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Meet the ‘Nostradamus of AI’ who built a $20 billion hedge fund before turning 25

Leopold Aschenbrenner, a former OpenAI researcher with no professional investing experience, launched Situational Awareness in 2024.

Hacker News Front Page

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Show HN: DomainTasker – avoid losing domains and surprise renewals

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Business Insider

진보 성향

I left Salesforce in my 50s to start my own company. AI made it feel possible.

Gabrielle Tao left her Salesforce SVP job to launch an AI startup. She says advances in AI made entrepreneurship feel possible as a woman of color.

7 Ways New Engineers Can Flourish in the Age of AI

New graduates’ careers are unfolding in an era when AI is not optional. The most successful engineers treat artificial intelligence as leverage, not competition. Here are seven tips to help keep young professionals in demand no matter how quickly the field’s tools evolve. 1. Master the fundamentals first. AI tools can help you code, but you still need strong fundamentals in: Data structures and algorithms for problem-solving. Operating systems, databases, and networking for system-level understanding. Core programming languages such as C++, Java, and Python. AI can autocomplete syntax, but if you don’t understand how things work under the hood, you’re likely to struggle to debug or optimize. 2. Learn how to work with AI, not against it. The best engineers will not try to out-code AI. Instead, they will learn to: Write clear prompts to generate better code snippets. Review and debug AI-generated code for accuracy, performance, and security. Use AI for productivity boosts while still exercising judgment. Think of AI as a teammate. The real skill is knowing when to trust it and when not to. 3. Build projects that showcase end-to-end thinking. Employers increasingly look for engineers who can design and build systems, not just solve problems. Create projects that show you can: Define requirements clearly. Use AI tools responsibly within the workflow. Deliver a product that scales and is maintainable. 4. Sharpen your system design skills early. Even junior engineers are now asked questions about basic system design with AI. Expect to explain to prospective employers: How you would responsibly integrate AI into a system. How to design fallbacks when AI fails. How to ensure scalability and reliability. 5. Develop strong communication skills. Today’s engineers don’t just code in isolation. You will be expected to: Explain design choices to teammates and stakeholders. Document decisions clearly. Collaborate effectively in cross-functional teams. This is one area where AI cannot replace you. Clear communication is a career accelerant. 6. Stay curious and keep learning. The tech industry moves fast, and AI is accelerating that pace. Cultivate habits such as: Following industry news, blogs, and open-source projects. Experimenting with new AI tools, frameworks, and libraries. Engaging in communities such as GitHub, IEEE Collabratec, LinkedIn, and Medium. Employers value engineers who keep themselves sharp and relevant. 7. Think beyond coding. AI will increasingly handle routine coding tasks. The differentiators for you will be: Problem-framing: Can you take a vague idea and turn it into a solution? Architectural judgment: Can you design systems that scale and last? Ethical awareness: Can you spot risks in AI use and address them responsibly? For more career advice, subscribe to the IEEE Spectrum Career Alert Newsletter. The biweekly newsletter features the latest information on jobs, education, management, and the engineering workplace.

