Balochistan security crisis

THE latest surge of violence in Balochistan has once again compelled Pakistan’s civil and military leadership to reaffirm its resolve to eliminate terrorism. During a high-level visit to Quetta following a series of deadly attacks, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Field Marshal Asim Munir, during a provincial apex committee meeting, declared that the country’s political and military leadership had reached a “mutual and singular decision” to eradicate terrorism.

While the apex committee was meeting in Quetta to discuss the implementation of the National Action Plan, another, less visible process involving the local community was unfolding only a short distance away. In the Hanna Urak area, a jirga of local elders was engaged in direct negotiations with an armed group that had abducted several citizens. Apparently, the elders secured the hostages’ release without any visible involvement of the district administration or provincial government. The abductors reportedly claimed affiliation with the banned TTP, although their identity and motivations could not be conclusively established.

One is uncertain about what impact the resolve shown by the civil and military leadership vis-à-vis the volatile security situation will have in the province. However, it is clear that the growing gap between the state and the civilians is making Balochistan’s security landscape more complicated. Not only have a variety of Baloch insurgent groups become hyperactive, but the TTP and even the IS have found space and have started terrorist activities, as seen in the assassination of two Christian cricketers in Mastung. The criminal threat has become particularly critical, especially in the province’s urban areas.

However, no substantial change has been witnessed in the state’s policy in the last few years. Whenever the level of violence decreases, the government claims victory over terrorism. But when violence increases, it puts all the blame on external factors.

It does not require a special lens to see how violent actors are surviving and thriving. Baloch insurgent groups have repeatedly demonstrated an ability to adjust their operational tempo to strategic requirements, temporarily reducing activity before resuming attacks with greater intensity. Consequently, a single month of lower incident numbers should not be interpreted as evidence that the conflict is diminishing. Instead, it may reflect a period of tactical recalibration on the part of these groups.

The state must revisit its security policies in the volatile province.

The data from the last few weeks suggests that the insurgency remains geographically dispersed, operationally flexible, and strategically deliberate. Although the total number of attacks declined, 17 incidents across 13 districts indicate that insurgent groups retain the capacity to operate simultaneously across a wide and challenging geographical area. In June, the banned Balochistan Liberation Army alone conducted attacks in nine districts, demonstrating sustained operational reach rather than a contraction of its activities. This month, the BLA launched an assault on Chagai district and destroyed public as well as several private properties.

The group is increasingly focusing on launching assault operations, but it also continues to carry out operations that can be classified as revenge attacks, especially on the anniversaries of Baloch nationalist and insurgent leaders. The recent attack in Khuzdar, particularly targeting Shafiq Mengal, currently affiliated with the PPP and previously accused of heading a militia operating against the insurgents, is a case in point. The Majeed Brigade’s attack on his residence was said to be an act of revenge.

One of the most notable developments witnessed during the last few weeks is the BLA’s activity in Qilla Abdullah and Pishin — border districts with predominantly Pakhtun populations that have historically experienced violence associated with the TTP rather than Baloch nationalist insurgents. The group’s attacks on police posts, the seizure of weapons and destruction of security infrastructure represent a significant expansion beyond its traditional areas of operation. While it remains unclear whether this reflects opportunistic exploitation of security forces already strained by the TTP threat or a deliberate effort to broaden its operational presence, insurgent movements that successfully expand into new geographic areas generally demonstrate growing confidence and organisational capability rather than decline.

The selection of targets also reflects a consistent strategic logic. Attacks against commercial and industrial assets, including the destruction of gas tankers on the Pakistan-Iran highway, the killing of a water tanker driver supplying the state-owned Oil and Gas Development Company, the abduction of another driver, and the assassination of a construction contractor, appear intended to increase the economic costs of operating in Balochistan. Such actions reinforce insurgent narratives portraying economic activity as the exploitation of Baloch resources, while discouraging external investment.

Similarly, the bombing of two bridges on national highways disrupted transportation infrastructure and imposed additional economic and logistical costs. The attack on a 220-kV electricity transmission line in Dera Murad Jamali further expanded this pattern by targeting critical energy infrastructure. Beyond the immediate disruption to electricity supply, such attacks also undermine public confidence in the state’s ability to provide essential services and maintain security.

Afghanistan holds a central role in the ongoing wave of violence in Balochistan and KP. Afghanistan provoked tensions in June by carrying out drone attacks inside Balochistan, forcing Pakistan to retaliate with strikes against TTP hideouts and safe havens along the Pak-Afghan border, killing several terrorists and destroying key infrastructure, including training facilities, command centres, and ammunition depots.

Pakistan also issued demarches to Afghanistan after investigators concluded that Afghan nationals were involved in the terrorist attack on a Pakistan Rangers camp in Karachi on June 27. However, Afghanistan should not be used as an excuse for the failure of security policies, which are not working well in either Balochistan or KP. There may be a need to look deeper into these policies.

The writer is a security expert.

Published in Dawn, July 12th, 2026 ...