from Kinshasa, motorcycles rather than Land Cruisers, and burial practices negotiated with families rather than imposed on them. WHO’s Global Health and Peace Initiative, and Its Limits To its credit, WHO has not ignored the 2018–2020 experience. In the years following the outbreak, the organization developed the Global Health and Peace Initiative (GHPI), built around two pillars: (1) making health programming “conflict-sensitive” by extending the “do no harm” principle into operational practice and (2) where conditions allow, making it “peace-responsive” by designing health interventions to actively contribute to peace outcomes such as social cohesion, dialogue, and community resilience. The initiative is likely to influence WHO’s thinking as it rapidly designs and rolls out its response to the current crisis. In a 2023 paper for the International Peace Institute, I argued that while the GHPI’s conceptual direction is broadly correct, its operationalization in violent conflict settings carries risks that have not yet been adequately addressed. Two in particular could present challenges for the response in eastern DRC. First, it is unclear how WHO and its partners in the field, including organizations such as Médecins Sans Frontières, will reconcile the principles of conflict sensitivity and humanitarian impartiality when the two pull in opposing directions. For example, even if a conflict-sensitive analysis identifies that delivering a particular intervention will exacerbate conflict dynamics (e.g., if negotiating access through a non-state armed group will entrench that group’s position), that intervention may still be compelled to proceed under the principle of humanitarian impartiality. The GHPI offers no framework for managing that tradeoff. Second, the initiative holds that programming “must be led at national level—from national authorities down to the community level.” This instinct to promote national ownership was borne of the lessons of the 2014-2016 Ebola crisis in West Africa, where the UN was criticized for bypassing national institutions. However, this principle becomes highly problematic when the state is itself a party to the conflict. In eastern DRC, much of the population views Congolese state institutions with hostility born of long experience. Deferring to national ownership without qualification risks reproducing the legitimacy problem that fueled community resistance in 2018 and could empower the predatory actors the response should be insulated from. The outbreak in the DRC demands a more localized, nuanced process for deciding on the role of national actors, grounded in thorough conflict analysis. The Way Forward The international response in eastern DRC will succeed or fail—and it is critical that it succeed—on its ability to implement emergency public health measures within the region’s long-standing social, political, and security quagmire. This will require three deliberate moves from the outset: (1) joint conflict and political-economy analysis to shape deployment decisions rather than follow them; (2) a security posture of less proximate protection combined with negotiated community-level access; and (3) a response built on localized approaches to engaging existing community structures and calibrating the role of national actors. Many further challenges will emerge that will demand difficult choices—not least the reconciliation of the dilemmas innate to the GHPI—but the decisions international responders make in the next weeks could have profound implications for regional and international public health. Originally Published in the Global Observatory
Countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Viet Nam Source: ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance Please refer to the attached Infographic. REGIONAL SUMMARY: During the twenty-first week of 2026, a total of 50 disaster events were reported across the ASEAN region, including floods, landslides, storms, and wind-related disasters in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Viet Nam. In Indonesia, Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Bencana (BNPB) reported disaster events across Aceh, Jakarta, West Java, Central Java, East Java, South Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan, East Kalimantan, North Maluku, and Central Sulawesi. In Malaysia, Agensi Pengurusan Bencana Negara (NADMA) reported flooding in Sabah. In the Philippines, National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC) and Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) reported flooding, landslides, storms, and wind-related disasters in Davao, North Cotabato, and Zamboanga City. Meanwhile, in Thailand, Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation (DDPM) reported flooding, storms, and wind-related disasters in Nan, Lampang, and Nakhon Ratchasima. Lastly, in Viet Nam, Viet Nam Disaster and Dyke Management Authority (VDDMA) reported storms, winds, flooding, and landslides in An Giang, Lam Dong, Ca Mau, Tuyen Quang, Son La, Phu Tho, Lang Son, Dien Bien, Tthai Nguyen, and Quang Ninh. HIGHLIGHT: In Indonesia, flooding affected both Pasuruan Regency and Pasuruan City in East Java Province following heavy rainfall on 19 May. In Pasuruan Regency, intense rainfall in the upstream areas of Pandaan, Purwodadi, and Purwosari increased water discharge in the Kedunglarangan and Welang river basins, resulting in flooding across Purwosari, Bangil, Pandaan, Pohjentrek, and Kraton. Meanwhile, in Pasuruan City, heavy rainfall between 1930H and 2130H UTC+7 overwhelmed drainage systems, causing water overflow and inundation in Gadingrejo, Purworejo, and Panggungrejo. According to BNPB, as of 22 May, these flooding situations affected approximately 3.3K households and impacted around 3.3K houses across both Pasuruan Regency and Pasuruan City. In addition, 13 road access points were disrupted. Relevant authorities are undertaking the necessary response measures to address the situation.