What It Takes for Future-Ready Power Distribution

This sponsored article is brought to you by Black & Veatch. The biggest challenge facing utilities today isn’t what it seems. It’s not demand, even as load growth accelerates. It’s not extreme weather, even as “major events” become routine. It’s not cybersecurity, even as connections expand across the grid. The real challenge is this: Distribution systems were designed for a different reality. Long gone are the days of predictable demand, one-way power flow and isolated disruptions. At Black & Veatch, we see that leading utilities are no longer debating whether to modernize. They’re deciding how quickly they can do it, and how to do it at scale. Across grid modernization programs globally, three truths consistently emerge. They define what it takes to prepare the distribution system for what’s next: 1. Outage response is not a resilience strategy Resilience is being redefined in real time. A strategy centered on mobilizing crews and restoring service as quickly as possible is reactive, and increasingly insufficient. Resilience has to shift upstream into integrated system design. That starts with hardening. Stronger poles, undergrounding and structural upgrades all have a role, particularly in high-risk corridors. We’re also seeing meaningful gains from how the network is configured and how quickly it can respond without waiting on manual intervention. This is where distribution automation programs can change outcomes. Strategically placed reclosers, automated switches and fault indicators help contain disruptions before they spread. When combined with feeder reconfiguration and updated protection strategies, distribution automation investments allow utilities to set more aggressive recovery targets and achieve measurable reductions in outage duration and customer impact. 2. Future-readiness depends on DERs at scale Forecasting is less and less reliable. Only 19 percent of utilities report strong confidence in their ability to predict future load growth, according to the Black & Veatch 2025 Electric Report. Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) like solar, storage, EVs and behind-the-meter generation are exciting solutions; but they fundamentally change how the system operates. Power is no longer just delivered. It’s injected, stored and redirected in ways the system was never designed to manage. At scale, these challenges show up quickly — particularly on feeders where distributed generation is approaching or exceeding hosting capacity. Protection coordination becomes more difficult when fault current comes from multiple directions. Voltage becomes less predictable as generation fluctuates throughout the day. And planning models must now account for highly variable, location-specific behavior. Distribution modernization is fundamentally changing how the system is designed and operated so it can absorb disruption, manage bi-directional flows and respond in real time. Adapting to bi-directional power flow requires more than incremental updates. Leading utilities are responding by building flexibility into the system, moving beyond static assumptions toward dynamic hosting capacity and interconnection studies, planning that incorporates DER, EV adoption and localized load growth, and infrastructure aligned with the communications and control needed to manage it. 3. The edge must be intelligent, visible and secure As system stress and complexity increase, utilities need far greater visibility and control over the network. Historically, utilities relied on customer calls, Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) at the substation level and field crews to understand what was happening on the system. That model doesn’t hold up. You can’t effectively manage a system you can’t see. Plus, the most critical events are increasingly happening beyond the substation — on feeders, laterals, and at the edge where DER and customer behavior are interacting with the grid. Grid-edge technologies have become essential. Sensors, Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) and automated switching provide the raw data and control needed to move from reactive to proactive operations. In more advanced deployments, utilities are creating centralized control environments that allow operators to see and manage the distribution system in near real time. That capability is enabled by: Advanced communications networks to form the backbone of real-time grid visibility Distribution Management System (DMS) and Outage Management System (OMS) to enable faster, more coordinated system response Analytics, AI and machine learning to improve situational awareness, anticipate system conditions, and support operational decision-making The same connectivity enabling this real-time visibility and control also introduces new vulnerabilities, blurring the line between physical and cyber risk, yet many utilities manage them separately. Only 22 percent have unified teams in place, even as threats continue to rise, including a 50 percent increase in substation attacks and growing exposure to malware and ransomware, according to the Black & Veatch 2025 Electric Report. Cybersecurity and resilient network design must be embedded into the architecture from the outset—not layered on after the fact. See what bolder vision looks like Distribution modernization is fundamentally changing how the system is designed and operated so it can absorb disruption, manage bi-directional flows and respond in real time. To learn about a successful program, check out Georgia Power’s recent grid modernization program. Black & Veatch partnered with the utility on large-scale infrastructure upgrades. The results? Outages are down 76 percent, restoration times have improved by more than 80 percent and communities across Georgia are powered by a grid built to meet the future head-on. When the state faced the most destructive storm in the company’s history, Hurricane Helene, Georgia Power deployed a rapid response team that utilized its “smart grid” and restored power to more than 1 million customers within days. A grid built to meet the future head-on—that’s the result of bolder vision.

The Verge

Microsoft’s first advanced reasoning AI is here

Microsoft announced a bunch of new in-house AI models at Build 2026, including a new "flagship" model: MAI-Thinking-1. It's an ambitious step into model development for Microsoft, which introduced its initial in-house models last year - before then, it had relied on OpenAI's models. The two companies recently renegotiated their deal to loosen ties. According […]

Ars Technica

Why cats prefer silver vine to catnip and other May highlights

Prehistoric mining in the Pyrenees, a new species of tiny blue octopus, slapstick acoustics, and more.

