Egalitarian-equivalent and strategy-proof mechanisms in homogeneous multi-object allocation problems

We study the problem of allocating homogeneous indivisible objects among agents with money.

In particular, we investigate the relationship between egalitarian-equivalence (Pazner and Schmeidler, 1978), as a fairness concept, and efficiency under agents' incentive constraints.

As a first result, we characterize the class of mechanisms that satisfy egalitarian-equivalence, strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and no subsidy.

Our characterization reveals a strong tension between egalitarian-equivalence and efficiency: under these properties, objects are allocated only in limited cases.

To address this limitation, we replace strategy-proofness with the weaker incentive property non-obvious manipulability (Troyan and Morrill, 2020).

We show that this relaxation allows us to design mechanisms that achieve efficiency while still ensuring egalitarian-equivalence.

Furthermore, under efficiency, we identify the agent-welfare-optimal mechanism in the characterized class.