Restive peripheries

THE centre-periphery divide in Pakistan is as old as the country itself. Its contours may have changed over time, but it remains as acute as any of the major structural crises that afflict us.

At the time of writing, at least three peripheries are simmering. Balochistan, KP and AJK are all unique geographical regions whose historical relationships with the state cannot be reduced to one another but even establishment apologists find it hard to simply reduce the current situation in all three regions to the proverbial foreign hand.

The Seraiki belt, Sindh and Gilgit-Baltistan may not presently be gripped by unrest, but they remain peripheral to the political, economic, cultural and intellectual mainstream. In short, the majority of the people of these regions are at best struggling for economic survival and dignity, and at worst are subject to oppressive governance.

Underlying the centre-periphery divide is a model of colonial statecraft that sees all ordinary people as subjects to be ruled by carrot and stick, rather than enfranchised citizens who can make claims on, and demand accountability of, the state. In this sense, notwithstanding its dominant role vis-à-vis the rest of Pakistan’s regions, Punjab has its own peripheral regions and populations too. Consider small farmers and the huge landless population in villages, or katchi abadi dwellers in big cities.

At play is a model of colonial statecraft.

The centre-periphery story is also about colonial-style extraction. Take the example of natural gas, which is supplied to many homes and industries in mainland Pakistan by Sui Northern or Sui Southern. This prized resource has been extracted from the small town of Sui in Dera Bugti since the 1950s, but it still remains largely deprived of its share of the benefits to this day. Dera Bugti, in fact, remains amongst the poorest district in the whole country.

This is not an isolated example, the story now extending to huge mineral deposits like copper and gold, as well as marine resources in coastal regions. The most war-torn parts of KP also boast all manner of resources that continue to be eyed if not yet extracted. There are also invaluable flows like water which rely on the glaciers of GB and culminate in the deltas of coastal Sindh.

Notwithstanding recent hyperbole about the supposedly large subsidies that the state lavishes on regions like AJK, the broader point about extraction and value transfers from historical peripheries to centres holds when one considers invaluable resources like water; add to this the huge labour outflows from KP, GB and AJK and the absurd argument that they are a burden on the centre runs aground.

There are of course countervailing tendencies. The weak federal compact has redressed power and resource imbalances to a limited extent. Some commentators actually argue against the 18th Amendment on the grounds that it has empowered ‘provincial’ elites whilst worsening the already poor state of public service delivery. I have already noted that the state really only caters to the rich and powerful, including in Punjab. It is hardly a surprise that one constitutional amendment has not redressed the larger colonial, classed logic of power.

Some peripheral populations have experienced social mobility on account of migration to metropolitan centres. An obvious example would be Pakhtun trading communities in urban Sindh and Punjab. But this does not offset the immiseration of the many more Pakhtun migrants who experience dispossession even in the big city, let alone those who are butchered in unending strategic games in the rural hinterland.

And then there is the story of what contemporary ‘dev­el­opment’ actually entails in the hinterland. The building of roads, ports and dams may have benefited some locals, but ultimately has not changed the underlying logic of extraction, whilst also destroying fragile ecologies. Tourism has also been called a ‘game-changer’ but this betrays real fears about outsiders taking control over local resources whilst transforming environmental landscapes.

Much has changed in Pakistan over the past eight decades, and the peripheries that existed in 1947 have not remained static. Many peripheral populations now live far away from their historical abodes, developmental patterns have evolved, and geographies have been transformed.

But the state continues to visit coercion on anyone who demands economic, cultural and political freedoms, especially those in historical peripheries. The key to dismantling the colonial social contract is to recognise the interlocking interests of peripheral populations everywhere, including Punjab. The militarised state apparatus would much rather carry on, as its predecessor did, by dividing and ruling.

The writer teaches at Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad.

Published in Dawn, July 17th, 2026 ...