Why Sardinians Are Fighting the Renewable Energy Transition

“Not in my backyard” is the rallying cry of citizens everywhere resisting projects proposed for their locality. Whether it’s affordable housing, a waste treatment plant, or a new data center, they may recognize the benefit of the activity. They just don’t want it near them. And the roots of that resistance differ from place to place. When it comes to the ongoing transition from fossil fuels to renewables, companies and policymakers need to know where, exactly, people are coming from. The Italian island of Sardinia is a textbook example. As IEEE Spectrum’s power and energy editor Emily Waltz discovered when she traveled there last October, Sardinian opposition to wind and solar projects runs deep. It spurred a quarter of the voting population to queue up in public squares in 2024 to sign a petition banning all construction of renewable energy. Waltz was surprised. She went there to see a promising new grid-scale energy storage system that uses domes inflated with carbon dioxide. While reporting on that project, she interviewed residents, engineers, activists, and professors about their attitudes toward climate change and the Italian government’s grand plans for renewable energy on the island. And Waltz soon learned of Sardinians’ profound antipathy toward renewable energy and its deep ties to a history of invasion, occupation, and exploitation stretching back 2,700 years. It started with the Phoenicians and then extended through the Romans, the Byzantines, and the Iberians. Sardinia was absorbed into a newly unified Italy in 1861, and it became an autonomous region of Italy in 1948. The island’s population is justifiably suspicious of outsiders, including the Italian government. “When you’re in Sardinia, the weight of history—you can feel it like in the air,” Waltz told me. “And it gets passed down from one generation to the next.” Now, Italy needs Sardinia to produce even more power to meet the country’s climate goals—something that Sardinians see as Rome’s problem, not theirs. “Sardinia already exports about 30 percent of its electricity. It’s not like they need more,” Waltz says. “So it’s hard to make the case to build, build, build.” The result of Waltz’s old-fashioned shoe leather reporting is this month’s cover story. She notes that the Sardinians she talked to aren’t climate-change deniers, and they don’t object to renewables per se. They just don’t like the way corporations and Italian policymakers are trying to plug into Sardinia like it’s one giant battery rather than the home of an ancient and proud people. “I think Sardinians would be more receptive to renewable projects if it was more of a ground-up, grassroots approach,” Waltz says. Indeed, this homegrown approach is already working in some places in Sardinia. She knows of more than 50 projects, called energy communities, where the residents are deploying renewables themselves. The idea also holds promise for other places struggling to get locals to buy into the renewable-energy transition. The Sardinian experience is both a cautionary tale and a blueprint. Ignore the weight of history that communities carry and your project risks failure. Meet the people where they are and you might just get somewhere. The same lesson applies whether you’re in Sulawesi or sub-Saharan Africa. You just have to show up to learn it.

New York Post

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Hollywood power player predicts AI recreation of ‘I Love Lucy’

Depending on who you talk to, AI is either the future, a cheap parlor trick or the death of creativity as we know it. But at this week’s “AI on the Lot” conference, up and coming filmmakers, developers and wanna-be showbiz entrepreneurs were all banking that AI will be their on-ramp into an insular business....

Fortune

A little-known semiconductor company just won an entrepreneur contest that previously honored Jensen Huang and Michael Dell

Also: All the news and watercooler chat from Fortune.

Hacker News Front Page

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Ask HN: Entrepreneurs, how long did it take you to succeed?

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Finding Success in Industry as a Chip Designer

