학술

Folk Theorems for Social Learning

arXiv Econ
CC BY
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Abstract

We study repeated games with purely informational externalities.

Each player observes a single conditionally independent signal and then repeatedly takes publicly observed actions to maximize their expected discounted payoff, which depends only on the state and their own action.

We show that, when there are sufficiently many players and they are sufficiently patient, there exist equilibria where information is aggregated: the players' payoffs approximate the full-information payoff.

This holds even if actions are uninformative under myopic play.

Conversely, even if myopic play reveals the state, there also exist equilibria where information is not aggregated: payoffs approximate those under autarky.

Our results speak to the range of possible outcomes of social learning games with forward-looking agents.

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