Country: Haiti Source: UN Integrated Office in Haiti Please refer to the attached file. I. VIOLENCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS According to the Human Rights Service (HRS) of the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), between 1 July and 30 September 2025, at least 1,247 people were killed and 710 injured as a result of violence perpetrated by gangs, self-defense groups and unorganized members of the population, as well as during security force operations1. Men account for 83 per cent of the victims, women 14 per cent, and children 3 per cent 2.
Countries: Haiti, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico Source: International Committee of the Red Cross In places where armed violence is rife, health-care workers may be harassed or subjected to physical or verbal abuse. Ambulances face even greater risks when transporting patients, struggling to do so safely. Health-care facilities are often damaged during clashes and their operations frequently disrupted. Meanwhile, patients are unable to access health care, either out of fear or because of security risks or difficulties in reaching health-care facilities, or simply because services have been shut down. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and other members of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement have observed that these issues are becoming increasingly common in many of the affected communities across Latin American and the Caribbean. “While acts of violence against health-care services are widespread, it is in Colombia, Mexico, Haiti and Ecuador where serious incidents linked to armed violence are most frequently reported. It is communities that suffer when health-care workers and the health system are jeopardized. Safeguarding their proper functioning is essential to ensure people can access health-care services,” explains Gabriel Mayorga, regional adviser for the ICRC on protection issues and respect for health care. Far from being isolated incidents, these events reflect a worrying pattern of violence that is affecting the provision of health-care services in places across the region where armed conflict and other situations of violence are widespread. According to figures from the National Medical Mission Board,* a total of 282 acts of violence against health-care services related to non-international armed conflicts were recorded in Colombia in 2025, indicating breaches of international humanitarian law. Incidents include threats and murders, with health-care workers and wounded people who are no longer taking part in the hostilities targeted, either in ambulances or in health-care facilities. Furthermore, in the areas most affected by armed conflict, communities are having their movements restricted, limiting their ability to access health-care services in a timely way. In some cases, the consequences are deadly. “I remember the case of a woman from an indigenous community who suffered pregnancy complications. The dynamics of the armed conflict resulted in movement restrictions. Unable to get to the nearest health centre, both she and her baby died,” says a member of the ICRC’s health team in Colombia. In these situations, the ICRC maintains a bilateral and confidential dialogue with all parties to the conflict to remind them of their obligation under international humanitarian law to respect and protect health care. Even in countries not experiencing armed conflict, health-care services still suffer the consequences of violence. In Mexico, the ICRC documented more than 190 serious incidents affecting health-care services and patient care between 2024 and 2025, based on primary and publicly available information. These incidents include attacks against – and sometimes the murder of – health-care staff, patients and their families, armed raids on health-care facilities, and the theft of data and supplies, among others. Beyond the statistics, these incidents have a profound impact on the lives of health-care workers. Fernanda,* a psychologist from southern Mexico, went from being a provider of mental-health care for health-care workers affected by violence to being a victim of violence herself. “Being a mental-health professional does not protect us from violence and its consequences. We have received threats and our lives have been in danger. In my case, I had to move away. I left behind my home and my support network, and the health centre where I worked had to close for more than a year. I still have nightmares and feel very anxious whenever I think about the centre reopening at some point and having to go back. I’ve had to have psychotherapy and medical treatment to be able to cope with it,” she recounts. * Name has been changed to protect the person’s identity. The ICRC is also very concerned about the situation in Haiti. The escalation of armed violence since 2024 has put out of action more than 70 per cent of health services in the capital, Port-au-Prince. Most health-care facilities have been affected, preventing people from accessing them safely. Emergency services, care for pregnant and breastfeeding women, and other medical specialisms have collapsed. Furthermore, many patients with chronic conditions have no access to medical care at all. In Haiti, the ICRC uses various channels to remind people of their obligation to respect health-care workers. This banner in Haitian Creole reads: “Hospitals, health-care workers and ambulances must not be targeted. Every life counts!” Against this backdrop of violence, which is significantly affecting and restricting people’s access to health-care services, the La Paix University Hospital is now the only major state-run hospital still operating in Port-au-Prince. But it faces a whole host of challenges. “We don’t have enough beds for all the patients coming to the hospital – we have to treat and resuscitate some patients on the floor,” says Dr Myriam Gousse, head of the hospital’s emergency department. Staff are also under pressure. “Sometimes