I have been an application-specific IC (ASIC) designer for almost three decades. Over that time, I’ve moved through the full academic trajectory, from graduate student to full professor; later, I transitioned to industry after an unsuccessful stint at entrepreneurship. When I made the switch to the private sector in 2019, I began focusing on a critically important aspect of the electronic industry: silicon intellectual property. As much as 80 percent of the physical area in today’s most advanced chips is occupied by blocks that aren’t made for specific products or even designed by the consumer-facing companies that built them. Instead, chipmakers draw heavily on established silicon IP from companies like Arm, Cadence, Rambus, Synopsys, and the company I work for, Silicon Creations. Throughout my career, I’ve designed chips for very different purposes, including enabling the research program in my academic lab and expanding the IP portfolio of my company. When I joined Silicon Creations, I had no idea how differently the industry approaches IC design and encountered a steep learning curve. Initially, it seemed that much of my two decades of academic research and training did not directly translate to the role. I had to learn new skills and adopt a new mindset. Today, demand for ASICs is rapidly growing, driven by the need for specialized chips in the automotive sector, AI applications, and more. By one market estimate, the ASIC market is expected to grow from US $23.4 billion to $38.8 billion by 2033, and the semiconductor industry as a whole is projected to hit $1 trillion by 2030. The industry needs more chip designers—but if you’re coming from an academic background as I did, there are a few things you’ll need to know. Different goals lead to different strategies The differences between industry and academe begin with a divergence in purpose. In academia, my primary objective was to generate new knowledge: to propose a novel circuit technique, validate an unconventional architecture, or explore the limits of performance in a given domain. A successful chip is one that demonstrates a concept. In industry, it is not nearly enough to prove that something can work. The goal is to ensure that it works reliably, repeatedly, and at scale. Success is measured not by novelty but by whether the silicon meets specifications, yields as expected in production, and supports a competitive product delivered on schedule. This leads to a stark contrast in risk tolerance. Academic designs often deliberately push into unproven territory, where even partial success can yield valuable insight. In industry, however, we systematically minimize risk. The cost of failure makes first-time silicon success a central requirement—especially at advanced technology nodes, where the lithography masks used to transfer circuit designs onto silicon wafers alone can cost tens of millions of dollars. As a result, industry design flows are built around eliminating uncertainty through conservative margins, extensive validation, and careful reuse of proven solutions. “Academia explores the design space, asking what is possible, while industry exploits it, determining what is viable at scale.” This paradigm has existed since the 1970s, when application-specific chip design was established. However, the gulf between academia and industry has expanded since the mid-2010s, when FinFET technology, a 3D architecture using vertical “fins” of silicon, was widely adopted in industry. System designs are also becoming increasingly modular with the advent of chiplets. This fundamentally altered the economics and complexity of ASIC development, with design costs rising by almost an order of magnitude. Initiatives like Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co.’s University FinFET Program and new government-funded chip-design hubs now let some well-resourced universities design for more advanced architectures, but the technology is still out of reach for many academics. What the industry-academia split means in practice Consider a startup developing an ASIC. Its engineering team may have deep expertise in a particular algorithm, sensor interface, or system architecture, the features that define its competitive advantage. But it is unlikely to possess world-class expertise in every supporting function. Developing each of these blocks internally would require significant time, capital, and specialized talent. Doing so could delay market entry beyond the startup’s viability. Even large semiconductor companies face similar constraints. Advanced-node development demands intense focus. Allocating a team to redesign a standard interface block that has already been implemented elsewhere may be difficult to justify when differentiation lies at the system level, such as an inference chip’s ability to speed up neural network computations. The time it takes to move a new chip from conception to market and risk mitigation, not self-sufficiency, govern most decisions about in-house development versus outsourcing. The economics of advanced IC manufacturing reinforce this reality. When the development cost of a leading-edge chip reaches hundreds of millions of dollars, minimizing risk becomes a central design imperative. In this context, silicon IP emerged as a practical solution. Similar to how software developers rely on preexisting libraries rather than writing every function from scratch, ASIC designers license predesigned, preverified silicon blocks—such as processor cores, memory interfaces, and security engines—from highly specialized IP vendors. These blocks can then be integrated into larger, increasingly complex systems. Design scope, verification, and time horizons With the use of silicon IP, industry is able to widen the scope of its designs. Academic efforts tend to focus on block-level innovation: a new analog-to-digital converter architecture or an ultralow-noise amplifier, for instance. These designs typically abstract away many of the complexities of bringing a chip to market, such as packaging constraints, long-term reliability, and manufacturing yield. In industry, the focus shifts to system-level integration. Modern systems on chips, or SoCs, incorporate dozens or even hundreds of functional blocks. Managing signal integrity, timing, firmware interaction, and system-level validation becomes as critical as the design of any individual block. Verification philosophy also diverges sharply. In academia, the goal of verification is to demonstrate that the concept works under nominal conditions, which may not always reflect how it would perform in real applications. Even if only a fraction of fabricated chips from a multiproject wafer operates correctly, the design may still be considered a success if it validates the underlying idea. At my academic lab for instance, we used to receive 40 chips from a TSMC prototyping service and started testing them in batches of five. If the first five or 10 chips proved functional, we had already collected more than enough data for a publication. If some of them failed, we weren’t required to mention this when publishing the results. In industry, verification is exhaustive, critical, and often dominates the development schedule. Failures are measured in parts per million, and even rare anomalies are carefully analyzed and documented to identify root causes and prevent recurrence. When I started at Silicon Creations, I was surprised by the level of detail and scrutiny designs face. Differences in time horizons and economic constraints reinforce each of these contrasts. Academic projects operate on flexible timelines aligned with research and funding cycles. If I missed a deadline, I just had to wait for the next cycle. Industry projects are driven by fixed product schedules and market windows, frequently targeting costly leading-edge nodes to achieve competitive performance, power, and area efficiency. Missing a deadline can negate the value of an entire design and may have major financial consequences along the entire supply chain. In essence, academia explores the design space, asking what is possible, while industry exploits it, determining what is viable at scale. Both are indispensable, but they operate under fundamentally different definitions of success. As ASIC complexity continues to grow, understanding both perspectives will be essential for the next generation of engineers navigating the evolving semiconductor landscape. This article appears in the June 2026 print issue.

