Product Returns and the Value of Search Prominence
Abstract
Ordered-search models typically make prominence valuable because the first-listed seller receives more traffic.
We show that product returns can overturn this logic by changing not only the volume but also the composition of demand.
We develop a duopoly model in which consumers inspect products sequentially, learn a coarse match signal through search, discover realized taste only after purchase, and may return the product.
With positive consumer hassle costs for product returns and a general taste distribution, optimal consumer behavior is characterized by pre-search inspection, post-search purchase, and retention cutoffs.
In a low-hassle, full-refund benchmark with uniformly distributed taste values, the non-prominent firm charges a higher price because consumers who reach it are screened by their experience with the prominent product.
Although prominence generates more visits and gross orders, it also exposes the first seller to less-screened, more return-prone demand.
When seller-side return losses are sufficiently large, the prominent firm can earn less than its rival while both firms earn positive profits.
The reversal also persists on local active pricing branches under small positive hassle costs, small departures from full refunds, and finite oligopoly.
Sellers' willingness to pay for prominence therefore depends on how a higher ranking changes both the profits from retained sales and the losses on returned units.