patients come in who are armed; they pull out their weapons to force the staff to treat them. We are seeing more incidents like this,” adds Dr Gousse. Ecuador is another country facing a worrying escalation in armed violence, and it is having an impact on its health services, particularly in the most conflict-affected areas. The situation has created significant challenges in managing health facilities in these areas, leading to the temporary suspension of certain services and making it more difficult for people to access health care. “In light of this situation, the Ecuadorian Red Cross, together with members of the Movement, has stepped up its efforts to promote respect for health services and to provide support to the Ministry of Health, medical units and health-care staff, as well as affected communities. Our actions uphold the right of health-care professionals to carry out their work in an environment free from pressure and threats,” explains Jhonny García, security coordinator for the Ecuadorian Red Cross. How do we address this issue? Dialogue with weapon bearers and strengthening legal frameworks In Port-au-Prince, Haiti, the ICRC talks with weapon bearers about their obligation to respect the work of health-care staff and humanitarian principles. . During our bilateral and confidential dialogue with armed actors, we remind them of their obligation to respect health-care staff and facilities, as well as humanitarian workers. We use these talks to stress that health services must always be protected from attack. Together with public health authorities and other organizations, we promote prevention and we help to strengthen the response to violence against health-care services. We also provide technical support to the authorities to help them formalize and strengthen regulatory frameworks that effectively recognize and address the threat of violence against health-care facilities, while establishing the rights of and protections for health-care staff and patients in situations of violence. Capacity-building in the health-care sector We support health-care systems at different levels to prevent, mitigate and manage the effects of violence. In Haiti, throughout 2026, fierce armed clashes have been affecting people in the capital, Port-au-Prince. For months, the ICRC has been providing medical supplies and first-aid training to community health workers. In the areas most affected by violence, we provide training and workshops to ensure that health-care staff and facilities are better prepared and more resilient when it comes to responding to and recovering from violence. In addition, we work collaboratively to promote safety protocols and contingency plans for health-care teams working in high-risk environments. Regional cooperation Since 2024, the ICRC – together with the region’s National Red Cross Societies, partner National Societies and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) – has stepped up its regional cooperation to ensure a coordinated response to address the issue of violence. We provide technical support to other Movement teams in the region, as well as training, events and knowledge-sharing for those most affected.
Countries: World, Canary Islands (Spain), Mauritania, Morocco Source: Mixed Migration Centre Please refer to the attached file. This paper examines migrant smuggling dynamics and protection risks on irregular journeys to the Canary Islands, based on 1,216 surveys conducted with migrants and refugees in Mauritania and Spain between March and September 2025, complemented by 11 in-depth qualitative interviews. Findings document the realities of the Atlantic crossing, the diversity of smuggling arrangements, and the conditions that drive people toward irregular routes. The paper calls for protection-sensitive, route-based programming and access to regular migration pathways. Key findings: Refugees and migrants arriving in Spain were much more likely to say they left because of violence (29%) or human rights concerns (28%) compared to those in Mauritania (7%). The dangers of the journey are widely known: however, when legal pathways and meaningful future prospects are absent, these risks are weighed against the certainty of harm at home, making high-risk movement a perceived necessity rather than a reckless decision. Maritime crossings to the Canary Islands primarily embark from Morocco (41%), Mauritania (30%), and Senegal (24%). A smaller number embarked from further south: 12 from Gambia, 5 from Guinea-Bissau, and 3 from Guinea, reflecting a trend toward longer routes to bypass heightened surveillance along northern coasts. Indeed, one in three embarkations left from countries south of Mauritania. More southerly embarkation points extend the time spent at sea and increase the dangers of the Atlantic crossing. 71% of those interviewed in Spain identified at least one location as dangerous along their journey. The Atlantic crossing remains the most dangerous, with the majority (64%) fearing death during the maritime crossing; but respondents also perceived risks in other locations, with Algeria being frequently reported among those who transited the country. While 40% of those who arrived in the Canary Islands used a smuggler for a portion of the journey, 16% did not use a smuggler, highlighting the existence of “self-organised” irregular journeys in especially among fishery communities. Around half of those who had considered migrating regularly said they resorted to irregular journeys with a smuggler because of the financial barriers to regular migration, or after a visa denial. Smuggling dynamics vary along the route: smuggling networks in Senegal and Gambia appear less systematic, compared to more organized structures operating from Morocco and Mauritania. There appears to be a link between smuggler use and perceived risk: respondents who did not use a smuggler on the Atlantic more often reported the Atlantic as dangerous, suggesting that smugglers may play a risk-mitigating role in these journeys.