Forbes Business

Meet The Doctor-Turned-Entrepreneur Using AI To Save Lives

Aengus Tran traded medical practice to build AI software that delivers quick and accurate diagnoses of X-rays and scans. Now, the 32-year-old CEO of Sydney-based Harrison.ai and a 30 Under 30 Asia alum, is targeting America’s overstretched healthcare system.

South Africa Has AI Leverage. Its Draft Policy Leaves It Unused

This article is adapted by the author with permission from Tech Policy Press. Read the original article. South Africa is not just another developing country struggling to govern artificial intelligence; it is the exception with leverage, and the window to act on it is closing. It holds approximately 88 percent of global platinum-group metal reserves, critical inputs to parts of the semiconductor and data-center supply chains that make AI infrastructure possible. It hosts the largest data-center market on the continent. Its existing hyperscaler relationships give it procurement leverage that most African states will never have. And a major geopolitical contest over AI infrastructure is being fought on its soil right now, between Chinese and American technology companies competing for control of the systems that will underpin an entire continent’s public sector. In physics, leverage requires three things: a fulcrum, a lever arm, and the ability to apply force. The Bushveld Complex, the world’s largest platinum-group metal deposit, is the fulcrum: a mineral endowment that gives South Africa a position in the semiconductor supply chain that no other African state holds. The since-withdrawn draft policy is the lever arm. The unresolved “OPTION” provisions in the policy are where force would be applied. Without a policy that specifies what South Africa wants in return for market access, the lever arm sits unused, and the weight of two of the world’s largest technology ecosystems settles exactly where those ecosystems want it to settle. This makes South Africa a global test case. Not because its proposed means of governance is exemplary, but because it is the one developing country with enough structural leverage to negotiate genuinely different terms, and the one that is choosing, through inaction, not to. The recent announcement of a new panel to update the draft policy is an important opportunity. But the deeper failure is not that an AI policy contained bad references. It is that no verification process caught them before the document entered the public domain. That is a systems problem, not merely a political one. It points to a missing layer in how governments are adopting AI. The contest already underway Last year, Huawei pitched an emerging-product bundle to tech executives across the continent. Huawei was now bundling access to DeepSeek’s large language model with its own cloud and storage infrastructure. The price differential was stark—in some cases by more than 90 percent. At the same time, Microsoft announced plans to spend ZAR 5.4 billion ($300 million) by the end of 2027 on cloud and AI infrastructure in South Africa, building on a prior ZAR 20.4 billion investment. Google, Amazon Web Services, and Oracle already have cloud regions in the country. According to one analysis, the country’s data-center market was valued at US $2.16 billion in 2024, the largest in Africa. These are not commercially neutral investments. Huawei’s infrastructure reach has been explicitly linked to Chinese strategic objectives, including a documented track record of providing governments with surveillance infrastructure through its Safe Cities network. U.S. hyperscaler investment comes with its own dependency structure: closed models, pricing set unilaterally, and terms of access that no African government has meaningfully shaped. South Africa is being asked to choose between these dependency models without a policy that specifies what it wants in return. The leverage it has There is a particular irony in South Africa’s position. The country whose mines supply platinum-group metals essential to semiconductor manufacturing, and through them to AI compute, has drafted a policy that treats it as a consumer of AI systems rather than a stakeholder in their governance. South Africa digs up the minerals that make AI possible. It has no say over the AI built from them. The AI triad framework covers algorithms, compute, and data. South Africa has no frontier model development capacity. South Africa holds significant data assets in financial services, health care, and agriculture, with no clear framework for their sovereign management. South Africa possesses PGM (Platinum Group Metals) leverage of global significance on the compute axis, currently being transferred without meaningful condition. It also has exceptionally high solar irradiance and significant renewable-energy potential. A country that can offer both critical mineral inputs and the energy to power the infrastructure those minerals help build occupies a negotiating position of unusual strength. The Draft Policy proposes no minimum terms for hyperscaler investment, no data sovereignty requirements, no technology transfer conditions and no compute visibility mechanism. Multiple provisions are explicitly left unresolved, marked “OPTION,” including the most consequential choices about how governance will function. Infrastructure decisions made now determine what is renegotiable later, and the answer is: very little. Three futures, one default The