학술
기타
Conditional Disclosure as a Coordination Device
arXiv Econ
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이 매체는 공공·자유 라이선스로 본문을 직접 표시합니다.Abstract
Social assurance contracts are private commitments to go public with a controversial view only when the coalition is big enough to be self-protecting.
Measurement, however precise, reveals what others think, not what they will do; social assurance contracts change that game.
By revealing nothing when a campaign fails, the contract removes the risk of speaking and finding too few beside you.
One global-games selection prices this protection in closed form, net of signing costs.
Success widens what can safely be said, but when failures leak the advantage erodes.
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