Dynamic Resource Allocation with Karma: An Experimental Study

Economics > General Economics [Submitted on 3 Apr 2024 (v1), last revised 16 Jun 2026 (this version, v4)] Title:Dynamic Resource Allocation with Karma: An Experimental Study View PDF HTML (experimental)Abstract:We perform a behavioral experiment of karma, a class of mechanisms for repeated resource allocation with attractive fairness and efficiency properties, in theory. Individuals in these mechanisms bid non-tradable credits that flow from resource consumers to yielders, like karma. Human subjects recruited on Amazon MTurk are repeatedly and randomly paired to bid karma according to time-varying and stochastic individual preferences or urgency to acquire resources. Treatments varied in the dynamic urgency process (frequent moderate urgency versus sporadic high urgency) and the richness of the bidding scheme (binary versus full range). Results are benchmarked against random allocation, and karma achieves a (almost) Pareto improvement over random, despite the MTurk subjects deviating significantly from the theoretically optimal Nash bidding policy. Maximum improvement is attained by subjects that deviate from Nash by up to one karma bid unit on average, and positive improvement is attained with average deviations of up to 3-4 bid units. These findings hold across all treatments, among which no significant differences are found, with the exception of the sporadic high urgency process with binary bidding treatment being (weakly) favorable over others. These results offer behaviorally robust lower bounds for the expected performance of karma in human populations. They also provide guidance for future testing and implementation of karma mechanisms in the real world. Submission history From: Ezzat Elokda [view email][v1] Wed, 3 Apr 2024 12:34:00 UTC (576 KB) [v2] Wed, 25 Dec 2024 10:50:22 UTC (765 KB) [v3] Thu, 5 Feb 2026 13:11:18 UTC (2,533 KB) [v4] Tue, 16 Jun 2026 16:07:25 UTC (2,554 KB) Current browse context: econ.GN References & Citations Loading... Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data and Media Associated with this Article alphaXiv (What is alphaXiv?) CatalyzeX Code Finder for Papers (What is CatalyzeX?) DagsHub (What is DagsHub?) Gotit.pub (What is GotitPub?) Hugging Face (What is Huggingface?) ScienceCast (What is ScienceCast?) Demos Recommenders and Search Tools Influence Flower (What are Influence Flowers?) CORE Recommender (What is CORE?) arXivLabs: experimental projects with community collaborators arXivLabs is a framework that allows collaborators to develop and share new arXiv features directly on our website. Both individuals and organizations that work with arXivLabs have embraced and accepted our values of openness, community, excellence, and user data privacy. arXiv is committed to these values and only works with partners that adhere to them. Have an idea for a project that will add value for arXiv's community? Learn more about arXivLabs.