three infrastructure futures on offer each create a structurally different form of dependency, and only one creates sovereign capability. The Huawei-hosted DeepSeek integration offers low cost and open-source weights, but with data stored on infrastructure potentially accessible under Chinese legal frameworks, creating surveillance dependency in a pattern already documented across Africa. The second is U.S. closed-model dependency: higher capability, more reliable data protection, but complete API dependency on developers abroad. The third is locally hosted open-weight infrastructure: models governed under South African data-sovereignty rules, on infrastructure subject to minimum terms, developed with South African data. As Nathan Lambert at Interconnects has observed, open-weight models are likely the only realistic way to get sovereign AI off the ground as a real effort, enabling local communities and economies to integrate meaningfully with the technology. But this requires procurement conditions, not goodwill. What binding governance looks like The GovAI “Governing Through the Cloud” framework identifies four roles compute providers should accept as conditions of operating at scale: securers (protecting model weights and training data), record keepers (maintaining infrastructure usage logs), verifiers (confirming customer compliance with safety standards) and enforcers (restricting access when violations occur). These are operational requirements, not theoretical categories—specific, enforceable, and well within the bargaining power of a market of South Africa’s size and mineral position. A detailed policy analysis submitted to the Department of Communications and Digital Technologies (DCDT) identifies the specific provisions the final policy must contain: mandatory minimum terms for foreign compute infrastructure investments above ZAR 500 million (~$30 million); a compute reporting threshold; a National AI Safety Institute mandate covering defensive monitoring of AI capability accumulation; and National AI Champion Sector designations to create data assets for domestic model development. Each provision converts a structural advantage into a governance instrument before that advantage is foreclosed by market reality. Just as modern software security increasingly depends on knowing what components are inside a system—model provider, training data, compute environment, evaluation methods, update cadence, human review points, and failure-reporting procedures—public-sector AI governance requires a clear account of the stack before deployment, not after a problem surfaces. A public institution that cannot verify the sources in its own AI policy is unlikely to be ready to verify the AI systems it procures, deploys, or regulates. Why this is the continental test case South Africa’s choices will establish a regional precedent for what is commercially negotiable in AI infrastructure. If South Africa negotiates data-sovereignty guarantees and technology-transfer conditions as requirements for hyperscaler investment, it creates a replicable model. If Microsoft’s $300 million investment and Huawei’s infrastructure expansion proceed on standard commercial terms, as they are currently, it normalizes extractive AI infrastructure across the continent. The lesson is not specific to Africa. Governments everywhere are producing AI strategies while lacking AI assurance infrastructure. South Africa is an early warning, not an isolated case. The public comment period closed when the policy was withdrawn. But a parallel process remains live: the National Treasury’s Draft General Public Procurement Regulations—the legal instrument that will govern every government AI contract—closes for comment on June 15. Those regulations contain no AI-specific provisions. South Africa has more AI leverage than any country on the continent. Some argue, with force, that governance requirements risk deterring the infrastructure investment South Africa urgently needs: compute capacity, reliable energy, venture capital, and talent retention. That concern deserves a direct answer. Minimum procurement terms, compute reporting thresholds, and technology transfer conditions are not barriers to investment. They are the conditions under which investment serves the host country rather than extracting from it. Infrastructure built without minimum terms produces dependency. Infrastructure built with them produces leverage. To serve the public interest, its AI policy must use it. When late last month News24 reported AI-hallucinated references in the draft AI policy, Minister of Communications and Digital Technologies Solly Malatsi withdrew the draft policy. That was a mistake that could cost South Africa and the rest of the continent the initiative on this urgent issue. His more recent constitution of an independent panel is a belated step in the right direction, if it can turn South Africa’s leverage into policy. The panel—chaired by Professor Benjamin Rosman of the Wits Machine Intelligence and Neural Discovery Institute, and including Professors Vukosi Marivate and Alison Gillwald of Research ICT Africa and Dr. Jabu Mtsweni of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research—has the technical and governance credibility to produce a stronger document. What it has not yet produced is a timeline. No revised draft has been scheduled. South Africa remains without a formal AI governance framework in the interim.

TechCrunch

Universal Music Group and TikTok renew agreement to combat unauthorized AI music

For years, UMG has pushed platforms, streaming services, and AI companies to implement stricter content moderation policies.

What Makes a Job Dull, Dirty, or Dangerous?

For years, the field of robotics has used the terms “dull, dirty, and dangerous” (DDD) to describe the types of tasks or jobs where robots might be useful—by doing work that’s undesirable for people. A classic example of a DDD job is one of “repetitive physical labor on a steaming hot factory floor involving heavy machinery that threatens life and limb.” But determining which human activities fit into these categories is not as straightforward as it seems. What exactly is a “dull” task, and who makes that assumption? Is “dirty” work just about needing to wash your hands afterwards, or is there also an aspect of social stigma? What data can we rely on to classify jobs as “dangerous?” Our recent work (which was not dull at all) tackles these questions and proposes a framework to help roboticists understand the job context for our technology. First, we did an empirical analysis of robotics publications between 1980 and 2024 that mention DDD and found that only 2.7 percent define DDD and only 8.7 percent provide examples of tasks or jobs. The definitions vary, and many of the examples aren’t particularly specific (for example, “industrial manufacturing,” “home care”). Next, we reviewed the social science literature in anthropology, economics, political science, psychology, and sociology to develop better definitions for “dull,” “dirty,” and “dangerous” work. Again, while it might seem intuitive which tasks to put into these buckets, it turns out that there are some underlying social, economic, and cultural factors that matter. Dangerous Work: Occupations or tasks that result in injury or risk of harm It’s possible to measure the danger of a task or job by using reported information. There are administrative records and surveys that provide numbers on occupational injury rates and hazardous risk factors. While that seems straightforward, it’s important to understand how this data was collected, reported, and verified. First, occupational injuries tend to be underreported, with some studies estimating up to 70 percent of cases missing in administrative databases. Second, injuries and risk factors are rarely disaggregated by characteristics like gender, migration status, formal/informal employment, and work activities. For example, because most personal protective equipment—such as masks, vests, and gloves—are sized for men, women in dangerous work environments face increased safety risks. These caveats are an opportunity for robotics to be helpful. If we went out and looked for it, we could probably find some less obviously dangerous work where robotics might be an important intervention, not to mention some groups that are disproportionately affected and would benefit from more workplace safety. Dirty Work: Occupations or tasks that are physically, socially, or morally tainted Colloquially, most people might think of dirty work as involving physical dirtiness, such as trash removal, cleaning, or dealing with hazardous substances. But social science literature makes clear that dirty work is also about stigma. Socially tainted jobs are often servile or involve interacting with stigmatized groups (for example, correctional officers), and morally tainted jobs include tasks that people commonly perceive as sinful, deceptive, or otherwise defying norms of civility (like a stripper or a collection agent). “Dirty work” is a social construct that can vary across time (like tattoo industry stigma in the United States) and culture (such as nursing in the U.S. versus in Bangladesh). One way to measure whether work is “dirty” is by using the closely related concept of occupational prestige, captured through quantitative surveys where people rank jobs. Another way to measure it is through qualitative data, like ethnographies and interviews. Similar to “dangerous,” we see some hidden opportunities for robotics in “dirty” work. But one of our more interesting takeaways from the data is that a lower-ranked job can be something that the workers themselves enjoy or find immense pride and meaning in. If we care about what tasks are truly undesirable, understanding this worker perspective is important. Dull Work: Occupations or tasks that are repetitive and lacking in autonomy When it comes to defining dull work, what matters most is workers’ own experiences. Outsiders can make a lot of false assumptions about what tasks have value and meaning. Sometimes things that seem boring or routine create the right conditions for developing skills and competence, such as the concentration needed for woodworking, or for socializing and support, when tasks are done alongside others. Instead of assuming that repetitive work is negative, it’s important to examine qualitative data on how people experience the work and what purpose it serves for them. DDD: An actionable framework In our paper, we propose a framework to help the robotics community explore how automation impacts individual jobs. For each term—dull, dirty, and dangerous—the framework gathers key pieces of information to reflect on what physical or social aspects of the task are, in fact, DDD. Worker perspective is an important part of all three considerations. The framework also emphasizes awareness of context—meaning the physical and social environment of an occupation and industry that can influence the DDD nature of a task. Our corresponding worksheet suggests existing data sources to draw on and encourages us to seek out multiple perspectives and consider potential sources of bias in the information. What makes tasks dull, dirty, or dangerous depends on the perspective of the humans doing those tasks.RAI Let’s take, for example, the waste and recycling industry. The world generates over 2 billion tonnes of waste annually, and this figure is expected to rise to nearly 4 billion tonnes by 2050. Intuitively, trash collection seems like a job that hits all the Ds. Going through our worksheet, we confirm that globally, workers in this industry face significant health hazards (dangerous), and waste collection is ranked as a low-status job (dirty), although interestingly, many workers take pride in providing this essential service. The job is also repetitive, but there are aspects that make it not dull. Specifically, workers cite the day-to-day interaction with their coworkers (which includes extensive insider vocabulary, work hacks, and mutual aid groups) and task variety as two of the most enjoyable aspects of the job. Task variety includes inspecting their vehicle and equipment, driving their truck, coordinating with crew members, lifting bins and bags, detecting incorrect sorting of waste, and unloading at the end destination. This finding matters because some types of robotic solutions will eliminate the parts of the job that workers most appreciate. For instance, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) recommends the adoption of automated side loader trucks and collision avoidance systems. This innovation increases safety, which is great, but it also results in a sole worker operating a joystick in a cab, surrounded by sensor and camera surveillance. Instead, we should challenge ourselves to think of solutions that make jobs safer without making them terrible in a different way. To do this, we need to understand all aspects of what makes a job dull, dirty, or dangerous (or not). Our framework aims to facilitate this understanding. Finally, it’s important to note that DDD is only one of many possible approaches to classify what work might be better served by robots. There are lots of ways we could think about which types of tasks or jobs to automate (for example, economic impact or environmental sustainability). Given the popularity of DDD in robotics, we chose this common phrase as a starting point. We would love to see more work in this space, whether it’s data collection on DDD itself or the creation of other frameworks. At RAI, we believe that the fusion of robotics and social sciences opens a whole new world of information, perspectives, opportunities, and value. It fosters a culture of curiosity and mutual learning, and allows us to create actionable tools for anyone in robotics who cares about societal impact. Dull, Dirty, Dangerous: Understanding the Past, Present, and Future of a Key Motivation for Robotics, by Nozomi Nakajima, Pedro Reynolds-Cuéllar, Caitrin Lynch, and Kate Darling from the RAI Institute, was presented at the 21st ACM/IEEE International Conference on Human-Robot Interaction (HRI) in Edinburgh, Scotland.